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Introduction to the Research 
The plight of the Rohingya people in Myanmar has been documented in manifold reports 
alleging escalating atrocities.1 Accompanying these allegations were mounting calls for an 
international investigation under the auspices of the United Nations. After several years of 
diplomatic wrangling, in 2017 the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) decided to establish “an 
independent international fact-finding mission… to establish the facts and circumstances of 
the alleged recent human rights violations by military and security forces, and abuses, in 
Myanmar, in particular in Rakhine State… with a view to ensuring full accountability for 
perpetrators and justice for victims”. 2  Myanmar opposed this decision and barred 
commissioners’ entry to its territory. In March 2018, the Independent International Fact-
finding Mission on Myanmar (the Myanmar Commission) informed the HRC that the 
information it had collected from outside Myanmar “points at human rights violations of the 
most serious kind, in all likelihood amounting to crimes under international law” and “should 
spur action”. 3  The HRC renewed its mandate, stressing the need to ensure that those 
responsible for crimes were held to account and acknowledging the authority of UN Security 
Council “to refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court.”4 In April 
2018, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) requested that the ICC rule on 
whether it “can exercise jurisdiction over the alleged deportation of the Rohingya people from 
Myanmar to Bangladesh”,5 citing human rights reports and the statement of the Myanmar 
Commission.6 Should this question be answered in the affirmative, the actions of Myanmar’s 
security forces and other individuals may be in the spotlight at the ICC.  
This narrative gives rise to many questions. Why did the HRC favour non-binding inquiry to 
respond to the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State? How did the Myanmar Commission carry 
out its mandate, in view of Myanmar’s refusal to cooperate? What is the significance of 
framing the mandate by reference to international law and accountability? What are the 
practical and normative implications of the Commission’s findings of violations? How does 
the Commission relate to actors in the international justice space, such as the ICC? Where 
does it fit in broader contexts of international law and global politics? 
The Myanmar Commission is not an isolated occurrence. The UN has established more than 
thirty such inquiries into situations of atrocities, termed in this thesis as ‘UN atrocity 
                                                 
1  See, e.g., the numerous reports cited in ICC Prosecutor, ‘Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction 
under Article 19(3) of the Statute’, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-1, 9 April 2018, para. 7, available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-1 (accessed 1 May 2018) [OTP 
Jurisdiction Request]. 
2  HRC Res. 34/22, 24 March 2017 [Myanmar Mandate]. 
3  ‘Statement by Mr. Marzuki Darusman, Chairperson of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on 
Myanmar, at the 37th session of the Human Rights Council’, 12 March 2018, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=22798&LangID=E (accessed 1 
May 2018) [Myanmar Statement]. 
4  HRC Res. 37/32, 23 March 2018, para. 8.  
5  OTP Jurisdiction Request, supra note 1, para. 1. 
6  Ibid., footnotes 6 and 23, citing Myanmar Statement, supra note 3.  
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inquiries’ and referred to as ‘commissions’. 7  There are several legal dimensions to 
commissions’ work. These bodies are often tasked with establishing the facts of atrocities, 
classifying them as legal violations and identifying legal responsibilities. Serving in their 
personal capacity, commissioners often have international legal expertise. Commissions’ legal 
analysis has attracted a great deal of attention in international legal discourse. They have even 
been described in scholarship as a new form of adjudication. Yet commissions remain non-
legal in key ways. Most mandating authorities are political bodies of the UN, so there are 
often political dimensions to commissions’ establishment. Lacking coercive information-
gathering powers, commissions depend on state cooperation. Their reports have no direct 
legal effect and are not intended to replicate or substitute judicial proceedings. Commissions’ 
recommendations may address political as well as legal actors and processes. Straddling 
domains of international law and politics, the identity of UN atrocity inquiries in the 
international legal order remains blurred.  
This research explores UN atrocity inquiries’ turn to international law and their navigation of 
considerations of principle (the legal) and pragmatism (the political), to discern their identity 
in the international legal order. Section 1 of this introductory chapter sets out the research aim, 
research question and sub-questions guiding each chapter. Section 2 delineates UN atrocity 
inquiries as the subjects of research, distinct from other fact-finding activities and bodies. 
Section 3 presents the thesis structure and methodology, including the research approaches 
adopted to answer each sub-question and the sources drawn upon in conducting research. 
Section 4 summarises strands of existing research into international fact-finding and inquiry 
and articulates the original contribution of this thesis to academic knowledge. 
1. Research Aim and Question 
This Section presents the research aim, research question, and sub-questions guiding each 
chapter. While commissions turn to international law in their practice, their findings are non-
legal in the sense of not being binding, and they are established by, and report to, actors 
operating in the international political space. In this setting, the research aim is:  
The concept of ‘identity’ may encompass many dimensions. To focus and concretise the 
research aim, this thesis zooms in on two elements: functional identity (functions) and 
relational identity (roles). Functional identity refers to the broad ends to be attained by UN 
atrocity inquiries, such as informing policy, deescalating tensions, raising alert, giving a voice 
to victims, and promoting accountability. Relational identity refers to commissions’ place vis-
à-vis other institutions. It evokes the idea of their playing a role in a system alongside other 
actors, including international criminal tribunals, UN political organs, human rights bodies, 
and transitional justice actors. The interrelationship of roles and functions is multifaceted. 
Where certain roles are highlighted, this has a bearing on a commission’s functions, and vice 
versa. Moreover, different permutations of roles and functions can be envisaged in different 
                                                 
7  Bodies classified as UN atrocity inquiries are listed in the Appendix. 




situations and institutional settings. Thus, this thesis does not take a schematic approach to 
commissions’ roles and functions, as this would oversimplify at the cost of nuance. Instead, 
these concepts are utilised to illuminate the unique institutional space in which commissions 
are situated. 
In determining the identity of UN atrocity inquiries in the international legal order, this thesis 
interrogates their turn to international law, termed ‘juridification’,8 and their navigation of 
considerations of principle and pragmatism. The term ‘principle’ refers to norms and values 
and is associated with the realm of law, while ‘pragmatism’ invokes utility and practical 
realities, and is associated with politics. These terms are not strictly oppositional; instead they 
are employed to illustrate how commissions navigate between the legal and the political in 
different settings and from different perspectives. These concepts also illustrate certain 
tensions. A strongly principled approach might boost a commission’s impartiality and lend an 
air of legal authority but render its work less effective in practice. Conversely, a pragmatic 
approach might encourage state cooperation and promote policy-based goals but take a toll on 
commissions’ independence. These concepts inform the discussion of roles and functions.  
The main research question is:  
This research question entails conceptualisation of commissions’ roles and functions, analysis 
of how those roles and functions informed inquiry practice, and an evaluation of 
commissions’ place in the international legal order more generally, utilising the key concepts 
discussed above.  
The main research question is divided into six sub-questions which are addressed in six 
Chapters. They trace the lifecycle of UN atrocity inquiries from establishment, interpretation 
and implementation of the mandate, legal analysis, and production of findings and 
recommendations. The sub-questions are: 
1. How have inquiries into situations of atrocities become part of UN practice, 
from historical and institutional perspectives? 
2. How do mandating authorities shape UN atrocity inquiries’ roles and 
functions?  
3. How do commissions’ roles and functions inform their mandate interpretation 
and implementation? 
                                                 
8  E.g., Gordon Silverstein, Law's Allure: How Law Shapes, Constrains, Saves, and Kills Politics (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2009) at 5 and Anne-Mette Magnussen and Anna Banasiak, ‘Juridification: Disrupting the Relationship 
between Law and Politics?’, 19 European Law Journal (2013) 325-339, at 326. Terms such as 
‘judicialization’, ‘formalization’ or ‘legalization’ might alternatively be used, but carry other connotations: 
e.g., Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Judicialization and the Construction of Governance’, (1999) 32 Comparative 
Political Studies 147-184; Benedict Kingsbury, ‘International Courts: Uneven Judicialization in Global 
Order’, in James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi (eds), Cambridge Companion to International Law 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2012) 202-228 and Kenneth Abbott, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie 
Slaughter and Duncan Snidal, ‘The Concept of Legalization’, (2000) 54(3) International Organization 401-
419 [Abbott et al].  
How have the roles and functions of UN atrocity inquiries informed their turn to 





4. How do commissions’ roles and functions inform the identification of the 
international legal framework applicable to their mandates? 
5. How are commissions’ interpretations and applications of substantive 
international law shaped by their roles and functions? 
6. How do commissions’ approaches to questions of responsibility and 
accountability reflect their roles and functions? 
By interrogating commissions’ roles and functions at different moments and from different 
perspectives, these sub-questions permit a contextualised analysis of commissions’ relational 
and functional identities in the international legal order. Before setting out the research 
structure and methodology, it is necessary to delineate UN atrocity inquiries as the subjects 
of research, distinct from other fact-finding actors and activities.  
2. Delineation of UN Atrocity Inquiries 
This Section delineates UN atrocity inquiries as the focus of research. Bodies classified as UN 
atrocity inquiries are international commissions of inquiry (2.1) established by the UN (2.2) in 
respect of situations of atrocities (2.3). Recourse to commissions’ substantive characteristics 
is necessary because identification is not always possible solely on the basis of their official 
titles. This is partly due to their inconsistent nomenclature. While some commissions were 
titled ‘commission of inquiry’,9 others were named ‘panel of experts’, ‘fact-finding mission’, 
or ‘commission of experts’.10 Moreover, the UN conducts other fact-finding activities distinct 
from inquiry. Identifying UN atrocity inquiries by their substantive characteristics and 
delineating them from other fact-finding activities and entities generates some institutional 
and normative consistency in a heterogeneous fact-finding universe. 
2.1  International Commissions of Inquiry  
While international commissions of inquiry may be established by different actors for 
different purposes, several characteristics are held in common. These institutions are 
established on the international legal plane (2.1.1), conduct ad hoc fact-finding (2.1.2), are 
impartial and independent (2.1.3) and issue non-binding reports (2.1.4). 
2.1.1 International legal plane 
International commissions of inquiry are established on the international legal plane. They 
may be established by ad hoc agreement between states, pursuant to treaty regimes, or by 
international organisations. The Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes 1899 provides that states may facilitate the peaceful resolution of international 
disputes by establishing an inquiry. 11  These ‘Hague-type’ inquiries are often mentioned 
alongside mediation and conciliation as ‘diplomatic’ methods of dispute settlement, in 
                                                 
9  E.g., Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [Syria Commission] and 
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [North Korea 
Commission]. 
10  E.g., Commission of Experts established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) [Yugoslavia 
Commission] and United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict [Goldstone Commission]. 




contrast with ‘adjudicative’ mechanisms.12 The former are seen as diplomatic “because the 
parties (ostensibly) retain control of the dispute and may accept or reject a proposed 
settlement.”13 Their diplomatic nature is underscored by the centrality of state consent to their 
establishment, composition and procedures. International inquiries may also be established by 
international organisations,14 including regional organisations. Such inquiries are linked to 
organisations’ functions and powers. They often have other international characteristics, such 
as being geographically diverse in composition and having regard to the international legal 
framework. 
By contrast, ‘domestic’ inquiries are established under the law of a particular state15 and may 
have coercive powers, depending on the legal system.16 Some domestic inquiries with certain 
international dimensions might be considered ‘internationalised’. An historic example is an 
inquiry established by Liberia at the instigation of the United States, which examined whether 
slavery existed in Liberia as defined in the Anti-Slavery Convention.17 Inquiries in Bahrain18 
and Kyrgyzstan 19  also examined violations of international law and were composed of 
international legal experts.20 This thesis classifies such inquiries as domestic, as they remained 
embedded in domestic jurisdictions. International inquiry should also be distinguished from 
fact-finding by civil society21 and private initiatives to investigate international crimes.22  
                                                 
12  J. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (6th ed, Cambridge: CUP, 2017) at ix and Lucy Reed, 
‘Observations on the Relationship between Diplomatic and Judicial Means of Dispute Settlement’, in 
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Marcelo Kohen and Jorge Viñuales (eds), Diplomatic and Judicial Means 
of Dispute Settlement (Leiden: Brill, 2012) 291-305, at 291. 
13  Reed, supra, at 291. 
14  The following definition of ‘international organisation’ is adopted: “an organization established by a treaty or 
other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own international legal personality”: 
International Law Commission (ILC), Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, 
GA Res. 66/100, 9 December 2011, Annex [DARIO]. 
15  E.g., Commission of Inquiry to Investigate the Massacre of Prisoners 1988 (Peru); Commission of Inquiry to 
Locate the Persons Disappeared during the Panchayat Period 1990 (Nepal) and National Commission on 
Political Imprisonment and Torture 2003 (Chile). 
16  E.g., Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) s. 2 (Australia). 
17  US Department of State, ‘Liberia: Appointment of the International Commission of Inquiry into the 
Existence of Slavery and Forced Labor in the Republic of Liberia’, in Papers Relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States, Vol. III, 274-329 and US Department of State, ‘The 1930 Enquiry 
Commission to Liberia’, (1931) 30 Journal of the Royal African Society 277-290. Commissioners were 
appointed by the League of Nations, the US and Liberia. 
18  Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 10 December 2011, available at 
http://www.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf (accessed 1 May 2018), established by Royal Order No. 28 of 2011 
(Bahrain), Art. 9. 
19  Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in southern Kyrgyzstan in 
June 2010, 2011, available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_490.pdf 
(accessed 1 May 2018). 
20  Cecilie Hellestveit, ‘International Fact-Finding Mechanisms: Lighting Candles or Cursing Darkness?’, in 
Cecilia Bailliet and Kjetil Larsen (eds), Promoting Peace Through International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2015) 
368-394, at 370.  
21  E.g., The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford: OUP, 2000); Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and 
Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 1914, available at http://archive.org/details/reportofinternat00inteuoft (accessed 
1 May 2018) and David Weissbrodt and James McCarthy, ‘Fact-Finding by International Nongovernmental 
Human Rights Organisations’, (1982) 22 Va J Int'l L 1-89.  
22  E.g., War Crimes Committee of the International Bar Association and Hogan Lovells, Inquiry on Crimes 




2.1.2 Ad hoc fact-finding body  
International commissions of inquiry are essentially concerned with finding facts.23 While the 
concept of ‘objective truth’ may be epistemologically queried, commissions’ narratives can 
elucidate facts and challenge other versions of events. Such narratives are not isolated from 
broader political contexts and struggles.24 There is no uniform definition of ‘fact-finding’; 
definitions tend to be crafted in light of the activities intended to be captured.25 For instance, 
Rob Grace and Claude Bruderlein differentiate ‘fact-finding’ from ‘monitoring’ and 
‘reporting’ and distinguish different strategies towards situations of concern.26 They define 
fact-finding as “a corrective strategy” involving “in-depth examination of specific incidents in 
order to establish evidence of responsibility” with the primary goal to “determine the most 
effective route for ensuring accountability”.27 As this definition excludes bodies not oriented 
towards accountability, it seems to depart from the everyday meaning of the term. This thesis 
adopts the broader definition proposed by Théo Boutruche: “a ‘method of ascertaining facts’ 
through the evaluation and compilation of various information sources”.28  
A few UN atrocity inquiries wrote that they did not carry out ‘fact-finding’, adopting a narrow 
view of this concept. For instance, the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Sri Lanka 
(Sri Lanka Panel) wrote that it had not conducted fact-finding “as it does not reach factual 
conclusions regarding disputed facts, nor did it carry out a formal investigation that draws 
conclusions regarding legal liability”. 29  The Human Rights Commission on South Sudan 
(South Sudan Commission) initially decided that it “did not have the mandate or resources to 
carry out investigations or fact-finding,”30 but later accepted that it was a fact-finding body.31 
                                                                                                                                                         
(accessed 1 May 2018); Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, ‘Collect and Preserve Documentation’, 
available at http://syriaaccountability.org/what-we-do (accessed 1 May 2018) and ‘Statement by William 
Wiley Executive Director, Commission for International Justice and Accountability at the Subcommittee on 
International Human Rights’, 22 November 2016, available at 
http://openparliament.ca/committees/international-human-rights/42-1/33/william-wiley-1/only (accessed 1 
May 2018). 
23  First Hague Convention, supra note 11, Art. 9. 
24  E.g., Hellestveit, supra note 20, at 391 and Laurie Blank, ‘Investigations into Military Operations: What 
Impact on Transitional Justice?’ 47(1) (2014) Isr L Rev 85-104. 
25  E.g., Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of International 
Peace and Security, GA Res. 46/59, 9 December 1991, Art. 2 [1991 Declaration] and Stephen Wilkinson, 
‘“Finding the Facts” Standards of Proof and Information Handling in Monitoring, Reporting and Fact-
Finding Missions’, HPCR Policy Paper, February 2014, at 11, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2400927 
(accessed 1 May 2018) [Wilkinson 2014].  
26  Rob Grace and Claude Bruderlein, ‘Building Effective Monitoring, Reporting and Fact-Finding 
Mechanisms’, HPCR Draft Working Paper, April 2012, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2038854 
(accessed 1 May 2018). 
27  Ibid., at 12-13.  
28  Théo Boutruche, ‘Credible Fact-Finding and Allegations of International Humanitarian Law Violations: 
Challenges in Theory and Practice’, (2011) 16(1) J Conflict & Sec L 105-140, at 106 (footnote omitted), 
citing Karl Josef Partsch, ‘Fact-Finding and Inquiry’, in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1992) 343. 
29  Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, 31 March 2011, para. 7, 
available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf (accessed 1 May 2018) 
[Sri Lanka Report]. 
30  Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, UN Doc. A/HRC/34/63, 6 March 2017, para. 9 
[South Sudan First Report]. 
31  Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, UN Doc. A/HRC/37/CRP.2, 23 February 2018, 
para. 11 explained that a standard of proof was adopted “[c]onsistent with the practice of other United 
Nations fact-finding bodies” [South Sudan Second Report]. 
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This Study classifies both as UN atrocity inquiries because their mandates and activities were 
substantively similar to commissions self-identifying as fact-finding bodies.32 
Commissions’ establishment, mandates and working methods are largely ad hoc. A 
commission is established upon a decision of its mandating authority and dissolves after 
presenting its report.33 Fact-finding guidelines provide that the mandate must identify the 
investigative focus but permit adaptation when circumstances change.34 As written mandates 
are usually brief, commissions must interpret them. This practice has given rise to questions 
as to the bounds of mandate interpretation. 35  There are few fixed rules of procedure; 
commissions’ working methods are generally set by the mandating authority or by 
commissions themselves.36 This characteristic enables the tailoring of mandates to different 
situations. A lack of standardised working methods has been criticized as damaging the 
veracity of findings and reduced methodological rigour. 37  Some common standards are 
emerging in the UN context.38 
International commissions of inquiry should be distinguished from other ad hoc fact-finding 
in respect of situations of atrocities. While commissions may have a truth-seeking function,39 
they are distinguishable from ‘truth commissions’, defined by Pricilla Hayner as:40 
(1) focused on past, rather than ongoing, events; (2) investigates a pattern of events that 
took place over a period of time; (3) engages directly and broadly with the affected 
population, gathering information on their experiences; (4) is a temporary body, with 
the aim of concluding with a final report; and (5) is officially authorized or empowered 
by the state under review.  
                                                 
32  Sri Lanka Report, supra note 29, paras. 5, 9 and 51; South Sudan First Report, supra note 30, paras. 10-12, 
compared with Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, UN Doc. S/2005/60, 1 February 
2005, para. 3 [Darfur Report]; Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights 
in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP.1, 7 February 2014, paras. 67-68 
[North Korea Report]; Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic, UN Doc. A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, 23 November 2011, para. 5 [Syria First Report] and Report of the 
International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African Republic, UN Doc. S/2014/928, 22 December 
2014, para. 16 [CAR Report]. 
33  Most initiatives to create permanent international inquiry commissions were unsuccessful: Arthur Lenk, 
‘Fact-Finding as a Peace Negotiation Tool – The Mitchell Report and Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process’, 
(2002) 24 Loy LA Int'l & Comp L Rev 289-325, at 292. An exception is the International Fact-Finding 
Commission, established by Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, Art. 90 [Additional 
Protocol I].  
34  M. Cherif Bassiouni and Christina Abraham (eds), Siracusa Guidelines for International, Regional and 
National Fact-Finding Bodies (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2013), Guideline 3 [Siracusa Guidelines]. 
35  See Chapter Three, Section 1. 
36  E.g., First Hague Convention, supra note 11, Arts. 10 and 17.  
37  Juan Mendez, ‘Commissions of Inquiry: Lessons Learned and Good Practices’, (2012) 54(2) Politorbis 47-
53.  
38  See Chapter Three, Section 4. 
39  Report of the International Commission of Inquiry Mandated to Establish the Facts and Circumstances of the 
Events of 28 September 2009 in Guinea, UN Doc. S/2009/693, 18 December 2009, para. 275 [Guinea 
Report]; Final Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 
(1992), UN Doc. S/1994/674, 27 May 1994, para. 320 [Yugoslavia Final Report]. 
40  Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions (2nd ed, 
New York: Routledge, 2011) at 11-12. 
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Truth commissions are also usually based in domestic legal systems 41  and may exercise 
coercive powers.42 By contrast, international commissions of inquiry are non-binding and not 
designed to comprehensively address grievances. Some commissions recommended the 
establishment of a truth commission as a follow-up measure.43  
Commissions are also distinct from special procedures mandates administered by the HRC, 
which are “independent human rights experts with mandates to report and advise on human 
rights from a thematic or country-specific perspective.” 44  As these mandate holders are 
independent experts who examine human rights situations of concern, they bear similarities 
with commissions. Indeed, they may be sequenced with UN atrocity inquiries, being 
established beforehand 45  or after an inquiry. 46  Whereas an inquiry examines a specific 
situation and dissolves after presenting its report,47 special procedures mandates may continue 
for several years. 48  In addition, special rapporteurs are individual appointments, whereas 
commissions are always a collective. Establishing a commission may signal an escalation in 
response.  
2.1.3 Impartiality and independence 
The necessity of impartiality is articulated in different inquiry contexts.49 ‘Impartiality’ may 
be defined as “equal treatment of all rivals or disputants” and “not prejudiced towards or 
against any particular side”.50 Impartiality may also be understood as the ability “to abstract 
him/herself from his prior opinions, to reduce oneself to one’s function, to identify in oneself 
what are sources of bias”. 51  Independence refers to a lack of ties or dependence upon 
interested actors, and its emphasis differs across contexts. The Hague tradition emphasises the 
inclusion of a neutral element rather than full independence from states, which participated in 
appointing commissioners.52 By contrast, commissioners serving on almost all modern UN 
                                                 
41  An exception is the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, which was administered by the UN. 
42  E.g., Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa.  
43  E.g., Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Events Connected with the March Planned for 25 March 
2004 in Abidjan, UN Doc. S/2004/384, 13 May 2004, para. 90(d) [Abidjan Report]. 
44 OHCHR, ‘Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council’, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Introduction.aspx (accessed 1 May 2018). 
45  E.g., Special Rapporteur on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, established by UNCHR Res. 
2004/13, 15 April 2004. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Marzuki Darusman, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/57, 1 February 2013, para. 
7. 
46  E.g., Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, Chair of the Syria Commission, was appointed as Special Rapporteur of that 
situation, to commence after the Commission’s mandate had terminated: HRC Res. S-18/1, 2 December 
2011. 
47  An exception is the Syria Commission, established by HRC Res. S-17/1, 22 August 2011 [Syria Mandate], 
whose mandate has since been extended several times. 
48  E.g., Special Rapporteur on Cambodia, established by UNCHR Res. 1993/6, 19 February 1993 and Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention, established by UNCHR Res. 1991/42, 5 March 1991. 
49  First Hague Convention, supra note 11, Art. 9; 1991 Declaration, supra note 25, Art. 3 and OHCHR 
Guidance and Practice, supra note 63, at 33. 
50  Collins English Dictionary, ‘Impartial’, available at 
http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/impartial (accessed 1 May 2018). 
51  Frédéric Mégret, ‘International Judges and Experts’ Impartiality and the Problem of Past Declarations’, 
(2011) 10 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 31-66, at 44 [Mégret 2011]. 




atrocity inquiries must have “a proven record of independence and impartiality”,53 act in their 
personal capacity and not be instructed by governments or other actors.54  
The element of independence distinguishes UN atrocity inquiries from fact-finding led by the 
UN Secretariat such as fact-finding missions by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR),55 ‘mapping exercises’,56 and a joint OPCW-UN investigation into 
chemical weapons in Syria. 57  This is a key distinction, as their tasks bear similarities: 
commissions may “map” 58  violations, while OHCHR ‘mapping exercises’ also examine 
issues of accountability. 59  While OHCHR provides support staff to some commissions, 
commissioners are external experts and remain independent of “all extraneous influences”.60 
2.1.4 Non-binding report 
Inquiry reports are in principle non-binding. Their findings and recommendations lack direct 
legal effect.61 While the recommendatory function is not found in all inquiry contexts,62 it is a 
standard feature of UN atrocity inquiries.63 This feature distinguishes inquiry from arbitration, 
judicial settlement, and compensation commissions authorized to enter binding awards.64 
                                                 
53  OHCHR Guidance and Practice, supra note 63, at 19. 
54  Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat 
impunity, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 2005, Principle 7 [Principles Against Impunity]. An 
exception is the Palmer Commission, discussed in Chapter Two, Section 5. 
55  E.g., OHCHR Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic to Investigate Alleged Violations of International Human 
Rights Law, HRC Res. S-16/1, 29 April 2011. Some OHCHR missions recommended that investigations be 
continued by an independent inquiry, e.g., Report of the United Nations Independent Investigation on 
Burundi, UN Doc. A/HRC/33/37, 20 September 2016, para. 156. 
56  OHCHR, ‘Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-conflict States: Prosecution Initiatives’, UN Doc. HR/PUB/06/4, 
2006, at 6, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/RuleoflawProsecutionsen.pdf 
(accessed 1 May 2018). E.g., ‘Terms of Reference’, para. 2, in OHCHR, Report of the Mapping Exercise 
documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed 
within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, August 
2010, Annex III, at 542 [DRC Mapping Report]; OHCHR, Nepal Conflict Report, October 2012, at 28, 
available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/RuleoflawProsecutionsen.pdf (accessed 1 May 
2018). 
57  SC Res. 2235 (2015); Seventh report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United 
Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, UN Doc. S/2017/904, 26 October 2017, para. 3.  
58  HRC Res. 21/26, 28 September 2012, para. 18 (Syria Commission). 
59  E.g., DRC Mapping Report, supra note 56, Executive Summary, paras. 7-8. See Rob Grace, ‘From Design to 
Implementation: The Interpretation of Fact-finding Mandates’, (2015) 20(1) J Conflict & Sec L 27-60, at 38-
39 [Grace 2015]. 
60  Michael Kirby and Sandeep Gopalan, ‘Recalcitrant States and International Law: The Role of the UN 
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’, (2015) 
37(1) U Pa J Int'l L 229-294, at 239.  
61  First Hague Convention, supra note 11, Art. 35. Exceptions are the Steamship Tiger Inquiry 
(Germany/Spain), 1918: P. Hamilton et al (eds), The Permanent Court of Arbitration: International 
Arbitration and Dispute Resolution (The Hague: Kluwer Law, 1999) at 307 [Hamilton et al] and inquiry 
under the Bryan/Knox treaties. 
62  First Hague Convention, supra note 11, Art. 14; Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes 1907, Art. 35 [Second Hague Convention] and 1991 Declaration, supra note 25, Art. 17. 
63  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Commissions of Inquiry and 
Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Right and Humanitarian Law: Guidance and Practice, UN 
Doc. HR/PUB/14/7 (2015) at 11 [OHCHR Guidance and Practice], available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/CoI_Guidance_and_Practice.pdf (accessed 1 May 2018). 
64  E.g., Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission, Agreement between the State of Eritrea and the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2000, Art. 5 and UN Compensation Commission, SC Res. 687 (1991). 
10 
 
While an inquiry report is not binding, it may be important that it be published.65 Some 
mandating resolutions require reports to be public.66 In UN practice, only one inquiry report 
remains confidential.67 This requirement is less emphatic in the interstate dispute resolution 
context, which allows for confidential reports.68  
Commissions generally do not have coercive powers and rely on states’ cooperation to gather 
information. They cannot compel document production or the appearance of witnesses, nor 
enter territories without states’ consent. Exceptional are inquiries established by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII, triggering the obligation of UN member states to carry out its 
decisions. 69  Where an inquiry is established under the Hague Conventions, there is an 
obligation to cooperate;70 however, their existence is contingent upon state consent.  
2.2 Established by the United Nations  
This research focuses upon inquiries established by the UN in pursuit of its unique principles 
and purposes. Relevant mandating authorities are the Security Council, General Assembly, 
Secretary-General, and HRC.71 This focus permits an analysis of the UN context, including 
the institutional features of UN mandating authorities; dynamics among these authorities and 
UN member states; and wider political factors at play, in light of the UN’s central role in 
international affairs.  
The focus on the UN indicates that other atrocity inquiry contexts are beyond the scope of 
research, such as inquiries established jointly by states and by other international and regional 
organisations. While there is more limited practice in this regard, UN practice may yet be 
viewed as part of a broader tradition of atrocity inquiries. This historical and institutional 
context is elaborated upon in Chapter One. Another context excluded from the ambit of 
research is inquiry to resolve international disputes pursuant to the Hague Conventions and 
certain other treaties. 72  Five such inquiries were established in practice, all centring on 
international maritime incidents.73 Larissa van den Herik observes that each departed from the 
                                                 
65  OHCHR Guidance and Practice, supra note 63, at 92; Siracusa Guidelines, supra note 34, Guideline 13.9; 
Principles Against Impunity, supra note 54, Principle 13 and Catherine Harwood and Carsten Stahn, 
‘Principle 13. Publicizing the Commission’s Reports’, in Frank Haldemann and Thomas Unger (eds), The 
United Nations Principles to Combat Impunity: A Commentary (Oxford: OUP, 2018) 152-159. 
66  E.g., Syria Mandate, supra note 47, para. 14. 
67  Rapport de la Commission d’enquête internationale sur les allégations de violations des droits de l’homme 
en Côte d’Ivoire, 25 May 2004, available at 
http://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Rapport_de_la_Commission_d%E2%80%99enqu%C3%AAte_internationale_su
r_les_all%C3%A9gations_de_violations_des_droits_de_l%E2%80%99homme_en_C%C3%B4te_d%E2%80
%99Ivoire (accessed 1 May 2018) [SC Côte d’Ivoire Report]. 
68  Second Hague Convention, supra note 62, Arts. 17 and 34; Permanent Court of Arbitration, Optional Rules 
for Fact-finding Commissions of Inquiry 1997, Art. 10 [PCA Optional Rules]. 
69  Charter of the United Nations 1945, 1 UNTS 16, Arts. 25 and 48 [UN Charter]. 
70  E.g., First Hague Convention, supra note 11, Art. 12 and Second Hague Convention, supra note 62, Art. 23.  
71  Powers and functions of UN mandating authorities are discussed in Chapter Two, Section 1.1. 
72  John Noyes, ‘William Howard Taft and the Taft Arbitration Treaties’, (2011) 56 Vill L Rev 535-558; 
Treaties for the Advancement of Peace between the United States and Other Powers Negotiated by the 
Honorable William J Bryan, Secretary of State of the United States, (New York: OUP, 1920). 
73  Dogger Bank Inquiry (UK/Russia) 1904, established by St. Petersburg Declaration 1904 [Dogger Bank 
Mandate]; Tavignano Inquiry (France/Italy) 1912, established by Convention of Inquiry in the Tavignano, 
Camouna and Gaulois cases between France and Italy 1912; Steamship Tiger Inquiry (Germany/Spain) 1918, 
in Hamilton et al, supra note 61, at 307; Tubantia Inquiry (Germany/Netherlands) 1921, established by 
Convention of Inquiry between Germany and the Netherlands 1921 and Red Crusader Inquiry (UK/Denmark) 
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Hague model in some way; some inquiry reports were treated as binding or involved vital 
state interests.74  The so-called Bryan treaties were implemented just once in the Letelier 
inquiry.75 Inquiry remains at states’ disposal as a means of dispute resolution,76 with some 
scholars proposing that inquiry be utilised to examine contemporary matters likely to cause a 
rupture, such as the cause of the crash of civilian aircraft MH17 and the South China Sea 
dispute.77 
Inquiries established pursuant to specialised international regimes are also excluded from the 
scope of research. Such regimes include investigations of transboundary harms,78 uses of 
chemical weapons,79 and serious cross-border aircraft accidents;80 and disputes regarding non-
navigational uses of international watercourses.81 These inquiries tend to be composed of 
technical or scientific experts. The International Labour Organization (ILO) also has a unique 
procedure whereby alleged violations of ILO-administered treaties may be investigated, and 
non-implementation of a commission’s recommendations may be met with sanctions.82  
2.3 Focus on Situations of Atrocities 
Having narrowed the scope of research to the UN context, there is also a limitation in respect 
of the investigative focus of inquiry, namely to situations of atrocities. Such situations are 
governed by three key fields of international law: international human rights law (IHRL), 
international humanitarian law (IHL) in armed conflict, and international criminal law (ICL). 
It does not require that commissions expressly qualify atrocities as violations, but rather 
leaves this open to permit a broad examination of whether and how commissions engage with 
international law. This common legal framework enables comparisons to be drawn among the 
mandates, operations and reports of UN atrocity inquiries. 
This limitation excludes UN inquiries into violations of sovereign rights, such as Security 
Council inquiries into violations of Greece’s borders,83 the “mercenary aggression” of the 
                                                                                                                                                         
1961, established by Exchange of Notes between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the Kingdom of Denmark 1961. 
74  Larissa van den Herik, ‘An Inquiry into the Role of Commissions of Inquiry in International Law: Navigating 
the Tensions between Fact-Finding and Application of International Law’, (2014) 13 Chinese J Int'l L 1-30, 
at 8, referring to the Steamship Tiger Commission and the Dogger Bank Inquiry, respectively. 
75  Treaty for the Settlement of Disputes That May Occur between the United States of America and Chile 1914 
(Bryan-Suarez Mujica Treaty) and Compromis to the Agreement between the United States and Chile 1990. 
76  UN Charter, Art. 33. See GA Res. 2329 (XXII), 18 December 1967. 
77  Jan Lemnitzer, ‘International Commissions of Inquiry and the North Sea Incident: A Model for a MH17 
Tribunal?’, (2016) 27(4) EJIL 923-944 and Ryan Mitchell, ‘An International Commission of Inquiry for the 
South China Sea?: Defining the Law of Sovereignty to Determine the Chance for Peace’, (2016) 49 Vand J 
Transnat'l L 749-818.  
78  Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context 1991, 1989 UNTS 309, Art. 
3(7); Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents 1992, 2105 UNTS 457, Art. 4(2). 
79  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
and on their Destruction 1992, 1974 UNTS 45, Arts. IX and X.  
80  Convention on International Civil Aviation 1944, 15 UNTS 295, Art. 26.  
81  Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses 1997, GA Res. 51/229, 21 
May 1997, Art. 33. 
82  Constitution of the International Labour Organisation 1919, TS 874, Arts. 26, 32 and 33. E.g., Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry appointed under article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour 
Organization to examine the observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29).  




Seychelles 84  and damage to Angola from South Africa’s invasion. 85  The research also 
excludes inquiries into discrete incidents such as attacks against peacekeepers 86  and 
assassinations.87 The two UN inquiries concerning the Israeli interception of a flotilla bound 
for Gaza88  are included in this Study, as both inquiries examined events in the broader 
humanitarian context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
3. Thesis Structure and Methodology  
Having delineated UN atrocity inquiries as the research subjects, this Section presents the 
structure of the thesis and the methodology. Section 3.1 outlines the structure of each chapter 
and the research approaches adopted when answering the sub-questions guiding each chapter. 
Section 3.2 discusses the primary and secondary sources utilized in conducting the research.  
3.1 Structure and Research Approaches  
While this research centrally concerns the international legal order, it extends beyond the 
classic doctrinal question: ‘what is the law?’ In determining commissions’ roles and 
functions, the research has descriptive, comparative, conceptual, legal, and critical elements. It 
describes and compares commissions’ institutional settings, operations, and practices. It 
conceptualises their roles and functions. The analysis of how commissions interpreted legal 
norms calls for doctrinal legal research into those norms. When querying whether elements of 
inquiry practice maintain the status quo of power relations and structures, the research has a 
critical character.  
Chapter One asks: how have inquiries into situations of atrocities become part of UN practice, 
from a historical and institutional perspective? It contextualises UN atrocity inquiry practice 
by providing a historical and institutional taxonomy of inquiries into atrocities established on 
the international legal plane. This overview locates UN atrocity inquiries within a broader 
inquiry tradition and allows comparisons and linkages to be drawn across contexts. It 
describes different commissions established into situations of atrocities and conducts a 
comparative analysis of commissions’ mandates and institutional settings.  
Chapter Two asks: how do mandating authorities shape UN atrocity inquiries’ roles and 
functions? This Chapter explores how UN mandating authorities act as ‘architects’ by 
sketching out commissions’ aesthetics and conceptual plans through their mandates. It 
describes and compares mandating authorities’ institutional contexts, functions, and powers. 
The scope of these powers is identified through doctrinal research into principles of 
international institutional law. The Chapter examines the investigative focus and operational 
aspects of written mandates and issues of selectivity arising therefrom. The Chapter concludes 
                                                 
84  Commission of Inquiry in connection with the Republic of the Seychelles, SC Res. 496 (1981) [Seychelles 
Mandate].  
85  Security Council Commission on Angola, SC Res. 571 (1985) [Angola Mandate]. 
86  Commission of Inquiry concerning Somalia, SC Res. 885 (1993) [Somalia Mandate]. 
87  UN Commission of Inquiry on the Circumstances of the Death of Mr. Lumumba, GA Res. 1601 (XV), 15 
April 1961; Commission of Investigation into the Conditions and Circumstances Resulting in the Tragic 
Death of Mr. Dag Hammarskjold and Members of the Party Accompanying Him, GA Res. 1628 (XVI), 26 
October 1961; UN Commission of Inquiry into the Benazir Bhutto Assassination, UN Doc. S/2009/67, 3 
February 2009 [Bhutto Mandate] and UN International Independent Investigation Commission, SC Res. 1595 
(2005) [UNIIIC Mandate]. 
88  Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2010/9, 1 June 2010. 
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by discussing key issues arising out of mandating authorities’ choices which informed 
commissions’ roles and functions, and which reveal tensions between principled and 
pragmatic considerations. In appraising the political significance of mandating bodies’ 
decisions, this Chapter draws on perspectives from international relations and critical legal 
scholarship. 
If mandating authorities are the architects of UN atrocity inquiries, commissions are the 
‘engineers’. Chapter Three asks: how do commissions’ roles and functions inform the 
interpretation and implementation of their mandates? This Chapter describes and compares 
how commissions interpreted different dimensions of their mandates, including the 
geographic and temporal scope and the actors under scrutiny, to ensure that mandates were 
impartial and of appropriate scope. It then discusses key principles and practical challenges 
which informed commissions’ information-gathering and assessment, and initiatives taken by 
commissions to foster credible and reliable findings. This Chapter concludes by discussing 
how these different elements of inquiry practice were informed by commissions’ roles and 
functions. 
Chapter Four turns from fact-finding aspects of inquiry towards commissions’ embrace of 
international law. It asks: how do commissions’ roles and functions inform their identification 
of the international legal framework considered applicable to their mandates? This Chapter 
describes different approaches taken by commissions when identifying the applicable law. It 
then examines commissions’ reasoning for extending the applicable law beyond the legal 
fields in their written mandates. Next, the Chapter discusses commissions’ views of the 
applicability of IHRL, IHL and ICL to situations and actors under scrutiny. Commissions’ 
rationales are compared to ascertain similarities and differences in approach. It is argued that 
commissions have justified the inclusion of different legal fields by reference to their roles 
and functions. 
Chapter Five asks: how are commissions’ interpretations and applications of substantive 
international law shaped by their roles and functions? To focus the discussion, a thematic 
comparative analysis is conducted of commissions’ analysis of substantive legal issues, 
namely economic, social and cultural rights, IHL principles and their interaction with the right 
to life, sexual and gender-based violence, genocide, and crimes against humanity. These 
topics display the range of approaches taken by commissions and key challenges faced by 
them when legally appraising facts. It is queried whether commissions are well-placed to 
apply such norms considering their institutional architecture. The Chapter then discusses how 
several cross-cutting issues, namely commissions’ focus on incident-based violations, the 
level of certainty of findings of legal violations, and the rigour of their legal analysis, are 
informed by commissions’ roles and functions.  
In light of the recurrent emphasis on ‘accountability’ in inquiry mandates and reports, 
commissions’ practice with respect to accountability norms and institutions warrant a detailed 
examination. Chapter Six asks: how do commissions’ approaches to questions of 
responsibility and accountability reflect their roles and functions? It describes the extent to 
which commissions engaged with responsibility regimes for different actors, and the range of 
recommendations proposed for corrective action. Commissions’ recommendations are 
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critically assessed in view of their roles and functions, against the broader political and 
institutional backdrop. The Chapter concludes with a discussion of how commissions’ 
practice responds to different dimensions of accountability and interacts with the politics of 
accountability.  
The Conclusion draws these threads together to offer final reflections as to how commissions 
continuously navigate between realms of law and politics, with the equilibrium shifting in 
different moments and contexts. As such, commissions’ identity in the international legal 
order remains liminal, and encompasses choices and trade-offs between considerations of 
principle and pragmatism. Some final thoughts are then offered as to the future place of UN 
atrocity inquiries in the international legal order. 
3.2 Sources 
This research primarily utilised text-based documentary sources. Different primary and 
secondary sources shed light on institutional, legal and normative aspects of the research. 
When examining institutional features and settings of UN atrocity inquiries, primary sources 
of central importance were those produced by mandating authorities and commissions. 
Documents relevant to mandating authorities include the resolution or decision formally 
establishing the commission and its mandate; records of debates and voting results; statements 
by UN member states in explanation of their votes; and resolutions reacting to commissions’ 
reports and implementing recommendations. Relevant documents of UN atrocity inquiries 
include the final report, any interim reports, and other documents produced by them, such as 
terms of reference, press releases, information sheets and oral or periodic updates.89  
The research also examined other documents which illuminated the workings of the UN 
system and contextualised the practice of UN atrocity inquiries, such as reports of the 
Secretary-General, publications of OHCHR, and resolutions of the Security Council, General 
Assembly, HRC and the former Commission on Human Rights. A range of secondary sources 
also informed institutional components of the research. Scholarly works by former 
commissioners provided information in respect of the commissions on which they served, 
including mandate interpretation and implementation, operational challenges and perceptions 
of commissions’ roles and functions. Other scholarly accounts critiqued commissions’ 
institutional features and practices in a more general way. ‘Outsider perspectives’ in critical 
scholarship also informed the appraisal of UN atrocity inquiries’ roles and functions in the 
international legal order.  
Legal components of the research, which analysed how commissions identified, interpreted, 
and applied international law, required a close reading of inquiry reports as well as primary 
and secondary legal sources. Sources of international law, including treaties, international 
judicial decisions and expert restatements as evidence of custom were examined to identify 
the applicability and content of international legal norms. Secondary sources of relevance 
included general comments of treaty bodies and scholarly works. Scholarship that critically 
                                                 
89  E.g., ‘Questions and Answers on the commission of inquiry on human rights in Eritrea, Prepared for the oral 
update to the Human Rights Council, 16 March 2015’, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoIEritrea/CoIE_QuestionsAndAnswers.doc 
(accessed 1 May 2018) [Eritrea Q&A]. 
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analysed UN atrocity inquiries’ legal analysis was utilised in assessing commissions’ legal 
approaches.  
Finally, the research was informed by the author’s attendance at expert meetings where 
former commissioners and fact-finding practitioners shared experiences from practice,90 and 
from the author’s conversations with several individuals who worked within UN atrocity 
inquiries as commissioners or support staff. These sources indirectly informed the research, as 
they could not be cited directly. Most expert meetings were conducted under Chatham House 
Rules, and UN confidentiality obligations often also applied. Nonetheless, these meetings and 
conversations provided valuable insights from those with ‘on the ground’ knowledge and 
expertise and informed the author’s research and analysis.  
4. Contribution to Knowledge  
This Section explains how this thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge by 
mapping previous scholarly efforts and explaining how it builds on those endeavours to 
ascertain the identity of UN atrocity inquiries in the international legal order.  
Until recently, non-judicial fact-finding had not garnered much attention from international 
legal scholars. Only a few scholarly works on such topics were published in earlier decades.91 
In 2011, Philip Alston suggested that the proliferation and diversification of international fact-
finding rivalled that of international criminal courts and tribunals in terms of significance for 
human rights, but that “while the criminal courts and tribunals have generated a veritable 
industry and a vast literature, fact-finding has been largely neglected as an area for sustained 
exploration, critique, and refinement.”92 Leading academic institutions have since carried out 
research projects on fact-finding.93 Several edited volumes94 and other scholarly works have 
                                                 
90  ‘From Fact-finding to Evidence: Harmonizing Multiple Investigations of International Crimes’, The Hague 
Institute for Global Justice [THIGJ], The Hague, 26-27 October 2012; ‘Meeting of Experts on the 
Establishment of Principles and Best Practices for International and National Commissions of Inquiry’, 
International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, Siracusa, 14-17 March 2013; ‘Special Session: 
Harvard Group of Professionals on Monitoring, Reporting, and Fact‑ finding: Coordination Between 
Monitoring, Reporting, and Fact-finding Missions and International Courts and Tribunals’, THIGJ, The 
Hague, 9 June 2013; ‘Experts Meeting on Attributing Individual Responsibility for Violations of 
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in UN-Mandated Commissions of Inquiry, Fact-Finding 
Missions and Other Investigations’, OHCHR, Geneva, 18 October 2016.  
91  Bertrand Ramcharan (ed.), International Law and Fact-finding in the Field of Human Rights (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1982); Thomas Franck and Laurence Cherkis, ‘The Problem of Fact-Finding in 
International Disputes’, (1967) 18 W Res L Rev 1483-1524; Stephen Kaufman, ‘The Necessity for Rules of 
Procedure in Ad Hoc United Nations Investigations’, (1969) 18 Am U L Rev 739-768; Edwin Firmage, 
‘Fact-Finding in the Resolution of International Disputes - From the Hague Peace Conference to the United 
Nations’, (1971) Utah L Rev 421-473 and Thomas Franck and H. Scott Fairley, ‘Procedural Due Process in 
Human Rights Fact-Finding by International Agencies’, (1980) 74 AJIL 308-345. 
92  Philip Alston, ‘Introduction: Commissions of Inquiry as Human Rights Fact-Finding Tools’, (2011) 105 Am 
Soc'y Int'l L Proc 81-85, at 84-85. 
93  Leiden University, ‘Inquiry and International Law’, http://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/research/research-
projects/law/inquiry-and-international-law (accessed 1 May 2018); The Hague Institute for Global Justice 
(THIGJ), ‘From Fact-Finding to Evidence: Harmonizing Multiple Investigations of International Crimes’, 
available at http://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/projects/from-fact-finding-to-evidence-
harmonizing-multiple-investigations-of-international-crimes (accessed 1 May 2018); Forum for International 
Criminal and Humanitarian Law, ‘Quality Control in Fact-Finding Outside Criminal Justice for Core 
International Crimes’, available at http://www.fichl.org/activities/quality-control-in-international-fact-
finding-outside-criminal-justice-for-core-international-crimes (accessed 1 May 2018); NYU Center for 
Human Rights and Global Justice, ‘Initiative on Human Rights Fact-Finding, Methods, and Evidence’, 
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been produced. Fact-finding guidelines and principles have also been prepared by scholars 
and practitioners, including OHCHR.95  
Scholarly engagement with the work of UN atrocity inquiries and fact-finding more generally 
can be grouped into different clusters. Several scholarly works focus on specific inquiries96 
with some contributions by former commissioners.97 Practice-oriented scholarship identifies 
challenges and proposes reforms to fact-finding practices and working methods.98 Another 
cluster of scholarship examines the use of inquiry reports in international criminal 
proceedings, and the manifestation of international criminal law in the inquiry context.99 A 
schematic strand of scholarship distinguishes different fact-finding activities and locates UN 
atrocity inquiries within broader fact-finding traditions. 100  Some commentators examine 
                                                                                                                                                         
available at http://chrgj.org/researchfocuses/past-programs (accessed 1 May 2018) and Harvard University 
Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR), ‘Monitoring, Reporting, and Fact-Finding’, 
available at http://hhi.harvard.edu/research/mrf#research-on-monitoring (accessed 1 May 2018). 
94  Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Quality Control in Fact-Finding (Florence: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 
2013); Derek Jinks, Jackson Maogoto and Solon Solomon (eds), Applying International Humanitarian Law 
in Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Bodies International and Domestic Aspects (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 
2014); Philip Alston and Sarah Knuckey (eds), The Transformation of Human Rights Fact-Finding (Oxford: 
OUP, 2016) and Christian Henderson (ed.), Commissions of Inquiry: Problems and Prospects (Oxford and 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2017). 
95  OHCHR Guidance and Practice, supra note 63; Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict 
Research, Advanced Practitioner's Handbook on Commissions of Inquiry, March 2015, available at 
http://hhi.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/publications/handbook-hpcrweb.pdf (accessed 1 May 2018) [HPCR 
Handbook] and Siracusa Guidelines, supra note 34. 
96  E.g., Philip Alston, ‘The Darfur Commission as a Model for Future Responses to Crisis Situations’, (2005) 3 
JICJ 600-607 [Alston 2005]; James Stewart, ‘The UN Commission of Inquiry for Lebanon’, (2007) 5 JICJ 
1039-1059; Dinah PoKempner, ‘Valuing the Goldstone Report’, (2010) 16 Global Governance 144-159; 
Zeray Yihdego, ‘The Gaza Mission: Implications for International Humanitarian Law and UN Fact-Finding’, 
(2012) 13 MJIL 1-59; Russell Buchan, ‘The Palmer Report and the Legality of Israel’s Naval Blockade of 
Gaza’, (2012) 61(1) ICLQ 264-273; Thilo Marauhn, ‘Sailing Close to the Wind: Human Rights Council Fact-
Finding in Situations of Armed Conflict – the Case of Syria’, (2013) 43 Cal W Int'l LJ 401-459; Kevin 
Heller, ‘The International Commission of Inquiry on Libya: A Critical Analysis’, in Jens Meierhenrich (ed.), 
The Law and Practice of International Commissions of Inquiry (OUP, forthcoming), unpublished version 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2123782 (accessed 1 May 2018). 
97  E.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘The United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 780 (1992)’, 88(4) (1994) AJIL 784-805; Christine Chinkin, ‘U.N. Human Rights 
Council Fact-Finding Missions: Lessons from Gaza’, in Mahnoush Arsanjani, Jacob Katz Cogan, Robert 
Sloane and Siegfried Wiessner (eds), Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W. 
Michael Reisman, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011) 475-498; Philippe Kirsch, ‘The Work of the International 
Commission of Inquiry for Libya’, in M. Cherif Bassiouni and William Schabas (eds), New Challenges for 
the UN Human Rights Machinery (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2011) 293-318 and Michael Kirby, ‘UN 
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Ten 
Lessons’, (2014) 15 MJIL 1-27. 
98  E.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Appraising UN Justice-Related Fact-Finding Missions’, (2001) 5 Wash U JL & 
Pol'y 35-49 [Bassiouni 2001]; Boutruche, supra note 28 and Stephen Wilkinson, ‘Standards of Proof in 
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Fact-Finding and Inquiry Missions’, Geneva Academy of 
Working Paper (2012) available at http://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-
files/Standards%20of%20Proof%20in%20Fact-Finding.pdf (accessed 1 May 2018). 
99  E.g., Carsten Stahn and Dov Jacobs, ‘Human Rights Fact-Finding and International Criminal Proceedings: 
Towards a Polycentric Model of Interaction’, in Alston and Knuckey, supra note 94, 255-280; Dov Jacobs 
and Catherine Harwood, ‘International Criminal Law Outside The Courtroom: The Impact of Focusing on 
International Crimes for the Quality of Fact-Finding by International Commissions of Inquiry’, in Bergsmo, 
supra note 94, 325-357; Catherine Harwood, ‘Human Rights in Fancy Dress? The Use of International 
Criminal Law by Human Rights Council Commissions of Inquiry in Pursuit of Accountability’, (2015) 58 
JYIL 71-100. 
100  E.g., Christian Henderson, ‘Commissions of Inquiry: Flexible Temporariness or Permanent Predictability?’, 
(2014) 45 NYIL 287-310 [Henderson 2014]; Federica D’Alessandra, ‘The Accountability Turn in Third 
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whether commissions’ reports have developed international law. 101  Other scholarship is 
normative, discussing how commissions could be better utilised in pursuit of the goals of 
prevention or accountability.102 Recent critical scholarship challenges these perspectives by 
viewing commissions as products and producers of hegemonies.103 
This Study complements this burgeoning scholarship by comprehensively analysing the 
practice of UN atrocity inquiries and their mandating authorities. It builds on scholarly 
discussions of different roles of inquiry104 to comprehensively study their practice and render 
explicit operational choices which shape their roles and functions, and thus their identity in 
the international legal order. In so doing, the research hopes to inform future UN atrocity 
inquiry practice. Having laid these foundations, Chapter One situates UN atrocity inquiries in 
historical and institutional context. 
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CHARTING THE RISE OF UN ATROCITY INQUIRY 
 
Introduction  
This Chapter traces the development of international atrocity inquiries through time and 
institutional contexts, culminating in their manifestation at the United Nations (UN). 
International atrocity inquiries may be established through ad hoc interstate agreement, treaty 
regimes, or international organisations. In light of this diversity, the development of 
international atrocity inquiry is presented contextually as well as temporally. By locating UN 
practice in a broader tradition of international atrocity inquiries, certain synergies and linkages 
may also be identified across contexts. This presentation also invites reflections on the 
prevalence of certain institutional settings across time, as well as obstacles to the 
establishment of atrocity inquiries in different contexts.  
This Chapter presents a historical and institutional taxonomy of international atrocity 
inquiries. It discusses the practice of establishing inquiries via ad hoc agreement among states 
(Section 1); ‘Geneva’ inquiry from IHL treaties (Section 2); atrocity inquiries by international 
organisations beyond the UN (Section 3) before zooming in on UN inquiry practice (Section 
4). Some reflections on the varied settings and aims of international atrocity inquiries are 
offered in Section 5. 
1. Interstate Atrocity Inquiries 
International atrocity inquiries jointly established by states clustered around two ruptures of 
international peace: World War One (WWI) and World War Two (WWII). At the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1919, Allied Powers established an inquiry to examine the responsibility of the 
‘authors’ of WWI and breaches of the laws and customs of war (1.1). Separate inquiries were 
conducted into atrocities by Bulgaria in occupied Serbia and Greek forces in Smyrna (1.2). In 
1942, in the midst of World War Two, Allied nations established the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission (UNWCC) to collect evidence and advise on alleged war crimes by 
nationals of Axis Powers (1.3). Functional and structural aspects of the UNWCC were 
different to the 1919 Commission and to later international atrocity inquiries. As it is a 
significant part of the history of international responses to atrocities and has been depicted as 
an early atrocity inquiry,105 it is discussed here. 
1.1 1919 Commission 
A key product of the Paris Peace Conference was an international inquiry into violations of 
international law by Germany and its allies during WWI. The Commission on the 
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties (the ‘1919 
Commission’) was established on 25 January 1919 at a plenary session of the Paris Peace 
                                                 
105  E.g., Bassiouni, supra note 97, at 784 and Darcy, supra note 101. 
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Conference, and consisted of representatives of Allied powers.106 The Commission was to 
inquire into the “responsibility of the authors” of the war; “facts as to breaches of the laws and 
customs of war” committed by Germany and its allies; the degree of responsibility attaching 
to individuals; and the characteristics of a tribunal appropriate to try those offences.107 By 
1919, the idea of establishing an inquiry into a situation of atrocities was somewhat novel but 
perhaps not extraordinary. By that date, some states had conducted domestic inquiries into 
atrocities, such as Ottoman inquiries into Armenian massacres108 – one involving British, 
French and Russian delegates109 – and the UK’s Casement inquiry into Belgian atrocities in 
the Congo Free State.110 Moreover, in 1914, the UK established an inquiry into German 
violations of IHL111 and 1918, set up the Committee of Inquiry into the Breaches of the Laws 
of War. This Committee, chaired by Sir John MacDonnell, recommended that an international 
tribunal be established “for the trial and punishment of the ex-Kaiser as well as other 
offenders against the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity”.112 By 1919, Allied 
Powers were familiar with utilising domestic inquiries to investigate atrocities and the UK had 
already settled on German responsibility for IHL violations in WWI.  
The idea of an international inquiry to determine responsibility for violations of international 
law was innovative and might have been unwittingly encouraged by Germany. As at 1919, 
international inquiries had been established under the auspices of the Hague Conventions to 
ascertain the facts of international maritime incidents.113 Diplomatic exchanges reveal that 
Germany proposed a neutral inquiry to investigate responsibilities arising from WWI. After 
signing the armistice, Germany requested to negotiate peace114  and wrote to the US, via 
Switzerland:115 
[I]t seems imperatively necessary to throw light on the events which brought on the war, 
in all the belligerent States and in all their particulars. A complete truthful account of 
the world conditions and of the negotiations among the powers in July 1914 and of the 
steps taken at that time by the several Governments could and would go far toward 
                                                 
106  Preliminary Peace Conference, 25 January 1919 (Minute No. 2) provided that the Commission would be 
composed of 15 members, two nominated by each ‘Great Power’, namely the US, UK, France, Italy and 
Japan, and five from ‘Powers with special interests’, namely Belgium, Greece, Poland, Romania and Serbia.  
107  Minute No. 2, supra. 
108  E.g., Mazhar Inquiry Commission (1918). See Vahakn Dadrian, ‘Military Defeat and the Victor’s Drive for 
Punitive Justice’, in Vahakn Dadrian and Taner Akçam (eds), Judgment At Istanbul: The Armenian Genocide 
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113  See Introduction, Section 2.2. 
114  US Office of the Historian, ‘Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State’, 26 November 1918, in Papers 
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Vol. II, at 71, 
available at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1919Parisv02/pg_71 (accessed 1 May 2018). 
115  Ibid., ‘Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State’, 2 December 1918, 71-72. 
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demolishing the walls of hatred and misconstruction erected by the long war to separate 
the peoples… The German Government therefore proposes that a neutral Commission 
be organized to probe the responsibilities for the war, which should be composed of 
men whose character and political experience will guarantee a true verdict…  
Similar proposals were sent to France and the UK.116 Allied states rejected the proposal, 
sharing the view that German responsibility was “incontestably proved”.117 When Germany 
was notified of that position on 1 February,118 the 1919 Commission was already established. 
As the British inquiry had recommended an international tribunal, it may be that the Allies 
adapted Germany’s proposal for an inquiry to investigate responsibilities in light of their view 
that Germany was to blame.  
The 1919 Commission was composed of three sub-commissions. Sub-Commission I found 
and collected evidence relating to culpable conduct on the part of the so-called ‘Enemy 
Powers’ while Sub-Commissions II and III considered whether on the facts established by 
Sub-Commission I, prosecutions could be instituted in respect of conduct which brought 
about WWI and which took place in hostilities, respectively; and the individuals who should 
be prosecuted.119 The report does not explain the Commission’s working methods in detail. It 
appears to have relied upon documentary sources, including memoranda and reports prepared 
by national delegations and an ‘Inter-Allied’ commission of inquiry.120 Individuals appointed 
as commissioners were legal experts, many of whom held political positions, “showing the 
nexus between legal interpretations and political power.”121 
Having examined documentary evidence of violations of the laws and customs of war, the 
1919 Commission found thirty-two violations liable for prosecution.122 Regarding its mandate 
to consider responsibilities, the Commission found that it was “not necessary to wait for proof 
attaching guilt to particular individuals”,123 as there was sufficient information to warrant 
criminal investigations. The Commission concluded that all individuals who had committed 
“offences against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity” 124  could be 
prosecuted. It rejected the idea of sovereign immunity from judicial process, as this would 
mean that those most responsible for the gravest crimes would escape punishment.125 These 
conclusions did not enjoy full consensus, with American and Japanese representatives 
dissenting on the basis that prosecutions for violations of ‘laws of humanity’ would not 
comply with the principle of legality and that sovereign immunity should be recognised.126 
                                                 
116  Ibid., ‘Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace’, 6 January 1919, at 73. 
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The Commission made several recommendations pertaining to responsibility. Concluding that 
acts of aggression should not be prosecuted as they were not prohibited by positive law,127 the 
Commission recommended that penal sanctions should be provided in the future. 128  The 
Commission proposed that serious violations affecting several Allied nations be prosecuted 
before a High Tribunal that was international in nature, with members selected from courts of 
Allied powers and the law to be applied as “principles of the law of nations as they result from 
the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the 
dictates of public conscience.”129 This language borrowed from the Martens Clause.130 This 
proposal was innovative; as at 1919, most commentators located the basis for war crimes 
trials in domestic legal systems.131  
Allied Powers departed from these recommendations in several respects. The proposal for an 
international tribunal to prosecute war crimes was not adopted; instead the Treaty of 
Versailles provided for a tribunal of Allied judges to prosecute the former German Emperor 
for “a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties”.132 Article 
228 provided that Germany recognised the Allies’ right to prosecute individuals accused of 
violating the laws and customs of war in domestic military tribunals, and would extradite 
suspects for this purpose. Mixed military tribunals would prosecute crimes committed against 
nationals of several Allied states.133 Even this pared-back system proved ineffective. The 
former Emperor sought refuge in the Netherlands, which refused to extradite him. Germany 
also persuaded Allied Powers that rather than extraditing suspected war criminals, they should 
be prosecuted in its own courts.134 Of the 896 suspects identified, only twelve individuals 
were prosecuted, with six acquittals. The Leipzig trials are impugned as inadequate,135 but 
“nonetheless serve as an important historical precedent for war crimes trials”.136 
Despite its limited impact, the 1919 Commission’s investigation of violations of international 
law, consideration of responsibilities and proposal for an international criminal tribunal mark 
it as the first international inquiry to promote criminal responsibility for violations of 
international law. However, the Commission was not without flaws. Its identification of 
violations attracting criminal sanction and affirmation of international criminal responsibility 
was criticised by some Commission representatives as beyond settled law. Moreover, the 
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circumstances of its establishment and composition reflect a certain tolerance for ‘victor’s 
justice’.137 These issues were to be reignited twenty years later, at the UNWCC. 
1.2 Inter-Allied Commissions of Inquiry  
Two lesser-known international inquiries were established during the Paris Peace Conference 
into atrocities by Greek forces at Smyrna (modern İzmir, Turkey) and by Bulgaria in occupied 
Serbia. Much less has been written about these inquiries; they are briefly discussed here. 
An Inter-Allied inquiry was established by the Supreme Council of the Conference to 
investigate “violations of the Hague Convention and International Law in general” 138  by 
Bulgaria in occupied Serbia during WWI (‘Commission on occupied Serbia’). The 
Commission on occupied Serbia was composed of a mix of state representatives and legal 
experts. 139  In its October 1919 report, the Commission explained that it undertook a 
preliminary investigation to “establish the necessity of judicial repressive measures” and 
reparations. Moreover, the Commission was unable to investigate the high number of 
complaints due to time pressure and practical difficulties in carrying out investigations, so its 
inquiry was limited to “a cursory view of the collected documents, and a general statement 
that grave violations of the international law have been committed.”140 While not providing a 
detailed account of its working methods, the Commission stated that it only considered facts 
“which have seemed to it certain and irrefutable”, including orders by Bulgarian authorities, 
material evidence such as destroyed villages and mass graves, and eye-witness testimony.141 
The report found violations under several headings, including unlawful treatment of 
belligerents, massacres of the civilian population, torture, rape, internment, pillage and 
denationalisation. The Commission also examined state responsibility, distinguishing crimes 
by Bulgarian government officials and groups operating alongside, and tolerated by, official 
authorities, from crimes by individuals not connected to Bulgaria. According to the 
Commission, Bulgaria was responsible for violations in the former case as “these organs have 
acted in the spirit of the general instructions given by the Government.”142 
The Commission’s report was mentioned in passing by the 1919 Commission, together with 
several others which supplied “abundant evidence of outrages of every description committed 
on land, at sea, and in the air, against the laws and customs of war and of the laws of 
humanity”143 by Germany and its allies. While the 1919 Commission discussed the possibility 
of an international tribunal for Balkan war crimes, this proposal did not find support after the 
signing of the Treaty of Versailles, which did not provide for such a mechanism in respect of 
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German war crimes.144 In a similar fashion, Balkan war crimes were to be prosecuted before 
domestic military tribunals.145 The report has not been much discussed in scholarship; perhaps 
it was overshadowed by the 1919 Commission. Yet it bears similarities with inquiries 
established several decades later in terms of its working methods, evaluation of IHL violations 
and consideration of responsibilities.  
A second Inter-Allied inquiry was established in July 1919 by the Supreme Council of the 
Conference to investigate reported atrocities by Greek forces at Smyrna, whose presence had 
been authorised by the Council.146 This Commission was mandated to investigate facts and 
responsibilities, and asked to propose solutions. It was composed of four state representatives, 
all military officials. The Commission travelled to several locations, including Smyrna, to 
hear witnesses.147 Its report found Greece largely responsible for the violence, but did not 
overtly qualify incidents as legal violations.148 The Commission found the presence of Greek 
forces as unnecessary and based on false information, and that its occupation had the 
appearance of annexation.149 Council members accepted the findings but also criticised the 
Commission for exceeding its mandate.150 Victoria Solomonidis observes that the Council 
was irritated at the Commission’s revival of a controversial issue that they would have 
preferred to shield from public view.151 The report was eventually published152 after being 
suppressed.153  
1.3 United Nations War Crimes Commission  
In 1943, in the midst of World War Two, seventeen Allied powers established the UNWCC to 
collect evidence of war crimes committed against Allied nationals and identify responsible 
individuals.154 The Commission had three committees with different functions. Committee I 
(Facts and Evidence) examined charges submitted by national offices; Committee II 
(Enforcement) was concerned with measures to ensure the apprehension, trial and punishment 
of war criminals while Committee III (Legal) advised on issues of international law. Although 
the UNWCC was originally envisaged to conduct independent investigations,155 this function 
was assigned to national offices within Allied states. The UNWCC reviewed information 
submitted by national offices and advised whether there was sufficient evidence to bring 
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cases; reported its findings to governments and circulated lists of war criminals. Carsten Stahn 
observes that the UNWCC was more of an “examining body than a fact-finder”.156 In its five 
years of operations, the Commission received files involving more than 36,000 individuals 
and units,157 and listed over 24,000 accused persons.158 In assessing cases for prosecution and 
coordinating with domestic bodies, the UNWCC played a pivotal support role. Stahn likens it 
to “a sort of international pretrial examination”.159  
The UNWCC also advised governments on legal questions relevant to war crimes trials.160 
Committee III examined many legal questions of relevance to ICL, including the availability 
of the defence of superior orders and whether aggression was recognised as an international 
crime. 161  In respect of the latter issue, the majority took a similar view as the 1919 
Commission, finding that aggression was not legally recognised as a crime but should be 
prohibited.162 Committee III proposed a definition of crimes against humanity which was 
incorporated in Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter.163 Dan Plesch and Shanti Sattler write 
that the UNWCC “offers a rare body of legal material developed by states working together… 
to address and develop elements of international law”.164  
Assessments of the UNWCC’s contributions to prosecutions are mixed. Around 2,000 war 
crimes trials of ‘minor’ war crimes suspects took place in military tribunals between 1945 and 
1948, many involving multiple defendants.165 Certain theatres of combat were excluded from 
prosecution. M. Cherif Bassiouni observes that although the UNWCC had extensive evidence 
of Italian and Libyan war crimes, no prosecutions occurred for “essentially political” 
reasons.166 Stahn points out that Committee III considered the Ethiopian charges as beyond its 
jurisdiction but took a “pragmatic” approach in practice, examining those cases at its final 
meeting.167 Bassiouni also points out that the UNWCC had limited impact on the trials of 
‘major’ suspects, as the IMT prosecution was led by the US which conducted its own 
investigation.168 
Certain parallels and distinctions can be drawn between the UNWCC and the 1919 
Commission. Both bodies were established to consider responsibilities arising out of world 
wars, representing attempts to re-establish rule of law. While the 1919 Commission examined 
responsibilities of states and individuals, the UNWCC focused entirely on suspected 
international crimes. The UNWCC’s limited focus “gave it a more neutral and targeted 
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mandate”169 and closely connected it to binding justice mechanisms. However, its one-sided 
mandate to focus on crimes by nationals of Axis Powers rendered it vulnerable to criticisms of 
victor’s justice, as had afflicted the 1919 Commission. Yet it also represents a multilateral 
commitment to accountability for international crimes.170 A significant accountability function 
for international inquiry would not be seen again until the Yugoslavia Commission in 1992. 
2. ‘Geneva’ International Humanitarian Law Inquiry 
This Section explains developments in the ‘Geneva’ strand of inquiry arising from IHL 
treaties. Inquiry mechanisms were set down in successive treaties, culminating in the 
establishment of a standing permanent commission in Additional Protocol I 1977. The 
International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission (IHFFC) represents both an 
achievement and still unrealised potential; its competence was triggered for the first time in 
2017. 
Article 30 of the Geneva Convention 1929 provided that upon “the request of a belligerent, an 
enquiry shall be instituted, in a manner to be decided between the interested parties, 
concerning any alleged violation of the Convention”.171 This provision was initially seen as “a 
significant step forward”. 172  However, at the 1929 Diplomatic Conference, delegates 
expressed fears that findings of IHL violations by an inquiry might lead to sanctions.173 The 
requirement for parties to agree on inquiry procedures would prove to be problematic.174 An 
opportunity to put Article 30 into practice arose in 1936 during the Italio-Ethiopian conflict. 
Both parties agreed in principle to an inquiry into alleged misuse of the protected emblem, 
and the ICRC entered into discussions concerning its procedures. Allegations of use of poison 
gas by Italy also surfaced, but Italy considered methods of warfare as beyond the scope of the 
inquiry.175 After the use of poison gas came to the attention of the League of Nations, the 
prospective inquiry was subject political manoeuvring, also posing challenges to the role of 
the ICRC. The inquiry procedure under the 1929 Geneva Convention was not put into 
practice. 
In an effort to render IHL inquiry more effective, the ICRC submitted a proposal to the 1949 
Diplomatic Conference for an ‘investigation procedure’ that would allow parties to “demand 
the institution of an inquiry” into alleged violations.176 States did not support that proposal, 
finding some aspects too complicated.177 The essence of the 1929 provision was retained in 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, with the amendment that if parties were unable to agree on 
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procedure, they should jointly appoint an umpire to decide.178 The requirement of ad hoc state 
consent remained. This mechanism also remains unused.179 The 2016 Commentary to Geneva 
Convention I (2016 Commentary) suggests that states’ lack of use of this inquiry procedure is 
mainly due to the requirement for parties to reach agreement.180 
Further efforts were made at the 1977 Diplomatic Conference181 to breathe life into IHL 
inquiry. There was a division at the Conference between states in favour of a more robust 
mechanism and those opposed. 182  The product was the International Fact-Finding 
Commission (also known as the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission, or 
IHFFC), provided for in Article 90 of Additional Protocol I. Pursuant to Article 90, the 
IHFFC may investigate facts alleged to be a grave breach or “other serious violation” of the 
Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocol I.183 While the IHFFC’s mandate indicates the 
relevance of legal questions,184 the IHFFC states that its procedure “stops short of stating the 
law, which opens more possibilities for States to find mutually acceptable compromise 
solutions.”185 Former IHFFC President Ghalib Djilali explains, “[c]larity about relevant facts 
might serve as a basis of mutual confidence and therefore better respect for [IHL].”186 The 
IHFFC does not aim to ‘name and shame’; its reports are confidential unless parties agree to 
their publication.187 
The IHFFC’s trigger mechanisms reflect a compromise between states’ positions at the 
Diplomatic Conference in favour of state consent. Article 90 provides that states may 
recognise the IHFFC’s compulsory competence in advance and that an inquiry must be 
requested by a state which accepts its competence regarding alleged violations by another 
state which also accepts its competence.188 The IHFFC may investigate “other situations”189 at 
the request of a party with the consent of other parties concerned, which may include non-
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international armed conflict (NIAC). 190  The IHFFC remains the principal IHL inquiry 
mechanism in existence, with recent proposals not finding sufficient state support.191  
The IHFFC remained dormant from its entry into force in 1991 until 2017. Likening the 
IHFFC to a “sleeping beauty”,192 Frits Kalshoven surmised that the reasons for its dormancy 
lay in its independence and “the reluctance of parties to an armed conflict to have the truth 
about certain alleged facts exposed”.193 The practice of UN bodies in establishing inquiries 
into IHL violations may also have diverted situations from the IHFFC. Grace and Bruderlein 
note that the Security Council appointed two IHFFC members to the Yugoslavia Commission 
“[a]s if to accentuate the IHFFC’s irrelevance”.194 However, the Sleeping Beauty recently 
awoke. On 18 May 2017 the IHFFC received its first mandate, upon the request of the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The IHFFC was asked to 
investigate an incident in Ukraine in which a vehicle exploded, causing the death of a 
paramedic and injuries to OSCE monitors. Its mandate was to “establish the facts… against 
the background of [IHL]”, 195  but not to consider criminal responsibility. The report is 
confidential, but an executive summary states that the explosion was caused by an anti-vehicle 
mine in violation of IHL due to its “predictable indiscriminate effect.” 196  The IHFFC’s 
acceptance of jurisdiction by an organisation of states 197  indicates its willingness to act 
beyond the strict confines of Additional Protocol I, and perhaps inviting future requests from 
other actors.  
3.  Atrocity Inquiries by International Organisations other than the UN  
International organisations have international legal personality198 but do not have the same 
breadth of competence as states, which hold “the totality of international rights and duties 
recognized by international law”. 199  According to the ICJ, the rights and duties of an 
international organisation “depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied in 
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its constituent documents and developed in practice.” 200  Inquiries by international 
organisations link to their functions and purposes. This Section considers the practice of 
international organisations in establishing atrocity inquiries, specifically the League of 
Nations (3.1) and regional organisations (3.2). The more extensive practice of the UN is 
discussed in Section 4.  
3.1 League of Nations 
The League of Nations was established in 1919 to encourage international cooperation and 
peace. 201  The Covenant of the League of Nations provided that members had to submit 
“disputes likely to lead to a rupture” to arbitration, judicial settlement or “enquiry by the 
Council”. 202  The League established seven inquiries, all of which concerned territorial 
disputes and invasions. 203  Some commissions were asked to offer settlement 
recommendations as well as to ascertain facts.204  
League practice is interesting for its lack of inquiries into atrocities. Commissions generally 
focussed on restoring peaceful international relations. For instance, the 1931 Lytton Inquiry 
was asked to report on circumstances threatening to disturb peace following Japan’s invasion 
of Manchuria and to consider solutions to reconcile states’ interests. 205  The Commission 
appealed to states’ interests,206 finding that Japan’s actions could not be regarded as self-
defence207 but avoiding characterising the invasion as aggression.208 The 1925 Inquiry into 
Greek Frontier Incidents acknowledged human suffering, but its central purpose was to 
establish facts enabling the fixing of responsibility and reparations arising from Bulgaria’s 
invasion and occupation of Greece.209 In calculating reparations, the Commission identified 
harm to civilians as a type of damage but did not qualify such harms as legal violations, and 
its emphasis remained on reducing the threat of war. 210  Mark Lewis observes that the 
League’s priority was not to establish punishments for aggression and war crimes, but rather 
to build “a new permanent system of adjudication for disputes between states”.211 
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At one point the League appeared to consider an inquiry into the use of poison gas by Italy 
during the Italio-Ethiopian conflict, upon the request of the Emperor of Ethiopia.212  The 
Committee of Thirteen of the League did not consider it as within the League’s mandate, as 
its goal was “to stop a war and not to observe a war”. 213  The Committee requested 
information from the ICRC, which declined to do so to avoid compromising its neutrality.214 
When a League inquiry became a possibility, Italy proposed that the ICRC should widen the 
terms of a separate inquiry into violations of the Geneva Convention 1929 to include those 
allegations.215 The League’s attention turned away from the matter. Ultimately, the ICRC 
inquiry did not materialise, so the situation was not subject to an inquiry. In short, League 
inquiries generally focussed on resolving territorial disputes and tensions in order to promote 
peace. 
3.2 Regional Organisations 
Regional organisations conduct an array of fact-finding activities. This Section highlights key 
inquiries into situations of atrocities established by prominent regional organisations in 
Europe, Africa and the Americas, and in respect of Arab states. This Section also identifies 
some other fact-finding activities by these actors to situate regional inquiries within their 
broader contexts.  
In the European context, the Council of the European Union (EU) established an inquiry into 
violations of international law in the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia. 216  The 
European Council has occasionally instructed fact-finding missions in respect of human rights 
situations.217  The EU is active at the UN, sponsoring mandating resolutions of HRC-led 
atrocity inquiries.218 The European Parliament has requested that EU member states pursue 
atrocity inquiries at the UN.219 Human rights fact-finding has also been conducted by the 
Council of Europe.220 From 1953 until its abolition in 1998,221 the European Commission on 
Human Rights examined alleged violations of the European Convention on Human Rights.222  
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Turning to the African region, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its successor, the 
African Union (AU) have established a few inquiries. The OAU created an International Panel 
of Eminent Personalities to investigate causes and responsibilities of the Rwandan 
genocide.223 The International Panel examined the failure of the international community to 
take action and the need for accountability in respect of violations. 224  In 2013, the AU 
established an inquiry into human rights violations in the South Sudan conflict. That 
Commission was asked to make recommendations on “accountability, reconciliation and 
healing”.225 The report, which found extensive violations,226 was published more than a year 
after completion, with deferral due to concerns that it would obstruct peace efforts.227 The 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) has carried out fact-finding 
missions on its own initiative and at the request of the AU Peace and Security Council. These 
missions were composed of ACHPR commissioners rather than independent experts.228 The 
AU has also supported UN-led inquiries, such as the Security Council’s inquiry on the Central 
African Republic (the CAR).229 
The League of Arab States has established inquiries concerning violations arising in the 
context of Israeli military operations in Gaza in 2009230 and human rights violations in Darfur 
in 2004. The former inquiry was mandated to report on alleged violations of IHL and human 
rights, and to collect information on the responsibility of states and individuals for 
violations. 231  Its report was oriented towards ascertaining responsibility and promoting 
accountability, including by recommending that the situation in Gaza be referred to the 
ICC.232 In respect of the latter inquiry on Darfur, its public statement about human rights 
violations was suppressed and its report was not published after Sudan apparently protested its 
findings.233  
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In the Americas, the Organization of American States (OAS) has investigated several 
situations. Like the fact-finding missions of the ACHPR, most inquiries were composed of 
OAS Council representatives rather than independent commissioners,234 with an inquiry into 
violence in Haiti as an exception.235 The OAS also established an inquiry jointly with the UN 
into allegations of extra-judicial executions in Togo.236 The Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, an OAS organ, has also established inquiries.237 
Regional organisations have shown interest in conducting fact-finding with respect to 
atrocities and some mandates emphasised accountability for violations. Several such 
organisations have a richer practice of establishing fact-finding missions composed of 
organisational officials, rather than independent inquiries. It is difficult to draw conclusions in 
respect of regional inquiries as a general type or category, not only due to their rather limited 
number, but also because they are located within distinct institutional and geographic 
contexts. They report to mandating authorities with divergent functions and powers, which in 
turn operate in organisational contexts guided by different principles and purposes. Regional 
inquiries may thus be distinguished from one another as well as from universal organisations. 
4. UN Atrocity Inquiries 
By contrast with the League of Nations and regional organisations, the UN provided fertile 
institutional soil for atrocity inquiries, generating a rich repository of practice. The UN was 
established in 1945 for several purposes, including the maintenance of international peace and 
security and the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 238  The Security 
Council, General Assembly and Secretary-General may all consider matters of international 
peace and security, with the Council primarily responsible for its maintenance. 239  These 
organs may undertake fact-finding to exercise their responsibilities in this field. 240  The 
HRC241 and its predecessor, the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR),242 have also 
established UN atrocity inquiries. Mandating authorities’ functions and powers are addressed 
in Chapter Two. This Section discusses two broad periods of UN practice: 1945 to 1991 (4.1) 
and 1992 onwards (4.2). 1992 is selected as the dividing line as wider global events around 
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this time, notably the fall of the Iron Curtain, marked a new era of global multilateralism and 
improved cooperation in the Security Council. 
4.1 Sparse atrocity inquiry practice 1945 – 1991  
UN atrocity inquiry practice in the period 1945 to 1991 should be viewed against wider 
human rights developments. The 1960s saw a burst of human rights activity. Several binding 
international human rights instruments were created243 and the 1968 Tehran Human Rights 
Conference explored proposals for reforms to the UN human rights system. 244  Non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) also emerged as important voices in reporting on human 
rights abuses, especially in respect of authoritarian regimes and struggles of decolonisation.245 
The establishment of truth commissions in several states to investigate human rights 
violations also signalled a recognition of accountability responses to mass atrocities.  
Against this backdrop of human rights activity, the UN’s practice of establishing inquiries was 
rather sparse, and entirely emanated from New York. Security Council inquiries centred on 
territorial disputes and invasions. 246  Only two UN inquiries into situations of atrocities 
occurred between 1945 and 1992, both of which were established by the General Assembly. 
Neither commission’s written mandate mentioned human rights, nor did their reports have 
much impact at the General Assembly, for different reasons. Each inquiry is briefly discussed. 
The Vietnam Commission was established in 1963 at the invitation of the President of South 
Vietnam to “ascertain the facts of the situation in that country as regards relations between the 
Government… and the Vietnamese Buddhist community”. 247  The Vietnam Commission 
interpreted its mandate as to investigate alleged violations of human rights,248 consistent with 
the listing of the situation in the General Assembly’s agenda as ‘[t]he violation of human 
rights in South Vietnam’.249  The Commission acknowledged allegations of human rights 
violations but did not reach findings;250 its mandate was terminated after a coup d’état and the 
General Assembly did not discuss its findings.251 
In 1973 the Assembly established an inquiry into “reported atrocities” in Mozambique, which 
was in the process of gaining independence from Portugal.252 The Mozambique Commission 
characterised atrocities as violations of IHRL and IHL253 and considered whether genocide 
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had occurred.254 The Commission recommended that the General Assembly request Portugal 
and Mozambique to “bring to court all those persons responsible for the reported massacres 
and other atrocities, in order that they may be called to reckoning”.255 It also recommended 
that Portugal provide compensation.256 The General Assembly did not endorse the report, but 
simply took note of it “with appreciation” and decided to “commend for appropriate action the 
recommendations”.257 Theo van Boven writes that the summary disposal of the report resulted 
from political change, demonstrating that at the UN, “political context determines the 
pertinence of human rights violations”.258  
While few formal inquiries into atrocities were established in this period, the UN did carry out 
some other fact-finding activities. In 1947, the General Assembly created a subsidiary body to 
report on international peace and security.259 Among other duties, the Interim Committee was 
asked to “appoint commissions of enquiry”.260 This body, established to counteract paralysis 
in the Security Council, did not establish any inquiries and was sidelined after the Uniting for 
Peace resolution.261 In 1952, the General Assembly established a working group into racial 
discrimination in South Africa,262 and in 1968 established a working group into the situation 
in Israeli-occupied territories.263 In 1967, UNCHR was authorised to investigate patterns of 
human rights violations264 and established working groups into situations of concern.265 The 
Security Council did not establish atrocity inquiries in this period, but did create a working 
group on racial discrimination in South Africa. 266  In general, the Council had limited 
engagement with human rights prior to 1991, with only a few mentions of human rights in its 
resolutions.267 Welscher writes that most Council members considered human rights issues as 
matters internal to states.268 This perspective was to be radically altered following political 
upheavals in the period 1989 to 1991. 
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4.2 Proliferation of UN atrocity inquiries – 1992 and beyond 
In the past twenty-five years, there has been a proliferation in UN atrocity inquiries and a 
renewed interest by UN bodies in responding to violations of international law with inquiry. 
This Section discusses broader developments relevant to the changes in UN dynamics (4.2.1); 
and identifies atrocity inquiries established by mandating authorities, namely the Security 
Council (4.2.2), Secretary-General (4.2.3), General Assembly (4.2.4), and HRC (4.2.5).  
4.2.1 Changing UN dynamics 
The physical fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the symbolic fall of the Iron Curtain in 1991 
marked the beginning of a new multilateralism, notably in the Security Council, and 
strengthening of the UN human rights system. The UN’s human rights programme had 
originated as a small division at New York and later moved to Geneva, becoming the ‘Centre 
for Human Rights’ in the 1980s.269 In 1989, “in the euphoria that followed the ending of the 
Cold War”, 270  the General Assembly held a global conference to assess human rights 
progress. At the World Conference on Human Rights at Vienna in 1993, 171 states reaffirmed 
human rights and recommended strengthening the UN human rights system, including by 
creating the post of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The General Assembly 
established this post in December 1993, to be exercised under the authority of the Secretary-
General.271 In 1998, the Secretary-General merged the Centre for Human Rights, which had 
been governed by an Assistant Secretary-General, with OHCHR. 272  OHCHR carries out 
human rights activities and provides support to human rights bodies established under the 
Charter and pursuant to treaties. These developments reinforced Geneva’s role as the UN’s 
centre for human rights and would lead some commentators to observe rivalries between 
Geneva and New York.273 
Accompanying the end to the deadlock in the Security Council was a shift in the Council’s 
view of the links between violations of IHRL and IHL, and international peace and security. 
Although the Security Council had used fact-finding mechanisms since its inception, 
“commissions of inquiry related to gross violations of human rights became an integral part of 
Council practice only following the Cold War.”274 In 1991 it condemned the “repression of 
the Iraqi civilian population… the consequences of which threaten international peace and 
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security”.275 Some commentators point to this resolution as the Council’s first recognition that 
human rights violations could threaten international peace and security.276  
There was also “progressive interaction”277 between the Security Council and human rights 
bodies. In 1992, UNCHR requested that reports of the Special Rapporteur for the former 
Yugoslavia be sent to the Security Council for its consideration of “appropriate steps towards 
bringing those accused to justice.”278 When referring the situation in Libya to the ICC, the 
Security Council welcomed the HRC’s decision to establish the Libya Commission.279 Cecilie 
Hellestveit observes that this was “the first explicit recognition of the HRC fact-finding 
mechanisms as part of the Security Council’s investigative functions.”280 The Council has 
discussed the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK 
or North Korea) several times281 since the report of the International Commission of Inquiry 
on North Korea (North Korea Commission) was submitted to it by the General Assembly.282 
Security Council members have called on Burundi to cooperate with the HRC’s Burundi 
Commission. 283  In 2017, the Security Council held its first thematic debate on human 
rights.284 The Council thus engages with human rights norms and bodies more regularly.285  
These developments reflect increasing recognition of links between security and human rights 
at the UN more generally.286 In 2005, the General Assembly recognised that “development, 
peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing.”287 Similar 
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statements were issued by the Security Council and Secretary-General.288 The concept of the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ also links security and human rights, recognising that where states 
manifestly fail to protect their civilian populations from atrocity crimes, UN member states 
are prepared to take collective action through the Security Council to protect those 
populations.289  The thawing of dynamics in the Security Council in the 1990s was thus 
accompanied by significant developments in the UN human rights system and increased 
linkages between paradigms of human rights and collective security.  
4.2.2 Security Council atrocity inquiries  
Against this background, the Security Council established its first atrocity inquiry in 1992, in 
respect of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The Commission of Experts on the former 
Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia Commission) was asked to examine information and provide its 
conclusions on the evidence of IHL violations.290 Michael Scharf recalls that in negotiations, 
the US insisted that the mandating resolution state ‘Commission’ rather than ‘Committee’, as 
was the preference of the UK, France, and Russia, because:291 
[T]he title ‘Commission’ was of historic importance since the investigative body that 
preceded the Nuremberg Tribunal was known as the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission. Further, we felt the title would be of practical significance since it would 
suggest a greater degree of independence and authority for the new body. 
The Yugoslavia Commission was thus linked with the UNWCC and intended to have a high 
degree of autonomy.  
The Yugoslavia Commission characterised incidents as violations of IHL and international 
crimes. Apparently encouraged to consider the value of an international criminal tribunal by 
members of the Security Council, 292  the Commission wrote that creating such a tribunal 
would be consistent with its work.293 The Council subsequently established the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY),294 linking international security with 
criminal justice. 295  After the Yugoslavia Commission issued its final report, the Council 
established an inquiry into the Rwandan genocide. The Rwanda Commission held a similar 
mandate, with added instruction to examine the evidence of acts of genocide. 296  That 
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Commission found violations of IHL and international crimes, including genocide. 297  It 
recommended international prosecutions, 298  and the Council established the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) following its interim report.299 Some scholars write 
that this inquiry served as a vehicle for the Council’s ultimate intention to set up another ad 
hoc tribunal.300  
The Security Council established several other inquiries into situations of atrocities, namely in 
Burundi in 1995,301 Côte d’Ivoire302 and Darfur303 in 2004, and the CAR in 2013.304 The 
Darfur Commission represents another significant development in atrocity inquiry practice; 
after receiving its report, the Council referred the situation in Sudan to the ICC.305 Then 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan described its report as “one of the most important documents 
in the recent history of the [UN]”. 306  However, not all Security Council-led inquiries 
engendered international prosecutions.307 The Security Council also establishes other fact-
finding initiatives. In 2015, it established jointly with the OPCW a team composed of UN and 
OPCW staff members to investigate responsibilities for uses of chemical weapons in Syria.308 
Recently, it established an investigative team to assist Iraq in prosecuting international crimes 
by ISIS members.309 These bodies represent further avenues to promote accountability. 
4.2.3 Secretary-General atrocity inquiries  
The Secretary-General has established a few inquiries into situations of atrocities. Inquiries 
into situations of violence in Côte d’Ivoire,310 Guinea311 and Mali312 were established with the 
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consent of those states. The Secretary-General established inquires to evaluate accountability 
measures in states which had experienced mass atrocities, namely Timor-Leste in 2005313 and 
Sri Lanka in 2009.314 The Secretary-General also created a Panel of Inquiry on the Flotilla 
Incident, known as the Palmer Commission after its chair Geoffrey Palmer, to examine 
Israel’s interception of a flotilla bound for Gaza.315 Established with the consent of Turkey 
and Israel, the Palmer Commission was asked to review national reports, identify the facts and 
recommend ways of avoiding such incidents.316 The HRC also established an inquiry into this 
situation with a rather different investigative focus.317 
The Secretary-General conducts a myriad of other fact-finding activities, including a special 
mandate to investigate uses of biological and chemical weapons. A fact-finding mission into 
the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war was established upon the request of Iran,318 
and was subsequently granted a general mandate to conduct such investigations.319 In 2013, 
the Secretary-General established a fact-finding mission to “ascertain the facts related to the 
allegations of use of chemical weapons” 320  in Syria, which excluded questions of 
responsibility. It was headed by chemical weapons expert Åke Sellström, rather than a panel. 
The Secretary-General also establishes confidential internal ‘headquarters boards of inquiry’ 
into incidents involving UN property and personnel321 and has created special investigations 
into situations concerning peacekeeping operations, headed by a single investigator.322 These 
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mechanisms are not examined further due to their technical nature and institutional 
differences from UN commissions of inquiry.  
4.2.4 General Assembly atrocity inquiries  
The General Assembly has rarely established atrocity inquiries since 1991. In 1997, the 
General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to examine Cambodia’s request for 
assistance to respond to past serious violations, including the possibility of appointing a group 
of experts to evaluate the evidence and propose measures to achieve reconciliation, strengthen 
democracy and address individual accountability. 323  The Group of Experts on Cambodia 
(Cambodia Commission) determined the nature of the crimes by Khmer Rouge leaders from 
1975 to 1979; and assessed the feasibility and modalities of bringing them to justice.324 
Following the Cambodia Commission’s recommendation of an ad hoc international 
tribunal,325 a special chamber was established within Cambodia’s domestic jurisdiction with 
UN assistance.326 In an emergency session in 2006, the Assembly established an inquiry into 
Beit Hanoun.327 This mission was not dispatched, as Israel did not confirm its cooperation.328 
The HRC also established an inquiry into this situation, despite Israel’s opposition.329  
A noteworthy development is the General Assembly’s establishment in 2016 of the 
International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to assist in the Investigation and 
Prosecution of those Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law 
committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 (IIIM).330 This body is headed by a 
single judge who is a UN staff member.331 The IIIM has “a quasi-prosecutorial function”332 
beyond the scope of the HRC’s International Commission of Inquiry on Syria (Syria 
Commission).333 These bodies have distinct yet complementary roles: the Syria Commission 
collects information, reports on violations and makes recommendations, while the IIIM 
“builds on the information collected by others… by collecting, consolidating, preserving and 
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analysing evidence and prepares files”334 to assist prosecutions. The IIIM states that access to 
the Syria Commission’s “extensive documentary holdings… is a central requirement” 335 in its 
mandate and the modalities of cooperation were being agreed. It also bears similarities with a 
Security Council-led inquiry to facilitate criminal investigations into the assassination of 
Rafik Hariri, which was headed by a criminal investigator.336 There are also similarities with 
the 1919 Commission and the UNWCC, which analysed evidence of crimes provided by other 
actors. That this mechanism represents a further step in the direction of legal accountability is 
also reflected in the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ request that the HRC 
consider recommending that the General Assembly “establish a new impartial and 
independent mechanism, complementary to the work of the [Myanmar Commission], to assist 
individual criminal investigations of those responsible”.337  
4.2.5 Human Rights Council atrocity inquiries  
The General Assembly’s decision in 2006 to replace UNCHR with the HRC led to a 
significant increase in UN atrocity inquiries. The former only established two such inquiries, 
namely Timor-Leste in 1999338 and Gaza in 2000.339 The HRC is the most prolific mandating 
authority, having created sixteen inquiries at the time of writing. It established several 
inquiries into violations arising in different phases of the Israel-Palestine conflict,340 as well as 
Lebanon, 341  Darfur, 342  Libya, 343  Côte d’Ivoire, 344  Syria, 345  the DPRK, 346  Eritrea, 347  South 
Sudan, 348  Burundi 349  and Myanmar. 350  All HRC commissions examined human rights 
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violations. Some were also asked to examine violations of IHL and international crimes, and 
many were instructed to identify those responsible and to carry out their mandates with a view 
to ensuring that those responsible were held accountable.351  
In addition to establishing full-fledged inquiries, the HRC has occasionally instructed the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights to establish teams of experts to investigate situations 
of atrocities, which are to directly report to the High Commissioner rather than the HRC.352 
Perceived by some states as a softer measure than full inquiry, such arrangements have been 
seen as a compromise.353 The HRC also continues to administer the special procedures system 
that were previously under the auspices of UNCHR. 
Conclusions 
International atrocity inquiries have been established in a range of institutional settings, 
reflecting changing dynamics in international affairs. The earliest inquiries were established 
pursuant to ad hoc interstate agreements. States’ efforts to establish IHL inquiry procedures 
reflect general support for such mechanisms, coupled with an enduring unwillingness to 
relinquish control over them. International organisation practice is more mixed. The absence 
of such inquiries at the League of Nations is perhaps not surprising, given the limited 
development of human rights and the League’s focus on preventing war. Regional 
organisations created a few inquiries into situations of atrocities. By contrast, the UN has a 
rich practice of establishing atrocity inquiries. The varied functions and powers of UN 
mandating authorities add further complexity and are explored in Chapter Two. 
While institutional contexts differ, certain synergies are visible in the roles and functions of 
international atrocity inquiries. In some traditions, impartial fact-finding is the primary means 
to prevent further atrocities and encourage compliance with legal obligations. The ‘Geneva’ 
fact-finding tradition seeks to encourage the parties to a conflict to respect IHL. State consent 
is vital; if states object to the establishment of an inquiry, they will be unlikely to accept its 
findings, especially if they are not favourable to the state’s position. 
Classic human rights fact-finding sheds light on atrocities and characterise incidents as 
violations to raise alert and provoke an international response. By ‘naming and shaming’, 
such inquiries ramp up political pressure to induce actors to change their behaviour. States 
may face reputational costs and a damage to their diplomatic relations, in addition to 
enforcement measures such as sanctions. This approach is particularly prevalent in UN 
atrocity inquiries during the 1960s, which coincided with an increasingly active civil 
society.354 This purpose is also reflected in the mandates and reports of many contemporary 
commissions established by UN organs, particularly the HRC. 
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Some atrocity inquiries sought to enforce responsibilities for legal violations. A justice-
oriented approach can be traced back to the 1919 Commission and associated inquiries. 
Bassiouni, who chaired the Yugoslavia Commission, characterizes the 1919 Commission and 
UNWCC as “historical precedents” to the Yugoslavia Commission,355 with all three bodies 
aiming “to investigate war crimes and prepare for the eventual prosecutions before 
international and national judicial bodies”.356 The Yugoslavia Commission has been deemed a 
‘watershed moment’ for UN atrocity inquiry and international criminal justice.357 Michaela 
Frulli writes that the inquiries on Yugoslavia and Rwanda were “precursors to prosecution-
oriented investigations led by UN fact-finding missions”. 358  Several scholars observe an 
‘accountability turn’ in UN inquiry practice.359  
International atrocity inquiries have therefore been established in pursuit of diverse aims, 
including improving diplomatic relations, encouraging compliance with legal obligations, 
preventing future atrocities, and, increasingly, ensuring accountability for violations. The 
features of such inquiries, including the circumstances of establishment, mandate and 
composition are inexorably shaped by wider institutional and political dynamics, particularly 
those of their mandating authorities. Chapter Two turns to examine how these wider forces 
have shaped the roles and functions of UN atrocity inquiries. 
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ESTABLISHING THE MANDATE: MANDATING AUTHORITIES AS 
ARCHITECTS OF ATROCITY INQUIRIES  
 
Introduction  
Chapter One provided a historical and institutional taxonomy of international atrocity 
inquiries and explained how the UN has created most of these inquiries in the past twenty-five 
years. UN mandating authorities define commissions’ written mandates in concise terms: 
typically, one paragraph in the mandating resolution. Like an architect’s plan, the written 
mandate represents a broad vision of what an inquiry is supposed to achieve as informed by 
the architect’s own goals, institutional context, and the needs of the situation. 
This Chapter illuminates how the institutional characteristics and key choices of UN 
mandating authorities have shaped the roles and functions of UN atrocity inquiries. Section 1 
discusses institutional and political dynamics at play in establishing inquiries in the UN 
context. Section 2 examines legal dimensions of written mandates and analyses the HRC’s 
competence to establish mandates beyond IHRL. Section 3 examines the impartiality of 
mandates, including temporal and geographic parameters, actors under scrutiny and 
prejudgment of findings. Section 4 discusses commissioner appointment processes and 
selections. Section 5 examines mandating authorities’ decisions on operational aspects of 
inquiry, notably the extent of discretion accorded to commissions, provision of resources and 
time limits. Section 6 steps back to examine broader trends and consequences, namely the 
juridification of mandates, use of inquiry to condemn violations, and the proposition that 
establishing an inquiry may both build and release pressure. In examining these facets, the 
Chapter depicts how mandating authorities’ institutional dynamics and choices have shaped 
commissions’ roles and functions. 
1. Dynamics of Establishment  
This Section examines how institutional and political dynamics surrounding UN mandating 
authorities’ decisions to establish atrocity inquiries shape commissions’ roles and functions. 
Section 1.1 sets out the institutional framework governing the establishment of UN atrocity 
inquiries. Section 1.2 discusses the relevance of state consent and cooperation for 
commissions’ establishment. Commissions’ ad hoc establishment necessarily means that 
some situations are selected while others are not. Ramifications of this selectivity are 
discussed in Section 1.3. Broader dynamics in UN strongholds of New York and Geneva may 
also shape decisions to establish inquiries. These dynamics are discussed in Section 1.4. 
1.1 Institutional framework relevant to UN atrocity inquiries 
UN organs may conduct fact-finding on the basis of their powers as set down in the UN 
Charter and impliedly necessary to carry out their functions and purposes.360 UN atrocity 
inquiries are established in pursuit of the spheres of responsibility of their mandating 
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authorities. Inquiries are also established pursuant to mandating authorities’ decision-making 
processes. This Section recounts and distinguishes these aspects of UN mandating authorities, 
namely the Security Council, General Assembly, Secretary-General, and HRC. 
Article 34 of the UN Charter provides that the Security Council, which has primary 
responsibility for maintaining international peace and security,361 may investigate situations 
which might lead to international friction to determine whether they may threaten 
international peace and security.362 The Council has only invoked that provision twice;363 
commentators suggest that its atrocity inquiries are established pursuant to its implied 
powers.364 In some cases it determined that there was a threat to international peace and 
security when establishing an inquiry.365 Inquiries are established upon a majority vote of its 
fifteen members, provided that one or more of the five permanent members does not exercise 
its power of veto.366  
The General Assembly as the UN’s plenary body may discuss and make recommendations on 
any matters within the scope of the Charter, and has a complementary responsibility in the 
field of international peace and security.367 General Assembly resolutions to establish UN 
atrocity inquiries may either be adopted by consensus (without a vote) or otherwise by a 
majority vote of UN member states present and voting.368 The General Assembly may also 
“initiate studies and make recommendations to assist in the realization of human rights”.369 
The General Assembly has only occasionally established atrocity inquiries.370  
Pursuant to Article 99, the Secretary-General can bring the Security Council’s attention to 
“any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and 
security”. The Secretary-General also performs “such functions as are entrusted to him”371 by 
other UN organs. Although some authors query the Secretary-General’s ability to establish an 
inquiry in the absence of state consent,372 other authors locate an implied power to do so.373 
Dag Hammarskjold writes that Article 99 “carries with it, by necessary implication, a broad 
discretion to conduct inquiries”374 regarding threats to international peace and security. The 
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Secretary-General may establish an inquiry unilaterally375 but in practice usually does so upon 
the request of the General Assembly, Security Council, or member states.376 
The HRC, a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, is also a mandating authority of UN 
atrocity inquiries. It was created in 2006 to replace UNCHR, which had been established in 
1946 by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to encourage compliance with human 
rights.377 UNCHR could not “take action on individual human rights complaints”378 until its 
mandate was expanded in 1967 to include investigations.379 It then established thematic and 
country-specific mandates.380 From 1990, UNCHR was permitted to meet “exceptionally” to 
respond to human rights emergencies,381 and established two atrocity inquiries on this basis.382 
The HRC was mandated to assume, review and improve UNCHR’s mechanisms, functions 
and responsibilities.383 It provides a forum for debates on human rights issues and administers 
monitoring and compliance mechanisms, including special procedures.384 
Although the HRC has amassed significant practice of establishing inquiries, its power to do 
so is not expressly provided. The ‘institutional-building package’ resolution which sets out the 
mechanisms to be administered by the HRC does not mention inquiry. Christine Chinkin 
observes that as the HRC is a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, it shares its parent’s 
“authority to establish fact-finding missions.”385 The General Assembly has welcomed several 
HRC commissions’ reports, signaling its acceptance of this practice.386 Such competence to 
may also be implied from the HRC’s mandate to address situations of human rights violations 
and respond to human rights emergencies.387 While all UN member states may participate in 
the HRC’s activities, only 47 states have voting rights. Some HRC commissions were 
established by consensus 388  but most mandating resolutions, including all inquiries into 
Israel/Palestine, were established pursuant to a vote.  
1.2 State consent and cooperation  
The consent of a concerned state is not required to establish an inquiry, unless that state is a 
permanent member of the Security Council which exercises its veto power. However, if a 
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concerned state objects to the establishment of an inquiry, it is unlikely to cooperate, which 
may have significant flow-on effects for commissions’ information-gathering practices. The 
emphasis placed by the mandating authority on securing state cooperation may be reflected in 
the scope and focus of the mandate, and thus in commissions’ roles and functions. 
UN member states’ obligations to cooperate with UN atrocity inquiries are governed by the 
UN’s institutional framework. The Charter contains a general obligation on member states to 
give the UN “every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present 
Charter”. 389  The Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in the Field of the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security 1991 (1991 Declaration) provides that 
states should give fact-finding missions the assistance necessary to fulfil the mandate390 but 
also that sending a UN mission “to the territory of any State requires the prior consent of that 
State, subject to the relevant provisions of the Charter”.391 As UN member states agree to 
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council, states are arguably obliged to 
cooperate with Security Council-led inquiries. 392  The Council may also order states to 
cooperate by invoking Chapter VII, which it has done on occasion.393 Its inquiries have faced 
little overt opposition from concerned states, but they have occasionally expressed 
disagreement. For instance, when the Security Council established the Darfur Commission 
and indicated the possibility of sanctions in the event of non-cooperation, the Sudanese 
Representative stated that the resolution was an “unfair text, only aimed at achieving political 
aims”,394 but that “[d]espite the injustice of the resolution, his Government would continue to 
honour its commitments”. 395  The Darfur Commission reported that the Government 
cooperated with its investigation, and carried out field visits.396 By contrast, since the Security 
Council referred the situation of Sudan to the ICC in 2005,397 the ICC Prosecutor has faced a 
“policy of complete non-cooperation”398 from the Government, and cannot conduct in situ 
investigations. In 2014, the Prosecutor decided to “put investigative activities in Darfur on 
hold” due to this non-cooperation.399 
The Secretary-General has tended to establish inquiries at the request of states or with their 
consent,400 and is sensitive to states’ views when formulating mandates. Steven Ratner, who 
sat on the Sri Lanka Panel, writes that the Secretary-General “deliberately devised a mandate 
that never used the word investigation, but instead was focused on giving advice to the Sri 
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Lankan government on international standards and best practices regarding accountability.”401 
The Palmer Commission was established with the concurrence of Turkey and Israel after 
“intensive consultations” with those states. 402  This consensual approach circumvented 
criticisms of politicisation in commissions’ establishment, but did not always ensure that they 
enjoyed full cooperation in practice. For instance, the Sri Lanka Panel was denied territorial 
access403 and several requests for information by the Guinea Commission were ignored by the 
Guinean authorities.404 
Neither the General Assembly nor the HRC requires the consent of concerned states to 
establish inquiries, but such commissions do not have coercive powers and rely on state 
cooperation. Some states refused to cooperate with commissions on the basis that they did not 
consent to their establishment. For instance, in 2016, Burundi blamed the way in which an 
HRC-inquiry into Burundi was created – against its wishes – as making it impossible to 
cooperate with the Burundi Commission.405 State cooperation is essential to carry out in situ 
investigations, and a lack of consent can pose serious practical impediments. Several HRC 
commissions denied territorial access to concerned states were unable to carry out in situ 
visits or meet victims and witnesses in those states.406 Lack of cooperation is particularly 
evident when one compares Syria’s refusal to cooperate with the Syria Commission with its 
granting of territorial access to a fact-finding mission by the Secretary-General into chemical 
weapons.407 A similar difference may be observed between the Palmer Commission and an 
inquiry into the same situation by the HRC; the former received information from Israel 
which was not shared with the HRC-led inquiry.408 Anne-Marie Devereux queries whether the 
Security Council could be more involved in calling on states to cooperate with inquiries 
established by other bodies.409 Commissions endeavoured to overcome these challenges in 
different ways; these efforts are discussed in Chapter Three.  
In short, atrocity inquiries by UN political bodies are not generally established with the 
consent of concerned states, which generates different obligations and consequences for 
cooperation. As is discussed below, HRC inquiries are often established in the face of their 
fierce opposition, which has led to a lack of cooperation. By contrast, inquiries by the 
Secretary-General are established with the consent of concerned states, which facilitates 
cooperation.  
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1.3 Selection of situations  
Commissions’ ad hoc establishment dictates that some situations are selected while others are 
not. As described above, the Secretary-General usually secures the consent of concerned 
states in establishing inquiries, and so the question of selectivity has not been of major 
concern. However, UN political bodies often establish inquiries without the consent of 
concerned states. As these decisions are made by member states, they are particularly 
vulnerable to accusations of bias or politicisation, which might form the basis of a challenge 
to the impartiality of the commission. Such criticisms have been frequently levelled at the 
HRC and its predecessor. UNCHR was plagued by accusations of bias, particularly in respect 
of its country-specific mandates. In 2005 the Secretary-General observed that states sought to 
become its members “not to strengthen human rights but to protect themselves against 
criticism or criticize others”, and that a “credibility deficit has developed, which casts a 
shadow on the reputation of the [UN] system as a whole”.410 In an effort to overcome these 
issues, the HRC was established in 2006 to replace UNCHR.411 
Complaints of politicisation continued at the HRC, with some authors identifying similar 
patterns of conduct.412 The HRC’s 47 member states with voting rights are elected for three-
year terms and seats are divided into geographic groups. 413  While this assists equitable 
geographic representation, it also contributes to the formation of voting blocs. That said, an 
empirical analysis of HRC voting records between 2006 and 2010 reveals that voting patterns 
are not explained solely by geographic or ideological groupings; rather, HRC members’ 
human rights records and levels of democracy are important factors in explaining their voting 
preferences.414 The authors observe that countries with poor human rights records tend to vote 
systematically differently from those which observe human rights; and that most controversial 
resolutions are proposed by a small group of countries with blemished human rights 
records.415  
The HRC’s decisions to establish inquiries have been critiqued on two levels: accusations of 
bias against particular states and a general objection to country-specific mandates. Israel has 
complained of being persistently singled out, positing that inquiries into its conduct are 
pretexts for political attacks. 416  The HRC’s focus on Israel has arguably been 
disproportionate. Chinkin observes that by 2009, half of its special sessions focussed on 
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Israel.417 This has since lessened: by June 2018, eight of the HRC’s 28 special sessions 
concerned Israel. However, resolutions concerning Israel are also concluded at its regular 
sessions.418 Some HRC mandating resolutions were utilised to make wider political statements 
against Israel. An example is the mandating resolution of the 2014 Gaza Commission, whose 
Preamble states that Israeli assaults are “the latest in a series of military aggressions by 
Israel”.419 The US was alone in voting against the resolution, explaining that it was a “biased 
and political instrument”. 420  Others, including the EU bloc, abstained out of concern of 
bias.421 A similar issue arose in respect of the mandate of the Lebanon Commission.422 Eleven 
states opposed that resolution, including Canada and the US, because it did not recognise the 
actions of all parties to the conflict.423 Other concerned states have opposed inquiries into their 
territories on a similar basis. The DPRK rejected the North Korea Commission’s mandate as 
“an extreme manifestation of politicisation, selectivity and double standards which denied 
dialogue and cooperation.”424 Eritrea opposed an inquiry into its territory, stating that it was 
“strongly opposed to country-specific mandates and resolutions which lacked the consent of 
the concerned country”, and that such mandates were “abused for other ulterior motives.”425 
In opposing the creation of the Syria Commission, Russia stated that the resolution was “one-
sided and politicised” and “aimed at removing a legitimate government while fully ignoring 
the [principles] of democracy.”426 
Several states explained their negative or abstaining votes as a principled objection to country-
specific mandates. For example, Venezuela opposed the establishment of the HRC’s Burundi 
Commission, stating that it “would continue to call for reflection in the [HRC] on the 
                                                 
417  Chinkin, supra note 97, at 483-484. 
418  E.g., HRC Res. 28/26, 27 March 2015 and HRC Res. 28/27, 27 March 2015.  
419  Gaza Mandate, supra note 340.  
420  OHCHR, ‘Human Rights Council establishes Independent, International Commission of Inquiry for the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory’, 23 July 2014, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14897&LangID=E (accessed 1 
May 2018) [Gaza Press Release]. 
421  ‘EU – Explanation of vote’, reproduced at Ireland Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Ireland’s 
position at UN Human Rights Council on situation in Gaza and Israel’, 23 July 2014, available at 
http://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/press-releases/press-release-archive/2014/july/ireland%27s-position-at-
the-un-human-rights-council (accessed 1 May 2018) [EU Press Release].  
422  Lebanon Mandate, supra note 341.  
423  OHCHR, ‘Second special session of Human Rights Council decides to establish high level inquiry 
commission for Lebanon’, 11 August 2006, available at 
http://newsarchive.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=3087&LangID=E 
(accessed 1 May 2018) [Lebanon Press Release]. 
424 OHCHR, ‘Council Establishes Commission of Inquiry to Investigate Human Rights Violations in the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea’, 21 March 2013, available at 
http://newsarchive.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13178&LangID=E 
(accessed 1 May 2018) [North Korea Press Release]. 
425  OHCHR, ‘Human Rights Council holds interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of 
human rights in Eritrea’, 24 June 2015, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16136&LangID=E (accessed 1 
May 2018). 
426  OHCHR, ‘Human Rights Council decides to dispatch a commission of inquiry to investigate human rights 
violations in the Syrian Arab Republic’, 23 August 2011, available at http://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-
republic/human-rights-council-decides-dispatch-commission-inquiry-investigate (accessed 1 May 2018) 
[Syria Press Release]. 
50 
 
ineffectiveness of the mandates against specific sovereign countries.”427 When abstaining in 
the vote to establish the Syria Commission, India stated that its position “concerning country 
specific resolutions was well known. India believed that engaging the country concerned was 
a more positive approach than pointing and naming.”428 Several states regularly advocate that 
human rights matters should be pursued through dialogue.429 This issue is not limited to the 
HRC; states also sought to curtail country-specific texts at the General Assembly.430 The High 
Commissioner for Human Rights has criticised this position as “self-serving” and “usually 
voiced by leaders of States that feature few independent institutions, and which sharply curtail 
fundamental freedoms”.431  
Critiques of HRC commissions as products of politics have synergies with accusations that 
this body overlooks situations of atrocities for the same reason. A pertinent example is the 
conflict in Yemen, in respect of which HRC member states have sought to establish an inquiry 
at successive sessions. In September 2015, exiled President Hadi created a national inquiry 
into human rights violations.432 A draft resolution sponsored by the Netherlands requested that 
OHCHR support that inquiry and establish its own investigation.433 After apparent pressure 
from Saudi Arabia, this draft was withdrawn434 and replaced with a Saudi-led text focussing 
on technical assistance and omitting reference to an OHCHR-led investigation. 435  In 
September 2016, another draft resolution requesting OHCHR to send a fact-finding mission 
was withdrawn.436 Instead, the HRC passed a Sudan-sponsored resolution limiting OHCHR’s 
role to technical assistance and requesting that the High Commissioner send human rights 
experts to assist the national inquiry.437 In 2017, another effort to create an inquiry led to the 
establishment of an ‘eminent team of experts’ which reports to the High Commissioner rather 
                                                 
427  OHCHR, ‘Human Rights Council adopts four resolutions, creates commission of inquiry on Burundi’, 30 
September 2016, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20619&LangID=E (accessed 1 
May 2018). 
428  Syria Press Release, supra note 426. 
429  E.g., OHCHR, ‘Human Rights Council establishes Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan’, 23 March 
2016, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=18528#sthash.TjP9PJUp.dpuf 
(accessed 1 May 2018). 
430  E.g., United Nations, ‘Third Committee Approves 5 Draft Resolutions on Situations in Syria, Iran, Crimea, 
Introduces 5 Others Concerning Self-Determination, Enhanced Cooperation’, UN Doc. GA/SHC/4188, 15 
November 2016, available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/gashc4188.doc.htm (accessed 1 May 2018). 
431  United Nations, ‘Addressing Human Rights Council, UN rights chief decries some States’ lack of 
cooperation’, 6 June 2017, available at 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56915#.WTkE0miGM2w (accessed 1 May 2018). 
432  Presidential Decree No. 13 of 7 September 2015 (Yemen). 
433  UN Doc. A/HRC/30/L.4/Rev.1, 30 September 2015, para. 13.  
434  E.g., Nick Cumming-Bruce, ‘Saudi Objections Halt U.N. Inquiry of Yemen War’, New York Times, 30 
September 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/world/middleeast/western-nations-drop-
push-for-un-inquiry-into-yemen-conflict.html?_r=0 (accessed 1 May 2018) and Julia Brooks, ‘Why No 
International Inquiry in Yemen?’, ATHA Blog, 4 November 2015, available at http://atha.se/blog/why-no-
international-inquiry-yemen (accessed 1 May 2018). 
435  HRC Res. 30/18, 2 October 2015. 
436  UN Doc. A/HRC/33/L.32, 27 September 2016. 
437  HRC Res. 33/16, 29 September 2016, paras. 10-11.  
51 
 
than the HRC.438 This resolution reflects a compromise between Saudi Arabia and states 
supportive of a fully-fledged inquiry.439  
The above examples illustrate a critique that the HRC prioritises political interests and 
strategies above human rights. An expert paper on the HRC stated:440 
Hopes for a new era of international collaboration in promoting and protecting human 
rights through the [HRC] have proved to be unfounded. Apart from the UPR the 
Council has been at least as partial, political, selective and confrontational as its 
predecessor. Perhaps this is inevitable. The [HRC] is a political body. It is made up of 
States whose representatives act on the instructions and in the interests of their 
Governments. It is not made up of human rights experts who act on the basis of [IHRL] 
and knowledge and experience of human rights violations. 
However, some HRC inquiries do not follow this pattern. For instance, the situations in the 
DPRK, Eritrea, Burundi and Myanmar have been of concern for several years, and the HRC’s 
decision to establish inquiries in respect of these states followed years of reports of grave 
violations. For instance, the HRC established the North Korea Commission after the tenth 
report of the Special Rapporteur reviewed more than sixty documents pertaining to human 
rights violations in the DPRK and recommended that an inquiry body “produce a more 
complete picture, quantify and qualify the violations in terms of international law, attribute 
responsibility … and suggest effective courses of international action.”441 The North Korea 
Commission’s mandating resolution passed with consensus, notably with no statement by 
China. The Burundi Commission was likewise established following the recommendation of 
independent experts that an inquiry body should continue investigations. 442  The HRC’s 
decisions to establish inquiries in these situations cannot be dismissed as resulting from bias. 
Nevertheless, as a political body, the HRC’s decisions are inherently political, even when its 
resolutions promote principles of human rights and accountability. HRC-led commissions 
must create distance from these political dynamics and establish their own authority as 
independent and impartial entities. 
Political interests also shape the Security Council’s decisions to establish inquiries, but it has 
not been subject to the same criticism as the HRC. Michelle Farrell and Ben Murphy argue 
that “the charge of a legitimacy-deficit levelled at the [HRC] but not at the Security Council is 
itself evidence of a form of politicisation, which can be best understood as an acceptance and 
perpetuation of the hegemonic order”443 within the UN. Decisions of all UN political organs 
are inevitably influenced by political factors. When selection processes are influenced by 
political factors beyond the gravity of the situation and the objective utility of an inquiry, 
decisions may be criticised as biased. Commissions established on the basis of such decisions 
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may be insulated from such critiques if their mandates create conditions for an impartial 
inquiry. Whether that has occurred in practice is discussed in Section 3 below. 
1.4 New York/Geneva dynamics 
Wider dynamics among UN bodies oriented towards security at New York and human rights 
at Geneva may also shape their decisions to establish inquiries. Hellestveit observes that when 
the HRC was created, “a certain division of labour was envisaged” with the Security 
Council.444 In practice, both bodies establish inquiries into violations of international law to 
ensure accountability. The division of labour appears to lie elsewhere. 
States have taken different views as to whether the HRC should involve itself in ongoing 
conflicts. For instance, some states opposed the HRC’s creation of the Lebanon Commission, 
mandated to investigate violations in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, on the basis that action 
should be channeled through the Security Council.445  By contrast, the Libyan delegation 
supported an inquiry, noting that the Security Council was unable to pass a resolution “calling 
for the immediate cessation of the Israeli aggression”.446  
Some authors suggest that the HRC’s establishment of inquiries is particularly important in 
situations likely to be greeted with paralysis in the Security Council. Stephen Rapp observes 
that the HRC was established inquiries in situations where a Council veto would have likely 
been cast, including in respect of the DPRK, Eritrea, Sri Lanka and Gaza.447 Zeray Yihdego 
writes that HRC fact-finding in such situations is “a persuasive, engaging and influential 
(rather than confrontational) undertaking to protect the values at stake.”448 Van den Herik 
observes:449 
It may in fact also be that, occasionally, these Geneva-based commissions rather 
function as a correction mechanism to New York dynamics and in particular to a 
paralysed Security Council. In such a case, they would represent public opinion and 
have the de facto aim to express condemnation, to present a compelling conflict 
narrative so as to counter the Security Council inaction or to elicit alternative 
involvement by the [ICC]. This different emphasis in their role, function and audience 
may obviously impact the manner in which they fulfil their mandate, and more 
specifically it may influence their invocation of international law.  
Van den Herik compares the two UN inquiries into the Gaza flotilla situation as an illustration 
of these approaches. The HRC-led inquiry was instructed to investigate violations of 
international law, while the Palmer Commission was asked to make findings of fact and 
recommend how such incidents could be avoided in the future.450  
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At the same time, the Security Council has positively engaged with some HRC inquiries. For 
instance, when referring Libya to the ICC, the Security Council welcomed the HRC’s 
decision to establish the Libya Commission.451 In 2014, the General Assembly submitted the 
North Korea Commission’s report to the Security Council and encouraged it to “take 
appropriate action to ensure accountability”.452 Some Security Council members met with 
commissioners in an Arria-Formula meeting453 and the Council discussed the situation of 
human rights in the DPRK despite opposition by several members.454 Yet enforcement action 
remains directed at its weapons activities.455 Also in 2014, a draft resolution which would 
have taken note of the Syria Commission’s reports and referred Syria to the ICC failed due to 
vetoes from China and Russia.456 The Security Council has not always taken enforcement 
action recommended by the HRC, but has at least engaged with some of its atrocity inquiries.  
Some authors argue that the Security Council is the more appropriate body to establish 
inquiries to examine IHL violations and foster prosecutions due to its enhanced capacity to 
ensure state cooperation and take binding enforcement action. 457  By contrast, Hellestveit 
observes that the Council’s reliance on fact-finding by other UN bodies gives it “more 
flexibility to refrain from acting where intervention may in fact cause a situation to escalate 
rather than be contained.”458 The Council’s selective engagement with HRC inquiries may 
create distance between commissions’ reports and expectations for follow-up. States may 
prefer to establish inquiries through the HRC precisely because it has no power to take 
binding action. States can condemn violations and place pressure on concerned states in the 
knowledge that collective security measures still require Council consent, while it can engage 
with atrocity inquiries and yet have room to manoeuvre. From this perspective, the New 
York/Geneva divide may not be so much a ‘gap’ in need of being filled, but rather strategic 
‘wiggle room’. 
2. Legal Dimensions of Written Mandates 
According to a UN declaration on fact-finding, a “decision by the competent [UN] organ to 
undertake fact-finding should always contain a clear mandate for the fact-finding mission and 
precise requirements to be met by its report”.459 Commissions’ turn towards international law 
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may be stimulated at the outset via the terms of their mandates. While the differentiation of 
facts and law is not entirely neat,460 an emphasis on international law can shape commissions’ 
roles and functions. This Section discusses juridified elements in the investigative focus and 
instructions to provide recommendations (2.1). Next, the particular legal lenses invoked by 
mandating authorities are identified (2.2). This Section finally examines challenges to the 
HRC’s jurisdiction to examine fields of international law beyond IHRL and evaluates 
potential rationales for such competence (2.3).  
2.1 Investigative focus and recommendations 
An inquiry into a situation of atrocities might be mandated to find facts and additionally to 
determine whether violations of international law have occurred. As “[i]t is the norms that tell 
us what facts one is looking for”,461 a juridified investigative focus hones in on facts capable 
of being characterised as legal violations. In practice, most mandates framed commissions’ 
fact-finding tasks by reference to fields of international law, discussed in Section 2.2 below.  
A juridified investigative focus is underscored by an instruction to collect evidence of 
crimes.462 For instance, the Syria Commission was asked to “preserve the evidence of crimes 
for possible future criminal prosecutions or a future justice process”.463 After the General 
Assembly established the IIIM, 464  the HRC stressed “the complementary nature of its 
mandate”465 and took note of information collected by the Syria Commission “in support of 
future accountability efforts, in particular the information on those who have allegedly 
violated international law”.466 
A turn to international law is also evident in instructions to make recommendations in pursuit 
of accountability.467 The concept of accountability is broader than the enforcement of legal 
responsibility and is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. At this stage, it suffices to observe that 
the concept of accountability has legal dimensions when invoked in connection with legal 
violations. For instance, the Cambodia Commission was instructed to evaluate Khmer Rouge 
leaders’ crimes and propose individual accountability measures. 468  The Secretary-General 
instructed the Sri Lanka Panel to advise on modalities of accountability “having regard to the 
nature and scope of violations.”469 Each commission had to assess the nature and extent of 
violations to identify appropriate accountability measures. The accountability concept also 
invokes the rule of law, defined by the Secretary-General as:470 
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[A] principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and 
private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws…, measures to ensure 
adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability 
to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in 
decisionmaking, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal 
transparency. 
Some commissions with a juridified investigative focus were asked to make recommendations 
in pursuit of goals beyond legal accountability, such as reconciliation.471 Such mandates are 
more rare: ‘justice-oriented’ inquiries became increasingly common in the 2000s and continue 
to be the dominant model. 472  As observed by William Schabas, “[p]robably the star of 
‘transitional justice’ is now waning in the discourse of the [UN] in favour of the cognate 
concept of ‘rule of law”.473  
That juridified investigative focuses and recommendations are choices on the part of 
mandating authorities is demonstrated by the few occurrences to the contrary.474 For instance, 
the Mozambique Commission was instructed to carry out an investigation of ‘reported 
atrocities’ and ‘massacres’.475  Although the Commission made findings of violations, the 
language of IHRL was absent from its mandate. A modern example is Palmer Commission, 
which was asked to identify the “facts, circumstances and context” 476  of the Israel’s 
interception of the Gaza flotilla and “recommend ways of avoiding similar incidents in the 
future.”477 The Palmer Commission was intended to de-escalate tensions between Turkey and 
Israel, whose diplomatic relations had deteriorated.478 When establishing the Commission, the 
Secretary-General stated that he hoped “this will have a positive impact on the overall 
Turkey-Israel relationship and the situation in the Middle East.”479 Geoffrey Palmer remarks 
that for “inquiries established for preventive diplomacy objectives, the absence of consent 
may bring into question the utility of having an inquiry at all.”480 Laurie Blank writes that the 
Palmer Commission “was specifically designed to seek a middle ground of sorts between the 
divergent views of Turkey and Israel”.481  
                                                 
471  SC Burundi Mandate, supra note 301; South Sudan Mandate, supra note 348, para. 18(c). 
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2.2 Legal lenses of analysis  
This Section identifies the ‘legal lenses’482 in commissions’ written mandates. Legal lenses 
were articulated with varying specificity. Only two mandates instructed commissions to 
investigate situations with respect to ‘international law’ generally. 483  Most mandates 
identified fields of international law, namely IHRL (2.2.1), IHL (2.2.2) and ICL (2.2.3).  
2.2.1 International human rights law  
Almost all inquiries by the HRC and UNCHR were explicitly mandated to examine alleged 
violations of human rights or the “human rights situation”484 in a concerned state.485 The 
Security Council and the Secretary-General have also established inquiries with human rights 
dimensions. 486  The mandates of some recent HRC commissions identified particular 
violations of concern. The North Korea Commission was instructed to investigate nine types 
of human rights violations, including the right to food and the prohibitions of torture, arbitrary 
detention, and enforced disappearances. 487  The Myanmar Commission was requested to 
establish the facts with respect to arbitrary detention, torture, sexual violence, arbitrary 
killings and enforced disappearances.488  
An instruction to establish the facts with respect to human rights violations might be 
perceived as one-sided where a situation involves armed groups, if states are seen as the sole 
duty-bearers of human rights obligations.489 Such challenges have been experienced by treaty 
bodies, whose work “may appear rather one-sided, given that they cannot hear applications 
against or demand reports from the non-State entity which may, in fact, be committing more 
or worse atrocities than the State party.”490 Andrew Clapham writes:491 
Given that many of the concerns could not be presented as violations of the law of 
armed conflict, the human rights framework has been extended by NGOs to the activity 
of certain armed non-state actors. At the same time UN Commissions of Inquiry and 
Special Rapporteurs found themselves confronted with the need for balanced reporting 
and starting addressing human rights concerns to armed non-state actors in the situations 
under consideration. 
                                                 
482  Théo Boutruche, ‘Selecting and Applying Legal Lenses in Monitoring, Reporting, and Fact-Finding 
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487  North Korea Mandate, supra note 346, para. 5.  
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Human Rights Bodies’, (2007) 47 Va J Int'l L 839-896, at 883.  
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In some situations involving armed groups, mandating authorities instructed commissions to 
examine both ‘violations’ and ‘abuses’ of human rights. For instance, the Security Council 
established an inquiry into “reports of violations of [IHL], [IHRL], and abuses of human 
rights in CAR by all parties.”492 The HRC created an inquiry on “the alleged recent human 
rights violations by military and security forces, and abuses, in Myanmar”.493 This phrasing 
suggests that state organs commit ‘violations’, while ‘abuses’ may be carried out by other 
actors,494 and this interpretation was adopted by recent commissions.495 This broad phrasing 
may permit an even-handed approach in terms of scrutinizing the actions of organized armed 
groups. However, it is also important to recognise when the applicability or scope of 
obligations vary, to avoid giving a false sense of equivalence. The extent to which human 
rights obligations are applicable to these actors have been discussed at length by scholars and 
was addressed by UN atrocity inquiries. Commissions’ interpretations of this issue are 
discussed in Chapter Four. 
2.2.2 International humanitarian law 
Many UN atrocity inquiries were mandated to examine IHL violations, reflecting the fact that 
atrocities occurred in the context of armed conflict. All Security Council commissions 
established since 1992 concerned situations of armed conflict, and were all mandated to 
examine IHL violations.496 Its more recent commissions were instructed to investigate both 
IHL and human rights violations. 497  Several commissions established by the HRC and 
UNCHR held mandates to examine IHL violations.498 This has engendered controversy in 
light of the HRC’s human rights-oriented mandate; this issue is discussed in Section 2.3 
below.  
2.2.3 International criminal law 
Several written mandates referred to ICL or to ‘crimes’ more generally. The Security Council 
has established several inquiries with ICL dimensions. The Yugoslavia Commission and 
Rwanda Commission were instructed to examine grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, 
which are criminalized as war crimes.499  The Yugoslavia Commission was also asked to 
analyse “information submitted pursuant to resolution 771 (1992)”,500 which affirmed that 
individuals who perpetrated grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions were “individually 
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responsible”501 and called upon states to collect information on IHL violations.502 When the 
Yugoslavia Commission’s mandating resolution is read together with Resolution 771, a focus 
on individual criminal responsibility is discernible. HRC-led commissions have been 
instructed to investigate violations which might amount to crimes against humanity,503 or war 
crimes,504 or international crimes generally.505 Other HRC-led commissions were instructed to 
investigate violations and “related crimes” 506  or “crimes perpetrated”. 507  The Secretary-
General has crafted such mandates only occasionally, such as when mandating the Guinea 
Commission to “qualify the crimes perpetrated”.508 
An ICL lens may also be inferred from instructions to point to “possible criminal 
responsibility” 509  and to identify “alleged perpetrators” 510  or “those responsible” 511  for 
violations of human rights and IHL. This inference is drawn from the fact that individuals are 
responsible under international law for committing violations recognised as international 
crimes. Many of these mandates were formulated by the HRC. It may be similarly queried 
whether the HRC trespasses its mandate when establishing inquiries into international crimes. 
This issue is discussed in Section 2.3 below. 
2.3 Challenges to legal lenses of HRC-led inquiries 
Some scholars have questioned the institutional competence of the HRC to establish inquiries 
and other mechanisms to investigate violations beyond IHRL.512 Daphne Richemond-Barak 
writes, “no matter how laudable the goal of enforcing IHL, the automatic application of IHL 
by the [HRC] finds legal support neither in theory or in practice.”513 Such a jurisdictional 
overstep would likely create an internal irregularity rather than being ultra vires the UN as a 
whole.514 However, concerned states and other stakeholders might use this ground to refuse to 
cooperate with an inquiry or challenge its findings. As the HRC is the most prolific mandating 
authority, this challenge is highly relevant to current and future UN atrocity inquiries. This 
Section analyses whether the HRC is competent to instruct commissions to examine IHL and 
ICL, by reference to principles of international institutional law. It examines three possible 
bases: conferral of competence by the General Assembly (2.3.1); competence implied from 
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the responsibility to promote and protect human rights (2.3.2); or developed in practice 
(2.3.3). 
2.3.1 Conferral of competence by the General Assembly 
As an international organisation, the UN’s rights and duties “depend upon its purposes and 
functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice.”515 
Implied powers are conferred “by necessary implication as being essential to the performance 
of its duties.”516 Like other international organisations, the UN acts through its organs, which 
may establish subsidiary bodies to assist in fulfilling their functions.517 UN commissions of 
inquiry are considered as subsidiary bodies of their mandating authorities. 518  HRC-led 
inquiries have an extra degree of subsidiarity due to the HRC’s position as a subsidiary of the 
General Assembly.  
One possibility is that the HRC acquired competence to examine IHL and ICL by the General 
Assembly, which may consider any matters within the scope of the Charter.519 Chinkin argues 
that the HRC shares its parent’s “residual responsibility for international peace and 
security”.520 As a subsidiary body, the HRC’s functions and powers are primarily located in 
its mandating resolution, GA Resolution 60/251. The Preamble recognizes that “development, 
peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing”. It provides that 
the HRC is responsible for “promoting universal respect for the protection of all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms”, 521  addressing situations of violations of human rights, and 
making recommendations. This resolution further provides that the HRC should promote “full 
implementation of human rights obligations undertaken by States”522 and does not mention 
individual responsibility for violations. There is no mention of IHL or ICL in its mandating 
resolution, nor were those legal fields discussed in General Assembly debates.523  
There is a glimmer of reference to IHL in subsequent resolutions relevant to the HRC’s 
institutional framework. In 2007, the HRC adopted its ‘Institution-building package’ which 
set out its monitoring and reporting mechanisms. That resolution stated that in respect of 
Universal Periodic Review, “given the complementary and mutually interrelated nature of 
[IHRL] and [IHL], the review shall take into account applicable [IHL].”524 The HRC also has 
a confidential complaints procedure to address “consistent patterns of gross and reliably 
attested violations of all human rights and all fundamental freedoms”.525 OHCHR advises that 
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the term ‘gross violations’ in this context includes “breaches of [IHL] or threat to peace”.526 
However, the limited information that is publicly available about this process indicates that 
the HRC has focused on human rights concerns. 527  The General Assembly endorsed the 
HRC’s institution-building package,528 and when conducting a general review of the HRC in 
2011, affirmed its human rights mandate but did not recognise its competence in IHL or 
ICL.529  
GA Resolution 60/251 provides that the HRC assumed all “mandates, mechanisms, functions 
and responsibilities” of UNCHR, 530  so another possibility is that the HRC might have 
inherited IHL and ICL competence from its predecessor. ECOSOC resolutions pertaining to 
UNCHR’s powers did not mention IHL but in practice, UNCHR instructed two inquiries to 
investigate IHL violations.531 Elvira Domínguez-Redondo observes that by the end of the 
1990s, “humanitarian standards were becoming a normal component within the work of 
[UNCHR] and its subsidiary organs”.532 Alston and others posit that ECOSOC’s support of 
UNCHR’s IHL activities impliedly brought this field within its mandate, which was then 
inherited by the HRC.533 Richemond-Barack disagrees, arguing that the HRC was a clean 
break, so that even if UNCHR had an IHL mandate, it did not transfer to the HRC.534  
Similar arguments might be made in respect of UNCHR’s mandate with respect to ICL, but its 
record of practice is patchier. UNCHR resolved that commissions of inquiry “can be 
complementary to the essential role of judicial mechanisms in protecting human rights and 
combating impunity” 535  but its two commissions were not instructed to investigate 
international crimes, nor referred to ICL. 536  A few special rapporteurs analysed whether 
violations amounted to international crimes, but their written mandates did not mention 
ICL.537  
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2.3.2 Competence implied from human rights function 
The HRC’s competence to consider IHL and ICL might spring from the rights to the truth and 
a remedy, as part of its human rights mandate.538 The General Assembly and HRC recognise 
the right to truth in respect of serious violations of human rights and IHL.539 Truth-seeking 
remedies are also affirmed in the General Assembly’s Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human 
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Principles on the 
Right to a Remedy).540 The HRC has invited its mechanisms to take into account “the issue of 
the right to the truth”541 in their work. Flowing from this recognition, the HRC might be 
empowered to establish mechanisms to examine IHL and ICL to promote the rights to truth 
and a remedy. 
This argument has not usually been accepted as a basis for including IHL and ICL within the 
jurisdiction of bodies competent to assess individual complaints of human rights violations.542 
The Human Rights Committee has not made findings of IHL violations when assessing 
individual communications. Most regional human rights courts had regard to IHL only in 
order to interpret the scope of human rights in armed conflicts.543 An exception is a line of 
jurisprudence from the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights in which findings of 
IHL violations were made.544 However, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) 
deemed that approach as exceeding the Commission’s jurisdiction.545 Silja Vöneky sees the 
competence of human rights bodies for violations of IHL as “indirect” as each body “works 
under a particular mandate that is distinct from the responsibility of states to respect and 
ensure respect for [IHL].”546 Escorihuela reaches a similar view, stating “no human rights 
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body has jurisdiction over the lex specialis just because they have jurisdiction over the 
supposed lex generalis”.547 Richemond-Barak writes that human rights courts’ practice of 
interpreting human rights in light of IHL, without pronouncing on IHL violations, “reveals the 
weakness of the claim that the [HRC] has no choice but to apply IHL under the lex specialis 
doctrine.”548  
Bodies competent to adjudicate allegations of human rights violations have occasionally had 
regard to ICL, but through the lens of human rights law. The Human Rights Committee 
frames its findings as violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
1966 (ICCPR), even when applicants characterised them as crimes against humanity.549 The 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has occasionally considered the criminal nature of 
conduct when assessing alleged violations of the right to a fair trial. In Korbely v. Hungary, 
the ECHR examined whether the applicant’s conduct amounted to crimes against humanity,550 
and in Kononov v. Latvia, it examined if conduct amounted to war crimes.551 In both cases, 
the Court did not independently determine criminal responsibility, but considered whether the 
acts, when committed, were recognised as crimes.552 In Almonacid-Arellano and others v. 
Chile, the IACtHR characterised murder as a crime against humanity when determining that 
an amnesty law was incompatible with the duty to investigate and prosecute serious violations 
and give effect to the right to truth.553 However, the IACtHR has also held that it is not 
necessary to qualify incidents as international crimes in order to find that the state must 
investigate and prosecute.554 In La Cantuta v. Perú, the IACtHR observed that it “is not a 
criminal court with power to ascertain liability of individual persons for criminal acts”, and 
that in order to establish a violation of rights, “it is not necessary to determine the 
responsibility of its author or their intention, nor is it necessary to identify individually the 
agents who are attributed with the violation”.555 
In general, human rights bodies have engaged with IHL and ICL only to the extent necessary 
to assess violations of human rights recognised in specific instruments. These bodies are 
generally reluctant to make findings of IHL violations and international crimes, even when 
doing so might promote the right to truth. However, the HRC has a broader mandate to 
promote human rights and address situations of concern, rather than to adjudicate individual 
complaints of violations. The goals of giving effect to the rights to truth and a remedy might 
be a possible basis for the HRC’s competence to apply IHL and ICL, but it also marks a point 
of departure from human rights bodies with authority to determine individual complaints. 
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From the perspective of international institutional law, the HRC’s own practice may be 
relevant to the scope of its competence. This potential basis for the HRC’s competence to 
consider matters beyond IHRL is discussed next.  
2.3.3 Competence developed through organisational practice 
The practice of an international organisation is depicted as both a source and interpretive aid 
of its rules.556 Relevant for interpretation is an international organisation’s practice, including 
that of its organs557 and member states.558 The upshot of the functionalist theory of implied 
powers is that “many instances of application can be regarded as implicit acts of 
interpretation”; 559  this can lead to organisational mission creep. 560  Whether a subsidiary 
body’s practice can shape its own powers remains unclear. Commentary has analysed the 
practice of judicial bodies established by non-judicial organs, where the former’s implied 
powers may be explained as an inherent part of the judicial function.561  Considering the 
HRC’s subsidiarity and the lack of clarity regarding the nature of subsidiaries’ practice, it is 
apposite to examine responses of the General Assembly as the HRC’s parent organ, as well as 
the practice of the HRC and its member states. These bodies provide a forum for member 
states to articulate their views and build up a repository of practice which can indicate the 
scope of the HRC’s powers. 
Inclusion of IHL and ICL in some commissions’ mandates indicates that the HRC considers 
these fields as within its competence. Alston, in his capacity as Special Rapporteur, observes 
that the HRC has acquiesced to IHL developments in special procedures’ mandates “through 
its response to the reports, traditionally in the form of resolutions”562 endorsing or approving 
the mandate-holder’s activities. The HRC generally acknowledged commissions’ findings of 
IHL violations, even where written mandates did not mention IHL.563 For instance, when 
welcoming a report of the Syria Commission which found IHL violations, 564  the HRC 
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(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004) at 2; Nigel White, The Law of International Organisations (2nd ed, 
New York: Juris Publishing, 2005) at 84; Derek Bowett, ‘The Impact of the U.N. Structure, Including That of 
the Specialized Agencies, on the Law of International Organization’, (1970) 64 Am Soc'y Int'l L Proc 48-51, 
at 49; Jan Klabbers, ‘International Institutions’, in James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi (eds), The 
Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2012) 228-244, at 231.  
561  Danesh Sarooshi, ‘The Legal Framework Governing United Nations Subsidiary Organs’, (1997) 67(1) British 
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562  Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, UN Doc. A/62/265, 16 
August 2007, para. 53 [Extrajudicial Executions SR Report]. 
563  E.g., HRC Res. 22/29, 15 April 2013, Preamble and HRC Res. 9/18, 24 September 2008, para. 5. 
564  Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012 [Syria Third Report].  
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resolved that it was imperative to investigate violations including war crimes.565 HRC practice 
of acknowledging commissions’ findings of international crimes seems to be guided by 
whether the written mandate had an ICL component. The HRC acknowledged findings of 
crimes against humanity by the Syria Commission and North Korea Commission;566 both 
were instructed to examine such crimes. After the Eritrea Commission presented a report that 
was limited to human rights violations, citing the scope of its written mandate,567 the HRC 
extended its mandate to include crimes against humanity568 and subsequently acknowledged 
its ICL findings.569 By contrast, ICL findings by commissions whose written mandates lacked 
ICL components were not affirmed as strongly.570 For instance, when welcoming the Israeli 
Settlements Commission’s report, the HRC referred to IHL but not ICL,571 even though the 
Commission characterised the transfer of Israeli citizens as an international crime.572  
Turning to the practice of HRC member states, a majority of voting members approved of 
IHL and ICL components to commissions’ written mandates, while a minority voiced 
opposition. For instance, Canada opposed the Lebanon Commission’s mandate to examine 
IHL:573 
As the [UN’s] principal body responsible for human rights, this was an opportunity for 
the [HRC] to focus specifically on the human rights concerns emanating from the 
conflict, reflecting its mandate and its competence. The armed conflict that was 
occurring in Israel and Lebanon had resulted in actions that were contrary to [IHL] and 
these should be pursued in other appropriate contexts by the international community. 
In the past, the US challenged HRC mandate-holders’ competence to apply IHL, in line with its 
view that human rights and IHL were mutually exclusive.574 The US now accepts that IHRL 
applies in armed conflict with IHL as the “controlling body of law”.575 It has also sponsored 
HRC resolutions condemning IHL violations. 576  However, in 2014, voting against the 
establishment of the Gaza Commission, the US objected to the recommendation that 
                                                 
565  HRC Res. 21/26, para. 10 (emphasis added).  
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Switzerland reconvene the conference of High Contracting Parties to Geneva Convention IV577 
as outside the HRC’s mandate.578  
A minority of states have objected to the HRC’s engagement with themes of accountability and 
ICL. For instance, when debating a resolution on Syria,579 India stated that the text “unduly 
focused on accountability” and that the HRC “should not confuse its mandate with the 
humanitarian one.” 580  Pakistan stated that mandate-holders’ statements that crimes against 
humanity were likely to have been committed in Syria should be recalled.581 Although Russia 
voted for a resolution endorsing the Goldstone Commission’s recommendations, it stated that 
some provisions “went beyond the scope of the Mission, in particular recommendations to the 
[ICC] and the Security Council, as well as calls on States to prosecute war crimes”.582 Most 
HRC member states have not voiced opposition; a majority supported the inclusion of ‘crimes 
against humanity’ in some mandates, 583  and the Syria Commission’s draft mandate was 
amended to include this term.584 
General Assembly practice is sparser; it has not responded to all HRC commissions’ reports.585 
Nonetheless, its practice indicates general support for the HRC’s engagement with IHL and 
ICL. For instance, responding to the Goldstone Commission’s report, the Assembly called upon 
Israel to investigate “serious violations of [IHL] and [IHRL] reported by the Fact-Finding 
Mission”.586 The Assembly recognised the North Korea Commission’s finding of “reasonable 
grounds to believe that crimes against humanity have been committed”587 when recommending 
that the Security Council refer that situation to the ICC. Perhaps the most demonstrative 
acceptance of the HRC’s competence was in respect of the Syria Commission. In 2013, the 
General Assembly welcomed the Syria Commission’s report and stressed the need to conduct 
an international investigation into violations, “including those that may amount to crimes 
against humanity and war crimes”.588 In 2016, the Assembly created the IIIM and instructed it 
to “closely cooperate” with the Syria Commission to collect and analyse evidence of IHL and 
human rights violations. 589  These statements indicate that the Assembly approved of the 
Commission’s engagement with IHL and ICL. In general, the above practice indicates that most 
HRC member states and the General Assembly have accepted or at least acquiesced to the 
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HRC’s practice of establishing commissions to investigate IHL violations and international 
crimes. 
3. Impartiality of Written Mandates 
In order for inquiries to be impartial and insulated from political forces surrounding their 
establishment, written mandates must allow for the examination of relevant events, actors and 
contexts. The quality of impartiality, recognised in various fact-finding instruments,590 has 
been variously defined as “equal treatment of all rivals or disputants; fairness”591 and “not 
prejudiced towards or against any particular side or party; fair; unbiased.”592 These definitions 
invoke different understandings of the concept. While even-handedness implies equal 
treatment, this may not be required if impartiality is understood as ‘absence of prejudice’. In 
any case, where the mandate indicates elements of bias or prejudgment, the commission may 
be perceived as politicised and lacking in objectivity. Impartiality is therefore essential for 
commissions’ narratives to be accepted as authoritative, their truth-finding efforts to be 
recognised as sincere, and their calls for accountability to be taken seriously.  
This Section identifies key aspects of written mandates that generated impartiality challenges, 
namely geographic parameters (3.1), temporal scope (3.2), actors under scrutiny (3.3) and 
prejudgment of findings (3.4). Commissions’ efforts to protect and restore impartiality in their 
mandates are detailed in Chapter Three. 
3.1 Geographic parameters  
Written mandates consistently identified the geographic scope of the situation under scrutiny. 
Usually commissions were instructed to examine the situation in a concerned state. 593 
Sometimes particular regions were specified. For example, commissions were asked to 
examine alleged violations in the Darfur region of Sudan 594  and in Rakhine State, 
Myanmar.595 The Syria Commission was mandated to examine specific localities alongside its 
general mandate with respect to Syria.596 
The geographic scope of the mandate was problematic in respect of several HRC inquiries 
established into situations of armed conflict involving Israel. In 2006, the HRC established an 
inquiry into “systematic targeting and killing of civilians by Israel in Lebanon.”597 In 2009, 
the Goldstone Commission was mandated to investigate violations “by the occupying Power, 
Israel, against the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip”.598 In 2014, an inquiry was launched into violations 
“in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, particularly in the occupied 
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Gaza Strip”.599 These written mandates did not include violations occurring on the territory of 
Israel. There was significant pushback from some HRC members who considered these 
resolutions as biased against Israel.600 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Israel refused to cooperate with 
all these commissions. Commissions took different approaches towards remedying one-sided 
mandates; these are discussed in Chapter Three.  
3.2 Temporal scope 
Mandating authorities have taken different approaches towards identifying the temporal scope 
of an inquiry. Where an inquiry is established in respect of a long-standing situation of 
concern, mandating authorities tended not to identify a particular time period. For instance, 
the Eritrea Commission was simply instructed to investigate “all alleged violations of human 
rights in Eritrea”.601 A similarly broad mandate was held by the North Korea Commission.602 
Open-ended mandates were also held by commissions investigating ongoing conflicts. For 
instance, the Syria Commission was instructed to investigate violations in Syria “since March 
2011”.603  
A closed time period was generally utilised when an inquiry concerned a time-bound event. 
For instance, the Cambodia Commission was instructed to examine the period 1975 to 
1979,604 tracking the regime of Democratic Kampuchea. The Guinea Commission was asked 
to investigate “events of 28 September 2009 in Guinea and the related events in their 
immediate aftermath”.605 Although these mandates specified particular dates, some flexibility 
is visible in directions to consider ‘related events’. The mandates of HRC inquiries into 
Operation Cast Lead and Operation Protective Edge struck a compromise in specifying 
investigations to be conducted into violations in the context of the military operations, 
“whether before, during or after”.606 This broad framing enabled commissions to investigate 
incidents of relevance to the general situation, while focussing on specific operations. 
The temporal scope of some mandates was criticised as producing incomplete narratives. A 
case in point is the situation of Burundi, in respect of which the UN established several 
inquiries to examine violence in the 1990s and in 2015.607 However, none were mandated to 
examine earlier uprisings, including what one inquiry termed a “genocidal repression”608 in 
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1972. A mission established in 2005 to consider the utility of a ‘judicial’ inquiry 
reproached:609  
In a society deeply divided along ethnic lines, where the inter-ethnic killings in 1965, 
1972, 1988, 1991 and 1993 form part of the same whole, limiting the mandate of any 
inquiry to a single cycle of massacres and, worse still, characterizing them, and them 
alone, as genocide, was considered by many in Burundi as a partial and biased account 
of the events, and one oblivious to the suffering of an entire ethnic group, by far the 
largest. In a society where “genocide” is not only a legal characterization of a crime but 
a political statement and global attribution of guilt to an entire ethnic group, the 1996 
report had a divisive effect on Burundian society and contributed to the perception of a 
biased international community. The call for the establishment of a commission of 
inquiry whose temporal jurisdiction extends over four decades of Burundi recent history 
is thus an appeal for fairness in recounting the historical truth and putting the 1993 
massacres in historical perspective. It was also a plea for recognition that members of 
all ethnic groups were at different times both victims and perpetrators of the same 
crimes.  
Writing in 2006, Romana Schweiger observes that these limited mandates “neither satisfied 
the need for justice through criminal prosecution, nor the need for producing an objective 
historical record.” 610  The modalities of a comprehensive truth-seeking mechanism were 
subject to peace negotiations 611  and the resulting national truth commission is at last 
operational.612 Its temporal scope is from 1 July 1962 until 4 December 2008. The UN has 
continued to establish inquiries into Burundi with temporal limits; the HRC’s most recent 
inquiry was mandated to investigate violations “since April 2015”.613 Burundi objected to the 
series of limited mandates and lack of follow-up when refusing to cooperate with the latest 
inquiry, stating: “[t]he people of Burundi had memories of the violence that had occurred until 
1994, however, the [UN] had remained silent on these crimes. Why was the [UN] only 
focusing on crimes committed from 2015?”614 
By limiting the temporal scope in each case, mandating authorities did not appear to intend for 
commissions to produce an authoritative overarching historical narrative or conduct 
comprehensive truth-seeking. In contexts such as Burundi, a short-term focus may not permit 
a full appreciation of the cyclical nature of violence and its drivers, so root causes remain 
unaddressed. While these commissions were designed to inquire into specific periods of 
heightened unrest to focus attention and raise alert, they did not appear to have been intended 
to hold a strong preventative function. 
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3.3 Actors under scrutiny  
An impartial mandate must permit examination of all relevant actors suspected of committing 
atrocities. In situations where atrocities were suspected on the part of the government, 
mandates focussed on human rights violations in concerned territories. For instance, the 
commissions on Eritrea and North Korea were asked to investigate alleged human rights 
violations. 615  In situations of sporadic violence involving clashes between governmental 
forces and militants, mandating authorities referred to human rights ‘violations’ and ‘abuses’, 
which might also encompass actions of non-state actors. For instance, the Myanmar 
Commission was asked to establish facts regarding alleged human rights violations “by 
military and security forces” as well as “abuses”.616  
In situations of violence amounting to armed conflict, an impartial mandate must involve an 
examination of all parties. This issue not only affects impartiality, but the fact-finding process 
itself, as to “under IHL, rules on the conduct of hostilities necessitate establishing facts with 
regard to the behaviour of the other party.”617 Some written mandates did not mention actors, 
but rather instructed commissions to examine violations in the relevant territory. 618  The 
Security Council instructed its inquiries on Darfur and the CAR to investigate violations “by 
all parties” to armed conflicts.619  
In some cases, identification of particular parties to a conflict but not others generated 
criticisms of bias. All such mandates were in respect of HRC-led inquiries involving Israel. 
The HRC’s first inquiry concerned the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The 
Lebanon Commission was asked to investigate civilian deaths “by Israel in Lebanon” and the 
“deadly impact of Israeli attacks”,620 omitting the other party to the conflict. Voting against 
that resolution, Canada stated that as it did not consider the responsibilities of all parties, it 
was not constructive in promoting human rights, the rule of law, or regional stability.621 In 
abstaining, Switzerland considered the mandate “somewhat unbalanced and selective”.622 
Also in 2006, the Beit Hanoun Commission was asked to recommend ways “to protect 
Palestinian civilians against any further Israeli assaults”. 623  The Goldstone Commission’s 
original mandate was to investigate violations “by the occupying Power, Israel, against the 
Palestinian people”. 624  Israel rejected these resolutions as biased. 625  Although the written 
mandate of the 2014 Gaza Commission did not single out Israel, the HRC had not fully 
heeded earlier criticisms, as its geographic scope was limited to violations “in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory.”626  
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The HRC’s repeated practice of establishing mandates which refer to alleged violations by 
one party is unhelpful. Chinkin writes that the HRC’s practice suggests that it lacks “political 
sensibility”,627 as such mandates predictably lead to non-cooperation by concerned states. 
Such mandates do not create ideal conditions for a principled inquiry and make it very 
difficult for commissions to alleviate suspicions that they are simply another type of politics.  
3.4 Prejudgment of findings  
As a general principle, mandates should not presume the existence of facts that are ostensibly 
yet to be found. Such prejudgment may suggest that a fact-finding exercise is not genuine and 
is merely a conduit for political objectives. Fact-finding guidelines caution against prejudging 
findings in the mandate. The Belgrade Rules provide that the mandate should not prejudge the 
issues to be investigated, the mission’s work or its findings.628 OHCHR writes that mandates 
should “be drafted in such a way as to enable the [commission] to conduct its work in line 
with best practice methodology, without prejudging any aspects of its work.”629 
Some UN inquiries into incidents whose facts were unclear were formulated so as not to 
prejudge findings.630 However, the mandates of some atrocity inquiries suggested predisposed 
outcomes. The HRC has condemned violations of human rights and IHL when establishing 
inquiries ostensibly to investigate them. Sometimes, these conclusions were expressed in the 
written mandates, such as the Lebanon Commission’s instruction to investigate “systematic 
targeting and killings of civilians by Israel”.631 The original written mandate of the Goldstone 
Commission instructed that body to “investigate all violations of [IHRL] and [IHL] by the 
occupying Power, Israel, against the Palestinian people…”632 Israel rejected the mandate on 
the basis that it “prejudges the issue at hand, determining at the outset that Israel has 
perpetrated grave violations of human rights and implying that Israel has deliberately targeted 
civilians and medical facilities…”633 In 2014, many states did not support the establishment of 
an inquiry into Operation Protective Shield for similar reasons. EU members abstained on the 
basis that the text “prejudges the outcome of the investigation by making legal statements”.634 
In 2018, Australia voted against establishing an inquiry into violations in the context of 
civilian protests in Palestine as it was “concerned that the language of the draft resolution 
prejudged the outcome of the inquiry.”635 In that case, the HRC condemned “disproportionate 
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and indiscriminate use of force by the Israeli occupying forces against Palestinian civilians, 
including in the context of peaceful protests” 636  in violation of IHL, IHRL and UN 
resolutions. In some cases, operative paragraphs of mandating resolutions instructed 
commissions to examine ‘alleged’ violations, 637  formally insulating mandates from 
prejudgment, while condemning violations elsewhere in the document. The HRC frequently 
adopts this practice,638 but it is not alone. In 2013, the Security Council condemned violations 
of IHL and human rights when establishing the CAR Commission.639 In other cases, the 
Security Council has been more reserved. When establishing the Yugoslavia Commission, the 
Council expressed alarm at “continuing reports”640 of violations, and when creating the Darfur 
Commission, urged parties to respect IHL and human rights and instructed the Commission to 
investigate “reports of violations” and “determine also whether or not acts of genocide have 
occurred”.641 
Not every recognition of violations amounts to predetermination. The HRC is empowered to 
“respond promptly to human rights emergencies”,642 requiring situations of concern to have 
been recognised as such in order for an inquiry to be established. Moreover, in practice, the 
political momentum for HRC members to decide to establish in inquiry is often built through 
other credible reports of violations. For instance, when establishing the North Korea 
Commission, the HRC took note of reports over a period of ten years by the Special 
Rapporteur,643 and condemned human rights violations in the DPRK on the basis of those 
reports.644 The creation of inquiries in such circumstances is underscored by the ECOSOC 
resolution authorising UNCHR to investigate “situations which reveal a consistent pattern of 
violations of human rights”.645 Unlike investigations of genuinely unknown or disputed facts, 
UN atrocity inquiries are usually established to examine suspected violations in order to 
expose their gravity and inspire corrective action. Whether recognition of violations amounts 
to wrongful prejudgment should be considered in light of the wider context.  
4. Appointment and Composition of Commissions  
Mandating authorities appoint individuals to serve on UN atrocity inquiries. This Section 
examines how mandating authorities’ appointment processes and selections informed 
commissions’ roles and functions. Section 4.1 discusses mandating authorities’ ad hoc 
appointment processes and efforts to render these more transparent and standardised. Section 
4.2 discerns the emphasis placed on commissioner independence and impartiality in different 
inquiry settings and moments, and safeguard mechanisms to address concerns of bias. Finally, 
individuals are appointed in light of their education, skills and expertise, and carry those 
                                                 
636  Gaza Protests Mandate, supra note 340, para. 1.  
637  E.g., Eritrea Mandate, supra note 347, para. 8. 
638  E.g., East Timor Mandate, supra note 338, para. 2; UNCHR Gaza Mandate, supra note 339 and Libya 
Mandate, supra note 343, para. 1.  
639  CAR Mandate, supra note 304, para. 17.  
640  Yugoslavia Mandate, supra note 290, Preamble. 
641  Darfur Mandate, supra note 303, para. 12. 
642  GA Res. 60/251, para. 5(f).  
643  North Korea Mandate, supra note 346, Preamble.  
644  Ibid., para. 1.  
645  ECOSOC Res. 1235 (XLII), para. 3 (emphasis added).  
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qualities with them as commissioners. Section 4.3 examines mandating authorities’ practice 
with respect to the expertise deemed relevant to commissions’ mandates.  
4.1 Appointment processes  
The decision on the composition of a UN atrocity inquiry normally rests with the mandating 
authority, which may appoint commissioners directly or instruct another UN organ to do so on 
its behalf. The Security Council and General Assembly have requested the Secretary-General 
to appoint commissioners to inquiries established by them.646 Commissions established by the 
Secretary-General have been appointed in different ways. The Secretary-General appointed 
some commissioners directly647 and OHCHR was involved in other selection decisions.648 The 
Secretary-General consulted with ECOWAS and the AU regarding the Guinea 
Commission,649 and the Palmer Commission was established after “intensive consultations” 
with Turkey and Israel.650 HRC-led inquiries are appointed by the President of the Council, 
who “generally seeks the views of States, [NGOs] and OHCHR regarding possible 
candidates”.651  Experts registered with OHCHR may be considered for appointment, and 
OHCHR reviews potential candidates, but the final decision is taken by the President.652 
While processes differ for various mandating authorities, all are ad hoc appointments.  
There has been periodic interest in establishing lists of experts eligible for appointment to UN 
inquiries. A roster would make the appointment process more transparent and limit a 
mandating authority’s ability to select individuals on the basis of political factors. The use of a 
roster is not unknown in the UN system. Some experts are appointed from a roster, such as 
panels of experts attached to Security Council sanctions committees, 653  experts on 
investigations into biological and chemical weapons 654  and special procedures mandate-
holders.655 While there have been initiatives to establish rosters of fact-finders, these have not 
been embraced in practice. Such initiatives include the General Assembly’s UN Panel for 
Inquiry and Conciliation,656 its instruction in 1967 for the Secretary-General to establish a 
roster of fact-finding experts657 and provision in the 1991 Declaration for the Secretary-
                                                 
646  Yugoslavia Mandate, supra note 290; Rwanda Mandate, supra note 296; Darfur Mandate, supra note 303; 
CAR Mandate, supra note 304; Cambodia Mandate, supra note 323.  
647  Sri Lanka Report, supra note 29. 
648  Abidjan Report, supra note 43, para. 2; Timor-Leste Report, supra note 376, para. 6.  
649  Guinea Report, supra note 39, para. 6.  
650  Palmer Mandate, supra note 315. 
651  OHCHR Guidance and Practice, supra note 63, at 18 
652  Ibid., at 18. 
653  United Nations, ‘Security Council Affairs Division Roster of Experts’, available at 
http://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/expert-roster (accessed 1 May 2018). 
654  UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, ‘Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of 
Chemical and Biological Weapons’, available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/secretary-general-
mechanism (accessed 1 May 2018). 
655  Letter from the Chairperson of the Coordination Committee of Special Procedures to the President of the 
Human Rights Council dated 4 September 2007, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/docs/cclettertechnical.pdf (accessed 1 May 2018). 
656  Articles Relating to the Composition and Use of the Panel for Inquiry and Conciliation, Art. 1, annexed to 
GA Res. 268D (III), 28 April 1949. See Douglas Coster, ‘The Interim Committee of the General Assembly: 
An Appraisal’, (1949) 3(3) International Organization 444-458, at 455. 
657  GA Res. 2329 (XXII), 18 December 1967. See Antonio Cassese, ‘Fostering Increased Conformity with 
International Standards: Monitoring and Institutional Fact-Finding’, in Antonio Cassese (ed.), Realizing 
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General to maintain lists of experts available for fact-finding missions.658 There has been a 
recent resurgence in calls to establish a roster for commissions. 659  To date, appointment 
processes remain ad hoc and largely opaque. 
4.2 Commissioner independence and impartiality  
Fact-finding guidelines provide that commissioners must “have a proven record of 
independence and impartiality”,660 act in their personal capacity and not be instructed by 
governments or other actors.661 Impartiality may be understood as a commissioner’s ability 
“to abstract him/herself from his prior opinions, to reduce oneself to one’s function, to 
identify in oneself what are sources of bias”,662 while independence refers to a lack of ties or 
dependence upon parties to a dispute or other relevant actors. Ratner argues that independence 
is crucial for UN human rights fact-finding bodies, as it “creates distance between the report 
and those who will use it, permitting the [Secretary-General] or others seeking to promote 
accountability to take a sort of political cover behind the reputation of the commissioners.”663 
The importance of independence and impartiality wax and wane across temporal and 
institutional contexts. This Section outlines these different emphases (4.2.1), the 
contemporary problem of prior statements (4.2.2) and independence and impartiality 
safeguards in practice (4.2.3). 
4.2.1 Emphasis on independence and impartiality  
Commissioners serving on international atrocity inquiries have not always served in their 
personal capacity. Historic inquiries such as the 1919 Commission and the UNWCC were 
composed of representatives of Allied governments. Early UN atrocity inquiries were 
similarly composed of representatives of UN member states. The President of the General 
Assembly identified the member states which would serve on the Mozambique 
Commission,664  and individual commissioners were appointed by their governments.665  A 
similar procedure was adopted in respect of the Vietnam Commission.666 Acceptance of this 
practice was illustrated by draft rules on fact-finding prepared in 1970 by the Secretary-
General (Draft Model Rules 1970) which provided that fact-finding bodies could be composed 
of ‘individuals’ or ‘states’.667  
Critiques centring on lack of independence began to surface in the 1970s in relation to UN 
human rights bodies composed of representatives of states which did not have friendly 
                                                                                                                                                         
Utopia: The Future of International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2012) 295-303 [Cassese 2012] and Kemileva et al, 
supra note 440, at 30. 
658  1991 Declaration, supra note 25, Art. 14.  
659  Cassese 2012, supra note 657, at 303. 
660  OHCHR Guidance and Practice, supra note 63, at 19. 
661  1991 Declaration, supra note 25, Art. 25; Principles Against Impunity, supra note 54, Principle 7. 
662  Mégret 2011, supra note 51, at 44. 
663  Ratner 2015, supra note 401, at 106.  
664  GA Res. 3144 (XXVIII) 12 December 1973, para. 1 and Mozambique Report, supra note 253, para. 8.  
665  Mozambique Report, supra note 253, para.10. 
666  Vietnam Report, supra note 273, at 5. 
667  Draft Model Rules of procedure suggested by the Secretary-General of the UN for ad hoc bodies of the 
United Nations entrusted with studies of particular situations alleged to reveal a consistent pattern of 
violations of human rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1021/Rev.1, 30 October 1970, rule 4 [Draft Model Rules 1970]. 
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relations with states under scrutiny.668 For instance, a General Assembly committee which 
investigated the human rights situation in Israeli-occupied territories was composed of 
individuals from Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Somalia and Yugoslavia,669 where the two latter states 
had no diplomatic relations with Israel. Israel protested its composition, arguing that unless 
fact-finding was carried out under conditions ensuring objectivity, it was a “worthless 
exercise, that simply converts the [UN] itself into a vehicle for propaganda and political 
warfare.”670 The independence and impartiality of the Working Group on Southern Africa was 
similarly brought into question as three of its six members were state representatives and at 
least three members had previously made critical statements concerning the racial policies of 
South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia.671  
Efforts have since been made to improve the independence and impartiality of UN fact-
finding. In 1970, ECOSOC reported that the composition of a human rights body “must be 
such as to provide a reliable guarantee of its competence and impartiality.”672 The Draft 
Model Rules 1970 proposed to solemnise commissioners’ commitment to independence 
through a declaration, similar to a judicial oath.673 When that document was revised by a 
UNCHR working group, this rule was removed, apparently because “it would not be 
appropriate to require this solemn declaration from representatives of States”.674 In 2015, 
OHCHR formulated model rules of procedure (OHCHR Model Rules) which provide that 
commissioners must promise to exercise their functions “independently, impartially, loyally 
and conscientiously... without seeking or accepting instructions from any Government or any 
other source.”675 
Against this background, independence and impartiality are generally required of individuals 
serving on modern UN atrocity inquiries. In almost all cases, commissioners were appointed 
in their personal capacity. 676  For instance, the Guinea Commission’s terms of reference 
provided that it was to be composed of three members with “a reputation for probity and 
                                                 
668  Franck and Fairley, supra note 91, at 313.  
669  The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the 
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4.4. 
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Paragraph 1 of Security Council Resolution 935 (1994) of 1 July 1994, UN Doc. S/1994/879, 26 July 1994, 
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impartiality.”677 The Palmer Commission is an exception to this trend, as it was composed of 
representatives of Turkey and Israel alongside two independent commissioners.678  As its 
central goal was to improve diplomatic relations,679 the Palmer Commission finds synergies 
with inquiry under the Hague Conventions, where states participate in appointing 
commissioners and an inquiry requires the inclusion of a neutral element, rather than fully 
independent commissioners.680 
4.2.2 The problem of prior statements  
UN regulations and guidelines acknowledge that prior statements may affect the impartiality 
and independence of fact-finding. According to the Regulations for Experts on Mission, which 
apply to commissioners,681 experts must avoid “any kind of public pronouncement that may 
adversely reflect on their status, or on the integrity, independence and impartiality that are 
required by that status.”682 A 2015 guidance document for commissions of inquiry published 
by OHCHR (OHCHR Guidance and Practice) states that it is essential that “the background 
of candidates, prior public statements or political or other affiliations do not affect their 
independence or impartiality, or create perceptions of bias.” 683  As observed by Geoffrey 
Robertson, professional expertise is insufficient to guard against bias, as “some undoubted 
experts will already have committed themselves to an opinion, and could therefore be 
criticised for pre-judgment.”684 
Although commissions are supposed to be impartial, a certain tension between impartiality 
and activism is seen in practice, particularly in relation to HRC-led inquiries. Several 
commissioners were accused of bias based on their prior statements. 685 For example, UN 
Watch, an NGO, petitioned for Christine Chinkin to recuse herself from the Goldstone 
Commission because of a public letter which she had signed onto characterising Israeli 
military actions in 2009 as aggression,686 which it said gave rise to actual or apparent bias.687 
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In 2014, Israel, UN Watch and some academics criticized the appointment of William 
Schabas to the Gaza Commission, citing his prior statements concerning President Netanyahu 
which were said to show an anti-Israel bias.688 In both cases, the HRC did not replace those 
commissioners on the basis of their prior statements. In 2015, Israel renewed its calls for 
Schabas’ resignation because of a prior “contractual relationship with the Palestinian side”.689 
Schabas subsequently resigned.690  
The HRC’s practice of appointing commissioners who have publicly weighed in on situations 
under scrutiny may be by design. Frédéric Mégret observes, “in some cases individuals will 
have been chosen for certain international mandates precisely because of their commitment to 
a cause understood either generally or specifically”. 691  Challenges on the basis of prior 
statements also results in part from “revolving doors of international academia and 
international professional opportunities.”692 This observation is apt for the above examples, 
where statements were generally issued in commissioners’ capacities as academics and human 
rights advocates. 
It is arguable that there should be greater tolerance for prior statements in the context of UN 
atrocity inquiries, in light of the need for commissioners to hold relevant expertise. 
Individuals appointed to judicial institutions might be expected to anticipate topics to be 
avoided, 693  but this may be more difficult in respect of temporary inquiries. It is also 
questionable the extent to which potential commissioners should engage in self-censorship, 
especially when employed as academics. Mégret advises that impartiality should not be 
approached too rigorously and that apprehensions of bias should be assessed according to 
factors including the focus of the statement, whether it was proffered in a professional or 
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personal capacity, and the passage of time.694 He surmises that “[t]he problem is, at least 
formally, that the [HRC] is insistent that human rights mandates involve impartiality.”695 
Recent HRC practice in respect of the Myanmar Commission suggests that the HRC may be 
changing its position towards prior statements. That Commission was established in March 
2017696 and its composition was announced in May.697 In July, the HRC President removed 
Indian lawyer Indira Jaising as the head of the inquiry and replaced her with Marzuki 
Darusman, an Indonesian lawyer who had served as Special Rapporteur on North Korea and 
sat on the North Korea Commission.698 The HRC’s press release does not give a reason for 
this change. Media reports quote an anonymous UN official as stating, “Jaising agreed to step 
down after the council president raised concerns about public comments she made that could 
be seen as indicating bias,”, and that “[i]f there’s any perceived bias... it undermines the 
credibility of the mission before it has started”.699 In May 2017, Jaising had been quoted by Al 
Jazeera as stating, “[t]he situation of the Rohingya community in Myanmar is especially 
deplorable because they face the risk of a genocide”.700 This recent practice suggests that the 
HRC may be becoming more responsive to apprehensions of bias from commissioners’ prior 
statements.  
4.2.3 Ensuring impartiality and independence in practice 
There is little by way of formal recourse to mandating authorities for raising and responding 
to concerns regarding commissioners’ independence or impartiality. Recusal is “the preferred 
route to avoiding partiality”701 in practice, but there are no binding UN rules to this effect702 
and procedures governing challenges to independence are under-developed. Mégret observes 
that the mandates of international experts “stand in a relative grey zone when it comes to 
impartiality mechanisms, given the more explicitly political nature of their designation.”703  
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As commissioners hold privileges and immunities of UN experts on mission,704 concerns as to 
their ability to carry out their mandates might be guided by regulations applicable to those 
positions. The Regulations for Experts on Mission contain many duties, but its accountability 
section is brief, simply stating that experts “are accountable to the [UN] for the proper 
discharge of their functions.”705 The Commentary to the Regulations states:706 
The method of accountability may vary. For officials appointed by the General 
Assembly, that accountability would be a matter for the Assembly. For experts on 
mission, it would be the Secretary-General or the appointing authority who could 
terminate an assignment or otherwise admonish the expert. 
The Commentary clarifies that it is for the UN to “characterize an [expert’s] action or 
pronouncement as adversely reflecting on the status of an official or an expert on mission”.707 
The non-binding Updated Principles to Combat Impunity 2005 (Principles Against Impunity) 
provide that sitting commissioners should not be removed “except on grounds of incapacity or 
behaviour rendering them unfit to discharge their duties and pursuant to procedures ensuring 
fair, impartial and independent determinations.”708 The OHCHR Model Rules do not discuss 
recusal, simply providing that if a commissioner “for any reason, is no longer able to fulfil his 
or her functions,”709 a new commissioner should be promptly appointed. In the absence of 
clear rules, some NGOs advocate that regulations of international criminal tribunals should 
guide UN fact-finding.710 While judicial procedures may be too rigorous, the general lack of 
guidance does not indicate a strong commitment on the part of mandating authorities to 
ensuring impartiality.  
4.3 Commissioner expertise 
Fact-finding guidelines provide that commissioners should possess the skills, knowledge and 
qualifications “required to carry out the mandate.” 711  Commissioners’ knowledge and 
expertise shape the inquiry report, as “facts deemed relevant and the recommendations made 
on the basis of the fact-finding are… determined by the expertise of the commissioners.”712 
The expertise required should reflect the inquiry’s investigative focus. For instance, naval 
officers served on inquiries into maritime incidents and early Security Council inquiries into 
threats to international security were composed of diplomats and military experts.713 Early UN 
human rights inquiries were also composed of diplomatic personnel.714 UNCHR expressed an 
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interest in appointing legal experts, resolving that the Working Group of Experts on Southern 
Africa was to be composed of “eminent jurists and prison officials”.715 In reality, appointees 
included diplomatic personnel.716 Scholars have called for further professionalisation of UN 
inquiries since the 1970s.717 This is not to say that diplomats were entirely unqualified; Iain 
Guest notes that appointing the UK representative to UNCHR as chairperson of its Working 
Group on Enforced Disappearances was advantageous: “as a former government minister he 
would be able to understand, and talk to, governments.” 718  However, such appointments 
emphasised the diplomatic tradition and an inclination to appoint institutional insiders. This 
practice tapered off in the 1990s, and it is now rare for government officials to be appointed as 
commissioners. An exception is the Palmer Commission, which was composed of former 
heads of state and state representatives, in line with its more diplomatic approach. 
As commissions’ mandates have juridified, so too has commissioners’ expertise. The 
Yugoslavia Commission was initially headed by IHL expert Frits Kalshoven, and later by 
international law professor Cherif Bassiouni.719 The Secretary-General informed the Security 
Council that in selecting the Rwanda Commission, he would “take into account their 
qualifications in the areas of human rights, humanitarian law, criminal law and prosecution, as 
well as their integrity and impartiality.”720 The Darfur Commission was headed by former 
ICTY Judge Antonio Cassese and inquiries into Libya,721 Syria,722 and the DPRK723 counted 
international judges, special rapporteurs and prosecutors among commission members. Some 
mandating authorities expressly required that commissions include legal experts. 724  For 
instance, the Security Council specified that the CAR Commission should include experts in 
IHL and human rights,725 and the Secretary-General specified that those appointed to the Mali 
Commission must have expertise in “[IHRL] and/or [IHL] and/or [ICL]”.726 
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Previously Vitit Muntarbhorn (Thailand) and Yakın Ertürk (Turkey). 
723  Composed of Michael Kirby (former Judge of High Court of Australia), Marzuki Darusman (Indonesia; 
Special Rapporteur on North Korea) and Sonja Biserko (Serbian human rights campaigner). 
724  E.g., SC Burundi Mandate, supra note 301, para. 2; Lebanon Mandate, supra note 341, para. 7.  
725  Composed of Philip Alston (Australia), Fatimata M’Baye (Mauritania) and Bernard Acho Muna (Cameroon). 
726  Mali TOR, supra note 312, para. 4(a).  
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It should not be overlooked that other types of expertise remain relevant.727 On occasion, 
mandating authorities provided for other types of expertise. In respect of the Mali 
Commission, individuals were appointed in light of criteria including knowledge of principles 
and processes of fact-finding or investigations, violence against persons, and the Malian and 
regional contexts.728 The HRC resolved that relevant fields of expertise for the Myanmar 
Commission included forensics and sexual and gender-based violence.729 Such expertise may 
be supplied via UN support staff, 730  experts contributed by states, 731  or Justice Rapid 
Response.732  
Some commissions faced criticism that commissioners lacked relevant expertise. Lyal Sunga 
critiques the Rwanda Commission on the basis that its members “claimed no specialist 
expertise” in ICL, IHL or human rights, and that a “more international spectrum of experience 
and expertise could have lent greater credibility to this important fact-finding effort.”733 In a 
similar vein, Xiaodan Wu criticises the Israeli Settlements Commission as lacking expertise in 
IHL.734 Critiques are particularly loud from IHL experts who warn against the appointment of 
human rights lawyers to assess IHL violations, due to the risks of inaccurate interpretation and 
application of IHL norms.735  As commissions may collect information in anticipation of 
prosecutions, expertise relating to evidence collection is highly relevant. Dan Saxon writes 
that commissioners should have expertise in “international law and accountability” 736 rather 
than career diplomats or academics. Such critiques promote commissions’ further 
juridification through the expertise of those implementing the mandates. 
Commissioners’ credentials and professional standing may “lend legitimacy to the mission”737 
and raise the profile of an inquiry. The public relations practices of some mandating 
authorities seem to link commissioners’ credentials to the authority of inquiries on which they 
serve. The HRC routinely publishes biographies of commissioners on webpages dedicated to 
its commissions.738 Although Security Council-led commissions do not have the same online 
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732  Justice Rapid Response, Annual Report 2014, at 8, available at http://www.justicerapidresponse.org/wp-
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The International Journal of Human Rights 187-205, at 195 [Sunga 2011].  
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224, at 223. 
737  Grace and Bruderlein, supra note 26, at 38.  
738  E.g., OHCHR, ‘Biographies of the members of the Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar’, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/MyanmarFFM/Pages/Members.aspx (accessed 1 May 2018) and 
‘Biographies of the members of the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi’, available at 
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presence as those of the HRC, the Secretary-General has highlighted individuals’ expertise 
when announcing commissioner appointments. 739  The Darfur Commission included 
commissioners’ biographies in its report.740 OHCHR Guidance and Practice cautions that 
while “having eminent personalities as members could be beneficial for mandates that require 
a high-profile approach”, it should not be the sole criterion for appointment.741 
The emphasis on legal expertise is consistent with the juridified investigative focus of modern 
UN atrocity inquiries. As noted by Boutruche, it seems “virtually impossible to conduct fact-
finding without knowledge of the law because it is only through legal expertise that one can 
select the relevant facts from the huge quantity of information around a given incident.”742 
Commissioners’ legal expertise may also juridify the process of mandate implementation. 
Christine Schwöbel-Patel observes that as the “perspective from which the facts are 
considered not only depends on the mandate but also on the members appointed to the 
commission”.743 This change marks a turn away from diplomatic settlement towards a more 
juridified model. More fundamentally, participation of international legal experts may impart 
the gravitas and authority of international law to commissions, even though they remain 
formally non-judicial bodies. 
5. Decisions on Operational Aspects 
The roles and functions of UN atrocity inquiries are affected by decisions regarding their 
working methods and operations. This Section first discusses the extent to which such matters 
were left to commissions’ discretion, including initiatives to standardize fact-finding methods 
(5.1). It then discusses how mandating authorities’ decisions in respect of the allocation of 
resources and time limits for reporting have important operational consequences (5.2).  
5.1 Scope of discretion accorded to commissions  
Mandating authorities identified general tasks to be carried out such as to establish facts,744 
conduct investigations, 745  determine responsibilities 746  and make recommendations. 747 
Instructions were often generalized, with operational decisions made by commissions. The 
conferral of broad discretion upon commissions to decide their own fact-finding approaches 
and working methods creates distance between commissions and mandating authorities, 
which in turn promotes a principled approach grounded in autonomy and impartiality.  
Conferring broad discretion to commissions might also be explained by pragmatic factors 
such as the difficulty of reaching consensus regarding technical elements, or that mandating 
authorities are simply uninterested in such details. However, the example of the Palmer 
                                                 
739  E.g., United Nations, ‘Secretary-General Announces Members of Central African Republic Commission of 
Inquiry to Investigate Events since 1 January 2013’, UN Doc. SG/A/1451-AFR/2799, 22 January 2014, 
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744  E.g., SC Burundi Mandate, supra note 301.  
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Commission indicates that where a commission is intended to improve diplomatic relations, 
mandating authorities prefer to retain more control over the fact-finding process. The 
Secretary-General set out the Palmer Commission’s working methods in comprehensive terms 
of reference748 and a separate document.749 The Commission received information through 
‘Points of Contact’ designated by Israel and Turkey, exclusively obtaining information 
“through diplomatic channels”.750 The Secretary-General’s involvement in setting down its 
working methods reflects the fact that these aspects were negotiated by Israel and Turkey. 
Involving states in this way encouraged their cooperation. The close association between the 
Palmer Commission and its mandating authority was advantageous in this setting. The 
Commission’s curtailed autonomy seemed to generate trust on the part of concerned states 
and reflected its more pragmatic function.  
Requiring commissions to determine their own working methods promotes independence 
from mandating authorities but is also impugned as producing unreliable reports. Martin and 
Villarreal Sosa argue that the lack of a standardized methodological framework “often results 
in the utilization of flawed methodology, which in turn leads to incorrect conclusions, and 
compromised relationships with Member States.”751 Such observations have led to calls for 
greater standardisation of commissions’ working methods. 752  Debates on the merits of 
standardising inquiry have oscillated between concerns of flexibility/arbitrariness and 
certainty/rigidity.753 In 1968, noting that problems associated with ad hoc fact-finding, the 
International Conference on Human Rights recognised the “importance of well-defined rules 
of procedure for the orderly and efficient discharge of their functions by [UN] bodies 
concerned with the field of human rights”754 and recommended the preparation of model rules 
of procedure. The resulting Draft Model Rules 1970 were subsequently substantially revised 
and not adopted by ECOSOC. 755  The revised rules did not provide guidance on many 
important aspects such as witness testimony. 756  Franck and Fairley write, “[f]or those 
concerned with credibility and due process in fact-finding, the model rules are not the 
answer”.757 The 1991 Declaration did not much advance this state of affairs, including just 
two provisions concerning the right of concerned states to express their views and use of 
“appropriate rules of procedure” to ensure fair hearings.758 
In 2001, Bassiouni lamented that after fifty years of UN practice, “there is no standard 
operating procedure for fact-finding missions”, resulting in “little consistency and 
predictability as to the methods and outcomes.”759 OHCHR Guidance and Practice represents 
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significant progress in this regard. It comprehensively examines fact-finding missions and 
commissions of inquiry, identifies best practices, and includes new model rules based on the 
Model Rules 1970 and “modified on the basis of experience.” 760  These rules do not 
exhaustively prescribe working methods, instead providing that inquiries “shall be conducted 
in conformity with relevant international standards and best practices on human rights fact-
finding and investigations as developed by the [UN].”761 This approach promotes consistency 
and development of institutional knowledge while retaining commissions’ discretion to adopt 
methods of work appropriate for their mandates. 
5.2 Provision of resources and time limits  
Mandating authorities must ensure that commissions have sufficient resources to carry out 
their mandates and set appropriate time limits for the delivery of the report. OHCHR advises 
that deadlines and resources must be “commensurate with the mandate and consider the 
circumstances under which the commission/mission is required to operate.” 762  The HRC 
commonly requests that commissions are provided with all resources necessary to fulfil their 
mandates.763 However, information regarding the financing of inquiries is not easy to locate764 
and many inquiry reports do not specify the extent of resources or their allocation.765  
Commissions have signalled that they operated with scarce resources and under tight time 
limits.766 For instance, the Rwanda Commission only operated for four months, during which 
it was expected to examine massacre sites, interview witnesses, collect information and 
prepare its reports. Sunga observes, “[p]ractically speaking, it would have been very difficult 
for the three commission members to sift through the mass of documentary material, taped 
testimonies and other records it received in order to identify items of possible probative value 
to prosecutions.”767 Six months into its year-long mandate, the CAR Commission had only 
five investigators and lacked a chief of investigations and a legal advisor, which was a “source 
of anxiety”768 regarding its ability to fulfil its mandate within the specified time. Marina 
Aksenova and Morten Bergsmo suggest that commissions’ “widely defined, open-ended 
objectives”769 contribute to this situation, and that mandates with more specific functions 
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might be more capable of being met. This proposal was not taken up by mandating 
authorities, which continue to award multi-faceted mandates. 
A lack of resources might also be the result of political factors. Federica D’Alessandra writes 
that some mandating authorities ensured that commissions were understaffed and under-
resourced to give the appearance of pursuing human rights “while at the same time not 
generating politically unwanted results”.770 In at least one case, commentators suggest that 
resource restrictions aimed to limit an inquiry’s functions. Scharf, who participated in drafting 
the Yugoslavia Commission’s mandate, writes that the UK and France preferred a more 
passive body which would analyse information received by it, while the US preferred a more 
active investigative mandate; and that the UK’s agreement on that point was undermined “by 
insisting that the Commission be funded from existing UN resources rather than include in the 
resolution a specific budget for the Commission”.771 The General Assembly did not allocate 
resources for the Yugoslavia Commission, which required the Commission to seek 
independent funding and assistance. 772  The Yugoslavia Commission’s temporal mandate 
concluded before it could complete its plan of work, and it had to cancel exhumations. The 
Commission sent its information to the ICTY Prosecutor before its final report was presented 
to the Security Council. Bassiouni writes that this lack of resources was due to the desire of 
some governments and those in the UN system “who wanted to advance the political agendas 
of those governments.”773  
6. Principle and Pragmatism in Mandating Authorities’ Choices 
The above discussion highlighted how mandating authorities determine key aspects of UN 
atrocity inquiries, including the investigative focus, composition, resources and in some cases, 
operational activities. This Section describes how choices by mandating authorities across 
these dimensions of inquiry practice reflect principled and pragmatic considerations and 
discusses consequences for commissions’ roles and functions. These choices and 
consequences concern commissions’ turn to international law (6.1), use of inquiry to condemn 
atrocities (6.2) and inquiry as a lever to build and release pressure (6.3). 
6.1 Turn to international law  
Mandating authorities frequently instructed UN atrocity inquiries to assess violations of 
international law. In addition to specifying legal lenses of analysis, many mandates linked the 
generation of recommendations with aims associated with the realm of law, such as ensuring 
accountability for violations. The appointment of commissioners with legal expertise 
reinforces commissions’ legal orientation. International legal academics, judges, and 
practitioners are part of a professional community which Oscar Schachter famously termed 
the “invisible college of international lawyers”,774 where ideas are carried from one role to 
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another. Commentators typify these inquiries as ‘quasi-judicial’,775 ‘justice-oriented’,776 and 
as new mechanisms for adjudication.777 The Palmer Commission’s mandate may be cited as a 
counterweight to the trend of juridification and shows that an emphasis on international law is 
a choice on the part of mandating authorities.778 
The juridification of UN atrocity inquiries gives rise to certain consequences. Framing 
mandates by legal concepts focuses the scope of the inquiry. When a commission is mandated 
to inquire into violations, the fact-finding exercise naturally focuses on incidents which may 
be characterised in this way. Boutruche observes that where a fact-finding body is instructed 
to assess facts on the basis of law, “the facts covered through the inquiry are framed by the 
elements of the very rule allegedly violated. Otherwise, a legal conclusion cannot be 
reached.”779 A focus on legal violations also channels expected follow-up as a corollary of 
duties to investigate and prosecute serious violations.780  As observed by Jean-Pierre Cot, 
“human rights do not leave much room for compromise.”781 
Several mandates emphasized criminal responsibility through instructions to investigate 
international crimes or to ensure ‘full accountability’ for violations. As noted by Saxon, a 
focus on individual accountability may be inevitable when a human rights lens is selected:782 
[A]ttempts to de-couple criminal accountability from human rights fact-finding creates a 
false dichotomy. Part of the relevance of fact-finding processes – whether by national or 
international bodies – includes the identification of persons responsible for international 
crimes. 
The use of ICL language in mandates may also play a strategic role to draw attention to 
reported atrocities and signal the possibility of specific corrective action. Van den Herik 
argues that the North Korea Commission was instructed to use ICL language in order to 
“legally characterise given facts and thereby express a certain indignation and to evoke an 
external response rather than solely as a lens to select relevant facts.”783  
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Commissions’ written mandates emphasising individual responsibility for violations may be 
cited as examples of a wider turn to criminal law in human rights practice. Karen Engle writes 
that the human rights project has rather uncritically embraced criminal law “with little 
systematic deliberation about the aims of criminal law or about its pitfalls. In fact, forgotten 
are not only the debates about justice versus peace and truth but also broader critiques of 
penal systems that have long been voiced by human rights advocates.”784 She cautions:785 
… as criminal law has become the enforcement tool of choice, it has negatively affected 
the lens through which the human rights movement and the international law scholars 
who support it view human rights violations. In short, as advocates increasingly turn to 
[ICL] to respond to issues ranging from economic injustice to genocide, they reinforce 
an individualized and decontextualized understanding of the harms they aim to address, 
even while relying on the state and on forms of criminalization of which they have long 
been critical. 
Other scholars also argue that an individualised focus may even mask responsibilities of 
collective actors such as states and organized armed groups, whose actions (and inaction) 
produce conditions for mass atrocities to occur.786 André Nollkaemper writes that criminal 
law “provides a distorted and fragmentized picture of reality in which the blame rests on a few 
individuals who, understandably, resent their being sacrificed as scapegoats.” 787  Claire 
Nielsen similarly writes that ICL “fails to account for the structural causes of violence” and 
that its focus on actions of individuals is “obscuring and avoiding discussion of the global 
inequality in which powerful states are profoundly implicated.”788  
A mandate to investigate legal violations of can also produce quite different dynamics 
between commissions and states. There is less room for negotiation; rather than seeking 
collaboration with concerned states, commissions may be perceived as antagonistic and 
accusatory. For instance, Michael Kirby writes that the North Korea Commission could not 
ignore its mandate to examine culpability for violations even if “addressing this question 
might alienate the leadership or authorities of DPRK or make peaceful dialogue with them 
more difficult.”789 It may also mean that any perceived deviations in the mandate from full 
impartiality are more strictly critiqued and utilised to attack a commission’s credibility.  
6.2 Inquiry to condemn atrocities  
Many mandating resolutions at once condemn violations and call for their investigation. 
While condemning atrocities may justify states’ collective involvement in a crisis situation, it 
appears to prejudge the result of a supposedly impartial inquiry. UN atrocity inquiries are not 
usually established in circumstances where the facts are truly unknown or disputed. Rather, 
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credible reports of violations build momentum for their establishment. As observed by Van 
den Herik:790  
Whereas the traditional [Hague] commissions of inquiry were principally meant to 
pacify and defuse a conflict, contemporary human rights commissions rather aim to stir, 
to evoke action, to opine and to condemn. Their inquiry is to a certain extent 
predisposed. The mere fact that a commission is created by the [HRC] signals a 
perception that there are credible allegations that human rights have been violated. 
The HRC’s responsibility to respond to human rights emergencies may be triggered upon 
reports of serious violations, so it is not inconsistent for a mandating resolution to 
acknowledge reported violations. However, the notion of ‘impartial’ inquiry must take on a 
different hue, as commissions mandated to investigate human rights violations and ensure 
accountability are “inherently biased to contribute to the normative agenda that underlies 
human rights.”791 
The desire to condemn violations may also influence commissioner selection. Commissions 
established to examine alleged violations of international law should include recognised legal 
experts who are demonstrably independent. Credibility and impartiality issues that have arisen 
from commissioners’ prior statements illustrates that potential appointees’ previous activities 
should be carefully considered. However, as observed by Mégret, “the politicized nature of 
designation processes means that judges/experts are in fact sometimes chosen not despite their 
previous declarations, but on the very basis of having made them.”792 In addition, appointment 
processes remain opaque and a matter of discretion for the mandating authority, despite 
initiatives to formalise this process. If mandating authorities wished to further demonstrate 
their commitment to impartiality, they might consider appointing commissioners from a 
public list of vetted candidates. 
Challenges to impartiality are compounded where the mandating resolution is unbalanced, 
such as by identifying violations by only one party to a conflict or containing geographic or 
temporal limitations which exclude relevant actors, events, or contexts. As such imbalance is 
often seized upon by states as reason to deny cooperation, they may endanger a commission’s 
ability to discharge its mandate. There is room for improvement in the drafting of mandates to 
avoid limiting commissions’ impact before they have commenced their work. Devereux 
suggests that it may be beneficial to develop model precedents for mandates to “outline the 
desirable categories of information as well as provide draft language”.793 She writes that while 
states are likely to want to retain control over the formulation of mandates, identifying best 
practices might encourage greater uniformity and consistency, and thus greater clarity in 
written mandates.794 However, it is unclear whether model precedents would discourage the 
sorts of mandates which appear to have been fully intended. In addition, the text is subject to 
debate and may reflect significant compromise in light of wider goals and interests. 
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6.3 Inquiry as building and releasing pressure  
Establishing an inquiry signals that allegations of violations are being taken seriously and that 
international community’s attention is turned to the situation. As inquiry is one of several 
measures available at the UN, it represents an escalation in response. For instance, Human 
Rights Watch called on the UN to establish an inquiry on North Korea, stating “North Korea’s 
defiance of the [HRC’s] mandates and mechanisms should not be allowed to stand. It’s time 
for the UN to take the next step, and ratchet up the pressure by [setting up an inquiry].”795 
When voting to establish the Syria Commission, Thailand’s representative stated that 
Thailand supported the resolution because of “the need to turn back the tide of violence in 
Syria… and to send a firm message to the government of Syria”.796 Where a mandating 
authority has power to take binding action, inquiry might pave the way for enforcement 
measures. Bassiouni claims that the Security Council had already decided to establish the 
ICTR prior to establishing the Rwanda Commission, so the latter’s function “was essentially 
window dressing.”797  
The prospect of inquiry may be used to induce states to comply with their obligations. For 
instance, the High Commissioner for Human Rights warned that unless the DRC cooperated 
with a hybrid investigation into violations, he would “insist on the creation of an international 
investigative mechanism”. 798  Recent HRC practice shows that the label ‘commission of 
inquiry’ also has power. The Myanmar Commission is described in its written mandate as an 
“independent international fact-finding mission”. 799 This term was evidently the subject of 
negotiation; in explaining its position on the resolution, the Philippines stated, “[t]he balanced 
efforts of the [EU] were appreciated, steering away from a Commission of Inquiry”. 800 
However, the official title of the Myanmar Commission is nearly identical to that of the 
Goldstone Commission.801 Although the Myanmar Commission is substantively a commission 
of inquiry, the ‘inquiry’ label appears to have the ability to communicate denunciation. 
At the same time as establishing an inquiry can build pressure for actors to comply with 
obligations, it may relieve other sources of pressure. While the subject-matter and 
composition of UN atrocity inquiries have moved closer to the realm of international law, 
they have not been endowed with judicial powers. Enforcet still depends on the will of 
external actors. Mandating authorities might establish an inquiry to appease feverish political 
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situations and mollify calls for immediate action. Such a perspective was originally advanced 
in 1899 by Martens in relation to commissions established to resolve international disputes:802 
One can compare the commission of inquiry to a safety valve given to the governments. 
They are allowed to say to the very excited and ill-informed public opinion, ‘Wait— we 
will organize a commission which will go to the spot, which shall furnish all the new 
information— in a word, it shall shed light.’ In that way time is gained, and in 
international life a day gained may save the future of a nation. The object of 
commissions of inquiry is therefore clear. They are the instruments of pacification.  
A similar function has been observed of atrocity inquiries. For instance, as well as bolstering 
the case for an ad hoc tribunal, Bassiouni suggests that the Rwanda Commission served as a 
delay tactic: “[i]t was necessary to gain time before the Security Council established the ICTR 
in order to work out the logistics of the prospective tribunal.” 803  Saxon writes that 
commissions may be subservient to wider diplomatic objectives, including “attempts to create 
a ‘safety-valve’ through which the international community may criticize a particular regime; 
to facilitate the resolution of a conflict or temper its severity; or, more cynically, to act as a 
‘placeholder’ for an international community that cannot achieve consensus on a strategy for 
addressing a crisis.”804 Such observations have synergies with wider critiques of the Security 
Council’s inaction in the face of ongoing atrocities 805  and its practice of establishing 
accountability mechanisms rather than taking measures of prevention or intervention. 806 
Criminalized mandates are also critiqued for having the opposite effect. Schwöbel-Patel sees 
these commissions as part of an ‘intervention formula’ carried out in the name of the 
international community but in reality, at the service of powerful Western states.807 
Some commentators perceive mandating authorities’ lack of guidance and support of 
commissions’ operations as in service of wider political goals. According to Bassiouni, the 
general state of ‘ad hoc-ery’ can be explained by the fact that “the human rights component of 
the UN system reflects the values of justice, while systemically it functions as a political 
process, thus conditioning the upholding of these values to political oversight”.808 In any case, 
UN atrocity inquiries are “caught in a certain tension rising from international law’s ambition 
of peace on the one hand and justice on the other.”809 Thus, the establishment of an inquiry 
can represent a mandating authority’s commitment to principles of justice and the rule of law, 
as well as pragmatic considerations such as retaining discretion to take action and advancing 
wider political goals and interests. 
                                                 
802  Third Commission, Sixth Meeting, 19 July 1899, in James Brown Scott (ed.), The Proceedings of the Hague 
Peace Conferences: The Conference of 1899 (New York: OUP, 1920) at 641. 
803  Bassiouni 2001, supra note 98, at 43. 
804  Saxon, supra note 736, at 212 (footnotes omitted).  
805  E.g., the Syria Commission wrote that inaction by the permanent members of the Security Council “provided 
the space for the proliferation of actors in [Syria], each pursuing its own agenda and contributing to the 
radicalization and escalation of violence. The Security Council bears this responsibility”: Report of the 
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/65, 12 
February 2014, para. 155 [Syria Seventh Report].  
806  Engle, supra note 784, at 1076.  
807  Schwöbel-Patel, supra note 103, at 167. 
808  Bassiouni 2001, supra note 98, at 38. 




This Chapter illustrated how the characteristics and decisions of UN mandating authorities 
shaped the manifestation of UN atrocity inquiries in practice. Their institutional 
characteristics and spheres of responsibility attracted differing levels of consent and 
cooperation on the part of concerned states. Several HRC-led inquiries faced strong 
opposition from concerned states because of the HRC’s constellation of features, including its 
political decision-making, practice of condemning violations and recommendatory powers. 
Inquiries by the Security Council and the Secretary-General did not face such impediments for 
different reasons; states generally obeyed Security Council decisions, while the Secretary-
General sought their consent. State cooperation was thus influenced by the circumstances of 
commissions’ establishment.  
Mandating authorities fundamentally shaped commissions’ roles and functions through the 
formulation of their written mandates. These mandates were often juridified, with a focus on 
legal violations and responsibilities, and were associated with the aim of ensuring 
accountability. Regarding commission composition, mandating authorities have moved away 
from the traditional practice of appointing state representatives. Recently, most 
commissioners were respected international legal experts serving in their personal capacity. 
These actions signal a commitment to encourage actors to comply with obligations and 
promote the rule of law. At the same time, mandating authorities have resisted initiatives to 
sharpen the institution of inquiry, so it remains institutionally ‘soft’ and deployed at their 
discretion.  
Like an architect’s conceptual plan, written mandates identify broad tasks and objectives, but 
leave much detail to be worked out by those charged with their implementation. While 
mandating authorities’ institutional characteristics and decisions crucially inform the roles of 
UN atrocity inquiries, commissions also make their own choices. The next Chapter explores 
how commissions’ interpretations and implementations of their mandates further illuminate 




CHAPTER THREE  
 
MANDATE INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION: COMMISSIONS 
AS ENGINEERS OF THEIR ROLES AND FUNCTIONS 
 
Introduction 
If mandating authorities are the architects of UN atrocity inquiries, sketching out the broad 
aesthetics and conceptual plan, commissions are the engineers. Commissions must work 
within the limits of their mandates to execute the mandating authority’s vision, determining 
what is feasible and resolving practical issues. In addition to interpreting the scope of their 
mandates, commissions must decide how to carry out their work. Chapter Two explained that 
most often, mandating authorities left operational decisions in the hands of commissions.  
This Chapter analyses how commissions interpreted and implemented their mandates in light 
of their roles and functions. The analysis chiefly draws from commissions’ reported mandate 
interpretations and working methods. This qualification is important for two reasons. First, to 
evaluate how commissions carried out their mandates in practice, it would have been 
necessary to observe operations first-hand, which was not possible within the scope of this 
research. Secondly, commissions did not report on all aspects of their work and the level of 
detail provided is uneven.810 As such, this Chapter aims to identify patterns and trends in 
commissions’ approaches, to determine how their roles and functions informed their mandate 
interpretation and implementation. 
Chapter Three is organised as follows. Section 1 examines how commissions interpreted their 
mandates in order to uphold, and in some cases to restore, impartiality. It does not address 
commissions’ interpretations of the legal framework or recommendations, as these are 
discussed in Chapters Four and Six, respectively. Section 2 examines key principles guiding 
mandate implementation. Section 3 discusses practical challenges faced by commissions 
when operationalising their mandates and their efforts to overcome them. Section 4 discusses 
commissions’ initiatives with respect to working methods in order to promote credible and 
reliable findings. The Conclusions section discusses how commissions’ roles and functions 
shaped their approaches to mandate interpretation and implementation. 
1. Interpretation of the Mandate  
Chapter Two identified how mandating authorities set down written mandates and how some 
elements of these documents posed challenges to commissions’ impartiality. Commissions 
routinely interpret their mandates in order to flesh out the focus of the inquiry and ensure that 
it is of appropriate scope. The Advanced Practitioner's Handbook on Commissions of Inquiry 
by the Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR Handbook) 
recommends that commissions’ interpretations be guided by principles of professional 
                                                 
810  E.g., Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Côte d'Ivoire, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/48, 1 July 
2011, paras. 5-8 [HRC Côte d'Ivoire Report], as compared with North Korea Report, supra note 32, paras. 
28-62. See Martin and Villarreal Sosa, supra note 751, at 69-70. 
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practice,811 which include impartiality. This Section discusses how commissions interpreted 
their mandates so as to preserve or reinstate impartiality and distance themselves from the 
politicised circumstances of their establishment. It examines commissions’ interpretations of 
geographic parameters (1.1), temporal scope (1.2), actors under scrutiny (1.3) and issues of 
prejudgment (1.4).  
1.1 Geographic parameters 
Commissions’ written mandates generally specified the territory of concern. Where alleged 
violations were confined to a particular territory, the literal wording tended to be adopted. For 
instance, the Darfur Commission interpreted its geographic mandate as “only the situation in 
the Darfur region of the Sudan”,812 on the basis of the text of its mandating resolution.  
Some commissions interpreted geographic parameters broadly to include actions or actors 
beyond concerned states. For instance, the HRC requested the North Korea Commission to 
investigate violations in the DPRK, including “abductions of nationals of other States”.813 The 
Commission interpreted its mandate broadly to include violations “by the DPRK against its 
nationals both within and outside the DPRK as well as those violations that involve 
extraterritorial action originating from the DPRK”.814 It explained that such violations fell 
within its mandate as they “facilitate subsequent human rights violations in the DPRK, or are 
the immediate consequence of human rights violations that take place in the DPRK.”815 This 
approach led the Commission to make findings in respect of China’s refoulement practice.816 
In a similar vein, the HRC mandated the Burundi Commission to investigate violations “in 
Burundi”. 817  The Commission interpreted its mandate to include “abuses committed in 
Burundi by nonstate entities, or their members, based abroad.”818 The mandating resolution 
also recognised the situation of Burundian refugees in neighbouring countries and invited the 
Commission to engage with them. 819  Reading these provisions together, the Burundi 
Commission determined that its mandate included an “examination of the human rights 
situation relating to refugees”.820  
By contrast, the Eritrea Commission adopted the literal meaning of its mandate to investigate 
violations “in Eritrea”. 821  It interpreted the geographic scope as “the territory of Eritrea, 
without any exclusion of a specific area of the country and including the border zones and 
Eritrean maritime territory.” 822  This interpretation excluded potential violations against 
members of the Eritrean diaspora. Van den Herik and Mirjam van Reisen write that the 
                                                 
811  HPCR Handbook, supra note 95, at 9. 
812  Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 11.  
813  North Korea Mandate, supra note 346, para. 5.  
814  North Korea Report, supra note 32, para. 19.  
815  Ibid., para. 20.  
816  Ibid., paras. 452, 458, 1197 and 1221(a). 
817  HRC Burundi Mandate, supra note 349, paras. 23(a) and (b).  
818  HRC Burundi TOR, supra note 495, at II(iii) (emphasis added). 
819  HRC Burundi Mandate, supra note 349, paras. 23(d). 
820  HRC Burundi TOR, supra note 495, at II(iii).  
821  Eritrea Mandate, supra note 347, para. 8.  
822  Eritrea First Report, supra note 567, para. 10.  
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diaspora was not perceived “as an object of protection in its own right”,823 although it was 
engaged as an information source and dissemination channel. The HRC seems to have 
approved of the Eritrea Commission’s interpretation, as the geographic scope was not 
widened when its mandate was extended include an investigation of crimes against 
humanity. 824  The Eritrea Commission’s approach diverges from that of the North Korea 
Commission, even though both examined authoritarian regimes which are often perceived as 
alike.825 However, neither inquiry closely examined more diffuse contributions emanating 
beyond concerned states that enabled situations of violations to continue, such as foreign 
revenue streams.826 
As observed in Chapter Two, where an inquiry is established into a situation of armed 
conflict, the mandate must include relevant all geographic zones. This aspect proved to be 
problematic for several HRC-led inquiries into conflicts involving Israel, whose written 
mandates focussed on violations occurring on the territory of the other party to the conflict 
and often explicitly referred to violations by Israel. As the effect of these formulations was to 
focus on one party to the conflict, they are discussed together in Section 1.3 below. 
1.2 Temporal scope 
Just as mandating authorities qualified the temporal scope in various ways, so too have 
commissions taken different approaches to their interpretation. Some commissions interpreted 
the temporal scope narrowly but also had regard to earlier events as relevant context. For 
instance, the Sri Lanka Panel was instructed to advise on accountability measures in relation 
to Sri Lanka’s commitment to address IHL and IHRL violations “with respect to the final 
stages of the war”.827 Taking guidance from that phrase, the Panel focussed on the most 
“intense and violent phase”,828 namely September 2008 until May 2009, when the Sri Lankan 
Army carried out its final offensive and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were 
defeated. It examined events prior to this point “in order to provide context.”829 The CAR 
Commission reported that although its temporal focus was limited to events on or after 1 
January 2013, it “takes note of earlier events where appropriate to an understanding of the 
situation during the period under review.”830 The Gaza Commission was asked to investigate 
violations “in the context of the military operations conducted since 13 June 2014, whether 
before, during or after”.831 Understanding that its mandate was bookended by the murder of 
three Israeli teenagers on 12 June 2014 and the conclusion of Operation Protective Edge, the 
                                                 
823  Larissa van den Herik and Mirjam van Reisen, ‘A Diasporic Perspective on the Commission of Inquiry for 
Eritrea: A Missed Opportunity to Maximize Impact?’, forthcoming, at 2.  
824  Eritrea Mandate Extension, supra note 503.  
825  E.g., Nathaniel Myersjune, ‘Africa’s North Korea’, Foreign Policy, 15 June 2010, available at 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/06/15/africas-north-korea (accessed 1 May 2018). 
826  Allegations of DPRK nationals being sent abroad to perform forced labour emerged after the North Korea 
Commission’s report was published, and were examined by the Special Rapporteur: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Marzuki 
Darusman, UN Doc. A/HRC/28/71, 18 March 2015, para. 19. 
827  ‘Terms of Reference’, in Sri Lanka Report, supra note 29, para. 5.  
828  Sri Lanka Report, supra note 29, para. 12. 
829  Ibid., para. 13. 
830  E.g., CAR Report, supra note 32, para. 6.  
831  Gaza Mandate, supra note 340, para. 13.  
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Gaza Commission interpreted its temporal mandate as “between 13 June and 26 August 
2014”.832 
Other mandates were silent as to the temporal scope. Where an inquiry concerned a situation 
of increased violence or conflict, some commissions identified the beginning of the crisis 
period as the starting point. For instance, the Libya Commission focussed on events from 
2011, as commissioners “perceived these incidents to constitute the mandate’s implicit 
focus.” 833  The Darfur Commission examined violations from 2003, when “reports of 
violations” began to emerge.834  
In situations of long-standing concern, commissions defined temporal scope differently. In 
light of practical limitations of time and resources, the North Korea Commission focused on 
violations “reflective of the human rights situation as it persists at present” and, where 
resources permitted, patterns of past violations of continued relevance.835 Historical events 
were considered where crucial to understanding the situation in North Korea and underlying 
causes of violations. 836  The Eritrea Commission focussed on events from 1991, “when 
Eritrean entities took effective control of Eritrean territory.” 837  The Eritrean Government 
objected to the breadth of the written mandate “which theoretically can span any time period 
in Eritrean history”838 but also criticised the Commission’s determination of temporal limits as 
exceeding its authority.839 This type of criticism indicates how a very broad written mandate 
could be used as a basis to undermine the work of an inquiry.  
1.3 Actors under scrutiny  
Most mandates did not identify particular actors as the focus of inquiry. Rob Grace observes 
that in such cases commissions should be “guided by the professional norm of 
evenhandedness to probe allegations of violations committed by all relevant parties.”840 In 
situations not involving active hostilities, commissions chiefly focussed on concerned states. 
For instance, the Eritrea Commission interpreted its mandate as limited to “violations that are 
imputable on Eritrean authorities.”841 The North Korea Commission took a slightly broader 
view, examining alleged violations “by the DPRK against its nationals” and “the extent to 
which other states carry relevant responsibility”842 for violations in North Korea. In support of 
its broad interpretation, the Commission cited other UN atrocity inquiries which examined 
actions of actors other than concerned states.843  
                                                 
832  Gaza Report, supra note 766, paras. 6 and 58.  
833  HPCR Handbook, supra note 95, at 11.  
834  Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 11.  
835  North Korea Report, supra note 32, para. 18.  
836  Ibid., para. 18.  
837  Eritrea First Report, supra note 567, para. 10; Eritrea Second Report, supra note 569, para. 1.  
838  Eritrea Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Commission of Inquiry Report: Devoid of Credibility and Substance’, 
19 June 2015, para. 4, available at http://www.shabait.com/news/local-news/20031-commission-of-inquiry-
report-devoid-of-credibility-and-substance (accessed 1 May 2018).  
839  Ibid. 
840  Grace 2015, supra note 59, at 46.  
841  Eritrea First Report, supra note 567, para. 10.  
842  North Korea Report, supra note 32, para. 20.  
843  Ibid., footnote 8. 
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Some commissions examined contributions to situations of human rights concern by actors 
other than states. The Burundi Commission interpreted its mandate to examine human rights 
‘violations’ as referring to state agents or entities, and ‘abuses’ to refer to “actions committed 
by non-state entities or their members.”844 The Israeli Settlements Commission, instructed to 
investigate human rights implications of Israeli settlements in Palestine,845 interpreted the 
term ‘Israeli settlements’ to mean “all physical and non-physical structures and processes 
that… support the establishment, expansion and maintenance of Israeli residential 
communities beyond the Green Line of 1949”. 846  This interpretation permitted the 
Commission to examine actors beyond the Israeli Government which contributed to the 
situation of the settlements, notably private companies. 847  The Eritrea Commission also 
examined contributions to the human rights situation by foreign enterprises, and directed 
recommendations to these actors.848  
A few commissions were instructed to focus on specific actors. The Cambodia Commission 
was asked to examine crimes by “Khmer Rouge leaders”. 849  The Cambodia Commission 
observed that its mandate excluded potential violations by other actors, but “endorse[d] this 
limitation as focusing on the extraordinary nature of the Khmer Rouge’s crimes.”850 It may be 
queried whether a formally even-handed inquiry would have created an inappropriate sense of 
equivalence. More recently, the Myanmar Commission was asked to investigate “alleged 
recent human rights violations by military and security forces, and abuses, in Myanmar”.851 
The term ‘abuses’ might be interpreted broadly to refer to non-state actors in line with other 
commissions’ interpretations. 852  However, its mandate focusses principally on state 
institutions.  
Commissions which examined situations of conflict generally interpreted their mandates to 
include all parties. For instance, the Libya Commission examined the military actions of the 
Gadhafi regime, opposition forces and NATO.853 As discussed in Chapter Two, the HRC 
instructed several inquiries involving Israel to investigate violations by that State and limited 
the geographic scope to the territory of the other party. In addition to raising concerns of bias, 
such mandates are problematic because “rules on the conduct of hostilities necessitate 
establishing facts with regard to the behaviour of the other party.” 854  The Lebanon 
Commission wrote, “any independent, impartial and objective investigation into a particular 
conduct during the course of hostilities must of necessity be with reference to all the 
belligerents involved.” 855  
                                                 
844 HRC Burundi TOR, supra note 495, at II(i). 
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Commissions took different approaches when trying to resolve one-sidedness mandates. The 
most conservative approach was taken by the Lebanon Commission, the first inquiry to be 
established by the HRC. It was asked to investigate “systematic targeting and killings of 
civilians by Israel in Lebanon”.856 The Commission considered that it could not construe its 
mandate as “equally authorizing the investigation of the actions by Hezbollah in Israel”, as 
this would exceed its “interpretative function and would be to usurp the [HRC’s] powers.”857 
Israel refused to cooperate with this inquiry.858 Also in 2006, the HRC established the Beit 
Hanoun Commission to, inter alia, “make recommendations on ways and means to protect 
Palestinian civilians against any further Israeli assaults”.859 The mandate focussed on Israeli 
violations and did not include victims in Israel. The Commission interpreted its mandate 
broadly to review the situation “within a broader context of events in Gaza”860 and examined 
obligations of other parties to the conflict.861 Chinkin writes that the instruction to make 
recommendations for the protection of Palestinian civilians “opened the way for inclusion of 
consideration of the firing of rockets from Gaza.” 862  Israel refused to cooperate, so the 
Commission had to enter Beit Hanoun via Egypt.863 The Commission stated that Israel’s view 
that the mandate was biased “is a matter for the Council”, and that the Commission had “gone 
to great lengths to execute its mandate in as balanced a way as possible.”864  
A two-step approach to mandate reformulation was taken by the UN Fact Finding Mission on 
the Gaza Conflict (known as the Goldstone Commission after its chair, Richard Goldstone). 
Its original mandate was to investigate violations “by the occupying Power, Israel, against the 
Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in the occupied 
Gaza Strip”.865 Israel rejected the resolution as biased866 and several potential commissioners 
declined appointment due to the mandate. The mandate was reformulated by the HRC 
President as a condition of Goldstone’s appointment867 as the investigation of violations “in 
the context of the military operations that were conducted in Gaza”. 868  The Commission 
interpreted its mandate to require consideration of the actions of all parties and to “review 
related actions in the entire Occupied Palestinian Territory and Israel”. 869  Despite the 
amended mandate and Goldstone’s assurance of even-handed investigations, 870  Israel 
                                                 
856  Lebanon Mandate, supra note 341.  
857  Lebanon Report, supra note 855, para. 15.  
858  Lebanon Report, supra note 855, para. 19. 
859  Beit Hanoun Mandate, supra note 317, para. 7.  
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861  Ibid., para. 14. 
862  Chinkin, supra note 97, at 491-492. 
863  Beit Hanoun Report, supra note 620, paras. 3 and 7.  
864  Ibid., para. 73. 
865  Goldstone Mandate, supra note 340. 
866  Israel MFA Press Release, supra note 416.  
867  Richard Goldstone, ‘Quality Control in International Fact-Finding Outside Criminal Justice for Core 
International Crimes’, in Bergsmo, supra note 94, 35-53, at 47.  
868  Ibid. 
869  Goldstone Report, supra note 633, para. 152.  
870  Letter from Richard Goldstone to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations at Geneva, 3 
April 2009, in Goldstone Report, supra note 633, at 434.  
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considered that the mandate could only be changed by the HRC, so the original mandate 
persisted.871 
The 2014 Gaza Commission’s mandate also raised concerns of partiality; it was instructed to 
investigate violations “in the [OPT], including East Jerusalem, particularly in the occupied 
Gaza Strip, in the context of the military operations conducted since 13 June 2014, whether 
before, during or after”.872 While this phrase did not mention Israel, the surrounding context 
emphasised Israeli violations.873 The resolution did not mention Hamas, instead generally 
condemning “all violence against civilians wherever it occurs, including the killing of two 
Israeli civilians as a result of rocket fire”, and urging “all parties” to respect IHL.874 There was 
pushback from several states who considered the resolution biased.875 The Gaza Commission 
interpreted its mandate as requiring it to also examine alleged violations in Israel.876 
Commissions’ approaches reflected different understandings of their interpretive powers. The 
Lebanon Commission took a narrow view of its interpretive competence, in contrast with 
more recent inquiries which interpreted mandates liberally. Its narrow interpretation may have 
been intended to discourage the HRC from issuing similar mandates in the future; if so, it was 
not successful. Chinkin writes that the HRC’s practice to the contrary suggests that it lacks 
“political sensibility”,877 as such mandates predictably lead to non-cooperation. Fact-finding 
guidelines endorse commissions’ ability to interpret their mandates to give effect to the 
mandating authority’s intent while ensuring impartiality. Commissions’ interpretations of 
their mandates to remove one-sided elements has not always produced state cooperation, so 
that such one-sided mandates may pose intractable difficulties for commissions.  
1.4 Prejudgment of findings 
Concerns of bias arose from several HRC mandates which presumed the existence of 
violations. Commissions tried to ameliorate these aspects by reformulating mandates in more 
neutral terms. For instance, the Gaza Flotilla Commission was instructed to investigate 
violations “resulting from the Israeli attacks” on the flotilla. 878  The Commission 
acknowledged that this wording indicate prejudgment879 and reformulated the mandate as 
“ascertaining the facts surrounding the Israeli interception of the Gaza-bound flotilla to 
determine whether any violations… took place.”880 It also cautioned, “[i]t is important in the 
drafting of matters of the sort that the impression is not given of the appearance of any 
prejudgment.”881 Perhaps as a testament to the Commission’s efforts, Israel’s initial objection 
                                                 
871  Israel letter to Goldstone Commission, supra note 633, at 436. See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Initial 
Response to Report of the Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza’, 24 September 2009, para. 15, available at 
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876  Gaza Report, supra note 766, para. 6. 
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on grounds of bias882 was not reiterated after the Commission’s interpretation. Rather, Israel 
argued that the report should be postponed until inquiries by national authorities and the 
Secretary-General were completed.883 Ultimately, Israel did not cooperate with the HRC-led 
inquiry. 
Some written mandates gave the impression of prejudgment through instructions to 
investigate ‘all violations’ or to make recommendations to protect civilians from ‘further 
assaults’.884 This language contrasts with mandates to investigate ‘alleged’885 or ‘reported’ 
violations. 886  Several commissions included the word ‘alleged’ when interpreting their 
mandates. For instance, the Gaza Commission wrote that its mandate was to investigate “all 
alleged violations” and to “examine whether” crimes were perpetrated. 887  Such language 
communicates that violations are yet to be proven and that the commission is committed to 
carrying out an impartial inquiry.  
It should also be noted that such language does not necessarily give rise to prejudgment. 
Where inquiries are established after credible reports of violations have emerged, mandating 
authorities may recognise those findings as grounds to establish an inquiry. The example of 
the North Korea Commission is illuminating. When establishing that inquiry, the HRC 
condemned “ongoing grave, widespread and systematic human rights violations” 888  and 
instructed the Commission to investigate violations “as outlined in paragraph 31 of the report 
of the Special Rapporteur”.889 In its report, the Commission recalled the raft of preceding 
human rights reports and explained that it aimed to further investigate and document those 
violations.890 In this case, there was already evidence of violations, and recognition of that fact 
should not amount to prejudgment. In more immediate situations, commissions interpreted 
their mandates more cautiously to remove any pre-existing indications of prejudgment.  
2. Principles Guiding Mandate Implementation  
Commissions identified broad principles which guided the conduct of their work. Several 
commissions stated that they were guided by principles of independence, impartiality, 
objectivity, transparency, confidentiality, integrity and the principle of ‘do no harm’ in 
relation to victims and witnesses.891 This Section zooms in on three key principles that have 
frequently informed mandate implementation: impartiality (2.1), centrality of victims (2.2) 
and accountability (2.3). 
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In addition to interpreting their mandates so as to ensure impartiality, commissions sought to 
establish the facts in a demonstrably impartial way. For instance, the UNCHR’s Gaza Inquiry 
was “deeply mindful of its responsibility to exercise every care to be objective and impartial 
in gathering information and evaluating the evidence upon which it would base its 
conclusions and recommendations…”892 The Goldstone Commission “based its work on an 
independent and impartial analysis of compliance by the parties with their obligations.”893 
Members of the Security Council’s Burundi Inquiry formally declared that they would act 
impartially,894 a practice endorsed by fact-finding guidelines.895  
Some commissions sought to take a ‘balanced’ approach by treating all parties equally. For 
instance, the Yugoslavia Commission wrote that although it had to adopt a selective approach 
to investigations due to resource constraints, “[i]n its choice and method of conducting 
research projects or investigations, the Commission endeavoured, at all times, to be both 
impartial and balanced.”896 The Commission explained that “as a matter of balance”,897 it 
simultaneously negotiated access to excavate mass graves believed to contain Serb victims 
and those believed to contain victims of Serb forces. The Rwanda Commission wrote that it 
applied the same standards of impartiality and independence when considering allegations of 
atrocities by RPF authorities and allegations of atrocities by other actors.898 Impartiality was 
also demonstrated through broad information-gathering and outreach activities. Commissions 
routinely issued public calls for submissions, welcomed information from all interested actors, 
and made efforts to hear from relevant stakeholders. These efforts were not always successful, 
as discussed in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 below.  
2.2 Centrality of victims 
Evident in many commissions’ reports is a concern that their work be victim-centred. 
Commissions recognised harms as experienced by victims and provided a platform for their 
voices to be heard. For instance, the Gaza Commission wrote that “the victims and their 
human rights were at the core of its mandate. Its activities were thus informed by the wish to 
ensure that the voices of all victims are heard”.899 The Goldstone Commission wrote that the 
purpose of its public hearings, which were broadcast live, was “to enable victims, witnesses 
and experts from all sides to the conflict to speak directly to as many people as possible in the 
region as well as in the international community”, and priority was given to “participation of 
victims and people from the affected communities.”900 Kirby writes that the North Korea 
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Commission resolved that collecting testimony at public hearings would be its “centrepiece” 
as it would “play a function in raising public consciousness of the suffering of the victims”.901  
Many commissions emphasised the importance of visiting affected communities. For instance, 
the Beit Hanoun Commission emphasized the importance of travelling to Beit Hanoun “to 
witness first-hand the situation of victims and survivors of the shelling, in particular to 
comprehend the deep distress of the victims of the shelling and of the population generated by 
the ongoing blockade.”902 The Goldstone Commission similarly wrote that its field visits were 
“particularly important to form an understanding of the situation, the context, impact and 
consequences of the conflict on people, and to assess violations of international law.”903 
Several commissions were unable to enter relevant territories owing to a lack of cooperation 
by concerned states. Their efforts to overcome such obstacles are detailed in Section 3 below. 
A victim-centred approach manifests in information-gathering techniques responsive to 
challenges in reporting violations, particularly in relation to sexual and gender-based violence 
(SGBV). Commissions observed that victims of SGBV faced difficulties in reporting 
violations due to fears of being disbelieved and stigmatized.904 Almost a century ago, the 
Greek Delegate to the Smyrna Commission objected to its findings of rape on the basis that 
complaints were made by women of “dubious morality”. 905  In 2014, the North Korea 
Commission wrote, “[v]iolence against women, in particular sexual violence, proved to be 
difficult to document owing to the stigma and shame that still attaches to the victims.”906 The 
Eritrea Commission received reports that some victims of sexual violence committed suicide 
“as a result of the extreme shame, stigma and related consequences from which they 
traditionally suffer.”907 
Some commissions designed their working methods in light of the challenges experienced by 
victims of SGBV. Of note is the work of the Yugoslavia Commission, which gave specific 
attention to sexual violence908 and conducted interviews with victims by teams of female 
lawyers with the support of mental health specialists.909 The Commission observed that it was 
the first time that an women-led rape investigation was conducted in wartime.910  It also 
conducted a ‘pilot study’ on rape to review information and “develop a methodology for 
interviewing witnesses and victims in order to determine how relevant evidence could be 
obtained for use before a tribunal.”911 However, methodological attention to SGBV has not 
been uniform. An analysis of UN inquiry reports between 2005 and 2012 by Emily Kenny 
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found “astonishing disparities in their reporting of gender issues” 912  and recommended 
strengthening gender dimensions of methodologies. In 2013, the HRC resolved that 
commissions should “devote specific attention to violence against women and girls in their 
reports and recommendations”.913 OHCHR’s Guidance and Practice advises the integration 
of a gender perspective into commissions’ work.914  
Recent UN atrocity inquiries examined gendered dimensions of their work in more detail.915 
The Eritrea Commission engaged a specialist to provide gender-sensitive training and 
guidance.916 The Commission recognised that women faced particular difficulties in giving 
information and “developed innovative ways to overcome these challenges”,917 including by 
engaging with women’s networks and female intermediaries, conducting interviews at various 
locations, including women’s homes; and observing strict confidentiality.918 It tried to find 
interpreters “with experience in interpreting for survivors of [SGBV] and/or victims of 
trauma”. 919  Examining SGBV remains difficult sensitive work which continues to pose 
challenges for commissions.  
2.3 Accountability  
Many commissions identified the principle of accountability as central to their work. 
Commissions conceived of this concept differently;920 these themes are explored further in 
Chapter 6. The principle of accountability was embraced by commissions whose written 
mandates mentioned this term as well as some whose mandates did not.921 Some commissions 
linked their work to accountability in a rather generalized way. For instance, the Eritrea 
Commission considered that an objective of its report was “to provide a comprehensive 
account of violations which could serve as a historical record for future accountability”.922 
Other commissions identified more concrete contributions to criminal investigations and 
prosecutions. The Yugoslavia Commission wrote that its purpose was not only to establish 
“the existence of certain patterns of criminality but also to obtain specific evidence such as an 
investigative body would need for prosecution purposes”. 923  The Burundi Commission 
similarly decided to “amass evidence that could be of use for any later judicial action”.924  
Commissions’ concern to facilitate criminal proceedings influenced their methods of 
gathering, assessing and storing information. The South Sudan Commission sought to 
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preserve the chain of custody of evidence, ensure high-quality witness statements and 
organize information in a database which could be utilised in criminal investigations.925 The 
Syria Commission informed the HRC that it was “recording and safeguarding all evidence it 
obtains… bearing in mind its possible use by a future justice mechanism.” 926  After the 
General Assembly established the IIIM to collect and preserve evidence of crimes,927 the 
Commission aligned its work with this body.928 The Darfur Commission represents the high 
water mark of this ‘ICL approach’. It oriented its work towards criminal proceedings and 
collected “all material necessary” to classify facts according to ICL.929 It made accounts of 
witnesses’ testimony, collected official records and verified crime scenes, which “allow[ed] it 
to take a first step in the direction of ensuring accountability for the crimes committed in 
Darfur”.930 
Some commissions also designed their working methods in an effort to avoid impairing future 
trials. For instance, the Guinea Commission wrote that in order to preserve evidence, it did not 
visit locations that had been identified as mass graves, for fear of their destruction.931 The 
Darfur Commission did not take signed witness statements, instead making accounts of 
witnesses’ testimony. 932  This avoided the issue of generating multiple, and possibly 
conflicting, witness statements should a witness be called to testify in future criminal 
proceedings.  
The question of whether UN atrocity inquiries ought to design their working methods in the 
aim of facilitating criminal proceedings is a subject of continued debate.933 Commentators 
have examined to what extent UN atrocity inquiries contribute to criminal proceedings in 
practice.934 There are some positive indications; Bassiouni writes that the ICTY Prosecutor 
would not have been able to start work so quickly had it not been for the work of the 
Yugoslavia Commission935 and the Darfur Commission is credited with facilitating the ICC’s 
plan of investigation.936 At the same time, myriad issues arise from non-judicial investigations 
of international crimes, including contamination of evidence and witnesses, 937  problems 
associated with multiple witness interviews 938  and difficulties in transferring information 
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across institutions.939 In practice, accountability remains an important guiding principle for 
most commissions when implementing their mandates. 
3 Practical Challenges Informing Mandate Implementation 
Commissions implemented their mandates in light of practical challenges and limitations. 
These challenges include limitations in resources and time (3.1), security concerns (3.2), lack 
of territorial access (3.3) and states’ refusals to provide information (3.4). This Section 
discusses these challenges and commissions’ efforts to overcome them.  
3.1 Resource and time limitations  
Commissions’ information-gathering and assessment practices were profoundly shaped by 
limitations in resources and tight reporting deadlines. Many commissions were instructed to 
examine ‘all’ violations in concerned states. 940  Such broad mandates were not usually 
matched with plentiful resources or lengthy time periods for reporting.  
Working within these constraints, commissions often decided to focus on certain types or 
patterns of atrocities. For instance, the Goldstone Commission wrote, “[i]n view of the time 
frame within which it had to complete its work, the Mission necessarily had to be selective in 
the choice of issues and incidents for investigation.”941 Some commissions used terms such as 
‘representative’, ‘illustrative’, or the ‘most serious’ to explain their selections. 942  Some 
commissions linked their focus on violations amounting to international crimes,943 seeking to 
facilitate accountability efforts. For instance, the CAR Commission chose to focus on “more 
serious violations, and especially those for which it is reasonable to expect that accountability 
might be exacted in the future”.944 Commissions also referred to practical considerations. For 
instance, the Darfur Commission selected incidents deemed “most representative” of patterns 
of violations with “greater possibilities of effective fact-finding”.945 It highlighted site access, 
witness protection and evidence-gathering potential as particularly relevant to the selection 
process.946 Not all commissions explained how incidents were selected.947 Rob Grace suggests 
that “articulating the rationales for the mission’s decisions in detailed terms would enhance 
the transparency regarding the mission’s methodological choices”. 948  There is no legal 
definition of ‘serious’ violations, but the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law 
and Human Rights identifies certain indicators, including the nature of obligations, the scale 
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and impact of violations, and the status of victims.949 Such parameters were adopted by some 
OHCHR-led mapping exercises950 and might be useful for UN atrocity inquiries.951  
Limited resources and time also meant that commissions could not always carry out all 
desired information-gathering activities.952 For instance, the Gaza Commission decided that it 
was not feasible to hold public hearings in light of the timeframe for its work.953 As it could 
not gain territorial access, it made a public call for submissions and held individual interviews 
in other locations.  
Resource limitations pose particular difficulties for information-gathering regarding SGBV, as 
demonstrated in the example of the CAR Commission. That Commission reported that it 
could not fully investigate SGBV in refugee camps due to practical constraints:954 
Although it visited six camps and met with one hundred and ninety-eight victims in four 
days, it was unable to investigate [SGBV] due to time constraints which impeded its 
ability to establish the necessary rapport with the victims and to create a conducive 
working environment in which to conduct interviews. 
The CAR Commission advised that this task should be undertaken by investigators with 
sufficient time and resources.955 In effect, the Commission could not investigate SGBV in 
relation to this group of victims due to lack of time. 
3.2 Security concerns 
Security concerns also shaped commissions’ working methods. The Syria Commission 
reported that concerns around witness protection “lie at the heart of the methodology of 
human rights investigations.”956 Several commissions faced challenges where victims and 
witnesses feared reprisals. 957  The North Korea Commission explained at length its 
consideration of risks posed to victims and witnesses by interacting with the Commission, 
including reprisals against those individuals or their family members inside the DPRK.958 It 
did not take up offers to have mobile telephone contact with witnesses inside the DPRK out of 
concerns that such contact could put them at risk959 and only heard publicly from people who 
had no close family in the DPRK or were judged not to be at risk in China. 960  Other 
commissions similarly took practical steps to minimise risks such as not interviewing 
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witnesses at locations where they could be seen to be cooperating,961 conducting interviews 
confidentially, and redacting identifying information.962  
Recently, commissions have recognised that they could not guarantee comprehensive witness 
protection.963 For instance, the Eritrea Commission wrote that its ability to “physically protect 
concerned persons is limited” and that it depended on states to “respect their primary 
responsibility to protect all individuals present on their territories, whatever their status may 
be”. 964  Such practice is consistent with OHCHR’s recommendation that participants be 
informed of commissions’ limited capacity to ensure their safety and that primary 
responsibility for ensuring their protection lies with states.965 
In some situations, commissioners and support staff also faced security risks, which limited 
their ability to gather information. For instance, the CAR Commission could not visit some 
areas due to general instability in the CAR.966 In addition, some support staff of the CAR 
Commission were targeted and held hostage.967 The Libya Commission similarly reported that 
it faced significant security considerations and was unable to visit sites where active hostilities 
continued.968 
3.3 Lack of territorial access 
Where concerned states refused to cooperate, commissions were barred from entering their 
territories. HRC-led commissions have largely borne the brunt of this lack of cooperation; 
inquiries into North Korea, Eritrea, Syria, Myanmar, and different phases of the 
Israel/Palestine conflict were all denied territorial access and information. 969  It may be 
recalled from Chapter Two that while states usually consented to inquiries by the Secretary-
General and Security Council, this did not always translate to full cooperation in practice.970 
Saxon writes that lack of state cooperation is not a “fatal impediment” where fact-finders are 
persistent and creative.971 In practice, UN atrocity inquiries frequently resorted to gathering 
information from outside uncooperative states.  
Some commissions held hearings and conducted interviews with victims and witnesses in 
third states. For instance, the North Korea Commission conducted public hearings in Seoul, 
Tokyo, London and Washington DC.972 The Goldstone Commission held public hearings in 
Gaza and in Geneva.973 The Syria Commission collected first-hand accounts from people who 
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had left the country and interviewed people inside Syria by Skype and telephone.974 The 
Eritrea Commission similarly collected accounts from people located outside Eritrea, 
including refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants.975  
Commissions also utilised documentary sources of information. Several commissions utilised 
satellite imagery; this enabled the Eritrea Commission to locate many detention facilities976 
and the North Korea Commission to confirm the existence of prison camps. 977  Some 
commissions obtained satellite imagery from the UN Institute for Training and Research’s 
Operational Satellite Applications Programme,978 while the North Korea Commission had to 
rely on commercially available information.979 That Commission chided, “[a]lmost certainly, 
higher resolution satellite imagery produced by more technologically advanced states would 
have provided further information”,980 but that its requests were not granted, apparently due to 
security restrictions.981 
Commissions also examined information available in the public domain, including by those 
implicated in violations. The Syria Commission examined public communications by 
CENTCOM 982  and videos and photographs published by extremist groups. 983  Some 
commissions also obtained clandestinely-recorded videos and photographs.984 For instance, 
the Syria Commission examined a cache of thousands of photographs allegedly taken inside 
in Government-run detention facilities.985 As it can be difficult to verify the authenticity of 
documentary sources, such information was usually used to corroborate first-hand 
accounts.986987 In some cases, commissions were not able to use photographic and video 
materials as they could not be authenticated.988 
Some states criticised commissions’ information-gathering methods after refusing to 
cooperate. For instance, Eritrea complained that most claims of violations were from “550 
anonymous individuals who are comprised of refugees”, which was “not representative of the 
vast majority of Eritreans abroad and inside the country.”989 Yet, Eritrea had denied access to 
the Eritrea Commission, which, in combination with that state’s control of information and 
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fears of reprisals, precluded the Commission from contacting those within the country. In 
response to the Government’s assertion that testimonies of prison camps were false, the North 
Korea Commission stated that the best way for the DPRK to respond would be to allow access 
to sites allegedly containing such camps.990 Commissions also adopted other strategies to 
respond to states’ non-cooperation, discussed next.  
3.4 States’ refusals to provide information  
Fact-finding instruments affirm that concerned states must have an opportunity to be heard.991 
Palmer writes that if such an opportunity is not reasonably afforded, an inquiry risks 
“delegitimization”.992 In practice, uncooperative states did not exercise this opportunity and 
refused to engage with commissions. In such cases, commissions reported that they had 
repeatedly invited the views of concerned states, without success.993 Commissions also sought 
to identify states’ views from their public statements. For instance, several commissions 
examined statements published on government websites expressing Israel’s versions of events 
concerning its military operations.994 The Sri Lanka Panel similarly examined governmental 
military strategies from publicly available sources, including the Defence Ministry website.995 
The Eritrea Commission wrote that in the face of Eritrea’s non-cooperation, “the Commission 
has relied wherever possible on statements by the Government of Eritrea as reported on its 
official website or in the public domain.”996 Some commissions also afforded an opportunity 
for states to reply to their findings before their reports were finalised. For instance, the North 
Korea Commission shared its draft findings with the DPRK and invited its “comments and 
factual corrections.”997 That invitation was not accepted.  
States’ refusals to cooperate gave rise to particular difficulties where they exclusively held 
material information. Where cooperation was sought to no avail, some commissions decided 
to draw adverse inferences from their silence. This practice is known in arbitration998 and the 
ECHR has ruled that where events in issue lie within the exclusive knowledge of the state and 
the facts give rise to a strong presumption of violations, “the burden of proof may be regarded 
as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation.”999 In a draft 
general comment on the right to life, the Human Rights Committee identifies an obligation to 
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disclose information where an attack results in loss of life, subject to ‘compelling’ security 
concerns:1000 
States parties should, subject to compelling security considerations, disclose the criteria 
for attacking with lethal force individuals or objects whose targeting is expected to 
result in deprivation of life, including the legal basis for specific attacks, the process of 
identification of military targets and combatants or persons taking a direct part in 
hostilities, the circumstances in which relevant means and methods of warfare have 
been used, and whether non-lethal alternatives for attaining the same military objective 
were considered. They must also investigate allegations of violations of article 6 in 
situations of armed conflict in accordance with the relevant international standards. 
In the inquiry context, the North Korea Commission reported that it was comfortable in 
drawing inferences, as it had provided many opportunities for DPRK authorities to address the 
Commission and provide its views, of which it had not availed itself.1001 The example of the 
Goldstone Commission demonstrates how adverse inferences may not always promote 
effective implementation of the mandate. That Commission responded to Israel’s refusal to 
provide information about its military operations by making findings on the basis of “the 
information available”1002 or “in the absence of any information refuting the allegations”.1003 
Such findings included that Israel had a policy of intentionally attacking civilians.1004 Israel 
criticised the findings as made “in the absence of the sensitive intelligence information which 
Israel did not feel able to provide”.1005 Goldstone defended the Commission’s findings: “Our 
mission obviously could only consider and report on what it saw, heard and read. If the 
government of Israel failed to bring facts and analyses to our attention, we cannot fairly be 
blamed for the consequences.”1006 While its report was heralded in some quarters as adhering 
to the highest standards of legality given the lack of cooperation and challenges posed by the 
fog of war,1007 it was also criticised in others for making findings on the basis of information 
supplied by one party to the conflict. 1008  Later, Goldstone personally renounced some 
findings, explaining that information later published by Israel indicated that civilians were not 
targeted as a matter of policy, but that the Commission “had no evidence on which to draw 
                                                 
1000 CCPR, General Comment No. 36 on article 6 of the ICCPR, Revised draft prepared by the Rapporteur, para. 
67, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/GCArticle6/GCArticle6_EN.pdf 
(accessed 1 May 2018) [Draft GC 36]. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Ben Emmerson, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/29/51, 16 June 2015, para. 58. 
1001 North Korea Report, supra note 32, para. 76.  
1002 Goldstone Report, supra note 633, paras. 32, 75, 389, 437, 494, 629, 652, 701, 1102, 1167. 
1003 Ibid., paras. 595, 838, 1167.  
1004 Ibid., para. 1191. 
1005 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Israel's Analysis and Comments on the Gaza Fact-Finding Mission 
Report’, 15 September 2009, available at 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Pages/Israel_analysis_comments_Goldstone_Mission_15-
Sep-2009.aspx (accessed 1 May 2018). 
1006  Richard Goldstone, ‘Israel’s Missed Opportunity’, The Guardian, 21 October 2009, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/oct/21/goldstone-report-israel-gaza-war-crimes-
un (accessed 1 May 2018). 
1007 Richard Falk, ‘The Goldstone Report and the Goldstone Retreat: Truths Told by Law and Reviled by 
Geopolitics’, in Chantal Meloni and Gianni Tognoni (eds), Is there a Court for Gaza? (The Hague: TMC 
Asser Press, 2012) 83-103, at 97.  
1008 E.g., Trevor Norwitz, ‘Letter to Justice Goldstone’, in Gerald Steinberg and Anne Herzberg (eds), The 
Goldstone Report “Reconsidered”: A Critical Analysis (Israel: NGO Monitor, 2011) 153-180,at 153.  
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any other reasonable conclusion”.1009 This episode stands as a cautionary tale of the real 
difficulties that arise when concerned states refuse to provide information. 
Commentators are divided as to the use of adverse inferences in the inquiry context. Liesbeth 
Zegveld points out that inquiry reports are not sufficient to convict, but rather provide grounds 
for opening investigations. 1010 By contrast, Mégret writes that as states may argue that fact-
finding reports are biased whether they cooperate or not, it is important to create incentives 
for cooperation and to tread carefully in reaching findings when access to information is 
denied. Mégret cautions that “adverse factual findings cannot be a way of ‘punishing’ a non-
cooperative state and must evidently result from the best possible interpretation of the 
evidence in the circumstances.”1011 Drawing adverse inferences walks a tightrope between 
preventing non-cooperation from obstructing an inquiry and rendering findings vulnerable to 
criticism that they are incorrect or even a de facto penalty for refusing to cooperate. In both 
scenarios, the credibility of findings may be damaged, and prospects for stimulating corrective 
action may be reduced.  
4. Fostering Quality in Methods of Work 
While commissions enjoy a large degree of freedom in determining their working methods, 
this flexibility has engendered criticisms of arbitrariness and unreliability. Some states pointed 
to commissions’ non-judicial nature as grounds to reject their findings. For instance, Eritrea 
wrote that the Eritrea Commission “admits that it is not a judicial body. In other words, its 
accusations do not meet fundamental standards of accuracy, objectivity, neutrality and 
legality”.1012 Commissions have taken various initiatives to reduce misgivings of ad hoc-ery 
and strengthen the credibility of their findings, as well as ensuring that working methods are 
appropriate to the context of inquiry. This Section discusses initiatives taken by commissions 
in pursuit of these aims, namely adopting judicial procedures (4.1), rules of procedure and 
terms of reference (4.2), standards of proof (4.3) and best practices (4.4). 
4.1 Judicial procedures 
A few UN atrocity inquiries borrowed procedures from the judicial context. For instance, the 
Burundi Commission decided to “conform as far as possible to judicial standards” in order to 
“give its eventual conclusions a solid base”.1013 It permitted any person appearing before it to 
be assisted by a lawyer, and all witnesses had to swear to “speak the truth, the whole truth, 
                                                 
1009 Richard Goldstone, ‘Reconsidering the Goldstone Report on Israel and war crimes’, Washington Post, 1 
April 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/reconsidering-the-goldstone-report-on-
israel-and-war-crimes/2011/04/01/AFg111JC_story.html (accessed 1 May 2018). This statement was 
opposed by the other commissioners: Hina Jilani, Christine Chinkin and Desmond Travers, ‘Goldstone 
report: Statement issued by members of UN mission on Gaza war’, The Guardian, 14 April 2011, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/apr/14/goldstone-report-statement-un-gaza (accessed 1 
May 2018). 
1010 Liesbeth Zegveld, ‘The Importance of Fact-Finding Missions Under International Humanitarian Law’, in 
Chantal Meloni and Gianni Tognoni (eds), Is there a Court for Gaza? (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2012) 
161-167, at 165 [Zegveld 2012]. 
1011 Mégret 2016, supra note 460, at 40. 
1012 Eritrea Ministry of Information, ‘Press Statement by H.E. Mr. Yemane Gebreab, Presidential Adviser’, 8 
June 2016, available at http://www.shabait.com/news/local-news/21964-press-statement-by-he-mr-yemane-
gebreab (accessed 1 May 2018) [Eritrea Press Release].  
1013 SC Burundi Report, supra note 307, para. 6.  
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and nothing but the truth”.1014 The Mozambique Commission also required witnesses to swear 
an oath, adopting the ICJ’s formulation.1015 The Darfur Commission adopted “an approach 
proper to a judicial body” 1016  when examining international crimes. These references to 
judicial standards and approaches appear to convey analytical rigour. At the same time, most 
commissions did not identify specific judicial regimes, so their invocations were generalised.  
Commissions invoked ‘judicial’ procedures infrequently and distinguished their work from 
that of courts and judicial procedures.1017 For instance, the Libya Commission emphasised 
that “it is not a court of law and that its investigations were not undertaken with the time, 
resources, and judicial tools (such as subpoena powers) that normally characterize criminal 
investigations.”1018 The Eritrea Commission stated, “it has no law enforcement powers and is 
not a judicial body. It has nevertheless adopted a rigorous approach to the analysis of the 
information it has collected.” 1019  Although the Darfur Commission adopted a ‘judicial 
approach’, it explained that it was not “vested with prosecutorial or investigative functions 
proper”, so focussed on collecting reliable information about suspected perpetrators.1020 This 
distinction clarifies that commissions are not seeking to replicate the judicial process, so their 
investigations should not be judged against such standards. At the same time, such approaches 
could imbue the fact-finding process with gravitas akin to judicial proceedings, while 
maintaining differentiation.  
4.2 Rules of procedure and terms of reference 
Some commissions adopted rules of procedure to govern the conduct of their work. Such rules 
tended to govern formal aspects such as decision-making, confidentiality policies and 
methods of information-gathering and assessment. Although many rules were similar in 
content, these documents also contained some differences, and the practice of adopting them 
was ad hoc. Rules of procedure were especially popular during the 1990s and were also 
adopted by historic UN atrocity inquiries.1021 Several commissions in the 1990s adopted rules 
of procedure, including inquiries on the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Burundi, and Timor-
Leste.1022 
The practice of adopting rules of procedure fell away in the 2000s, but support for their use 
has recently re-emerged. OHCHR Guidance and Practice recommends that commissions 
adopt rules of procedure defining their methods of work and responsibilities, and drew up 
model standard rules. 1023  OHCHR also recommends that commissions adopt terms of 
reference at the outset of their operations specifying the scope of the investigative mandate, 
                                                 
1014 Ibid., Annex, Rules of Procedure, Rule 12. 
1015 Mozambique Report, supra note 253, para. 18. See Vietnam Report, supra note 273, Annex II, Rules of 
Procedure and Plan of Work of the Mission, Rule 13 [Vietnam Rules of Procedure]. 
1016 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 14. 
1017 E.g., ibid., para. 14; Timor-Leste Report, supra note 376, paras. 11-12; Goldstone Report, supra note 633, 
para. 25 and Libya First Report, supra note 968, para. 227. 
1018 Libya Second Report, supra note 853, para. 8.  
1019 Eritrea Second Report, supra note 569, para. 31.  
1020 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 538. 
1021 Vietnam Rules of Procedure, supra note 1015, Rule 13. 
1022 Yugoslavia Interim Report, supra note 292, Appendix; Rwanda Final Report, supra note 297, Annex II; SC 
Burundi Report, supra note 307, Annex I and East Timor Report, supra note 338, Annex I. 
1023 OHCHR Guidance and Practice, supra note 63, Annex II. 
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legal framework and methods of work. 1024  The Siracusa Guidelines recommend that 
commissions adopt an ‘operational plan’ setting out their budget, internal protocols, functions, 
activities and methods of work, and an ‘investigation plan’ outlining investigative priorities, 
methodology and internal protocols.1025 In practice, only two recent commissions reported 
that they adopted rules of procedure, and did not include them in their reports. 1026 
Commissions have been more receptive to drawing up terms of reference, but practice 
remains mixed. Some commissions appended terms of reference to their reports 1027  or 
published them as separate documents. 1028  Other commissions discussed their terms of 
reference in their main reports.1029 The CAR Commission reportedly adopted an ‘investigation 
plan’. 1030  Other recent commissions did not refer to rules of procedure or terms of 
reference.1031  
4.3 Standards of proof 
In comparison with commissions’ rather practices of adhering to judicial procedures or 
adopting rules of procedure, there is rich practice of utilising standards of proof, also termed 
‘evidentiary standards’ or ‘evidentiary thresholds’, to communicate the strength of findings. 
In the adjudicative context, evidence must meet or surpass a standard of proof for findings to 
be made out. 1032  For instance, the standard of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ is generally 
required for criminal convictions.1033 Proponents of standards of proof in the inquiry context 
argue that they may encourage commissions to scrutinise the strength of findings, convey the 
strength of conclusions and demonstrate procedural integrity, while also accepting they are 
not a panacea for credibility.1034 The use of common standards of proof by UN fact-finding 
bodies was advocated as long ago as 1982.1035 However, it has taken some time for standards 
of proof to become a regular part of commissions’ working methods. 
In the 1990s, commissions did not utilise standards of proof, instead expressing findings with 
differing degrees of certitude. For instance, the Yugoslavia Commission concluded with “a 
reasonable degree of certainty” that the civilian population was deliberately targeted during 
                                                 
1024 Ibid., at 67. See OHCHR Model Rules, supra note 675, Rule 2. 
1025 Siracusa Guidelines, supra note 34, Guidelines 5 and 7. 
1026 Eritrea First Report, supra note 567, para. 24; CAR Preliminary Report, supra note 768, para. 8.  
1027 Lebanon Report, supra note 855, Annex II; Report of the High-Level Mission on the situation of human 
rights in Darfur pursuant to Human Rights Council decision S-4/101, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/80, 9 March 2007, 
Annex II [Darfur High-Level Report]; Syria First Report, supra note 32, Annex I; Gaza Flotilla Report, 
supra note 681, Annex I.  
1028 ‘Terms of Reference of the Independent International Fact-finding Mission on the Israeli Settlements in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory including East Jerusalem’, para. 11, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session19/FFM/FFMSettlementTO
R.pdf (accessed 1 May 2018) [Israeli Settlements TOR] and HRC Burundi TOR, supra note 495. 
1029 E.g., Goldstone Report, supra note 633, para. 15 and Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 2.  
1030 CAR Preliminary Report, supra note 768, para. 8.  
1031 E.g., Gaza Report, supra note 766. The North Korea Commission applied ‘best practices’ but it is unclear 
whether it adopted specific rules of procedure: North Korea Report, supra note 32, para. 29. 
1032  Katherine Del Mar, ‘The International Court of Justice and Standards of Proof’, in Karine Bannelier, 
Theodore Christakis and Sarah Heathcote (eds), The ICJ and the Development of International Law: the 
Lasting Impact of the Corfu Channel Case (Oxon: Routledge, 2011) 98-123.  
1033 E.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 2187 UNTS 90, Art. 
66 [Rome Statute]. See Dov Jacobs, ‘The Burden and Standard of Proof”, in Goran Sluiter et al (eds), 
International Criminal Procedure, Principles and Rules (Oxford: OUP, 2013) 1128-1150. 
1034 Wilkinson 2014, supra note 25, at 12 and Franck and Fairley, supra note 91, at 310. 
1035 Ramcharan, ‘Evidence’, in Ramcharan, supra note 91, 64-82, at 78.  
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the battle of Sarajevo; 1036  the Rwanda Commission found “abundant evidence” of 
genocide,1037 and the East Timor Commission concluded that evidence “clearly demonstrates” 
a pattern of serious violations.1038 In 2005, the Darfur Commission applied a standard of proof 
when identifying suspected perpetrators. The standard adopted was “a reliable body of 
material consistent with other verified circumstances, which tends to show that a person may 
reasonably be suspected of being involved in the commission of a crime.”1039 Since then, most 
commissions have articulated standards of proof,1040 which have been expressed differently. 
For instance, the Sri Lanka Panel considered an allegation of violations as credible “if there 
was a reasonable basis to believe that the underlying act or event occurred”.1041 The Libya 
Commission adopted a ‘balance of probabilities’ standard.1042 Other formulations were similar 
to that of the Darfur Commission.1043 A review of these standards by Wilkinson in 2012 
concluded that expressions of certitude were “being applied, though not uniformly and only to 
some extent”.1044  
Recent practice suggests that commissions are commonly adopting a standard of ‘reasonable 
grounds to believe’, defined by the North Korea Commission as “a reliable body of 
information, consistent with other material, based on which a reasonable and ordinarily 
prudent person has reason to believe that such incident or pattern of conduct has occurred.”1045 
Many commissions have applied this standard,1046 with some indicating that their adoption of 
this standard was consistent with the practice of other commissions1047 and UN fact-finding 
bodies.1048  Such self-referential practice contributes to the development of best practices, 
discussed below. 
Commissions contrasted their standards of proof with those used in criminal proceedings and 
generally agreed that the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard was inappropriate for the inquiry 
context, as their findings were not binding and they lacked coercive information-gathering 
powers.1049 The Darfur Commission observed that its standard of proof was lower than the 
prima facie standard used to confirm indictments before ad hoc tribunals.1050 Commissions 
have explained that the ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ standard is sufficiently high to call for 
                                                 
1036 Yugoslavia Final Report, supra note 39, para. 209. 
1037 Rwanda Final Report, supra note 297, para. 184.  
1038 East Timor Report, supra note 338, para. 142. 
1039 Darfur Report supra note 32, para. 15.  
1040 An exception is the Palmer Commission, which wrote that that findings were established to its ‘satisfaction’: 
Palmer Report, supra note 316, para. 125. Wilkinson criticises this formulation as lacking transparency: 
Wilkinson 2014, supra note 25, at 13. 
1041 Sri Lanka Report, supra note 29, at i. 
1042 Libya Second Report, supra note 853, para. 6.  
1043 Timor-Leste Report, supra note 376, para. 12; Guinea Report, supra note 39, para. 22.  
1044 Wilkinson, supra note 98, at 61.  
1045 North Korea Report, supra note 32, para. 68.  
1046 CAR Preliminary Report, supra note 768, para. 17; Eritrea First Report, supra note 567, para. 31; Gaza 
Report, supra note 766, para. 19; Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the 
Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/58, 4 June 2013, para. 6 [Syria Fifth Report]. 
1047 Gaza Report, supra note 766, para. 19, citing North Korea Report and Eritrea Second Report, supra note 
569, para. 32. 
1048 CAR Preliminary Report, supra note 768, para. 17; Eritrea First Report, supra note 567, para. 31; HRC 
Burundi TOR, supra note 495, at IV. 
1049 Timor-Leste Report, supra note 376, paras. 12 and 110; Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 15; Goldstone 
Report, supra note 633, para. 25.  
1050 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 15, citing practice of the ICTR and ICTY. 
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further investigations, which might lead to prosecutions.1051 The Eritrea Commission further 
observed that this standard was “used by the ICC to review evidence prior to the issuance of 
an arrest warrant.”1052 The Commission was referring the rule that the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber 
must be satisfied that there are “reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court” to issue an arrest warrant. 1053  Commissions’ 
preferred standard of proof may be compared to that applied by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber 
when assessing a request by the Prosecutor to initiate proprio motu investigations. The 
Chamber must decide whether there is a “reasonable basis to proceed”,1054 which entails “a 
reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has or is being 
committed”. 1055  These linkages with judicial standards reflect the function of promoting 
accountability for violations and their role as catalysts or precursors for criminal 
investigations.  
4.4 Best practices  
An emerging trend is the invocation of ‘best practices’ or ‘international standards’ of fact-
finding or of international commissions of inquiry. Several commissions asserted that their 
working methods complied with standard UN practices. The Goldstone Commission stated 
that it based its work on “international investigative standards developed by the [UN].”1056 
Similar statements were made by commissions on Timor-Leste, Guinea, the CAR and 
Eritrea.1057 The Syria Commission wrote that its methodology was based on “best practices of 
commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions.” 1058  The North Korea Commission 
reported that it applied ‘best practices’ regarding integrating gender into the exercise of its 
mandate,1059  witness protection, outreach, rules of procedure, report writing, international 
investigation standards, and archiving.1060  
Commissions often did not identify specific sources of these standards, rather asserting that 
they adhered to them. For instance, the above-cited statement by the Goldstone Commission 
was not accompanied by references, and it did not explain what ‘international investigative 
standards’ meant in practice. The Eritrea Commission referred to OHCHR’s “standard 
policies”1061 of protecting victims and witnesses but did not identify their source or content. 
Some recent commissions cited a manual on sexual violence investigations1062 and OHCHR 
                                                 
1051 Eritrea First Report, supra note 567, para. 32; CAR Preliminary Report, supra note 768, para. 32; North 
Korea Report, supra note 32, para. 68.  
1052 Eritrea Second Report, supra note 569, para. 32.  
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1062  CAR Report, supra note 32, footnote 215, citing ICTR Prosecutor, Best Practices Manual on the 
Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Violence Crimes in Post Conflict Regions, 30 January 2014, 
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Guidance and Practice1063 as sources of best practices. Adhering to best practices may go 
some way towards defusing objections that commissions’ working methods are unfair or 
insufficiently rigorous.1064  They give the impression of the development of coherent and 
consistent inquiry practice, which may bolster perceptions of the credibility and reliability of 
commissions’ findings. 
Conclusions  
This Chapter examined how UN atrocity inquiries acted as engineers of their mandates, 
determining the technical requirements to implement the mandating authority’s vision in light 
of practical constraints and in view of their roles and functions. Understanding impartiality as 
a crucial condition for formulating credible findings, commissions interpreted their mandates 
to include relevant actors and territories, while excising suggestions of prejudgment and bias. 
Commissions’ independence was especially asserted when their interpretations departed 
significantly from the language of mandating resolutions. These efforts went some way to 
insulate commissions from elements of politicisation at the level of the mandating authority. 
Commissions’ approaches to mandate implementation were guided by principles of 
impartiality, a victim-centred outlook, and in many cases, accountability. The limited 
allocation of resources and time pressure for reporting necessitated selective information-
gathering and consideration of feasibility in designing working methods. Security risks added 
further complexity. By focussing on serious violations, especially those amounting to 
international crimes, commissions prioritised scarce resources towards incidents that would 
trigger states’ duties to investigate and prosecute and which would command the attention of 
the international community. Their efforts to collect and preserve information for use in 
criminal proceedings further concretised their roles as precursors of investigations of 
international crimes. Commissions provided a platform for victims’ voices by holding public 
hearings and designing working methods that facilitated victim participation while protecting 
their safety to the extent possible. Interesting in this regard is commissions’ burgeoning 
recognition of their limited abilities to protect witnesses and investigate SGBV. Such 
disclosures reflect a commitment to transparency and signal to mandating authorities that such 
tasks should not be expected to be undertaken by bodies with temporary mandates and scarce 
resources. 
While commissions encouraged states to participate in their work, they found ways to gather 
and assess information in the absence of state cooperation, to recognise harms as experienced 
by victims and avoid frustrating their mandates. By according states highly visible 
opportunities to provide information, reporting on the extent of their non-cooperation and 
seeking states’ views from alternative sources, commissions insulated themselves to some 
extent from critiques that they had discharged their mandates unfairly. Kirby recalls that in 
respect of the North Korea Commission, “transparency was the antidote to our exclusion 
                                                 
1063 Gaza Report, supra note 766, footnote 3; North Korea Report, supra note 32, footnote 11; Eritrea First 
Report, supra note 567, para. 16.  
1064 E.g., ‘Response of the Government of Eritrea to the report of the Commission of Inquiry’, in Note verbale 
dated 19 June 2015 from the Permanent Mission of Eritrea to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed 
to the Office of the President of the Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/G/6, 24 June 2015, Annex 
II, para. 5 [Eritrea Note Verbale].  
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from, and non-cooperation by, the country subject to our inquiry.”1065 The drawing of adverse 
inferences was another strategy, especially where material information was exclusively held 
by states. While this practice allows commissions to reach findings of violations and thereby 
denounce states’ conduct, it also gives rise to some concerns. Where states refuse to cooperate 
due to perceptions of bias, use of adverse inferences may be interpreted as further unfair 
targeting. The example of the Goldstone Commission shows how this practice might 
undermine an inquiry’s work.1066 This practice remains vulnerable to criticism that findings 
reflect political ends rather than the results of impartial fact-finding.  
Commissions’ design of their working methods was also informed by their roles and 
functions. Some commissions emphasised links with judicial procedure, not only to align their 
work with judicial bodies but to borrow from the hallmarks of judicial pedigree. 
Commissions’ adoption of rules of procedure added a sense of formality to their work and, 
where rules were similar, promoted consistency across commissions. The adoption of 
standards of proof and best practices acted as means of quality-control. The development of a 
common standard of proof and best practices more generally reinforced consistency in inquiry 
practice while distinguishing commissions’ work from that of judicial bodies. These 
initiatives convey that commissions are not simply arbitrary exercises or ‘lite’ judicial 
proceedings, but rather are principled endeavours occupying a distinct institutional space.  
In short, commissions interpreted and implemented their mandates in an effort to create 
conditions for the production of authoritative findings. Such findings could challenge denials 
by concerned states, command the attention of the international community and galvanise 
accountability efforts.1067 These functions also informed commissions’ interpretations of legal 
dimensions of their mandates and the substantive applicability of fields of international law. 
These aspects are explored in next, in Chapter Four.  
                                                 
1065 Michael Kirby, ‘Foreword’, in Henderson, supra note 94, vi-xiv, at xi.  
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particular”: Yihdego, supra note 96, at 21. 
1067 E.g., UNCHR Gaza Report, supra note 536, para. 104.  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE APPLICABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Introduction 
Previous chapters identified how roles and functions of UN atrocity inquiries were fashioned 
by mandating authorities and finessed by commissions when interpreting and operationalizing 
their mandates. It was also observed that commissions’ mandates often had legal dimensions, 
such as through instructions to establish the facts of violations, determine responsibilities and 
propose accountability recommendations with regard to the nature and scope of violations.1068 
Some mandates mentioned specific legal fields, notably IHRL, IHL and ICL, as legal 
lenses 1069  of analysis. Building on these observations, Chapter Four zooms in on 
commissions’ engagement with legal dimensions of their mandates. Commissions often 
termed relevant legal fields as the ‘applicable’ law. 1070  In the UN inquiry context, such 
‘applications’ do not have direct legal effect; however, for ease of reference, similar language 
is used here. The Chapter examines how commissions’ roles and functions informed their 
approaches toward identifying the legal framework law applicable to the situations under 
scrutiny. 
Chapter Four is organised in the following way. Section 1 discusses how commissions 
identified legal dimensions of their mandates, including common rationales for interpreting 
mandates to include legal lenses beyond those specified by mandating authorities. The 
Chapter then moves to examine commissions’ approaches towards the selection of law 
applicable to the situations and actors under scrutiny. Section 2 examines commissions’ 
approaches in respect of IHRL, Section 3 examines the same in respect of IHL, and Section 4 
discusses commissions’ view of the applicability of ICL. The Conclusions section offers 
cross-cutting observations as to how commissions’ roles and functions informed their 
approaches to the identification of the applicable legal framework. 
1.  Identification of Legal Dimensions of the Mandate 
This Section discusses how commissions identified legal dimensions of their mandates. As 
these identifications were made independently of mandating authorities, they offer insights 
into commissions’ own perceptions of their functions. Commissions’ reasoning was expressed 
in their reports and was sometimes also articulated in other documents prepared by them, such 
as terms of reference and communications with states. This Section also examines 
commissioners’ views as expressed in their academic writings and published interviews with 
journalists and scholars, as these resources offer further comprehension of their approaches. 
                                                 
1068 See Chapter Two, Section 2. 
1069 Boutruche 2013, supra note 482. 
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supra note 32, para. 41. 
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Section 1.1 discusses how commissions interpreted mandates expressed in factual terms to 
include legal dimensions. Section 1.2 discusses the extent to which commissions interpreted 
their mandates conservatively, by confining the applicable law to fields specified in the 
written mandate. Section 1.3 discusses the more common practice of interpreting the mandate 
to include other legal fields and examines commissions’ rationales for those interpretations. 
Section 1.4 brings these strands together to discuss how commissions’ interpretations of legal 
dimensions of their mandates were shaped by their roles and functions. 
1.1 Inclusion of legal dimensions in factual mandates 
A few written mandates of UN atrocity inquiries did not explicitly mention international law. 
All these commissions interpreted their mandates to include legal dimensions. The approaches 
of two commissions are examined in more detail: the HRC-led Beit Hanoun Commission and 
the Palmer Commission. These commissions viewed the framework of international law as of 
significantly different relevance to their mandates.  
The HRC instructed the Beit Hanoun Commission to “[a]ssess the situation of victims; 
address needs of survivors; and make recommendations on ways to protect Palestinian 
civilians against further Israeli assaults”. 1071  The Commission saw the framework of 
international law as central, stating that “[i]n construing its mandate and the facts presented to 
it, the mission applied an international law framework, in particular [IHRL] and [IHL]”.1072 
When interpreting its mandate, the Beit Hanoun Commission took into account the “context 
provided by the [mandating] resolution as a whole, with particular reference to collective 
punishment; the killing of civilians as a gross violation of human rights law and [IHL]; [IHL] 
applicable to medical personnel”;1073 and the “rights-based definition of ‘victim’.”1074 The 
Commission treated its mandating authority’s condemnation of violations as indications that 
an important part of its mandate was to evaluate atrocities on the basis of international law.  
The Secretary-General instructed the Palmer Commission to identify the “facts, circumstances 
and context” 1075  of the Gaza flotilla incident and recommend ways of avoiding similar 
incidents in the future. The Commission depicted its mandate as concerned with matters 
beyond the scope of domestic inquiries by Israel and Turkey, which had reached opposite 
conclusions as to its legality.1076 Its view of the utility of international law as a framework for 
the inquiry is apparent from its statement:1077 
The [Commission] will not add value for the [UN] by attempting to determine contested 
facts or by arguing endlessly about the applicable law. Too much legal analysis 
threatens to produce political paralysis. Whether what occurred here was legally 
                                                 
1071 Beit Hanoun Mandate, supra note 317. 
1072 Beit Hanoun Report, supra note 620, para. 10. 
1073 Ibid., para. 5(a). 
1074 Ibid., para. 5(c). 
1075 Palmer TOR, supra note 316. 
1076 Palmer Mandate, supra note 315. See Report on the Israeli Attack on the Humanitarian Aid Convoy to Gaza 
on 31 May 2010, February 2011, available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/Turkish%20Report%20Final%20-
%20UN%20Copy.pdf (accessed 1 May 2018) [Turkish Report] and Report of the Public Commission to 
Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010, January 2011, available at http://www.turkel-
committee.gov.il/files/wordocs/8808report-eng.pdf (accessed 1 May 2018) [Turkel Report]. 
1077 Palmer Report, supra note 316, para. 15.  
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defensible is important but in diplomatic terms it is not dispositive of what has become 
an important irritant not only in the relationship between two important nations but also 
in the Middle East generally.  
The Palmer Commission also downplayed the authority of its legal views:1078 
We observe that the legal views of Israel and Turkey are no more authoritative or 
definitive than our own. A Commission of Inquiry is not a court any more than the 
Panel is. The findings of a Commission of Inquiry bind no one, unlike those of a court. 
So the legal issues at large in this matter have not been authoritatively determined by 
the two States involved and neither can they be by the Panel. 
These statements indicate that the Palmer Commission was not seeking to impose its views on 
states, instead aiming to provide an account of events which both states could accept in order 
to move past their diplomatic rupture. Blank observes that in respect of the Gaza flotilla 
situation, different legal positions reinforced disagreements about wider narratives of the 
conflict,1079 and that the law may be used “as a tool for further disputes”.1080 This observation 
may explain why the Commission did not dwell on legal dimensions of the conflict. The bulk 
of its report focussed on factual issues, but it also concluded that Israel’s naval blockade was 
lawful1081 and its actions when intercepting the vessels were “excessive and unreasonable”.1082 
Other legal principles were discussed in an annex and not applied to the facts. Moreover, they 
were the limited to the views of the Chair and Vice-Chair, excluding representatives of 
Turkey and Israel.1083 Recommendations were generally of a practical nature; the Commission 
considered the existence of practical alternatives and whether steps could be taken to remove 
the need for a blockade as “issues of importance to the wider international community.”1084 
1.2 Conservative interpretations of legal lenses 
In a few cases, commissions only applied the legal fields specified in their written mandates. 
For instance, the UNCHR’s Gaza Inquiry was instructed to investigate IHL and IHRL. 1085 
That commission characterised incidents as violations of these fields, and only engaged with 
ICL in a general statement that targeted shootings would attract “international criminal 
responsibility”.1086 The Eritrea Commission narrowly interpreted the legal dimensions of its 
mandate. The HRC had requested the Commission to “investigate all alleged violations of 
human rights in Eritrea, as outlined in the reports of the Special Rapporteur”.1087 The Eritrea 
Commission compared its mandate with other HRC mandates which had requested 
commissions to investigate human rights violations and ‘related crimes’,1088 concluding that 
its mandate did not include the investigation of international crimes.1089 It recommended that 
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1079 Blank, supra note 481, at 102. 
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1081 Palmer Report, supra note 316, para. 81.  
1082 Ibid., para. 117.  
1083 Ibid., Appendix I, at 86. 
1084 Ibid., para. 16. 
1085 UNCHR Gaza Mandate, supra note 339, para. 6 and Israeli Settlements Mandate, supra note 340, para. 9. 
1086 UNCHR Gaza Report, supra note 536, para. 119. 
1087 Eritrea Mandate, supra note 347, para. 8.  
1088 Eritrea First Report, supra note 567, para. 11.  
1089 Ibid., para. 11. See Eritrea Q&A, supra note 89. 
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the HRC mandate an investigation “of the extent to which the abuses identified by the 
Commission constitute crimes against humanity”.1090 Nor did it apply IHL, finding that the 
Government’s policy of ‘no war, no peace’ had no legal significance, and that Eritrea was not 
currently engaged in an armed conflict as defined in international law.1091 After receiving its 
report, the HRC extended its mandate to investigate violations with a view to ensuring 
accountability, including where they “may amount to crimes against humanity”. 1092  The 
Commission qualified violations as international crimes in its second report.1093 The Eritrea 
Commission’s interpretive approach suggests that it did not consider that it could – or should 
– stray beyond its written mandate. It may also have conveyed to the HRC that legal lenses 
should be specified in written mandates, to avoid potential claims that commissions had 
exceeded their jurisdiction.  
1.3 Broad interpretations of legal lenses 
Most commissions interpreted their mandates expansively, including legal fields in the 
applicable law beyond those stated in written mandates, particularly IHL and ICL. 
Commissions presented different – sometimes multiple – explanations for their 
interpretations, namely reference to resolutions of the mandating authority or other UN bodies 
(1.3.1); engagement with concerned states’ views (1.3.2); objective applicability of legal 
fields to the situation on the ground (1.3.3); the interrelationship of fields of law (1.3.4) and 
the purpose of ensuring accountability (1.3.5).  
1.3.1 Reliance on UN resolutions 
Some commissions identified legal lenses by pointing to other aspects of their mandating 
resolutions. The Beit Hanoun Commission identified IHRL and IHL as relevant legal lenses, 
citing the HRC’s reference to those fields in its mandating resolution. 1094  The Burundi 
Commission interpreted the instruction to identify “authors” of violations as including ICL 
within its applicable law.1095  Another pertinent example is the Syria Commission, whose 
original mandate mentioned IHRL and crimes against humanity.1096 Syria objected to the 
Commission’s investigation of IHL violations as invoking “incorrect legal pretexts which fall 
beyond the scope of its mandate”.1097 In response, the Commission cited HRC Resolution 
21/26 which affirmed the need to hold to account “those responsible for crimes against 
humanity and war crimes”, pointing out, “[w]ar crimes are serious violations of IHL.”1098 
OHCHR cites this resolution as expanding the Commission’s mandate to include war 
                                                 
1090 Eritrea First Report, supra note 567, para. 1542(c). 
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crimes.1099 While the resolution extended the Commission’s temporal mandate, the reference 
to war crimes is more oblique. By contrast, the HRC instructed the Commission to continue 
updating its “mapping exercise” 1100  of human rights violations and to investigate 
massacres.1101 The HRC has since expressly instructed the Commission to investigate war 
crimes.1102 
The Yugoslavia Commission referred to other UN resolutions when construing its 
mandate.1103 The Commission observed in its interim report that the Third Committee of the 
General Assembly adopted a draft resolution affirming that those committing crimes against 
humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions were individually responsible; the 
international community would seek to bring them to justice and relevant information should 
be provided to the Commission.1104 The Commission concluded that its mandate “empowered 
it to engage in consultations on the refinement of the principle of personal responsibility”.1105  
1.3.2 Engagement with concerned states’ views 
In at least one case, critiques by a concerned state regarding the legal lenses selected by a 
commission may have informed its mandate interpretation. This example is the Syria 
Commission, which was instructed by the HRC to investigate violations of human rights and 
crimes against humanity.1106  The Syrian Government argued that the Commission should 
examine terrorist acts, as well as foreign states’ support of terrorist organisations. As the latter 
issue gives rise to questions of state responsibility, it is examined in Chapter Six. This Section 
explores whether the first prong of the state’s critique encouraged the Syria Commission to 
examine acts of terrorism. In order to do so, it is necessary to closely read the Commission’s 
reports and its correspondence with the Syrian Government. 
At first, the Syria Commission did not engage with the concept of terrorism except as a 
pretext for the Syrian Government’s use of force. In its first report in late 2011, the 
Commission made findings of human rights violations by the Government and crimes against 
humanity by its agents.1107 It was critical of the Government’s use of force against mostly 
peaceful protestors, depicting its justification of responding to ‘terrorists’ as largely 
pretext.1108 In response, the Government accused the Commission of exceeding its mandate by 
“holding the Syrian Government fully accountable for what is going on in Syria, while you 
have given a blind eye to the violations of human rights committed by the terrorist 
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groups”.1109 The Commission replied that it was “firmly committed to reflecting violations 
and abuses on all sides”.1110 
In the Commission’s second report of February 2012, it found that opposition forces had 
become more organised1111 and that “instances of gross abuses” were committed by them.1112 
By contrast, “widespread and systematic” 1113  patterns of violations were found to be 
committed by State forces. The Commission did not qualify opposition attacks as ‘terrorist 
acts’, but did find that Government snipers and de facto agents known as Shabbiha had 
“terrorized the population”. 1114  In April 2012, the Commission wrote again seeking 
cooperation, reminding the Government that the Commission was “the first body to 
investigate and report on human rights violations by armed opposition groups” 1115  and 
assuring that it would investigate all violations, including those committed against Syrian 
military and security forces. In August 2012, the Commission qualified the situation in Syria 
for the first time as a NIAC.1116 It confirmed earlier findings of responsibility in respect of the 
Syrian Government and found that opposition groups had violated IHRL and IHL,1117 but did 
not qualify incidents as terrorist acts.  
In January 2013, the Syrian Government wrote again, stating that “[i]t remains unknown why 
the CoI continues to refuse to apply international law on combating terrorism – including 
relevant [Security Council] Resolutions, despite the fact that these are binding resolutions that 
are to be applied to what is happening in Syria.”1118 The Commission’s reply did not wholly 
answer those concerns. On one hand, the Commission seemed to take Syria’s views into 
account, stating that it would “welcome an exchange on the Government’s concern as to the 
application of international law on combating terrorism, including relevant UN Security 
Council Resolutions”.1119 On the other hand, the Commission suggested that it had already 
engaged with this issue:1120 
Although the mandate of the CoI does not include ‘terrorism’, previous CoI reports have 
condemned bombings that did not appear directed toward military targets (See Periodic 
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Update 24 May, p. 5 repeated in HRC/20/CRP.1) (See also HRC/21/50, p. 78) and 
which appeared to have as ‘a primary purpose spreading terror among the civilian 
population’ which are prohibited under IHL. The CoI’s subsequent report will contain 
additional findings in this area.  
The documents cited above identified several explosions which killed “scores of civilians”,1121 
but the Commission did not find that they were intentionally aimed at civilians, let alone 
qualifying as terrorist acts. On the contrary, the Commission reached the limited conclusion 
that while the explosions “may be linked to the [NIAC] and thus assessed under the applicable 
IHL rubric, lack of access to the crime scenes combined with an absence of information on the 
perpetrators hampered the Commission’s ability to render such an assessment”. 1122  The 
Commission’s indication that its next report would make ‘additional findings’ in the area of 
terrorism may have sought to mollify the concerned state if it was of the view that the 
Commission had not yet considered those issues. 
A change in approach is discernible in the Commission’s fourth report, issued in February 
2013. It recognised that some anti-Government groups as well as Government forces and 
“other perpetrators”1123 had spread terror in violation of IHL. Shortly after the Commission’s 
fourth report, UN bodies began to pay more attention to the involvement of terror groups in 
Syria. In March 2013, the HRC condemned “all violence, especially against civilians… 
including terrorist acts”.1124 In its fifth report, the Commission identified Jabhat Al-Nusra (Al-
Nusra Front) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Daesh or ISIS) as parties to the 
conflict, but did not make findings of terrorist acts by these actors.1125 In its sixth report, the 
Commission acknowledged terrorism in a broader way, stating in its methodology section:1126 
The commission investigated a number of incidents that may be labelled as ‘terrorist 
attacks’ or ‘terrorism’. Once the threshold of non-international armed conflict has been 
met, and the suspected perpetrators are parties to the conflict, the commission renders its 
assessment of an attack’s legality under the rubric of [IHL] and [IHRL]. Any attack the 
sole purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population is prohibited. 
The Commission qualified various attacks as acts of terror in violation of IHL.1127 From 2014, 
the Commission’s reports gave significant attention to terrorist acts by ISIS and the Al-Nusra 
Front,1128 noting that the Security Council had deemed these actors as ‘terrorist entities’.1129  
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The focus on terrorism in the Commission’s later reports arguably reflects the deteriorating 
situation on the ground. 1130  However, the Commission’s fourth report of February 2013 
represents an interesting intermediate phase, as it made findings of terrorist acts prior to wider 
recognition of this dimension of the conflict. This focus might have represented an effort to 
assure the Syrian Government of its even-handedness while pointing out that the scale of 
violations was not equivalent between the parties. Perhaps the Commission hoped to 
encourage Syria’s cooperation by examining acts of terrorism. If that was the case, it still did 
not fully accept the Government’s approach, as it examined terrorism through the frameworks 
of IHL and IHRL rather than as discrete violations, as might have been suggested by the 
Government’s invocation of Security Council resolutions. By requiring ‘terrorist acts’ to 
violate IHL, the Commission distinguished participation in hostilities against the Government 
from targeting of civilians. In this way, it avoided labelling all opposition forces as ‘terror’ 
groups. The Syria Commission is the sole instance to date of a commission adjusting its 
investigative focus in response to critiques by a concerned state. Its long-running mandate has 
also allowed more opportunities for engagement with the concerned state. 
1.3.3 Applicability to the situation on the ground 
Some commissions explained that fields of law came within their mandates as a result of their 
applicability to the situation on the ground, and that it was necessary to include them to 
conduct a comprehensive examination. For instance, the HRC-led Gaza Flotilla Commission 
had regard to jus in bello and jus ad bellum norms relevant to naval warfare, reasoning that 
these legal fields were of relevance to “issues raised by the mandate”. 1131  The Israeli 
Settlements Commission found that because there was an ongoing situation of occupation in 
Palestine, that IHL was applicable.1132 The North Korea Commission incorporated IHL into 
its applicable law to the extent relevant to the DPRK’s residual obligations after the Korean 
War.1133 After the HRC widened the Eritrea Commission’s mandate to include crimes against 
humanity, the Commission examined whether Eritrea was engaged in an armed conflict as 
defined under international law, in order to determine whether IHL was applicable.1134  
This rationale was notably adopted by commissions when expanding the applicable law to 
include IHL when their mandates had been formulated before violence escalated into armed 
conflict. For instance, in 2011 the HRC instructed the Syria Commission to investigate human 
rights violations. 1135  In March 2012, the Syria Commission reported that the situation 
amounted to a NIAC, so that IHL also applied.1136 The Libya Commission took a similar 
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1130 E.g., US Department of State, ‘The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS’, 10 September 2014, available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/seci (accessed 1 May 2018) and White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
‘Statement by the President on ISIL’, 10 September 2014, available at 
http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1 (accessed 1 May 
2018). 
1131 Gaza Flotilla Report, supra note 681, para. 48.  
1132 Israeli Settlements Report, supra note 572, para. 13.  
1133 North Korea Report, supra note 32, para. 64. 
1134 Eritrea Second Report, supra note 569, para. 190.  
1135 Syria Mandate, supra note 47. 
1136 Syria Third Report, supra note 564, para. 12 and Annex II, at 45, para. 3, contra Syria Second Report, supra 
note 1109, para. 13. 
124 
 
approach. Its mandate was drafted in February 2011 as the situation in Libya was rapidly 
deteriorating.1137 The Commission included IHL in its applicable law after finding that armed 
conflicts had arisen in Libya.1138 Philippe Kirsch, who chaired the Commission, explained that 
the application of IHL “could not have been anticipated by the [HRC] because there was no 
armed conflict when the commission was set up”. 1139  From his perspective, had the 
Commission excluded IHL, “there is no question we would have been criticized for avoiding 
so many violations.” 1140  The Burundi Commission prospectively recognized the potential 
applicability of IHL in its terms of reference. Noting that its written mandate referred to IHRL 
and ICL, the Commission also observed, “Burundi is party to the Geneva Conventions and 
their additional protocols. If the Commission were to reach the conclusion that aspects of the 
situation in Burundi fell under these conventions, they would also become part of the body of 
applicable law.”1141 
Some commissions identified the ICC’s active jurisdiction as a reason to include ICL within 
the applicable law. The Libya Commission interpreted its mandate to consider “crimes 
perpetrated” as follows: “[g]iven the Security Council’s referral of events in Libya to the 
[ICC], the Commission has also considered events in light of [ICL].”1142 This perspective was 
reiterated by Kirsch writing academically: “[ICL] also applies to the [Libyan] situation, by 
virtue of the referral of the Security Council to the [ICC]…” 1143  The CAR Commission 
reported that ICL was a “central frame of reference” as the CAR had ratified the Rome Statute 
of the ICC (Rome Statute) in 2001.1144 
Commissions utilized this rationale selectively. While IHL and ICL were commonly 
incorporated on this basis, other potentially relevant legal fields remained outside the 
mandate. For instance, the Gaza Commission examined the report of a Headquarters Board of 
Inquiry into damage to UN facilities1145 for the purpose of assessing IHL violations,1146 but 
did not examine whether the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations 1946 was violated, considering this body of law as beyond its mandate.1147 Several 
commissions did not examine potential violations of jus ad bellum. For instance, the Syria 
Commission did not address jus ad bellum dimensions of military operations by third states 
conducted without Syria’s consent, and the Libya Commission did not discuss whether 
NATO’s operations complied with the scope of the Security Council’s authorization of the 
use of force. 1148  Marko Milanovic observes in relation to regional human rights courts, 
“because jus ad bellum issues can be both politically and legally complex and controversial, 
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insulating human rights from the jus ad bellum can help preserve the integrity of human rights 
and the institutional competence of human rights bodies.”1149 Similar concerns might arise for 
inquiry bodies. Commissions might consider jus ad bellum as insufficiently connected to 
human rights, or perhaps as a matter reserved for other bodies, particularly the Security 
Council. 
1.3.4 Links between fields of international law 
Some commissions considered IHRL and IHL as sufficiently interconnected so as to fall 
within their mandates. Several commissions depicted IHL and IHRL as mutually 
reinforcing.1150 Offering an additional basis for the Libya Commission’s application of IHL, 
Philippe Kirsch states that the Commission concluded that “the broad human rights legal 
framework encompassed human rights and IHL as lex specialis applicable in times of armed 
conflicts.”1151  
This perspective of the interrelationship between IHL and IHRL is shared by scholars such as 
Thilo Marauhn, who writes that although the HRC was not originally established to address 
IHL violations, it may do so as a result of the overlap in these fields. Marauhn argues that the 
Syria Commission “can draw legitimacy for addressing [IHL] from the interface between the 
two bodies of law.”1152 Other scholars do not consider that a human rights mandate implicitly 
includes IHL.1153 
1.3.5 Purpose of ensuring accountability 
Some commissions depicted ICL as a means of ensuring individual accountability for serious 
violations of IHL and IHRL. 1154  This justification also has synergies with the above-
mentioned rationale based on links between legal fields, as it posits that ICL comprises rules 
of individual responsibility for violations of IHL and IHRL. It also reflects the goal of 
promoting human rights protection and compliance.1155 Some commissions whose written 
mandates did not mention ICL applied this legal field to promote accountability. For instance, 
the CAR Commission observed that although the Security Council did not mention ICL in its 
mandate, ICL was “an essential complement to both [IHRL] and [IHL], in that it establishes 
individual criminal liability for serious violations of those other two bodies of law.”1156 The 
Goldstone Commission explained its inclusion of ICL in the following way:1157  
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[ICL] has become a necessary instrument for the enforcement of IHL and IHRL. 
Criminal proceedings and sanctions have a deterrent function and offer a measure of 
justice for the victims of violations. The international community increasingly looks to 
criminal justice as an effective mechanism of accountability and justice in the face of 
abuse and impunity. The Mission regards the rules and definitions of [ICL] as crucial to 
the fulfilment of its mandate to look at all violations of IHL and IHRL by all parties to 
the conflict. 
The Rwanda Commission was instructed to investigate ‘grave violations’ of IHL and 
genocide. 1158  Its mandating resolution recognised individual responsibility for serious 
violations of IHL and affirmed that individuals “should be brought to justice”. 1159  The 
Commission wrote:1160 
The principle that the individual shall be held responsible for serious violations of 
human rights - firmly enforced by the Nuremberg Tribunal and today universally 
recognized by the international community - is the same principle that guides the 
operation of the [ICTY] and of the [Rwanda Commission] acting in conformity with 
[SC Res. 935 (1994)]. 
The Rwanda Commission’s explanation evokes the statement at Nuremburg that “[c]rimes 
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by 
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be 
enforced.”1161  
Commissions have not expressly included IHL on the basis that it is necessary to ensure 
accountability, but this argument has been made in commentary. Some scholars argue that 
because IHL lacks enforcement mechanisms, it is important for commissions to assess IHL 
violations.1162 Theodor Meron writes that because few expert bodies are mandated to apply 
IHL, human rights bodies “fill an institutional gap”.1163  Marauhn writes that if the Syria 
Commission did not investigate IHL violations, they would remain unaddressed, so “the 
Commission and the HRC deserve credit for taking up the issues”.1164  
1.4 Discussion  
All UN atrocity inquiries examined legal dimensions of situations of concern. The contrasting 
examples of the Beit Hanoun Commission and the Palmer Commission illustrate how both 
commissions interpreted their mandates to include some legal content. They also show that 
commissions saw rather different roles for international law in light of the wider purposes of 
their mandates. The Beit Hanoun Commission took a human rights-based approach and 
sought to convey the suffering of victims. By contrast, the Palmer Commission was not 
                                                 
1158 Rwanda Mandate, supra note 296, para. 1. 
1159 Ibid., Preamble. 
1160 Rwanda Interim Report, supra note 298, para. 128.  
1161 The Trial of Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, cited in Nollkaemper, supra 
note 787, at 313. 
1162 See in relation to special procedures mandates, Alston et al, supra note 533, at 184-185.  
1163 Meron, supra note 735, at 247. 
1164 Marauhn, supra note 96, at 455. 
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primarily concerned about determining legal responsibilities, and rather findings as a platform 
for practical suggestions to move Turkey and Israel beyond their diplomatic stalemate. 
UN atrocity inquiries usually interpreted their mandates broadly to include relevant fields of 
international law. The Eritrea Commission stands rather alone in its conservative approach. 
The weight of commissions’ practice indicates that they asserted their competence to interpret 
legal parameters of their mandates.1165 This competence is not unlimited; commissions did 
identify certain legal areas as outside their mandates. However, commissions were generally 
comfortable in expanding their mandates to include IHL and ICL.  
Different views have been expressed as to how mandates should be interpreted. The Siracusa 
Principles advocate a flexible approach, namely that a fact-finding body should be able to 
adapt to unexpected changes in circumstances, such as changes in the applicable law.1166 The 
HPCR Handbook recommends that mandates be interpreted in light of the text, investigative 
purposes, principles of professional practice and practical considerations.1167 It advises that 
commissioners examine the mandating authority’s intent and “shifts in conditions on the 
ground that might require a different approach to fulfil the mandating authority’s 
expectations”.1168 By contrast, the Special Rapporteur on Torture takes a stricter approach, 
advocating that mandates should be clearly drafted and only amended “in exceptional 
circumstances”, so long as new elements are necessary and the decision is explained 
transparently.1169  
In practice, not all commissions gave reasons for their interpretations of the applicable law. 
Further explanation as to how and why legal fields were selected might ward off critiques of 
overstepping the mandate and demonstrate commissions’ commitment to transparency. This 
issue might be avoided if written mandates identified all (potentially) relevant legal fields. 
Conversely, ambiguity in the mandate permits flexibility, and might also foster political 
consensus. Grace sees benefits in fleshing out the mandate through terms of reference 
formulated by OHCHR so that interpretations are based on technical rather than political 
considerations, and their scope can be adapted more easily.1170 
Commissions generally included IHL where it applied to the situation of concern, 
demonstrating an interest in raising alert of violations of humanitarian norms as well as 
human rights. Commissions tended to depict ICL as a vehicle for ensuring accountability for 
violations of IHRL and IHL. There are indeed normative links among IHRL, IHL and ICL. 
Crimes against humanity are sometimes depicted in scholarship as individualized prohibitions 
of IHRL violations,1171 and the ICTY depicts human dignity as the common underpinning of 
                                                 
1165 Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘Commissions of Inquiry and Traditional Mechanisms of Dispute Settlement’, in 
Henderson, supra note 94, 119-143, at 134.  
1166 Siracusa Guidelines, supra note 34, Guideline 3.5.  
1167 HPCR Handbook, supra note 95, at 9. 
1168 Ibid., at 11.  
1169 Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
Juan E. Méndez, UN Doc. A/HRC/19/61, 18 January 2012, para. 64. 
1170 Grace 2015, supra note 59, at 33-34.  
1171  E.g., Andrew Clapham, ‘Human Rights and International Criminal Law’, in William Schabas (ed.), 
Cambridge Companion to International Criminal Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2016) 11-33, at 16, and Thomas 
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IHRL and IHL.1172 There are also significant structural and substantive differences. Schabas 
argues that IHL and IHRL rest on fundamentally different predicates with respect to 
aggressive war.1173 Duty-bearers also differ across legal fields,1174 and norms are overlapping, 
but not identical. For instance, Paola Gaeta observes that while both states and individuals 
may commit genocide, those responsibilities are triggered by “infringement of two different 
primary rules, each one shaped upon the particular nature of their addressees and the 
consequences of the illegal conduct attributed to them.”1175 Links between these legal fields 
do not necessarily explain why bodies mandated to examine violations in one field should 
examine others. As observed in Chapter Two, such an approach was not usually adopted by 
adjudicative human rights bodies.1176 However, commissions’ interpretations find synergies 
with special procedures mandate-holders, which sometimes included IHL and ICL in their 
applicable law. 1177  Reviewing the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions, Alston observes:1178 
In general terms, the Commission and the [HRC] have chosen to create special 
procedures in response to particular violations which have generated pressure on the 
international community to take action to address specific problems. Thus the initial 
formulation of a mandate will often be narrow. But in relation to almost all mandates it 
quickly becomes apparent that a particular type of violation cannot be addressed in 
isolation, that the definition of the problem has been unduly restrictive, and that a 
systematic and potentially effective response to the goals set by the sponsors of the 
original resolution will require a more expansive approach. 
As commissions are not linked to a particular treaty regime, they might take a broader 
approach in a similar manner as special procedures, in pursuit of the goals of the mandating 
authority. 
2. Applicability of International Human Rights Law 
Commissions considered several issues pertaining to the substantive applicability of IHRL, 
namely the general applicability of human rights treaties and the operation of derogation 
regimes (2.1), extraterritorial applicability (2.2), applicability in armed conflict (2.3) and to 
organised armed groups (2.4). Some concluding observations are then offered (2.5).  
                                                                                                                                                         
Margueritte, ‘International Criminal Law and Human Rights’, in William Schabas and Nadia Bernaz (eds), 
Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law (Oxon: Routledge, 2011) 435-452, at 446. 
1172 Prosecutor v. Furundija, 1T-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 10 December 1998, para. 183: “The general principle of 
respect for human dignity is... the very raison d’être of [IHL] and human rights law…”  
1173 William Schabas, ‘Lex Specialis: Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law and 
the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus Ad Bellum’, (2007) 40(2) Isr L Rev 592-613, at 593 
[Schabas 2007].  
1174 Frédéric Mégret, ‘Nature of Obligations’, in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran (eds), 
International Human Rights Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010) 124-149.  
1175 Paola Gaeta, ‘On What Conditions Can a State Be Held Responsible for Genocide?’, (2007) 18(4) EJIL 631-
648, at 637.  
1176 See Chapter Two, Section 2.3.2.  
1177 E.g., Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1993/50, 10 
February 1993 [Yugoslavia SR Report]; DRC Joint Mission Report, supra note 537 and Somalia SR Report, 
supra note 537. 
1178 Extrajudicial Executions SR Report, supra note 562, para. 52.  
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2.1 Applicability of human rights treaties 
Commissions primarily identified as applicable those treaties that had been ratified by 
concerned states.1179 Occasionally, commissions included treaties which states had signed but 
not ratified, pursuant to the customary rule that a state must refrain from acts defeating the 
purpose of a treaty it has signed until it makes its intention clear not to become a party.1180 For 
instance, the Darfur Commission wrote that as Sudan was a signatory to the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (CRC-OP), it had to 
refrain from acts defeating its object and purpose.1181 
When identifying the scope of applicability of human rights treaties, commissions examined 
the operation of derogation regimes. They did not accept other justifications for derogations; 
for instance, the Eritrea Commission rejected the Eritrean authorities’ argument based on the 
so-called ‘no war, no peace’ situation in Eritrea, observing that “derogations and restrictions 
to human rights in exceptional situations are strictly regulated by the human rights treaties 
themselves.”1182  
Under the ICCPR, states may derogate from certain obligations to the extent strictly required 
“in times of public emergency threatening the life of nation”.1183 Commissions emphasized 
that certain rights could never be derogated from, such as the right to life, the prohibition of 
torture, and freedom of thought. 1184  In addition to expressly non-derogable rights, 1185 
commissions found that other ICCPR rights impliedly had this character, such as the 
prohibitions of hostage-taking and forcible transfer of population, 1186  and the right to a 
remedy for serious violations.1187 
When considering the ICCPR’s applicability, commissions examined whether derogation 
conditions were satisfied.1188 A state party wishing to derogate must inform the Secretary-
General of the provisions from which it derogated and the reasons therefor.1189 Commissions 
examined whether states had communicated derogations. For instance, the Darfur 
Commission observed that Sudan had declared a state of emergency but not that it would 
                                                 
1179 Relevant treaties include the ICCPR, supra note 243; ICESCR, supra note 243; CAT, supra note 780; 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965, 660 UNTS 195 
[CERD]; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1979, 1249 UNTS 
13 and Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 [CRC]. 
1180 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, Art. 18 [VCLT]. E.g., Darfur High-Level 
Report, supra note 1027, para. 20. 
1181 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 154. 
1182 Eritrea First Report, supra note 567, para. 55.  
1183 ICCPR, supra note 243, Art. 4(1). 
1184 See, e.g., Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 150; Gaza Flotilla Report, supra note 681, paras. 162 and 180, 
and North Korea Report, supra note 32, para. 165. 
1185 ICCPR, supra note 243. 
1186 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 151; Lebanon Report, supra note 855, para. 71; Gaza Flotilla Report, 
supra note 681, para. 72; Libya Second Report, supra note 853, footnote 1049.  
1187 Darfur Report, supra note 32, footnote 54.  
1188 See, e.g., Guinea Report, para. 170; Goldstone Report, supra note 633, para. 299; Libya Second Report, 
supra note 853, para. 16; Syria First Report, supra note 32, para. 25; CAR Preliminary Report, supra note 
768, para. 57.  
1189 ICCPR, supra note 243, Art. 4(3). 
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derogate from the ICCPR.1190 The Syria Commission observed that Syria had not declared a 
state of emergency nor sought to derogate, so the ICCPR similarly remained in full effect,1191 
including in periods of intense conflict such as the battle of Aleppo.1192 
Where states had entered derogations, commissions examined whether they were lawfully 
invoked. The Lebanon Commission observed that Israel had declared a state of emergency 
since 1948 and had declared in 1991 that it was necessary to derogate from its obligations 
regarding the right to liberty.1193 The Commission noted that the Human Rights Committee 
considered Israel’s reservation as overly broad, and did not take the derogation into account 
when assessing violations concerning detained persons.1194 The Sri Lanka Panel of Experts 
reported that although Sri Lanka had notified the Secretary-General of its derogations, their 
extent and duration were “a matter of concern”.1195 Doubting their validity, the Panel did not 
take Sri Lanka’s derogations into account when assessing its compliance with the ICCPR.1196 
The approach taken by these commissions is similar to the strict approach to derogations 
taken by the Human Rights Committee in monitoring the implementation of the ICCPR.1197 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (ICESCR) does 
not have a formal derogations regime. Some commissions observed this fact.1198 The ICESCR 
does however permit rights to be limited “in so far as this may be compatible with the nature 
of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic 
society.”1199 Gilles Giacca argues that this limitation clause could correspond to the ICCPR’s 
general derogation clause.1200 According to the ESCR Committee (CESCR), states parties 
have “a minimum core obligation” to ensure “minimum essential levels”,1201 and if a state 
blames failure to meet its obligations on a lack of resources, it must show that “every effort 
has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition”.1202 Commissions have affirmed 
the CESCR’s view. For instance, the Syria Commission observed minimum core obligations 
to the rights to health1203 and food.1204 The Lebanon Commission recognised that “in times of 
armed conflict where resources are constrained” Economic, social and cultural rights could be 
limited, but restrictions had to be proportionate, pursuant to a legitimate aim and strictly 
necessary.1205 The North Korea Commission observed that a state “cannot plead resource 
constraints to justify its failure to ensure minimum essential levels of socio-economic well-
                                                 
1190 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 153. 
1191 Syria Third Report, supra note 564, Annex II, para. 8.  
1192 Syria Thirteenth Report, supra note 928, Annex II, para. 3.  
1193 Lebanon Report, supra note 855, para. 73, noting Israel’s derogation from ICCPR, supra note 243, Art. 9.  
1194 Ibid., para. 197 and fn. 173.  
1195 Sri Lanka Report, supra note 29, para. 187.  
1196 Ibid., para. 187. 
1197 CCPR, ‘Chapter 1. Jurisdiction and Activities’, para. 31, in Report of the Human Rights Committee (Vol. 1), 
UN Doc. A/60/40, 3 October 2005.  
1198 Goldstone Report, supra note 633, para. 299.  
1199 ICESCR, supra note 243, Art. 4.  
1200 Gilles Giacca, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Armed Conflict (Oxford: OUP, 2014) at 72. 
1201 ICESCR Committee (CESCR), General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, UN 
Doc. E/1991/23, 14 December 1990, para. 10 [ESCR GC 3].  
1202 ESCR GC 3, supra note 1201, para. 10. 
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1204 Ibid., para. 132. 
1205 Lebanon Report, supra note 855, para. 72.  
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being... unless it can demonstrate that it has used all the resources at its disposal”. 1206 
Commissions generally interpreted ICESCR limitations narrowly, to maximize protection.  
2.2 Territorial scope of applicability 
Where states examined situations where states acted beyond their borders, they examined the 
extraterritorial applicability of IHRL obligations. Some commissions examined this issue in 
relation to IHRL generally. For instance, the CAR Commission wrote that “international 
forces in CAR are obliged to respect human rights in their activities and especially in relation 
to any individuals who are under their power or effective control, even when these forces are 
operating outside their national borders”, 1207  citing in support a general comment of the 
Human Rights Committee.1208  
Other commissions examined the question of territorial applicability by reference to human 
rights treaties, particularly the ICCPR and ICESCR. The ICCPR provides that a state party 
must ensure rights in respect of all individuals “within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction”.1209 Commissions which investigated Israel’s actions in Palestine, Lebanon and 
on ships in the high seas found that Israel’s ICCPR obligations applied wherever it exercised 
effective control, affirming the views of the International Court of Justice1210 and the Human 
Rights Committee.1211  While most states accept this view, 1212  the US, Israel and Turkey 
consider that the ICCPR only applies within their sovereign territories.1213 In 2015, the Gaza 
Commission acknowledged1214 but rejected Israel’s view, pointing out that Israel had accepted 
to exercise its powers “with due regard to internationally-accepted norms and principles of 
human rights and the rule of law”, 1215  and that the weight of authority favoured extra-
territorial applicability.1216 The North Korea Commission interpreted its mandate to include 
“violations that involve extraterritorial action originating from the DPRK”.1217  
                                                 
1206 North Korea Report, supra note 32, para. 638.  
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Unlike the ICCPR, the ICESCR does not have a jurisdiction clause. Commissions’ approaches 
reflected developments in authoritative interpretations of this treaty. As at the year 2000, there 
was little guidance as to the ICESCR’s extraterritorial scope. The UNCHR’s Gaza Inquiry 
found that Israel violated economic, social and cultural rights in Palestine while expressing 
doubt as to whether that treaty applied extra-territorially.1218 In 2003, the CESCR affirmed 
that Israel’s ICESCR obligations “apply to all territories and populations under its effective 
control.”1219 In 2004, the ICJ found that ICESCR obligations apply where states exercise 
“territorial jurisdiction.”1220 Subsequent commissions affirmed the extraterritorial applicability 
of the ICESCR with more confidence. The Goldstone Commission cited the CESCR when 
finding that Israel’s obligations extended to the population in Palestine. 1221  The Israeli 
Settlements Commission found that Israel was bound to protect the rights of “all persons 
within its jurisdiction” because it was a party to several human rights treaties including the 
ICESCR.1222 The Gaza Commission observed that in line with the position of the ICJ and 
treaty bodies, Israel’s human rights obligations in Palestine endured “to the extent that it 
continues to exercise jurisdiction in those territories”,1223 and was obliged to not impede the 
exercise of those rights where competence had been transferred to Palestinian authorities. 
Commissions thus affirmed the ICESCR’s extra-territorial applicability as legal authorities 
developed. 
2.3 Applicability in situations of armed conflict  
Commissions examined the applicability of IHRL in situations of armed conflict. 
Traditionally, IHL was considered as exclusively governing situations of armed conflict, with 
IHRL applying in peacetime.1224 The contemporary view of the ICJ1225 and treaty bodies1226 is 
that IHL and IHRL are co-applicable. While most states accept this position, the US and Israel 
were opposed,1227 though the US has since changed its view.1228 Commissions’ approaches 
reflect wider developments on this issue. The Yugoslavia Commission did not apply human 
rights treaties directly, instead having regard to human rights norms under the rubric of crimes 
against humanity.1229 The Rwanda Commission took a similar approach, citing the Genocide 
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Convention and the Apartheid Convention as recognising crimes against humanity. 1230 
Differences in approach do not seem to reflect doctrinal divergence but rather differences in 
commissions’ mandates which centred on IHL (and genocide, in the Rwandan case), and on 
species of violations attracting individual criminal responsibility.1231  
In 1996, the ICJ issued its landmark Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion which found that the 
ICCPR did not cease to apply in wartime, save for the possible operation of the derogations 
regime.1232 The Commission on East Timor in its 2000 report did not identify human rights 
treaties directly, instead describing human rights norms without identifying legal sources.1233 
This also may have been due to its mandate, which was to investigate “possible violations of 
human rights acts which might constitute breaches of [IHL]”.1234 In 2001, the UNCHR’s Gaza 
Inquiry cited the ICCPR and ICESCR as sources of human rights applicable in situations of 
occupation.1235 While the Commission did not directly cite the Nuclear Weapons opinion, its 
approach is substantively similar.  
In 2001, the Human Rights Committee stated that the ICCPR continued to apply in situations 
of armed conflict,1236 and reiterated that view in 2004.1237 Also in 2004, the ICJ issued its 
seminal Wall Opinion which reaffirmed its finding in Nuclear Weapons. 1238  Subsequent 
commissions consistently affirmed the applicability of IHRL in armed conflict. For instance, 
the Gaza Commission rejected Israel’s view that that it did not have human rights obligations 
in Palestine because IHL exclusively applied in armed conflict, 1239  instead adopting “the 
widely accepted interpretation” 1240  that states’ human rights obligations continued in 
situations of armed conflict and occupation.  
Some commissions also explained the interrelationship of these legal fields. Several 
commissions depicted IHRL and IHL as complementary and mutually reinforcing. 1241 
Commissions generally cited the principle of lex specialis derogat legi generali (lex specialis) 
that was articulated by the ICJ in its Nuclear Weapons opinion to resolve normative conflict 
between these fields.1242 For instance, the Goldstone Commission explained that IHRL would 
apply “as long as it is not modified or set aside by IHL”, and would continue to “inform the 
application and interpretation” of IHL.1243 The Syria Commission made similar observations, 
clarifying that it “deferred to the application of IHL under the principle of lex specialis.”1244 
Commissions’ interpretations of IHL and IHRL norms are explored further in Chapter Five.  
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2.4 Applicability to organised armed groups  
Several commissions examined whether human rights obligations applied to collective actors 
beyond the state, particularly organised armed groups (also termed ‘armed non-state 
actors’).1245 Some commissions interpreted their mandates to include assessment of IHRL 
violations by non-state actors. For instance, the Burundi Commission interpreted the 
instruction to investigate ‘human rights violations’ as meaning violations by states, while the 
direction to investigate ‘abuses’ was interpreted as “actions committed by non-state entities or 
their members.”1246 Some commissions identified that all actors must abide by human rights 
recognised as peremptory norms. 1247  For instance, the Syria Commission wrote, “at a 
minimum, human rights obligations constituting peremptory international law (ius cogens) 
bind States, individuals and non-State collective entities, including armed groups.”1248 The 
Commission reached that view before it had classified the situation in Syria as an armed 
conflict, which raises questions of whether and how armed groups bear such obligations 
outside armed conflict. 
Commissions examined whether armed groups bear treaty-based human rights obligations. 
The mainstream view in scholarship and practice is that these instruments create binding 
duties for states parties.1249 The Darfur Commission saw armed groups’ obligations as limited 
to IHL. 1250  However, several commissions examined whether the CRC-OP gave rise to 
binding obligations for these actors in the territories of states which had ratified this 
instrument. Article 4(1) of the CRC-OP provides that armed groups “should not, under any 
circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years.” 1251  Some 
commissions observed that because non-state actors could not be parties, they were not 
bound. The Libya Commission wrote that Libya’s ratification obliged it to take feasible 
measures to prevent armed groups from using child soldiers, but did not identify a distinct 
duty for armed groups, 1252  reasoning that in comparison with the Rome Statute which 
“regulates the conduct of all parties to the conflict”, the CRC-OP only imposed obligations on 
states parties.1253 The Syria Commission at first shared this view,1254 but later found that the 
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1252 Libya Second Report, supra note 853, para. 710. 
1253 Ibid., para. 699. 
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CRC-OP “by its terms applies to non-State actors”.1255 This interpretation carried over into 
later reports where the Commission found that armed groups used children in hostilities 
“contrary to” the CRC-OP. 1256  That interpretation was lauded as ‘progressive’ in 
commentary.1257 However, commentators have expressed doubt that the CRC-OP establishes 
a legal duty for armed groups,1258 and the general theoretical basis for imposing human rights 
treaty obligations on armed groups is also contested.1259 Commissions have not expounded on 
larger questions of the international legal capacity of armed groups, and analysis remains 
confined to the CRC-OP. As such, there is limited recognition in the inquiry context of armed 
groups’ treaty-based human rights obligations. 
By contrast, commissions have consistently supported the idea that armed groups have 
customary human rights obligations. Some commissions considered that armed groups had to 
respect human rights recognised as peremptory norms.1260 Others found that armed groups 
owed customary human rights obligations as parties to a conflict.1261 The dominant approach 
was to connect armed groups’ human rights obligations with their fulfilment of certain 
conditions, namely exercise of territorial control1262 and government-like functions.1263 This 
approach linked groups’ obligations with their capacity. For instance, the Libya Commission 
pointed to the exercise of territorial control “akin to that of a Government authority”,1264 and 
the Gaza Commission articulated the conditions as exercising “government-like functions and 
control over a territory”. 1265  Commissions expressed these interpretations with varying 
degrees of confidence. The Goldstone Commission depicted recognition of armed groups’ 
human rights obligations as “rapidly evolving”1266 and the Sri Lanka Panel wrote that this 
principle was “increasingly accepted”,1267 while observing that differences in view remained. 
The Libya Commission acknowledged that this issue “remains contested as a matter of 
international law” but was “increasingly accepted”.1268  The CAR Commission found that 
                                                                                                                                                         
1254 Syria Third Report, supra note 564, Annex X, para. 35.  
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earlier debates had been “replaced by a general understanding” that armed groups exercising 
territorial control must respect human rights.1269  
Commissions’ use of authorities in support of their interpretations offers interesting insights. 
They cited diverse authorities, including a seminal text by Clapham,1270 special rapporteur 
reports1271 and a Security Council resolution condemning human rights ‘abuses’ by rebel 
groups.1272 Commissions also cited previous inquiry reports as authorities. The Sri Lanka 
Panel’s report was cited by several commissions. 1273  The Panel itself did not cite any 
supporting authorities. This practice is rare; it is one of the only issues in respect of which 
commissions cited other commissions’ reports as authorities.  
While many commissions affirmed the general applicability of customary human rights 
obligations to armed groups in control of territory, they did not much identify particular 
norms that were applicable.1274 The Goldstone Commission wrote that most provisions of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) were customary but did not identify which 
ones. 1275  In some cases commissions’ views can be inferred through their findings of 
violations. For instance, the Syria Commission found that opposition forces had committed 
human rights violations of murder, extrajudicial execution and torture.1276 By contrast, the Sri 
Lanka Panel only categorised violations by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam under IHL, 
and did not consider their human rights abuses outside the conflict zone “because of the 
uncertainty surrounding whether non-state actors have obligations beyond the territories they 
control.”1277  Thus, commissions generally supported the broad idea that organised armed 
groups must respect customary human rights, but have not analysed the content of those 
obligations in detail.  
2.5 Discussion 
Commissions’ interpretations of the applicability of IHRL reveal a general commitment to a 
human-rights based approach. Commissions found that states must protect human rights 
wherever they have effective control over territory or persons, including in armed conflicts. 
Commissions interpreted the operation of the ICCPR derogation regime strictly and affirmed 
the existence of non-derogable rights in the ICCPR and minimum core obligations in the 
ICESCR.  
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When examining these issues, commissions frequently cited the ICJ and treaty bodies.1278 
Commissions consistently affirmed treaty bodies’ general comments as authoritative. The ICJ 
has also given weight to treaty bodies’ views to promote clear and consistent international 
law.1279 Commentators have described general comments as normatively authoritative but also 
point to methodological weaknesses which might reduce their persuasiveness. 1280 
Nevertheless, commissions’ reliance upon them promotes “doctrinal convergence”1281 and a 
coherent outlook across institutional contexts. It may also help to further marginalize the 
positions of states disagreeing with those interpretations. In general, commissions endorsed a 
broad reach of human rights treaties, while seeking to remain in-step with other legal 
authorities. 
Commissions’ findings that armed groups can hold customary human rights obligations in 
certain circumstances reflects a broad view of human rights protection, and a willingness to 
identify responsibility despite an absence of tangible enforcement mechanisms. Some 
commentators see these interpretations as commendable1282 while others argue that they stray 
into lex ferenda. 1283  Clapham writes that recognition of such obligations has generally 
emerged from a desire to address activities of non-state actors that cannot be framed under 
IHL and that UN commissions identified human rights obligations on the part of organised 
armed groups to achieve “balanced reporting”. 1284  Commissions’ practice of citing other 
inquiry reports on this issue might indicates the paucity of guidance by traditional sources of 
authority. While many commissions recognised that the matter of human rights obligations of 
organised armed groups is a developing area of law, they adopted interpretations which 
sought to enhance the protective scope of human rights.1285 
3. Applicability of International Humanitarian Law  
IHL governs situations of armed conflict, so its applicability “hinges on the status of the 
conflict”.1286 In order for IHL treaties and customary international law to be applicable to a 
situation, it must amount to either an international armed conflict (IAC), non-international 
armed conflict (NIAC), or situation of occupation. Where not classified as such, a situation is 
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governed by the ‘peacetime’ legal paradigm of IHRL. The lion’s share of IHL, including the 
four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, applies in IAC, 1287  which occurs 
“whenever there is a resort to armed force between States”.1288 A NIAC is ‘internationalized’ 
when a third state exercises “overall control” over an organised armed group. 1289  IHL 
applicable in IAC also applies to situations of occupation. 1290  According to the Hague 
Regulations, territory is occupied when “actually placed under the authority of the hostile 
army”, and “extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be 
exercised.”1291 The ICTY in Naletilić identified some non-exhaustive indicia to determine 
when territory is occupied, including that the occupying power can substitute its own 
authority; enemy forces have withdrawn; the occupying power has “the capacity to send 
troops within a reasonable time to make the authority of the occupying power felt”,1292 and 
establishment of a temporary administration. Naletilić also held that the application of the law 
of occupation “as it effects ‘individuals’ as civilians protected under [Geneva Convention IV] 
does not require that the occupying power have actual authority. For the purposes of those 
individuals’ rights, a state of occupation exists upon their falling into ‘the hands of the 
occupying power’.”1293 Naletilić thus distinguishes situations of occupation governed by the 
Hague Regulations from the broader applicability of Geneva Convention IV. 
IHL also applies in situations of NIAC. This concept was not defined in IHL treaties. The 
ICTY in Tadić defined NIAC as “protracted armed violence between governmental authorities 
and organised armed groups or between such groups”.1294 This definition has been accepted as 
authoritative and was cited by several commissions.1295 Fewer treaty rules govern NIAC. 
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions (CA 3) sets down protections applicable in all 
NIACs, and Additional Protocol II 1977 provides more detailed rules for specific types of 
NIAC.1296 Rules applicable in IAC may also apply in NIAC when the parties to the conflict 
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agree.1297  Many rules found in IHL treaties apply in both IAC and NIAC as customary 
law.1298 
This Section examines how commissions approached the applicability of IHL to situations of 
concern. When determining whether IHL treaties and custom applied, commissions 
considered whether the situation amounted to an armed conflict (3.1). Some commissions also 
examined the applicability of IHL to non-state armed groups (3.2) and multinational peace-
enforcement operations (3.3). Some general observations are then offered (3.4). 
3.1 Legal classifications of armed conflict 
This Section discusses commissions’ different approaches to classifying situations as armed 
conflict for the purpose of identifying the IHL substantively applicable. It distinguishes broad 
(3.1.1), narrow (3.1.2) and ambivalent (3.1.3) approaches to conflict classification.  
3.1.1 Broad approaches to conflict classification 
Some commissions interpreted the elements of conflict classification broadly, which had the 
effect of expanding the applicable IHL. The Yugoslavia Commission, qualifying the conflict 
prior to the ICTY’s seminal Tadić decision, found that “the character and complexity of the 
armed conflicts concerned, combined with the web of agreements on humanitarian issues that 
the parties have concluded among themselves, justify an approach whereby it applies the law 
applicable in [IAC] to the entirety of the armed conflicts”. 1299  In its final report, the 
Commission wrote, “when these conflicts are internal and when they are international is a 
difficult task because the legally relevant facts are not yet generally agreed upon”, and stated 
that this was a task for the ICTY.1300 The ICTY classified the conflict in Bosnia as IAC, not 
due to its complexity but the degree of control exercised by the Yugoslav Army over Bosnian 
Serb forces.1301 
Some commissions adopted a two-step approach, first considering whether there was an 
‘armed conflict’ and then examining whether the conflict was IAC or NIAC. For instance, the 
Rwanda Commission considered whether there was an “armed conflict” between government 
forces and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and then whether it was IAC or NIAC.1302 It 
concluded that there was an armed conflict due to the “means and methods employed” and the 
“scale of atrocities”,1303 which was non-international as hostilities remained within Rwanda’s 
borders and did not involve active participation of third states.1304 The Commission found that 
the conflict was governed by Additional Protocol II because individuals under responsible 
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command conducted military operations “involving strategic planning and tactical 
sophistication”.1305  
The Lebanon Commission adopted a two-step analysis, identifying the existence of ‘armed 
conflict’ before classifying it as IAC or NIAC. Citing Tadić, the Commission assessed the 
intensity of violence and found an ‘armed conflict’.1306 It identified sui generis features1307 
justifying its classification as IAC, even though active hostilities occurred between Israel and 
Hezbollah. 1308  The Commission identified many factors deemed relevant to its decision, 
including that Hezbollah “participates in the constitutional organs of the State”;1309 acted as a 
resistance movement against Israel’s occupation of Lebanese territory; 1310  the Lebanese 
President approved of its activities1311 and Israel had attacked Lebanon’s assets and civilian 
population. 1312  The Commission’s analysis does not reflect the established test for the 
‘internationalization’ of NIAC.1313 Its view that the conflict was sui generis implies that it was 
not appropriate to classify it pursuant to traditional IAC/NIAC distinctions. The 
Commission’s broad classification of the conflict as IAC expanded the substantive IHL 
applicable to the four Geneva Conventions. 
The Palmer Commission also departed from the orthodox approach when assessing the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It considered that the situation had “all the trappings of an 
international armed conflict”.1314 The Commission observed that classifying the conflict as 
IAC was “disputed”, but reasoned that circumstances of Gaza were “unique” and that “the law 
does not operate in a political vacuum, and it is implausible to deny that the nature of the 
armed violence between Israel and Hamas goes beyond purely domestic matters”.1315 The 
Commission treated the conflict as international “for the purposes of the law of blockade” and 
wrote that its analysis “goes no further than is necessary for the Panel to carry out its 
mandate”. 1316  These statements demonstrate the Commission’s pragmatic desire to avoid 
engaging with wider implications of conflict classification in this context.  
Several commissions interpreted the applicability of occupation law expansively, citing the 
ICTY’s broad interpretation in Naletilić of the protective reach of provisions in Geneva 
Convention IV.1317 Following Israel’s military withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005, it 
argued that it no longer occupied Gaza.1318 However, several commissions found that Israel 
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continued to be an ‘occupying power’, citing Naletilić. In 2009, the Goldstone Commission 
recognized the broad applicability of Geneva Convention IV:1319 
While the drafters of the Hague Regulations were as much concerned with protecting the 
rights of the State whose territory is occupied as with protecting the inhabitants of that 
territory, the drafters of [Geneva Convention IV] sought to guarantee the protection of 
civilians… in times of war regardless of the status of the occupied territories. That 
[Geneva Convention IV] contains requirements in many respects more flexible than the 
Hague Regulations and thus offering greater protections was recognized… in the 
Naletilić case, where the Trial Chamber applied the test contained in article 6 of [Geneva 
Convention IV]: the protections provided for in Geneva Convention IV become 
operative as soon as the protected persons fall ‘in the hands’ of a hostile army or an 
occupying Power, this being understood not in its physical sense but in the broader sense 
of being ‘in the power’ of a hostile army.  
The Goldstone Commission also found that Israel continued to exercise effective control over 
the Gaza Strip, 1320  pointing to the latter’s geopolitical configuration, Israel’s control of 
borders and conditions of life, military incursions and regulation of taxes and the local 
monetary market as indicating that “ultimate authority… still lies with Israel.” 1321  While 
recognizing a de facto local administration, the Commission found that this was just one 
factor and concluded that “essential elements of occupation are present in the Gaza Strip”.1322 
In 2015, the Gaza Commission adopted a similar analytical approach as the Goldstone 
Commission. It wrote that exercise of effective control was central to determining occupation, 
but that “continuous presence of soldiers on the ground is only one criterion to be used in 
determining effective control.”1323 The Commission observed that occupation law also applies 
where a state has the “capacity to send troops within a reasonable time to make its power 
felt”,1324 citing Naletilić. In addition to Israel’s fulfilment of this criterion, the Commission 
found that Israel “continues to exercise effective control of the Gaza Strip through other 
means”, 1325  pointing to similar facts as the Goldstone Commission, so that the Hague 
Regulations also applied. Commissions’ broad approaches to classifying the situation in Gaza 
as an occupation meant that civilian protections in Geneva Convention IV were applicable.  
3.1.2 Narrow approaches to conflict classification 
Some commissions were cautious when classifying conflicts, identifying a sequence of 
classifications, a patchwork of co-existing conflicts, or emphasizing the applicability of 
certain regimes within IHL. In 2017, the Burundi Commission found that the situation of 
violence did not amount to armed conflict, because it was sporadic.1326 In 2000, the UNCHR’s 
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Gaza Inquiry observed that while Israel treated the situation in Gaza as a NIAC, the 
Palestinian side characterised it as a largely unorganized civilian uprising. The Commission 
agreed with the latter, finding a lack of organisation on the part of Palestinian participants.1327 
Nor was the situation an IAC, as Palestine “still falls short of the accepted criteria of 
statehood.”1328 The Commission did find a situation of occupation, so that Geneva Convention 
IV applied. But even if the situation were categorized as armed conflict, “entitling the IDF to 
greater latitude in the exercise of its powers”, it was still required to abide by IHL and 
IHRL,1329 and “there is general agreement that [human rights] norms are to be applied in the 
case of prolonged occupation.” 1330  By de-coupling occupation from armed conflict, the 
Commission gave primacy to IHRL and greater limitations on lethal force, even though IHL 
applicable in IAC technically applied as a consequence of the occupation. 
The Libya Commission found co-existing separate armed conflicts. The Commission found 
that hostilities between the Libyan Government and thuwar rebels amounted to a NIAC. In its 
first report, the Commission acknowledged that it had more information regarding the 
intensity of violence and the exercise of territorial control by opposition forces, rather than 
their organisation. Nonetheless, it reached the “preliminary view” that a NIAC had come into 
existence which was governed by both CA 3 and Additional Protocol II.1331 The Commission 
also found that airstrikes conducted by a coalition of states pursuant to Security Council 
resolution 1973 (2011) gave rise to a separate IAC with Libyan forces. The Commission 
reasoned that as the coalition’s objective was to enforce the SC resolution and did not exercise 
‘overall control’ over the parties, the conflict remained legally separate.1332 It observed that 
Libya and “most states” in the coalition had ratified Additional Protocol I, “bringing its 
provisions into effect.”1333  It could have further clarified that Additional Protocol I only 
applied vis-à-vis state parties, excluding Turkey and the US.  
The Syria Commission reported in February 2012 that while violence appeared to have 
requisite intensity, it could not verify that opposition groups were sufficiently organised, so 
IHL was not applicable.1334 In August 2012, the Commission reported that opposition forces 
had increased their organisational capabilities, so that the situation amounted to a NIAC.1335 
In support of its finding, the Commission cited the ICRC and President Assad, who described 
Syria as in a state of war.1336 Since 2012, the conflict in Syria has grown in complexity with 
the participation of new armed actors and third states. The Commission observed that these 
developments rendered the conflict a “multisided proxy war steered from abroad by an 
intricate network of alliances”,1337 but did not assess whether those developments altered the 
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conflict classification. For instance, in 2017, the Commission did not address whether the US 
attack on a Syrian airbase generated a co-existing IAC.1338 
The CAR Commission also took a cautious approach, identifying several phases to the 
conflict. Adopting factors identified at the ICTY,1339 the Commission found several NIACs: 
one between the Seleka rebel group and governmental forces from January to March 2013;1340 
an intervening period of relative peace in which IHL did not apply; and resumption of 
hostilities from December 2013 between the Seleka and other armed groups. 1341  The 
Commission identified a separate NIAC between armed groups and French forces in the 
CAR.1342 The Commission noted that while the ICTY had cautioned against making many 
changes in conflict classification,1343 it considered that it was important to classify conflicts 
correctly to avoid thwarting prosecutions as a result of incorrect conflict classifications, citing 
Haradinaj.1344 Balancing these concerns, the CAR Commission considered it better to “avoid 
blunt classifications that may provide a greater degree of legal certainty and facilitate the 
continuing and uninterrupted application of [IHL] but that do not accurately reflect the nature 
of the events on the ground.”1345  
Finally, the Cote d’Ivoire Commission took a geographically narrow approach, finding that 
“the conflict was not waged throughout the full expanse of the country, so that [IHL] applies 
solely to the area where an armed conflict not of an international character actually took 
place.”1346 This interpretation conflicts with the position of the ICTY and the ICRC that in 
situations of NIAC, IHL applies to the entire territory of the concerned state.1347  
3.1.3 Ambivalence towards conflict classification 
Some commissions were ambivalent in their approaches to classifying conflicts, on the basis 
that IHL rules are converging across conflicts. The Goldstone Commission noted that 
hostilities between the IDF and groups “loosely affiliated with the Fatah movement in control 
of the Palestine Authority”1348 had been classified by the Israeli Supreme Court as IAC due to 
its cross-border nature and the situation of occupation.1349 It also noted that armed conflicts 
involving resistance movements against occupation are deemed as international in nature 
                                                 
1338 Syria Fourteenth Report, supra note 982, footnote 2. See Stephanie Nebehay, ‘Exclusive: Situation in Syria 
constitutes international armed conflict - Red Cross’, Reuters, 8 April 2017, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-redcross/exclusive-situation-in-syria-constitutes-
international-armed-conflict-red-cross-idUSKBN17924T (accessed 1 May 2018). 
1339 CAR Report, supra note 32, para. 86, and citations therein. 
1340 Ibid., para. 39.  
1341 Ibid., para. 95.  
1342 Ibid., para. 98 
1343 Ibid., para. 99. 
1344 Prosecutor v. Haradinaj and others, IT-04-84bis-T, Trial Judgement, 29 November 2012, para. 410.  
1345 CAR Report, supra note 32, para. 101.  
1346 HRC Côte d’Ivoire Report, supra note 810, para. 89.  
1347  ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts, 32nd 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, Switzerland, 8-10 December 2015, at 
13, available at http://www.icrc.org/en/document/international-humanitarian-law-and-challenges-
contemporary-armed-conflicts (accessed 1 May 2018) and Tadić Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 1294, 
paras. 69–70.  
1348 Goldstone Report, supra note 633, para. 282.  
1349 Ibid., para. 282, citing Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel (Targeted Killings 
case), HCJ 769/02, 13 December 2006.  
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pursuant to Additional Protocol I.1350 However, the Commission wrote that the question of 
conflict classification “may not be too important”, as “concern for the protection of civilians 
and those hors de combat in all kinds of conflicts has led to an increasing convergence in the 
principles and rules applicable to [IAC] and [NIAC]”.1351 The Commission cited the ICJ’s 
finding that “many similar norms and principles govern both types of conflicts”1352 and the 
ICTY’s view that “what is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in international wars, 
cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in civil strife.”1353 The Commission found that this 
related to civilian protection as well as means and methods of warfare,1354 and did not provide 
a firm conclusion as to the classification of the conflict.  
As mentioned above, the Gaza Commission found a situation of occupation in the West Bank 
and the Gaza strip.1355 It also observed that the ‘State of Palestine’ had ratified several IHL 
treaties,1356 which invites the question of whether the conflict should be classified as IAC in 
recognition of Palestinian statehood. The Commission did not answer this question, instead 
observing that “there are very little substantive differences” 1357  in customary IHL rules 
applicable in IAC and NIAC1358 and analysing the conduct of hostilities on the basis of 
customary law. The Commission did acknowledge that conflict classification was relevant for 
other contexts, such as the war crimes provisions in the Rome Statute.1359 This represents an 
alternative approach the ‘sui generis conflict’ reasoning of earlier commissions, which seems 
to have been generated in order to assess the sophisticated Israel-Palestine conflict beyond the 
very basic provisions of Common Article 3. 
3.2 Applicability to organised armed groups 
IHL obligations are held by the parties to armed conflicts.1360 Commissions readily accepted 
that in situations of NIAC, organised armed groups had obligations under IHL. While the 
theoretical basis for armed groups’ treaty-based obligations remains “misty”,1361 it is accepted 
in practice.1362 Most commissions did not expressly consider the theoretical basis of organised 
armed groups’ IHL obligations. The Goldstone Commission stated that the issue of whether 
organized armed groups were bound by IHL did not arise, “the question being settled some 
time ago”.1363 That Commission and the Syria Commission cited the SCSL’s view that “it is 
well settled that all parties to an armed conflict, whether States or non-State actors, are 
                                                 
1350 Ibid., para. 308, citing Additional Protocol I, supra note 33, Art. 1(4). 
1351 Ibid., para. 283.  
1352 Ibid., at 14, citing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States 
of America), Merits, Judgment [1986] ICJ Reports 64 [Nicaragua Case].  
1353 Tadić Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 1294, para. 119. 
1354 Goldstone Report, supra note 633, para. 283.  
1355 Gaza Report, supra note 766, para. 25.  
1356 Ibid., para. 32. 
1357 Ibid., para. 34.  
1358 Ibid., para. 37.  
1359 Ibid., para. 50 and citations therein. 
1360 CA 3, supra note 1297. 
1361 Andrew Clapham, ‘Human rights obligations of non-state actors in conflict situations’, (2006) 88(863) IRRC 
491-523, at 499. See Ryngaert, supra note 1249, at 357. 
1362 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmerman (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols 
of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: ICRC/Nijhoff, 1987), para. 4444 
[Commentary to Additional Protocols]. 
1363 Goldstone Report, supra note 633, para. 304. 
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bound”1364 by IHL. The Darfur Commission considered that armed groups had international 
legal personality when they “reached a certain threshold of organization, stability and 
effective control of territory”, so that such actors were “bound by the relevant rules of 
customary international law on internal armed conflicts”.1365 The Darfur Commission also 
recognised that organised armed groups could enter into international agreements under 
customary international law, and that armed groups in Darfur had entered into such 
agreements with the Sudanese Government in which they agreed to comply with IHL.1366 
3.3 Applicability to peace-enforcement missions 
A handful of UN atrocity inquiries considered the applicability of IHL to multinational peace-
enforcement missions involved in situations of conflict. The recent CAR Commission found 
that “[i]t is uncontested that the [UN] is bound by at least the customary rules of IHL when 
engaged in hostilities.”1367  It also found that the Security Council required peacekeeping 
forces in the CAR to carry out their mandates in compliance with IHL, pursuant to the 
mandating resolution.1368  
The Libya Commission discussed the applicability of IHL to NATO, flowing from its finding 
that an IAC existed between Qadhafi’s forces and states participating in the military operation 
authorised by SC Resolution 1973. 1369  The Commission examined NATO’s control over 
operations, finding that by 24 March 2011, NATO controlled operations within the no-fly 
zone, but that NATO member states controlled airstrikes by their own forces. This changed on 
31 March 2011, when NATO assumed command of all offensive operations. 1370  The 
Commission explained that NATO had to abide by IHL:1371 
The legal regime applicable to NATO’s actions in Libya based upon principles of [IHL] 
set out elsewhere in this report… Principles of distinction, proportionality, precautions, 
humanity and military necessity can be found in multiple legal sources, including the 
Hague and Geneva Conventions. They form part of customary international law.  
This statement suggests that the Commission considered NATO as bound by customary IHL, 
but not treaty law. It contrasts with the Commission’s earlier statement that the “full 
provisions of the four Geneva Conventions” and customary IHL applied in the IAC “that 
ensued once the international forces engaged the Qadhafi forces”.1372  
3.4 Discussion 
Commissions’ approaches to conflict classification indicate an interplay of different aims and 
objectives. Some commissions found that conflicts not of an international nature should be 
                                                 
1364 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, ‘Decision on preliminary motion based on lack of jurisdiction 
(child recruitment)’, SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), 31 May 2004, para. 22, cited in Goldstone Report, supra note 
633, para. 304 and Syria Thirteenth Report, supra note 928, Annex I, footnote 7.  
1365 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 172. 
1366 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 174.  
1367 CAR Report, supra note 32, para. 568. 
1368 Ibid., para. 569, citing CAR Mandate, supra note 304.  
1369 Libya First Report, supra note 968, para. 56. 
1370 Libya Second Report, supra note 853, para. 603. 
1371 Ibid., para. 613.  
1372 Ibid., para. 21. 
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treated as international nature due to their complexity to their sui generis characteristics. 
Others interpreted situations of occupation broadly, finding protections in occupation law 
applicable in situations beyond those governed by the Hague Regulations. Affirming the 
applicability of the more detailed IAC regime might be thought to better regulate hostilities 
and enhance civilian protection. However, it might erode the IAC/NIAC distinction, which is 
fundamental to IHL. Other commissions were more cautious when analysing whether a 
situation amounted to NIAC, by identifying different phases or co-existing separate conflicts 
and arguing that that in prolonged occupation, IHRL should govern the use of force. These 
narrower approaches indicate an awareness of IHL’s greater permissiveness of lethal force 
and concern not to hinder prosecutions with incorrect classifications. 
While a narrower approach may be more precise, it may also result in what Meron terms “a 
crazy quilt of norms”.1373 Some commissions sought to overcome this difficulty by taking a 
third way, expressing ambivalence towards conflict classification in light of the convergence 
of customary IHL across conflicts. This approach did not blur legal categories while avoiding 
the ‘patchwork approach’ to conflict classification. This approach also has certain drawbacks. 
The ICTY’s observation about the convergence of IHL was made in relation to war crimes, 
rather than IHL as a whole. Some rules such as combatant privilege remain wedded to IAC, 
and the extent to which customary rules are applicable in NIAC may be questioned. Such an 
approach may be suitable if commissions focus their efforts on violations attracting individual 
criminal responsibility; yet the war crimes regime in the Rome Statute preserves the 
distinction between IAC and NIAC.1374 An approach which presents an ‘essentialised’ IHL 
may over-simplify the law and de-emphasise rules whose violation does not attract individual 
sanction. 
Perhaps because it is uncontroversial that IHL applies to the parties to a conflict, commissions 
have not examined in much detail the theoretical basis for the attachment of IHL obligations 
to organised armed groups. More difficult questions arise in respect of the scope of IHL 
applicable to peace-enforcement missions and troop-contributing states. Commissions have 
not yet examined these issues often, nor in depth. 
4. Applicability of International Criminal Law 
The substantive applicability of ICL has been less discussed in commissions’ reports. Recent 
commissions readily accepted that individuals are responsible under ICL. For instance, the 
Syria Commission wrote, “[t]he principle of individual criminal responsibility for 
international crimes is well established in customary international law.”1375 The proposition 
that individuals can be found internationally responsible for violations was discussed by UN 
inquiries in the 1990s, prior to the proliferation of international criminal courts and tribunals. 
The Yugoslavia Commission did not mention ICL in its final report, instead identifying an 
array of norms giving rise to criminal responsibility. A year later, the Rwanda Commission 
examined the general basis for individual responsibility under international law. The 
Commission wrote, “attribution of responsibility to the individual in propria personam is not 
                                                 
1373 Theodor Meron, ‘Classification of Armed Conflict in Former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua’s Fallout’, (1998) 92 
AJIL 236-242, at 238. 
1374 Rome Statute, supra note 1033, Art. 8.  
1375 Syria Third Report, supra note 564, Annex II, para. 27.  
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entirely new”, pointing to trials from the Middle Ages and early recognition of international 
crimes of slave trading and piracy.1376 While acknowledging that “international responsibility 
is predominately, even almost exclusively, centred around States rather than other entities”, 
the Rwanda Commission found that the Nuremberg trials established that individuals could be 
“held responsible in international law for war crimes, crimes against peace or crimes against 
humanity.”1377  
Commissions did consider the applicability of sources of ICL norms to situations of concern. 
Some commissions reasoned that the Rome Statute was applicable on the basis of the 
concerned state’s ratification (in the case of the CAR)1378 or a Security Council referral (in the 
case of Libya).1379 The Burundi Commission observed that Burundi’s notification of intention 
to withdraw from the Rome Statute did not affect its applicability, as withdrawal did not 
release Burundi from its obligations while it was party, and would not come into effect for 
until one year after its notification. The Burundi Commission concluded that it could “base its 
work on the Rome Statute which will remain in force throughout its mandate”. 1380  The 
commissions on Syria and Darfur also applied the Rome Statute, noting that these states had 
signed but not ratified this treaty.1381 The Darfur Commission also observed that Sudan’s 
signature meant that it had to “refrain from “acts which would defeat the object and purpose” 
of the Statute.”1382 Commissions which were established before the ICC came into existence 
identified customary ICL as applicable. 1383  Some recent commissions also found that 
customary ICL applied due to the non-ratification of the Rome Statute by concerned states, 
but also had regard to provisions of the Rome Statute considered to reflect custom.1384 On 
occasion, commissions considered the rationae personae applicability of ICL.1385 
Conclusions  
UN atrocity inquiries’ interpretations of the legal dimensions of their mandates were informed 
by their roles and functions. The examples of the Beit Hanoun Commission and the Palmer 
Commission illustrate how commissions’ roles and functions informed their emphasis on 
qualifying facts as violations of international law. Commissions’ broad interpretations of the 
applicable law link with functions of raising alert and ensuring accountability. The inclusion 
of IHL reflects a concern to authoritatively report on the types and extent of violations, and to 
raise alert regarding the need for corrective action. Commissions’ depictions of ICL as a 
necessary tool to ensure responsibility for violations at the level of the individual and their 
incorporation of this legal lens into the applicable law reflect an accountability function.  
Commissions’ understandings of IHRL as applicable across borders and in armed conflicts 
aligned with the position of treaty bodies and the ICJ, promoting consistent interpretations 
                                                 
1376 Rwanda Final Report, supra note 297, para. 169.  
1377 Ibid., para. 171. See Rwanda Interim Report, supra note 298, para. 127.  
1378 CAR Report, supra note 32, para. 4.  
1379 Libya First Report, supra note 968, para. 4.  
1380 HRC Burundi TOR, supra note 495, at III(i). 
1381 Syria First Report, supra note 32, para. 111. 
1382 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 145.  
1383 Yugoslavia Interim Report, supra note 292, para. 54 and Rwanda Final Report, supra note 297, para. 134. 
1384 North Korea Report, supra note 32, para. 65 and Eritrea Final Report, para. 179.  
1385 Syria First Report, supra note 32, para. 111, citing Rome Statute, supra note 1033, Art. 27.  
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across institutional contexts. Several commissions also found that customary human rights 
obligations applied to organised armed groups in some circumstances. The examination of 
human rights violations of armed groups conveyed an even-handed approach. This approach 
was further emphasised in situations not amounting to armed conflict. As a matter of law, it is 
unclear whether armed groups have international legal personality outside of armed conflict. 
In any event, this approach promoted a broad protective reach of IHRL beyond the state.  
Commissions’ roles and functions also informed their classifications of armed conflicts. 
Several commissions avoided wading into political debates surrounding the Israel/Palestine 
conflict by classifying this conflict as international due to its sui generis nature, or by 
avoiding the classification issue by pointing to the general convergence of customary IHL 
across conflicts. Other commissions interpreted the applicability of IHL narrowly in order to 
limit use of lethal force yet broadly in situations of occupation in order to promote expansive 
protection of the civilian population. Thus, apparently divergent approaches can reflect the 
same purpose: to promote the expansive reach of human rights and humanitarian protections. 
Some commissions also demonstrated a concern to conduct rigorous conflict classification so 
as not to undermine possible future judicial proceedings. This concern evokes the role of a 
pre-investigative body that facilitates criminal investigations and prosecutions.  
Commissions’ interpretations of the applicable law thus sought to promote the broad 
protective reach of fundamental rights and freedoms, a commitment to impartiality, and 
operational realities, reflecting principled and pragmatic considerations. The next Chapter 
continues the study of legal dimensions of inquiry mandates by examining how commissions’ 




CHAPTER FIVE  
 
LAW-APPLICATION IN THE INQUIRY CONTEXT 
 
Introduction 
When assessing atrocities in light of international law, UN atrocity inquiries conduct ‘norm-
to-fact application’.1386  This activity involves legal interpretation, as “the question of the 
determination of the content of international legal rules arises each time one is called upon to 
apply a rule.”1387 As noted by Henderson, commissions “often go beyond ‘merely’ identifying 
violations… to making in fact quite detailed determinations on points of international law, a 
function traditionally associated with more formal and permanent legal adjudicative 
bodies.”1388 Yet their findings remain non-legal in fundamental ways. Chapter Five examines 
how commissions interpreted and applied international law (collectively ‘legal analysis’) in 
light of their roles and functions. 
Commissions’ approaches to legal analysis are first illuminated through a thematic analysis. 
Pertinent topics in the fields of IHRL, IHL and ICL are selected to focus the discussion, 
namely violations of economic, social and cultural rights (Section 1), violations arising from 
lethal attacks in armed conflict, focusing on IHL principles and their interaction with the right 
to life (Section 2), sexual and gender-based violence (Section 3), genocide (Section 4) and 
crimes against humanity (Section 5). These topics display the range of legal approaches taken 
by commissions and key challenges faced when legally appraising facts. Drawing on 
discussions from earlier chapters, it is critically assessed whether commissions are well-suited 
to assess those violations, considering their institutional architecture. Next, Section 6 conducts 
a cross-cutting analysis of three characteristics of commissions’ approaches, namely their 
focus on discrete incidents; the degree of certainty of findings of violations; and the rigour of 
their legal analysis. It discusses how these characteristics reflect commissions’ roles and 
functions. The Chapter concludes by reflecting on the idea that commissions analyse 
international law from outlooks of advocacy and adjudication, in a liminal normative space 
which speaks to both law and politics. 
1. Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Fact-finding guidelines emphasize that violations of economic, social, and cultural rights 
(ESCR) must not be overlooked. 1389  OHCHR cautions that such violations “can have 
consequences as serious as many violations of civil and political rights”.1390 Commissions 
have recognised the applicability of human rights treaties protecting ESCR as well as civil and 
political rights.1391 Rights of particular relevance include health, work, education, adequate 
                                                 
1386 Mechlem, supra note 1280, at 913.  
1387 Jean d’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2011) at 157. 
1388 Henderson 2014, supra note 100, at 293.  
1389 OHCHR Guidance and Practice, supra note 63, at 63. 
1390 OHCHR, Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring - Chapter XVII: Monitoring Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (2001), para. 13, available at http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/monitoring/chapter17.html#C 
(accessed 1 May 2018). 
1391 E.g., Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 147.  
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housing, water and freedom from hunger. States’ obligations to respect, protect and ensure 
ESCR are framed differently from civil and political rights. The ICESCR provides that states 
parties must take steps “to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant”.1392 ESCR 
may only be limited “solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic 
society.”1393 States parties have a “minimum core obligation” to ensure “minimum essential 
levels”1394 of rights. If a state blames its failure on a lack of resources, it must show that 
“every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition”.1395  
Commissions sometimes presented socio-economic factors as part of the broader social and 
political context or background, rather than assessing them as violations of ESCR.1396 This is 
particularly the case for inquiries into armed conflicts. For instance, the Syria Commission 
wrote that while it “focused on most serious violations of human rights, it wishes to note the 
overall deteriorating human rights situation”, and that “[t]he Syrian population is generally 
deprived of basic [ESCR].”1397 The CAR Commission acknowledged that armed conflicts are 
generally examined under the frameworks of ICL and IHL, and that “[w]hen a human rights 
lens is applied, it generally focuses only on civil and political rights”.1398 The Commission 
recognised that warfare severely impedes ESCR, which may be deliberately violated.1399 
Though not trying to analyse the “full range of such violations”,1400 in a section of its report 
dedicated to ESCR, the Commission only found one such violation, namely the right to 
housing.1401 While recognizing that rights to food, water and access to health services were 
jeopardized, the Commission stopped short of finding that parties had violated those rights. Its 
analysis of ESCR violations remained somewhat limited.  
UN atrocity inquiries generally found violations of ESCR in three broad scenarios. First, 
commissions found ESCR violations in respect of incidents which also violated civil and 
political rights, IHL, or ICL. Several commissions found that rape violated the prohibition on 
torture and the right to health.1402 The Darfur Commission found that the destruction of homes 
violated the right to housing1403 and that forced displacement of civilians was incompatible 
with the ICESCR. 1404  The CAR Commission found that attacks against humanitarian 
personnel and medical objects violated the right to health1405 and the Syria Commission found 
that starvation of the civilian population as a method of warfare violated “core obligations 
under the right to adequate food and the right to the highest attainable standard of health.”1406 
                                                 
1392 ICESCR, supra note 243, Art. 2(1).  
1393 Ibid., Art. 4.  
1394 ESCR GC 3, supra note 1201, para. 10.  
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1396 E.g., Syria Third Report, supra note 564, paras. 32-36.  
1397 Syria Third Report, supra note 564, para. 37. See Syria Fourth Report, supra note 1097, para. 30. 
1398 CAR Report, supra note 32, para. 507. 
1399 Ibid., paras. 508-509.  
1400 Ibid., para. 510. 
1401 Ibid., para. 517. 
1402 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 356; Syria Third Report, supra note 564, para. 59; Libya Second Report, 
supra note 853, para. 500; Eritrea Second Report, supra note 569, para. 123.  
1403 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 318.  
1404 Ibid., paras. 330-331. 
1405 CAR Report, supra note 32, paras. 596-602. 
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Secondly, commissions identified violations of ESCR which were discrete and measurable. 
For instance, the Syria Commission found that the Government’s occupation of schools and 
hospitals violated the rights to education and health.1407 Thirdly, commissions found pervasive 
violations of ESCR where states failed to meet minimum core obligations.1408 Perhaps the best 
example is the North Korea Commission’s finding that the DPRK failed to fulfill its 
obligation to use all the resources at its disposal to satisfy freedom from hunger.1409  
This survey of practice shows that commissions assessed violations of ESCR to some extent, 
and that their reports indicate certain concentrations of focus. Commentators observe that fact-
finders tend to focus on civil and political rights rather than ESCR, which are often relegated 
to the background 1410  or mentioned “in passing, by paying lip-service to the mantra of 
universality… of all human rights, and then apologetically highlighting that the nature of 
ESC-rights allegedly differs fundamentally from [civil and political] rights.”1411 In conflict 
situations, commissions tended to assess ESCR violations arising from physically violent 
incidents which were also expressed as prohibitions under IHL and ICL. Other findings of 
ESCR violations were usually discrete, rather than systemic or chronic. Commissions 
generally focused on the ‘tip of the iceberg’ of the obligation to progressively realize ESCR 
by focusing on states’ failures to fulfill minimum core obligations.  
This selective focus links to commissions’ institutional features. In order to identify violations 
arising from policies or patterns of discrimination, it may be necessary to analyse complex 
statistical and quantitative data. OHCHR observes that monitoring ESCR “tends to be 
confused with assessing general trends about basic needs” 1412  and that assessments of 
violations may require “statistics and quantitative information to prove that the State has not 
complied with its obligations, despite having the resources.” 1413  Where concerned states 
refuse to cooperate, it may be very difficult to obtain such information. For instance, the 
Eritrea Commission could not determine whether Eritrea complied with its ICESCR 
obligations, due to a lack of information. The Commission reported, “[i]n the absence of 
public financial information and statistics, it is difficult for the Commission to assess any 
progress in the areas of economic and social rights reported by the Government.”1414  Its 
findings of IHRL violations were almost entirely civil and political in nature.1415 By contrast, 
although Israel refused to cooperate with the Goldstone Commission, the latter evaluated 
Israel’s compliance with ESCR on the basis of reports by international agencies. Even where 
commissions enjoyed cooperation, they faced difficulties in analyzing complex data in the 
                                                 
1407 Syria Third Report, supra note 564, para. 124.  
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Gaeta (eds), Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (Oxford: OUP, 2014) 441-469, at 443. 
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short timeframe required to produce reports. Thus, there are many practical obstacles to the 
assessment of ESCR violations in the inquiry context. 
2. Violations Arising from Lethal Attacks in Armed Conflict  
Situations of armed conflict are governed by IHL as well as IHRL. This Section discusses 
how commissions interpreted and applied these fields of law when assessing attacks in armed 
conflict which resulted in loss of life.1416 In IHL, attacks are defined as “acts of violence 
against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence”. 1417  This Section discusses how 
commissions interpreted the right to life and its interaction with IHL norms (2.1). Next, it 
examines how commissions assessed the legality of lethal attacks in light of cardinal IHL 
principles (2.2). Finally, this Section discusses challenges faced by commissions in applying 
IHL and strategies adopted in response (2.3).  
2.1 Right to life in armed conflict  
Commissions consistently affirmed that IHRL continues to apply in armed conflict alongside 
IHL. 1418  Beyond this basic premise, questions arise as to how human rights are to be 
interpreted, particularly where they diverge from IHL. The ICCPR provides, “[n]o one shall 
be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”1419 In peacetime, lethal force may only be used to protect 
life; it must be reasonable and proportionate to the threat and must be a method of last 
resort.1420 IHL is by contrast more permissive. While attacks must not be directed against 
protected civilians, IHL accepts that some use of force is inherent in the waging of war and 
that an adversary may be lethally targeted. 1421  This Section discusses how commissions 
articulated the general relationship between IHRL and IHL (2.1.1) and interpreted the scope 
of the right to life in armed conflict (2.1.2). 
2.1.1 Interrelationship of IHRL and IHL 
In general, commissions depicted IHL and IHRL as complementary and mutually applicable. 
For instance, the Syria Commission wrote, “[t]he onset of IHL applicability does not replace 
existing obligations under IHRL; both regimes remain in force and are generally considered as 
complementary and mutually reinforcing. Where both IHL and IHRL apply, and can be 
applied consistently, parties to a conflict are obliged to do so.”1422 This view has synergies 
                                                 
1416 IHL also applies in situations of occupation. While it may be queried whether states have more extensive 
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with the Human Rights Committee’s position that “more specific” IHL rules may be relevant 
for the purposes of interpreting the ICCPR, but that “both spheres of law are 
complementary”.1423 Seeing IHRL as ‘filling the gaps’ in humanitarian protections reflects a 
desire to “humanize” 1424  IHL. Several commissions found that some atrocities in armed 
conflict violated both IHL and IHRL, such as torture1425 and targeting of civilian homes.1426 
The Sri Lanka Panel framed its findings of violations under IHL1427 but acknowledged that 
many incidents would also violate IHRL. 1428  Commissions applied IHL and IHRL in a 
complementary way where situations were protected by both fields, in particular detention.1429 
The Eritrea Commission also interpreted IHRL by reference to more detailed IHL rules: when 
assessing whether Eritrea violated the prohibition of forced labour, the Commission examined 
the types of non-military work permitted for prisoners of war under Geneva Convention 
III.1430  
Where IHRL and IHL norms were co-applicable but could not be applied consistently, 
commissions utilised the lex specialis principle.1431 Commissions invoked different meanings 
of lex specialis, reflecting wider academic debates.1432 Usually, commissions accorded general 
priority to IHL as the lex specialis of armed conflict. For instance, the CAR Commission 
wrote, “[i]n times of armed conflict, [IHL] is generally assumed to be the lex specialis.”1433 
The Goldstone Commission explained that IHRL applied “as long as it is not modified or set 
aside by IHL”. 1434  The Palmer Commission and Darfur Commission adopted similar 
views.1435 On occasion, commissions invoked a narrower form of lex specialis to accord 
priority to the norm more specifically regulating a given situation. For instance, the Syria 
Commission explained that parties “must abide by the legal regime which has a more specific 
provision on point. The analysis is fact specific and therefore each regime may apply, 
exclusive of the other, in specific circumstances”.1436 Several scholars advocate this approach, 
reasoning that otherwise IHRL could be ‘read out’ of the armed conflict paradigm 
altogether.1437 
                                                 
1423 CCPR GC 31, supra note 1208, para. 11.  
1424 Meron, supra note 735. 
1425 Libya First Report, supra note 968, para. 119.  
1426 Lebanon Report, supra note 855, para. 319. 
1427 Sri Lanka Report, supra note 29, paras. 185 and 243.  
1428 Ibid., para. 18.  
1429 E.g., Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 403; Palmer Report, supra note 316, Appendix 1, para. 63; 
Goldstone Report, supra note 633, para. 284; Syria Third Report, supra note 564, Annex II, para. 43. See 
ICRC, ‘Internment in Armed Conflict: Basic Rules and Challenges’, November 2014, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/en/document/internment-armed-conflict-basic-rules-and-challenges (accessed 1 May 
2018). 
1430 Eritrea First Report, supra note 567, paras. 1399-1401 and footnote 1912.  
1431 Syria Third Report, supra note 564, Annex II, para. 5.  
1432 E.g., Marko Milanovic, ‘The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship between Human 
Rights and International Humanitarian Law’, in Jens David Ohlin (ed.), Theoretical Boundaries of Armed 
Conflict and Human Rights (Cambridge: CUP 2016) 78-117 and Schabas 2007, supra note 1173. 
1433 CAR Report, supra note 32, para. 231.  
1434 Goldstone Report, supra note 633, para. 296.  
1435 Palmer Report, supra note 316, Appendix I, para. 63; Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 143. 
1436 Syria Third Report, supra note 564, Annex II, footnote 4; Syria Thirteenth Report, supra note 928, footnote 
2. 
1437 E.g., Marko Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflicts, International Humanitarian Law, and Human Rights Law’, in Orna 
Ben-Naftali (ed.), International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: Pas de Deux 
(Oxford: OUP, 2011) 95-128 and Marco Sassòli and Laura Loson, ‘The legal relationship between 
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2.1.2 Interpretation of the scope of the right to life  
Commissions uniformly recognised that in the ‘peacetime’ or ‘law enforcement’ paradigm of 
IHRL, states’ use of lethal force was governed by strict parameters of reasonableness, 
proportionality, and necessity.1438 Several commissions found that in armed conflict, the right 
to life was to be interpreted by reference to IHL targeting rules as lex specialis.1439  For 
instance, the Syria Commission wrote:1440  
… IHRL standards differ to a degree from those applicable to fighters/combatants 
during an armed conflict under IHL. For example, one would not expect soldiers to 
warn their enemies before an attack. So long as all applicable IHL, [customary 
international law] and IHRL requirements are met, killing an enemy fighter during an 
armed conflict is not illegal. The converse is also true: fighters/combatants causing 
another person’s death, even that of the enemy, during armed conflict can be unlawful 
when the applicable law is breached… 
The Gaza Commission noted that civilian deaths did not necessarily violate IHL because 
parties may “carry out proportionate attacks against military objectives, even when it is 
known that some civilian deaths or injuries will occur.”1441  
The Libya Commission took a different approach. While accepting that IHL operates as lex 
specialis 1442  and deeming fighters as “legitimate targets”, 1443  the Commission stated that 
IHRL could limit the use of lethal force in armed conflict in some circumstances:1444 
This is particularly the case where the circumstances on the ground are more akin to 
policing than combat. For example, in encountering a member of the opposing forces in 
an area far removed from combat, or in situations where that enemy can be arrested 
easily and without risk to one’s own forces, it may well be that the [IHL] regime is not 
determinative. In such situations, combatants/fighters should ensure their use of lethal 
force conforms to the parameters of [IHRL].  
The Libya Commission’s interpretation is more akin to the ‘mutually applicable and 
complementary’ approach rather than lex specialis. However, it does not seem to have applied 
its interpretation to the facts; its findings of arbitrary deprivations of life were all made in 
relation to civilians or those rendered hors de combat.1445 At first glance, the Commission’s 
approach might be thought to have synergies with the ICRC’s view that a party should avoid 
using lethal force against a civilian directly participating in hostilities when it is possible to 
“neutralize the military threat posed by that civilian through… non-lethal means without 
                                                                                                                                                         
international humanitarian law and human rights law where it matters: admissible killing and internment of 
fighters in non-international armed conflict’, (2008) 780 IRRC 599-627. 
1438 E.g., Syria Third Report, supra note 564, Annex II, paras. 30-31; Libya Second Report, supra note 853, para. 
144.  
1439 Gaza Flotilla Report, supra note 681, para. 69; Palmer Report, supra note 316, Appendix I, paras. 62-63; 
UNCHR Gaza Report, supra note 536, para. 62.  
1440 Syria Third Report, supra note 564, Annex II, para. 32. 
1441 Gaza Report, supra note 766, para. 22. 
1442 Libya First Report, supra note 968, para. 61 and Libya Second Report, supra note supra note 853, footnote 
24. 
1443 Libya Second Report, supra note 853, footnote 173.  
1444 Ibid., para. 145 (footnotes omitted).  
1445 Ibid., paras. 36 and 251-254.  
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additional risk to the operating forces or the surrounding civilian population”.1446 The ICRC 
based its reasoning on IHL concepts of military necessity and humanity, writing that while 
these principles were unlikely to restrict use of force against military targets in active combat 
zones, they “may become decisive where armed forces operate against selected individuals in 
situations comparable to peacetime policing.”1447 The ICRC’s analysis reaches a similar end 
point, but arrives there via IHL. The idea of a use-of-force continuum even within IHL is 
criticized by W. Hays Parks as beyond settled law. 1448  Nor does is the Human Rights 
Committee in favour of the Libya Commission’s approach, stating in a recent draft general 
comment that uses of lethal force compliant with IHL are “in principle, not arbitrary”1449 
deprivations of life. 
Commentators caution that the humanizing trend within IHL, epitomised by the Libya 
Commission, may have deleterious consequences. Shany cautions the tendency of human 
rights bodies to engage in “normative overreaching”1450 by viewing armed conflict through a 
human rights lens, which risks uncoupling law-application from conditions of warfare. 
Richemond-Barak similarly cautions that such approaches may not only weaken IHL norms 
but also reduce compliance, as “states may regard these standards as out of sync with the 
reality of the battlefield and be less inclined to comply with them.” 1451  An interpretive 
approach which disturbs the equilibrium struck in IHL between humanity and military 
necessity might erode parties’ willingness to comply with the law and decrease the protection 
felt on the ground. 
2.2 Assessment of lethal attacks under IHL 
This Section discusses how commissions interpreted and applied cardinal IHL principles of 
distinction (2.2.1), proportionality (2.2.2) and precautions (2.2.3) when assessing lethal 
attacks carried out in armed conflict.  
2.2.1 Distinction 
The principle of distinction requires that parties distinguish protected civilians from military 
objectives.1452 Deliberate attacks on civilians and persons hors de combat are forbidden, and 
attacks not directed at a specific military objective or whose effects cannot be so limited are 
prohibited.1453 Most armed conflicts under examination have been non-international in nature, 
where combatant status is not formally recognised. IHL applicable in NIAC provides that 
civilian protection is lost for such time as an individual directly participates in hostilities 
                                                 
1446 Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International 
Humanitarian Law (Geneva: ICRC, 2009) at 80 [ICRC Interpretive Guidance].  
1447 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 1446, at 80. 
1448 W. Hays Parks, ‘Part IX of the ICTC ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, 
and Legally Incorrect’, (2010) NYU J Int'l L & Pol 769-830. 
1449 Draft GC 36, supra note 1000, para. 67.  
1450 Shany, supra note 1513, at 29. 
1451 Richemond-Barak, supra note 513, at 18.  
1452 Additional Protocol I, supra note 33, Arts. 48, 51(2) and 52(2); ICRC Customary IHL Study, supra note 
1298, Rule 1.  
1453 CA 3, supra note 1297; Additional Protocol I, supra note 33, Arts. 51, 52 and 57; Additional Protocol II, 
supra note 1296, Art. 13; ICRC Customary IHL Study, supra note 1298, Rules 1, 6 and 12. 
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(DPH);1454 this concept is activity-based and narrow.1455 Rules pertaining to status-based loss 
of protection in NIAC are less defined. The ICRC’s Commentary on Additional Protocols 
advises that persons belonging to armed forces or armed groups “may be attacked at any 
time”.1456 Some states treat all members of armed groups as without protection, regardless of 
their role.1457 By contrast, the ICRC’s concept of ‘continuous combat function’ provides that 
only members of armed groups holding a continuous function involving DPH may be lawfully 
targeted.1458 This Section discusses how commissions interpreted and assessed the scope of 
protection from direct attack, and complexities arising in situations of asymmetric warfare. 
Commissions articulated status-based targeting in NIAC in different ways. Some 
commissions considered membership in an armed group as sufficient to lose protection from 
direct attack,1459 defining the parameters of membership carefully. For instance, the Goldstone 
Commission distinguished membership in Hamas, which comprises political, military and 
social welfare components, 1460  from membership in its armed wing. 1461  The Gaza 
Commission cited the concept of the ‘continuous combat function’, observing that this 
concept had been criticized both for broadening the definition of DPH and overly restricting 
targeting rules.1462 It disagreed with Israel’s position that all Hamas members lacked civilian 
protection.1463 It also rejected the term ‘enemy civilian’ as not recognised in international law, 
and reiterated that “a civilian is a civilian regardless of nationality, race or the place where he 
or she lives.”1464 Other commissions appear to have implicitly identified combat function as 
the touchstone for continuous loss of protection by using the term ‘fighter’.1465 The Lebanon 
Commission wrote that attacks against houses of “family, friends, members or relatives – but 
not fighters – of Hezbollah”1466 violated international law. The CAR Commission also used 
the term ‘fighter’ but it is unclear whether it endorsed status-based targeting. It found that 
targeting civilians not DPH was a war crime, and that this also applied to “unarmed fighters, 
not taking part in the hostilities”, so that killings of “unarmed recruits”1467 would be a war 
                                                 
1454 Additional Protocol II, supra note 1296, Art. 13(3).  
1455 Commentary to Additional Protocols, supra note 1362, paras. 1944-1945 and 4787-4789. 
1456 Ibid., para. 4789. 
1457 E.g., US Law of War Manual, supra note 575, paras. 5.8.1 and 5.8.3; Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 
68 (D.D.C. 2009); Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘The 2014 Gaza Conflict: Factual and Legal Aspects’, 
(2015), para. 264, available at http://mfa.gov.il/ProtectiveEdge/Documents/2014GazaConflictFullReport.pdf 
(accessed 1 May 2018). 
1458 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 1446, at 33. There is limited state practice in support of this concept, 
e.g., Germany Federal Ministry of Defence, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten, ZDv15/2, 
DSK AV230100262 (Berlin, 2013), para. 1308. 
1459 E.g., Sri Lanka Report, supra note 29, at 194; Goldstone Report, supra note 633, para. 431; Darfur Report, 
supra note 32, paras. 264 and 292. 
1460 Goldstone Report, supra note 633, para. 382. 
1461 Ibid., para. 428. 
1462 Gaza Report, supra note 766, para. 220 and footnote 30. See Kenneth Watkin, ‘Opportunity Lost: Organized 
Armed Groups and the ICRC ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ Interpretive Guidance’, (2010) 42 NYU J 
Int'l L & Pol 641-695. 
1463 Gaza Report, supra note 766, para. 220.  
1464 Ibid., para. 395, reflecting. Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 1289, para. 168. 
1465 Syria Third Report, supra note 564, Annex II, para. 32; Syria Fourth Report, supra note 1097, para. 42; 
Libya Second Report, supra note 853, para. 138; Gaza Report, supra note 766, footnote 30.  
1466 Lebanon Report, supra note 855, para. 318 (emphasis added).  
1467 CAR Report, supra note 32, para. 352. 
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crime. The Commission did not specify whether this was because the recruits did not yet hold 
a continuous combat function, or because it rejected status-based targeting more generally. 
Commissions also considered whether civilians who were not members of armed groups had 
lost protection by DPH.1468 Commissions did not offer a general definition of this concept but 
were cautious as to what would trigger loss of protection in concrete situations. For instance, 
the Darfur Commission found that since most tribes in Darfur possessed weapons to defend 
their land and cattle, the fact that attacked civilians had weapons was not necessarily evidence 
of DPH.1469 The UNCHR’s Gaza Inquiry cautioned that it was prohibited to kill civilians “on 
the basis of suspicion or even on the basis of evidence of their supposedly menacing activities 
or possible future undertakings”.1470 It found that political assassinations violated IHRL and 
were grave breaches of Geneva Convention IV.1471 The question of DPH was pertinent for 
Gaza flotilla incident, where several passengers onboard the Mavi Marmara were killed and 
many more were injured. Israel considered passengers who engaged in violence as DPH, 
reasoning that they had lost protection as they directed violence against Israel as a party to the 
conflict and were trying to transport cement, deemed as having a military purpose in breach of 
the blockade and in support of Hamas.1472 The Gaza Flotilla Commission found that there was 
a situation of occupation in Gaza to which IHL applied, but that passengers were protected 
civilians. 1473  It did not elaborate much on its reasoning, but found that the deaths of 
passengers who were injured or “not participating in activities that represented a threat to any 
Israeli soldier”1474 were violations of IHRL and grave breaches of Geneva Convention IV. 
The Palmer Commission found that Israeli soldiers faced organized violent resistance which 
justified use of force in self-defence1475 but that the extent of loss of life and injury was 
“unacceptable”. 1476  Further legal discussion was relegated to an appendix, and the 
Commission did not assess violations, reflecting an emphasis on policy analysis.1477 
The Syria Commission was instructed to investigate “massacres”,1478 and defined this term by 
reference to international law:1479  
[I]ntentional mass killing of civilians not directly participating in hostilities, or hors de 
combat fighters, by organized armed forces or groups in a single incident, in violation of 
international human rights or humanitarian law. 
Thilo Marauhn writes that this definition refers to IHL and IHRL “indifferently” 1480  and 
cautions that the Commission may have “blurred the lines”1481 by applying these legal fields 
                                                 
1468 E.g., Syria Third Report, supra note 564, Annex V, para. 17.  
1469 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 292.  
1470 UNCHR Gaza Report, supra note 536, para. 63. 
1471 Ibid., para. 61. 
1472 Turkel Report, supra note 1076, at 233-242 and 278. 
1473 Gaza Flotilla Report, supra note 681, paras. 62-66.  
1474 Ibid., para. 170. 
1475 Palmer Report, supra note 316, para. 133.  
1476 Ibid., para. 134.  
1477 See Palmer, supra note 480, at 605.  
1478 HRC Res. 21/26, para. 19. 
1479 Syria Fourth Report, supra note 1097, para. 42.  
1480 Marauhn, supra note 96, at 443.  
1481 Ibid., at 443.  
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alongside one another. In its analysis, the Syria Commission appeared to be sensitive to IHL 
concepts, distinguishing protected from unprotected persons. Some incidents qualified as 
‘massacres’ appeared to neatly fit its definition, such as mass summary executions.1482 Other 
‘massacres’ involved several phases which might have included active combat and in respect 
of which the Commission lacked material information. For instance, when reporting on a 
‘massacre’ at Temseh, the Commission stated that it could not determine whether some of 
those killed were “civilians or fighters”;1483 whether some civilians directly participated in 
hostilities; 1484  and whether civilians were “inadequately protected, or deliberately 
targeted”.1485 The latter scenario would be a serious violation of IHL, while in the former 
scenario, analysis of proportionality and precautions might be required. The Commission 
broadly qualified some complex events as massacres in violation of IHL and IHRL while also 
facing challenges in substantiating key facts. 
IHL requires that, where feasible, parties avoid locating military objectives in or near densely 
populated areas.1486 Where a party to the conflict does not or cannot do so, issues arise as to 
how to assess attacks by the other party causing significant civilian casualties. 1487 
Commissions which investigated hostilities in densely populated Gaza faced such 
complexities. The Gaza Commission wrote, “Gaza’s small size and its population density 
makes it particularly difficult for armed groups always to comply with these 
requirements.”1488 The Goldstone Commission found that Israel deliberately attacked civilians 
and civilian objects, and that while Hamas operated in a densely populated area, it did not 
intend to shield its operations with the civilian population.1489 Those findings are critiqued by 
scholars who see Hamas’ failure to distinguish itself from the civilian population as to blame 
for high rates of civilian casualties.1490 Richard Rosen writes that the Goldstone Commission 
effectively “placed the onus of avoiding civilian casualties entirely on Israel.”1491 As noted by 
Blank, “context does not excuse overt violations of the law nor does it alter the fundamental 
legal framework,”1492 but it might influence evaluations of compliance with IHL. Difficulties 
at the level of legal analysis were compounded by the fact that neither commission enjoyed 
Israel’s cooperation and lacked access to sensitive information which might have informed 
operational targeting decisions.1493 Strategies adopted by commissions in response to these 
challenges are discussed in Section 2.3.  
                                                 
1482 E.g., Events at Jedaydet Artouz, 1 August 2012: Syria Fourth Report, supra note 1097, Annex IV, at 47. 
1483 Syria Fourth Report, supra note 1097, Annex IV, Part 1A, para. 5. 
1484 Ibid., para. 8. 
1485 Ibid., para. 12. 
1486 Additional Protocol I, supra note 33, Art. 58(b); ICRC Customary IHL Study, supra note 1298, Rule 23. 
1487 See Robin Geiß, ‘Asymmetric conflict structures’, (2006) 88(864) IRRC 757-777.  
1488 Gaza Report, supra note 766, para. 473. 
1489 E.g., Goldstone Report, supra note 633, paras. 389, 483-488, and 1026. 
1490  Laurie Blank, ‘The Application of IHL in the Goldstone Report: A Critical Commentary’, in Gerald 
Steinberg and Anne Herzberg (eds), The Goldstone Report ‘Reconsidered’: A Critical Analysis (Jerusalem: 
NGO Monitor, 2011) 203-264, at 216 and Richard Rosen, ‘Goldstone Reconsidered’, (2012) 21 J Transnat'l 
L & Pol'y 35-103, at 91. 
1491 Rosen, supra note 1490, at 91.  
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Under IHL, it is prohibited to launch an attack expected to cause incidental civilian harm that 
is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.1494  The 
proportionality test is prospective; judicial assessments generally adopt the ex-ante 
perspective of the ‘reasonable military commander’. 1495  The proportionality principle is 
notoriously difficult to apply in practice;1496 this is borne out in commissions’ reports.  
While some commissions’ articulations of the proportionality principle mirror its codification 
in Additional Protocol I,1497 others omitted its forward-looking nature.1498 For instance, the 
Darfur Commission described proportionality as “a largely subjective standard, based on a 
balancing between the expectation and anticipation of military gain and the actual loss of 
civilian life or destruction of civilian objects.”1499 The balancing of actual civilian loss implies 
an ex-post rather than ex-ante assessment, more akin to IHRL. 1500  When applying the 
proportionality test, the Darfur Commission found that assuming that some rebels were hiding 
in villages, the destruction of those villages was disproportionate because “the military force 
used was manifestly disproportionate to any threat posed by the rebels”.1501 The Commission 
did not weigh anticipated military advantage against expected civilian harm, as required in 
Additional Protocol I, but rather against the military threat itself.  
Some commissions found disproportionate attacks without identifying a specific military 
advantage.1502 For instance, the Syria Commission found that attacks by Government forces 
against anti-Government armed groups often did not distinguish between civilian and military 
targets, and that Government shelling was indiscriminate. The Commission went on to 
find:1503 
[T]he attacks, especially shelling, caused incidental loss of civilian life and injury to 
civilians, as well as damage to civilian objects. There are reasonable grounds to believe 
that the damage was excessive when compared to the anticipated military advantage. 
The Syria Commission did not identify the military advantage, nor articulated that its analysis 
of civilian harm was ex-ante. It seems to have ‘piggybacked’ its finding of disproportionate 
attack onto its finding of indiscriminate attack. If attacks are indiscriminate, the question of 
proportionality is moot.  
                                                 
1494 ICRC Customary IHL Study, supra note 1298, Rule 14. See Michael Newton and Larry May, Proportionality 
in International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2014). 
1495 E.g., Gaza Report, supra note 766, para. 296; ICRC Customary IHL Study, supra note 1298, Rule 14; 
Prosecutor v. Galić, IT-98-29-T, Trial Judgement, 5 December 2003, para. 58.  
1496 Judith Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States (Cambridge: CUP, 2004) at 22.  
1497 E.g., Gaza Report, supra note 766, para. 37.  
1498 Syria Third Report, supra note 564, para. 29; Palmer Report, supra note 316, para. 78. Elsewhere, the Syria 
Commission articulated the principle correctly: Syria Third Report, supra note 564, para. 37.  
1499 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 260 (emphasis added).  
1500 E.g., Dominik Steiger, ‘Enforcing International Humanitarian Law through Human Rights Bodies’, in Heike 
Krieger (ed.), Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from the African Great 
Lakes Region (Cambridge: CUP, 2015) 263-299, at 290.  
1501 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 267.  
1502 E.g., Syria Third Report, supra note 564, Annex VI, para. 25 and Libya Second Report, supra note 853, para. 
600, contra Gaza Report, supra note 766, paras. 368-370 and 393-394. 
1503 Syria Third Report, supra note 564, para. 95. 
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Commissions’ varied understandings of elements of the proportionality test have led to varied 
outcomes. For instance, the Palmer Commission and the HRC’s Gaza Flotilla Commission 
viewed the scope of ‘attack’ differently, generating opposite legal conclusions. The Palmer 
Commission assessed the effects of Israel’s naval blockade separately to its land closure 
policy, finding that the naval blockade did not have a “significant humanitarian impact”,1504 so 
was proportionate. By contrast, the Gaza Flotilla Commission considered that the blockade 
was “implemented in support of the overall closure regime”1505 so formed part of a wider 
attack, including land closures. It concluded that Israel’s “policy of blockade or closure”1506 
was disproportionate. Commissions have also valued the weight of risks to one’s own side 
differently. Andreas Zimmermann argues that when finding that Israeli shelling of a 
Hezbollah-controlled town was disproportionate, the Lebanon Commission did not consider 
whether conquering the town using ground forces would significantly increase troop risks.1507 
The Gaza Commission recognised that “the issue of force protection of the attacking force as 
an element in assessing proportionality is still unresolved”,1508 but should not be an overriding 
concern. It found that although force protection might be taken into account, the IDF’s means 
and methods would likely result in excessive civilian casualties.1509 By reducing the weight of 
force protection, a lower level of civilian harm is tolerated. In this sense, such an approach is 
‘humanizing’, as it moves the balance further in the direction of protected persons. 
2.2.3 Precautions 
Parties to a conflict must take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimize incidental civilian 
harm.1510 Precautions include verifying the military nature of targets and giving effective 
advance warning to civilians, where circumstances permit.1511 Commissions have not always 
examined the question of precautions, as such analysis is only required if attacks prima facie 
comply with the principle of distinction. Many incidents examined by commissions fell at this 
first hurdle. In situations involving sophisticated military forces, commissions have examined 
compliance with this principle in more detail.  
Several commissions examined the ‘effectiveness’ of warnings. The Lebanon Commission 
identified that to be ‘effective’, a warning should give clear time slots for evacuation and link 
to guaranteed safe humanitarian exit corridors.1512 The Goldstone Commission was criticized 
for taking applying an unduly high standard for measuring the effectiveness of warnings; 
judging effectiveness based on whether warning were heeded, rather than successfully 
communicated; and wrongly applying a proportionality analysis when determining whether 
warnings were effective. 1513  The Goldstone Commission also linked the principle of 
                                                 
1504 Palmer Report, supra note 316, para. 79. 
1505 Gaza Flotilla Report, supra note 681, para. 59.  
1506 Ibid., para. 59.  
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precautions to the right to life, finding that Israel’s failure to take precautions violated the 
ICCPR’s ‘due diligence’ requirement to prevent arbitrary deprivation of life.1514 Yuval Shany 
argues that this approach “leads to a reversal of the lex specialis rule”1515 by replacing IHL’s 
greater tolerance for operational mistakes with the higher standard of care in IHRL. 
Recent commentary discussing the Syria Commission’s finding that the United States violated 
the principle of precautions illustrates how such findings are subject to critique. The 
Commission found that a US airstrike in the village of Al-Jinah, intended to target an Al 
Qaeda meeting, instead killed 38 civilians at a religious gathering.1516 The Commission found 
that the targeted building was part of a mosque complex and used for religious purposes.1517 
While it could have been subject to attack if an Al Qaeda meeting was taking place, US 
intelligence to that effect was three days old and additional verification of target activities 
should have been carried out as the building was a protected object.1518 In commentary, two 
senior members of the US military, Lt. Col. Shane Reeves and Lt. Col. Ward Narramore, 
write that the Syria Commission tried to “impose an absolute requirement” to minimize 
incidental civilian loss, which reflected “a common conflation perpetrated by those who 
attempt to usurp [IHL] by injecting some version of human rights laws.”1519 In response, Adil 
Haque points out that the Commission’s articulation of the principle of precautions is 
consistent with the ICRC and the US Department of Defence; and US forces admitted that the 
targeting team was erroneously not informed that the building was a religious complex, which 
would have required additional steps to verify its use for military purposes.1520  
In addition to arguing that the Syria Commission applied the wrong legal test, Reeves and 
Narramore argue that it did not have enough information make such a finding, which “erodes 
its authority in this and future investigations.”1521 The authors point to the Commission’s 
witness interviews as insufficiently corroborated and irrelevant, because “what matters is what 
the commander reasonably knew at the time the decision was made to attack the building.”1522 
This argument warrants further consideration. While villagers’ accounts can indicate the 
extent of civilian harm which occurred, they cannot necessarily show that a reasonable 
commander ought to have known that the building was a mosque. However, the Commission 
also cited a transcript of a media briefing by US Central Command in which the above-
mentioned errors were admitted.1523 This example shows how a commission’s authority may 
                                                                                                                                                         
Naftali (ed.), International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: Pas de Deux (Oxford: 
OUP, 2011) 13-33, at 30. 
1514 Goldstone Report, supra note 633, para. 862.  
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1520 Adil Haque, ‘A Careless Attack on the UN’s Commission of Inquiry on Syria’, Just Security, 21 September 
2017, available at http://www.justsecurity.org/45213/syria-commission-inquiry (accessed 1 May 2018). 
1521 Reeves and Narramore, supra note 1519. 
1522 Ibid. 
1523 Syria Fourteenth Report, supra note 982, footnote 11. The unofficial transcript is available at ‘Transcript of 
Pentagon’s Al Jinah Investigation media briefing’, Airwars, 27 June 2017, http://airwars.org/news/transcript-
of-al-jinah-investigation-briefing (accessed 1 May 2018). 
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be challenged both on the basis of its legal analysis and its approach to fact-finding. Particular 
challenges faced when establishing the facts of attacks in armed conflict are discussed next.  
2.3 Fact-finding challenges and strategies  
Fact-finding in armed conflict gives rise to specific challenges, including “access to the 
battlefield; the need for forensic, ballistic, and other technical evaluations; issues of security, 
credibility, and partiality of witnesses; and the obtainment of sensitive internal information 
that is relevant to weighing the lawfulness of attacks”.1524  The type and extent of detail 
required to assess attacks in armed conflict is illustrated by the Gaza Commission’s report:1525 
Israel was asked to explain the specific contribution of each building to the military 
actions of the Palestinian armed groups and how its destruction represented a military 
advantage for the IDF; what were the ranks and combat functions of members of armed 
groups if they were the target of the attack; what precautionary measures, including 
warnings and the choice of weapons, were employed; what was the number of fatalities 
resulting from each of the incidents; and whether any investigations had been initiated 
in relation to these strikes.  
Commissions’ information-gathering efforts were impeded for various reasons, including lack 
of territorial access,1526 less than full cooperation from parties to the conflict1527 and security 
concerns. 1528  Commissions adopted three broad strategies when faced with information-
gathering barriers: entering strong findings of violations on a limited basis; making broad 
findings of violations on a qualified basis; or stating that findings could not be reached. The 
first and third strategies result in more robust but truncated findings, while the second has led 
to critiques that findings were unreliable. Each strategy is discussed in turn.  
Some commissions entered convincing findings of IHL violations on a limited basis. 
Boutruche observes that fact-finding bodies tend to focus on “manifest and clear-cut incidents 
or patterns” 1529  of disproportionate attacks, in light of the difficulties in assessing such 
violations. For instance, the Darfur Commission found that civilian harm would be “patently 
excessive”1530 in relation to the expected military advantage. The Lebanon Commission wrote 
that if there were Hezbollah members among civilians who left villages in convoys, attacks 
against those convoys would be “utterly disproportionate and beyond any concept of military 
necessity or the principle of distinction.” 1531  The advantage of this ‘low-hanging fruit’ 
approach is that findings are less susceptible to reproach on the basis that commissions failed 
to consider material but unavailable information. However, it also means that more complex 
or sophisticated attacks are less likely to be scrutinized and recognised as in violation of IHL. 
                                                 
1524 PoKempner, supra note 96, at 149. 
1525 E.g., Gaza Report, supra note 766, para. 114.  
1526 Gaza Report, supra note 766, para. 18.  
1527 E.g., Goldstone Report, supra note 633, paras. 438-429 and 1339 regarding ‘Gaza authorities’; Darfur 
Report, supra note 32, para. 38 regarding rebel groups and Letter to Judge Kirsch dated 23 January 2012 
from Peter Olson, NATO Legal Adviser, at 8, in Libya Second Report, supra note 853, Annex II [NATO letter 
23 January 2012] regarding NATO’s refusal to provide some video footage which was classified. See 
Chapter Three, Section 3. 
1528 E.g., CAR Report, supra note 32, paras. 7 and 20-21 and Libya First Report, supra note 968, para. 145. 
1529 Boutruche 2013, supra note 482, at 33.  
1530 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 266 (emphasis added).  
1531 Lebanon Report, supra note 855, para. 153.  
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More often, particularly where concerned states refused to cooperate, commissions made 
broad but tentative findings of IHL violations. For instance, the Syria Commission made 
findings of massacres while acknowledging that could not verify that all those killed were 
protected persons.1532 The Goldstone Commission found some IHL violations with the caveat 
that they were reached on the basis of “available information”1533 or “in the absence of any 
information refuting the allegations”.1534 Some scholars criticized the Goldstone Commission 
for finding disproportionate attacks in the absence of full information.1535 Others, including 
Cassese, praised its report as systematically analyzing facts in light of the applicable law1536 
and adhering to standards of legality in ‘the fog of war’ and in the face of Israeli non-
cooperation. 1537  The Gaza Commission made similar caveats in its findings of 
disproportionate attack.1538  
As discussed in Chapter 3,1539 some commissions made qualified findings of violations by 
drawing adverse inferences or reversing the evidentiary burden where attacks were prima 
facie directed against civilians and civilian objects. The Gaza Commission wrote, “[t]he onus 
is on Israel to make available information about those objectives and explain how attacking 
them contributed to military action”, 1540  as only then could legality be assessed. While 
accepting that there may be limits to disclosure, the Commission required “a minimum level 
of transparency”1541 to assist victims’ rights to the truth and a remedy. Benjamin Wittes and 
Yishai Schwartz are critical of the Gaza Commission’s approach: “[h]aving put the burden on 
Israel to prove every attack legitimate and having no access to Israeli decision-making, it is no 
wonder that the commission regularly finds that many of the strikes it examines may have 
been war crimes.” 1542  Israel argues that IHL does not require disclosure of sensitive 
information, and it “cannot publicize detailed reasoning behind every attack without 
endangering intelligence sources and methods”.1543 The Commission rejected Israel’s view, as 
“accepting that logic would undermine any efforts to ensure accountability”.1544 The strategies 
of the Gaza Commission and Goldstone Commission reflect a more human rights-oriented 
approach by reaching prima facie findings in the absence of information from the concerned 
state, in order to promote accountability and the rights to truth and a remedy.  
                                                 
1532 See Chapter Five, Section 2.2.1. 
1533 Goldstone Report, supra note 633, paras. 32, 75, 389, 437, 494, 629, 652, 701, 1102, 1167. 
1534 Ibid., paras. 595, 838, 1167.  
1535 E.g., Abraham Bell, ‘A Critique of the Goldstone Report and its Treatment of International Humanitarian 
Law’, (2010) 104 Am Soc'y Int'l L Proc 79-86 and Blank, supra note 1490.  
1536 Antonio Cassese, ‘We Must Stand behind the UN Report on Gaza’, Financial Times, 14 October 2009, cited 
in Yihdego, supra note 96, at 47. 
1537 Falk, supra note 1007, at 97.  
1538 Gaza Report, supra note 766, para. 221.  
1539 See Chapter Three, Section 3.4. 
1540 Gaza Report, supra note 766, para. 228.  
1541 Ibid., para. 217. 
1542 Benjamin Wittes and Yishai Schwartz, ‘What to Make of the UN's Special Commission Report on Gaza?’, 
Lawfare, 24 June 2015, available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/what-make-uns-special-commission-report-
gaza (accessed 1 May 2018). 
1543  Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Israel's Investigation of Alleged Violations of the Law of Armed 
Conflict’, at 27, cited in Gaza Report, supra note 766, para. 215. Note: this quote does not appear in the 
document available at http://mfa.gov.il/ProtectiveEdge/Documents/IsraelInvestigations.pdf (accessed 1 May 
2018). 
1544 Gaza Report, supra note 766, para. 215. 
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In other cases, commissions acknowledged limits to their abilities to assess compliance with 
IHL due to a lack of information.1545 For instance, the Libya Commission wrote that while it 
established that many civilians were harmed, it could not “determine the full circumstances of 
the attacks in order to be able to evaluate whether the attacks were intentional, indiscriminate 
and/or disproportionate.” 1546  It was rather conservative in its analysis of NATO strikes, 
finding a few incidents where “NATO’s response to the Commission has not allowed it to 
draw conclusions on the rationale for, or the circumstances of the attacks”, so that it could not 
assess whether all feasible precautions were taken.1547 The Goldstone Commission refrained 
from making findings in respect of some incidents involving complicated assessments. In a 
letter quoted by Israeli authorities, Goldstone wrote that the Commission avoided calling a 
witness who could testify as to conditions of warfare in Gaza:1548 
[M]ainly because in our Report we did not deal with the issues he raised regarding the 
problems of conducting military operations in civilian areas and second-guessing 
decisions made by soldiers and their commanding officers ‘in the fog of war’. We 
avoided having to do so in the incidents we decided to investigate. 
For Israel, this response showed that the Goldstone Commission “deliberately selected 
incidents so as to evade the complex dilemmas of confronting threats in civilian areas.”1549 
Nigel Rodley surmises, “[t]he Israeli response seems to imply that concentrating on incidents 
where facts are relatively clear, rather than on those where they may not be, is somehow 
reprehensible.”1550 While in politically volatile situations, pragmatic selection of incidents 
might be interpreted by the parties as evidence of bias, such objections may also resemble the 
tu quoque fallacy when parties refuse to provide information.1551 
Commissions experienced significant difficulties in gathering and assessing information in 
ongoing conflicts. This was especially the case in respect of the principles of proportionality 
and precautions, which involve a difficult balancing of military necessity and humanity. 
Without cooperation from the parties, it could be very difficult to understand the conditions of 
the theater of combat and the intelligence relied upon when making targeting decisions. 
Commissions generally faced less criticism of findings of deliberate attacks against civilians, 
perhaps due to the absolute nature of this prohibition. An exception may be seen in respect of 
hostilities in densely populated areas, where it may be more difficult to determine whether 
civilians were directly targeted or incidentally harmed.  
                                                 
1545 E.g., Gaza Report, supra note 766, para. 223.  
1546 Libya First Report, supra note 968, para. 156. 
1547 Libya Second Report, supra note 853, para. 89. 
1548 Letter from Richard Goldstone dated 21 September 2009, cited in Israel Response to Goldstone Report, 
supra note 871, para. 18. 
1549 Israel Response to Goldstone Report, supra note 871, para. 18 (emphasis in original).  
1550 Nigel Rodley, ‘Assessing the Goldstone Report’, (2010) 16 Global Governance 191-202, at 197.  
1551 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (Leiden: Brill, 2012) at 465 and Sienho 
Yee, ‘The tu quoque argument as a defence to international crimes, prosecution or punishment’, (2004) 3(1) 
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3. Violations involving Sexual and Gender-Based Violence 
Violence committed against an individual on the basis of his or her sex or gender is a common 
occurrence in situations of conflict and has been used as a ‘weapon of war’.1552 The meaning 
and interrelationship of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ are discussed at length in scholarship.1553  UN 
policy documents often bundle these terms as ‘sexual and gender-based violence’ (SGBV). 
For instance, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees defines SGBV as:1554  
[A]ny act that is perpetrated against a person’s will and is based on gender norms and 
unequal power relationships. It encompasses threats of violence and coercion. It can be 
physical, emotional, psychological, or sexual in nature, and can take the form of a denial 
of resources or access to services.  
Other UN and judicial definitions contain similar elements. Some definitions are made in the 
context of violence against women and girls,1555 but SGBV may also be committed against 
men and boys.1556 SGBV encompasses sexual and non-sexual physical and mental violence 
based on a person’s gender. Some definitions of SGBV also include broader types of harm 
such as economic harm and denial of resources. 1557  This Chapter uses this expansive 
definition to discuss how commissions engaged with different gendered dimensions of 
violations. This Section examines how commissions recognised SGBV as violations of 
international law and the victims of such atrocities (3.1) and assessed these types of violations 
(3.2).  
3.1 Recognition of violations and victims 
Some scholars criticize IHL treaties and early war crimes trials for not sufficiently 
acknowledging SGBV as violations of international law. 1558  Early international atrocity 
inquiries recognised that sexual violence violated international law in a cursory way. The 
                                                 
1552 GA Res. 48/143, 20 December 1993, Preamble; SC Res. 1820 (2008).  
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6 [CEDAW GR 19]. 
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Prosecutor, ‘Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes’, (2014), para. 16, available at 
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includes “acts or omissions intended or likely to cause or result in death or physical, sexual, psychological or 
economic harm or suffering to women, threats of such acts, harassment, coercion and arbitrary deprivation of 
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1558 Judith Gardam, ‘Women, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law’, (1998) 324 IRRC 421-432, 
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1919 Commission identified rape and forced prostitution as violations of IHL attracting 
criminal sanction.1559 The Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry on occupied Serbia devoted a 
section of its report to rape.1560 The Smyrna Commission made findings of rape but did not 
qualify them as legal violations.1561 In the UN context, the Mozambique Commission made 
brief findings that women were raped and that some pregnant women were disemboweled,1562 
but its recognition of these acts as legal violations was quite generalized. It found that 
“massacres and other atrocities described in this report”1563 violated the right to life, liberty, 
and security of the person under the UDHR and the prohibition of mutilation, cruel treatment, 
and torture under Geneva Convention IV.1564 
From the 1990s, UN atrocity inquiries examined legal prohibitions of sexual violence in 
detail. The Yugoslavia Commission observed that most domestic legal systems considered 
rape as “a crime of violence of a sexual nature against the person” and that the “characteristic 
of violence of a sexual nature also applies to other forms of sexual assault against women, 
men and children, when these activities are performed under coercion or threat of force”.1565 
The inquiries on Yugoslavia and Rwanda both found that rape and sexual assault were 
prohibited as war crimes and underlying acts of crimes against humanity and genocide.1566 
Commissions now routinely recognise rape and sexual violence as underlying acts of 
international crimes, reflecting developments from the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC.1567 Some 
commissions also recognised that sexual violence violates other legal norms such as the 
prohibition against torture1568 and the right to health.1569 
Inquiry reports indicated increasing appreciation of gender-based violence, but uneven 
recognition of their legal prohibition. Neither the Rwanda or Yugoslavia commissions 
mentioned the term ‘gender’. While the Darfur Commission mentioned ‘gender violence’, it 
defined this as non-penetrative sexual violence.1570 By contrast, the Beit Hanoun Commission 
recognised that in conflict situations, gender-related violence might be given less attention:1571 
The particular position of women and gender-specific harm may be invisible where a 
whole society is facing gross violations of human rights and of [IHL], as there is a sense 
of unity that prevents identification of and focus on women’s situations. 
The Beit Hanoun Commission and the Lebanon Commission recognised gender-specific 
harms suffered from the breakdown of communities, such as domestic violence and sexual 
                                                 
1559 1919 Report, supra note 119, at 114.  
1560 Occupied Serbia Report, supra note 120, at 13. 
1561 Smyrna Commission, ‘Document 3: Account of Events that took place following the Occupation, which were 
established during the Inquiry between 12 August and 6 October 1919’, point 15.  
1562 Mozambique Report, supra note 253, paras. 69 and 86.  
1563 Ibid., para. 140.  
1564 Ibid., paras. 149 and 155.  
1565 Yugoslavia Final Report, supra note 39, para. 103 (footnotes omitted). 
1566 Yugoslavia Final Report, supra note 39, para. 107; Rwanda Final Report, supra note 297, paras. 140-145. 
1567 E.g., Darfur Report, supra note 32, paras. 177-178 and 358; Libya First Report, supra note 968, para. 203.  
1568 E.g., Syria Third Report, supra note 564, Annex II, para. 61.  
1569 Guinea Report, supra note 39, para. 175; Syria Third Report, supra note 564, para. 59, citing ICESCR, supra 
note 243, Art. 12. 
1570 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 359.  
1571 Beit Hanoun Report, supra note 620, para. 63.  
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abuse.1572 The Lebanon Commission acknowledged that legal and financial issues related to 
property and social benefits could be particularly severe for women, “who may be 
marginalized or isolated from social support networks.”1573  Neither commission expressly 
linked such harms to legal prohibitions, however. The CAR Commission defined gender-
based violence as “any harmful act directed against individuals or groups of individuals on the 
basis of their gender”, including “sexual violence, domestic violence, trafficking, forced/early 
marriage and harmful traditional practices”.1574 However, it only discussed prohibitions of 
sexual violence. 1575  By contrast, the North Korea Commission discussed gender-based 
persecution as a crime against humanity1576 and found that in addition to its expression in the 
Rome Statute, this prohibition was “crystalizing into customary international law.”1577  
3.2 Assessment of violations  
Commissions consistently remarked that it was very difficult to evaluate SGBV, especially in 
conflict situations, but also due to social, cultural, and religious beliefs.1578 The Yugoslavia 
Commission wrote:1579 
Owing to the social stigma attached - even in times of peace - rape is among the least 
reported crimes. For this reason, it is very difficult to make any general assessment of 
actual numbers of rape victims… The overall reluctance to report rape is aggravated by 
war, especially if the perpetrators are soldiers and also where there is a general 
condition of chaos and a breakdown in law and order. The victims may have little 
confidence in finding justice. The strong fear of reprisal during wartime adds to the 
silencing of victims. The perpetrators have a strong belief that they can get away with 
their crimes. 
The Eritrea Commission observed that in addition to the general trauma and shame felt by 
victims, the patriarchal nature of Eritrean society contributed to under-reporting and under-
acknowledgement of gender-based violence.1580  
Despite these difficulties, some commissions devoted considerable effort to assessing SGBV. 
The Yugoslavia Commission conducted a study of rape and sexual assault1581 and reported 
that it had identified almost 800 victims by name or number and 600 alleged perpetrators by 
name.1582 In 2016, the Eritrea Commission “decided to devote specific attention to [SGBV], 
including violence against women and girls, and to assess the gender dimension and impact of 
other violations.”1583 In 2018, the Syria Commission issued a thematic report centring on 
                                                 
1572 Beit Hanoun Report, supra note 620, para. 66; Lebanon Report, supra note 855, para. 280. 
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1576 North Korea Report, supra note 32, para. 1059.  
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SGBV.1584 Some commissions found that sexual violence was perpetrated against men and 
boys as well as women and girls.1585 
In other cases, commissions only made brief findings of SGBV. The Rwanda Commission’s 
findings of SGBV amounted to one sentence, namely that “disturbing reports”1586 of rape had 
been filed. Its lack of attention to sexual violence stands in contrast to findings of the 
prevalence of sexual violence in the Rwandan genocide1587 and the strong focus on such 
violations at the ICTR1588 following significant witness testimony in the Akayesu case.1589 
Linda Bianchi observes that ICTR investigators needed cultural training to elicit accurate 
information and understand what they were being told as Rwandan victims tended to refer to 
rape indirectly. 1590  It is not clear from the Rwanda Commission’s report whether it 
interviewed victims of SGBV or examined allegations in depth. If it had, it may well have 
faced similar obstacles.  
Occasionally, commissions identified gendered dimensions to sexual violence, recognizing 
that victims were targeted because of their gender. For instance, the Guinea Commission 
found that acts of sexual violence violated CEDAW “since they were clearly directed against 
women as such.” 1591  The North Korea Commission found that forced abortions violated 
women’s physical integrity and sexual and reproductive rights, and constituted gender-based 
persecution. 1592  The Eritrea Commission identified gender-based violence such as forced 
marriage of underage girls1593 and gender-specific torture of women in detention, such as 
preventing mothers from breastfeeding, beating women to induce abortions and refusing to 
provide sanitary pads.1594  
Gender-based violations distinct from sexual violations were generally recognised to a lesser 
extent. For instance, the Cambodia Commission did not examine SGBV, even though forced 
marriage was a feature of the Khmer Rouge regime and such allegations were investigated by 
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the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.1595 The CAR Commission used the 
term SGBV1596 but only made findings of rape.1597 Inquiries into authoritarian regimes gave 
some attention to non-sexual gender-based violations, such as the Eritrea Commission’s 
finding that women’s forced domestic servitude in military training camps was gendered 
enslavement.1598 Some commissions identified gendered dimensions of other violations. The 
Beit Hanoun Commission wrote that in a society where women had limited freedom of 
movement, soldiers’ intrusions into homes violated women’s privacy and dignity.1599 The 
North Korea Commission recognised that men and women suffered differently from enforced 
disappearances during and after wartime. Wartime abductions of POWs affected women 
whose families were left without breadwinners, while post-war, women were abducted 
because of their gender.1600  
Recently, commissions have identified the intersectionality1601 of SGBV with other violence. 
For instance, the Syria Commission examined ISIS’s treatment of Yazidi women and girls, 
finding that their practice of sexual enslavement constituted serious bodily and mental harm 
under the Genocide Convention.1602 The Commission emphasized:1603 
Yazidi women and girls are not, however, simply vessels through which ISIS seeks to 
achieve the destruction of the Yazidi religious group. Rape and sexual violence, when 
committed against women and girls as part of a genocide, is a crime against a wider 
protected group, but it is equally a crime committed against a female, as an individual, 
on the basis of her sex.  
This statement recognises that women and girls were subject to sexual violence on the basis of 
gender as well as ethnicity. The North Korea Commission found that discrimination arising 
out of North Korea’s songbun class system “intersects with gender based discrimination, 
which is equally pervasive”.1604 Persecution on political grounds also intersected with gender-
based persecution; for instance, women were forced to have abortions to prevent the 
reproduction of “class enemies”. 1605  The Eritrea Commission found that discrimination 
against women interacted with other violations, such as being forced into marriage to avoid 
the possibility of sexual abuse during military training.1606 Heightened sensitivity to gender 
issues has also manifested in recognition of limitations in assessing SGBV, with some recent 
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commissions cautioning that their reports might have only partially captured the extent of 
SGBV.1607  
Some feminist scholars critique IHL as reproducing structural gender inequalities by depicting 
women as “objects of vulnerability”. 1608  That recent commissions were concerned to 
recognise the agency of those who suffered SGBV is reflected in a linguistic shift, through the 
use of the term ‘survivor’ rather than ‘victim’. Some feminist scholars and activists 
deliberately use this term to recognise agency. 1609  For instance, the Eritrea Commission 
wrote:1610 
Prior, during, and after interviews with women and girls, the Commission highlighted 
the importance of their participation in its work, thereby contributing to the 
empowerment of survivors of sexual and gender-based violence through participation in 
the documenting/justice process. The Commission wishes to acknowledge the courage 
and strength of the Eritrean survivors who spoke in detail of the rapes they suffered. 
The South Sudan Commission also used the term ‘survivor’ in relation to SGBV.1611 This 
change in terminology is noticeable; most other commissions used the term ‘survivor’ to refer 
to those who escaped death.1612  These developments have occurred along with increased 
recognition of gender issues at the UN generally1613 and provision of gender expertise to UN 
atrocity inquiries.1614 We see a development that commissions are giving more attention to 
SGBV while also gaining awareness of their own limitations in evaluating such violations.  
While inquiry reports reveal increasing awareness of the different ways in which SGBV 
violates international law, there is some unevenness in commissions’ investigative focus. 
Commissions which examined violations in the context of authoritarian regimes gave more 
attention to non-sexual gender-based violence as well as gendered dimensions of other 
violations. By contrast, investigations of conflict situations tended to focus on sexual 
violations involving physical violence. Fionnuala Ní Aoláin writes that focussing on sexual 
violence reinforces the “presumed extremity of certain harms (physical sexual for women) 
over other less documented violations (economic and equality based).” 1615  From this 
perspective, if commissions focus on sexual violence and overlook other gendered violence, 
                                                 
1607 North Korea Report, supra note 32, para. 17; Eritrea First Report, supra note 567, para. 52. 
1608 Ní Aoláin, supra note 1558, at 91. See Gardam, supra note 1558.  
1609  Anne-Marie de Brouwer, ‘What the International Criminal Court Has Achieved and Can Achieve for 
Victims/Survivors of Sexual Violence’, (2009) 16 International Review of Victimology 183-209, at 184.  
1610 Eritrea Second Report, supra note 569, para. 25.  
1611 South Sudan First Report, supra note 30, paras. 36, 39 and 71.  
1612 E.g., CAR Report, supra note 32, paras. 250, 313 and 366; Syria Fourteenth Report, supra note 982, paras. 
45 and 59; Libya Second Report, supra note 853, para. 147. An exception is Syria Commission, They Came 
to Destroy, which uses the term ‘survivors’ in relation to SGBV: supra note 1602, paras. 114 and 117.  
1613 E.g., UN Sustainable Development Goal 5 (gender equality and women's empowerment); Office of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, SC Res. 1888 (2009); 
OHCHR, ‘Human Rights Council holds annual discussion on the integration of a gender perspective in its 
work’, 15 September 2014, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15037&LangID=E (accessed 1 
May 2018). 
1614 E.g., HRC Res. 23/25, para. 17; CAR Report, supra note 32, para. 19; HRC Burundi Mandate, supra note 
349, para. 25; Myanmar Mandate, supra note 2, para. 13.  
1615 Ní Aoláin, supra note 1558, at 90. 
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this can shape ideas of the types of harm experienced by women and imply that physical harm 
is more serious than socioeconomic harm.  
4. Genocide 
Several commissions examined whether atrocities amounted to genocide. According to the 
Genocide Convention, this international crime entails killing; causing serious bodily or mental 
harm; deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction; 
imposing measures intended to prevent births; or forcibly transferring children to another 
group, with “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such”.1616 This Section examines how commissions interpreted and applied pertinent 
facets of the prohibition of genocide, namely protected groups (4.1), special intent, or dolus 
specialis (4.2) and genocidal policy or a pattern of conduct (4.3). It then addresses possible 
reasons for the cautious approach taken by commissions in respect of findings of genocide 
(4.4).  
4.1 Protected groups 
The Genocide Convention requires that prohibited acts be committed against a “national, 
ethnical, racial or religious” group.1617 The Rwanda Commission hinted at the possibility of 
subjective group identification when stating, “it is not necessary to presume or posit the 
existence of race or ethnicity itself as a scientifically objective fact.”1618 Later commissions 
endorsed the idea that protected groups may be subjectively identifiable. 1619  The Darfur 
Commission took a wider interpretation, citing ICTR’s view that the Genocide Convention 
applied to “all stable and permanent groups”.1620 The Darfur Commission reasoned that this 
interpretation was well-accepted in international case law and state practice, so as to reflect 
custom. Schabas writes that this suggestion was “surely overstating the case”,1621 as such an 
approach was not supported at the ICTY or in subsequent ICTR case law. Moreover, it was 
not necessary to reach such a conclusion, as the Janjaweed subjectively considered the victims 
to belong to one of the enumerated groups.1622 
Some commissions distinguished ‘colloquial’ or ‘non-technical’ 1623  understandings of 
genocide from the narrower legal concept and discussed the possibility of ‘political’ or 
‘cultural’ genocide. The North Korea Commission and the CAR Commission considered that 
although it might be beneficial to include political groups, there was insufficient evidence that 
the customary prohibition had evolved to include such groups. 1624  The North Korea 
Commission found that extermination on political grounds and social class was beyond the 
                                                 
1616 Genocide Convention, supra note 780, Art. 2; Rome Statute, supra note 1033, Art. 6.  
1617 Ibid., Art. 2. 
1618 Rwanda Final Report, supra note 297, para. 159.  
1619 E.g., They Came to Destroy, supra note 1602, para. 104.  
1620 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgement, 2 September 1998, paras. 511, 516 and 701-702, 
cited in Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 498.  
1621 William Schabas, ‘Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and Darfur: The Commission of Inquiry’s Findings 
on Genocide’, (2006) 27(4) Cardozo L Rev 1703-1721, at 1712 [Schabas 2006].  
1622 Schabas 2006, supra note 1621, at 1713. 
1623 They Came to Destroy, supra note 1602, para. 13 and North Korea Report, supra note 32, para. 1158.  
1624 They Came to Destroy, supra note 1602, para. 13.  
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definition of genocide, but that such atrocities “[evoke] notions akin to ‘genocide’”1625 and 
“might be described as a ‘politicide’.”1626 While sympathetic to the idea of expanding the 
definition of genocide, it was not considered necessary as atrocities could be characterised as 
crimes against humanity. Recalling this view, Michael Kirby explains:1627 
…[W]here international law was in a possible state of evolution (as in the availability of 
the international crime of genocide in cases of annihilation of a section of the population 
on grounds of political belief) the [North Korea Commission] held back from 
expressing a conclusion on the possible infringement of such a law. However, it did 
indicate its inclination in that respect. There was already so much material (and findings 
on so many human rights violations and crimes against humanity) that this approach of 
prudent restraint appeared to be appropriate. 
The CAR Commission cited the North Korea Commission’s view that it was not necessary to 
make findings of genocide, in light of its findings of crimes against humanity.1628 The Darfur 
Commission aside, commissions exhibited caution when considering whether to expand 
protected groups beyond those specified in the Genocide Convention. 
4.2 Dolus specialis 
Commissions distinguished genocide from other species of international crimes by virtue of 
dolus specialis, namely “intent to destroy, in whole or in part” a protected group. According 
to the Darfur Commission, dolus specialis requires that “the perpetrator consciously desired 
the prohibited acts he committed”1629 to result in the destruction of the group. Christine Byron 
writes that the reference to ‘desire’ “may confuse motive with intent”.1630 Other commissions 
distinguished intent from motive more clearly. In 1993, the Yugoslavia Commission reasoned 
that evidence that a defendant was aware of the consequences of his or her conduct could 
establish intent, but not necessarily motive.1631 The Rwanda Commission similarly found, “the 
presence of political motive does not negate the intent to commit genocide if such intent is 
established in the first instance.”1632 The Syria Commission recognised that perpetrators with 
special intent “may also be fuelled by multiple other motives such as capture of territory, 
economic advantage, sexual gratification, and spreading terror.”1633  
When commissions appraised facts, they were rather cautious in identifying dolus specialis. 
The Cambodia Commission found that the Khmer Rouge committed genocide against 
minority ethnic groups and the Buddhist monkhood,1634 but decide whether genocide was 
committed against the general population of Cambodia. While finding that the Khmer people 
constituted a ‘national group’, the Commission found that the question of whether genocide 
                                                 
1625 North Korea Report, supra note 32, para. 1157. 
1626 Ibid., para. 1158. 
1627 Kirby, supra note 97, at 8. 
1628 CAR Report, supra note 32, para. 460.  
1629 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 491. 
1630 Christine Byron, ‘Comment on the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the 
United Nations Secretary-General’, (2005) 5(2) Hum Rts L Rev 351-360, at 356.  
1631 Yugoslavia Final Report, supra note 39, para. 97. 
1632 Rwanda Final Report, supra note 297, para. 159.  
1633 They Came to Destroy, supra note 1602, para. 10.  
1634 Cambodia Report, supra note 324, para. 63.  
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was committed against them “turns on complex interpretive issues, especially concerning the 
Khmer Rouge’s intent with respect to its non-minority-group victims”, and reserved the 
question for a tribunal to consider, in the event that leaders were charged with genocide 
against the Khmer people.1635 The CAR Commission considered whether atrocities by the 
anti-balaka against Muslims in amounted to genocide or alternatively as crimes against 
humanity of persecution and forcible population transfer.1636 It assessed whether the anti-
balaka “possessed the specific intent to destroy the Muslim community”1637 as an element of 
genocide. The Commission considered that its ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ standard of 
proof was similar to that required to issue an ICC arrest warrant.1638 While acknowledging 
that the ICC did not require genocidal intent to be the “only reasonable conclusion”1639 to 
meet that threshold, the Commission considered that it should draw the conclusion with the 
greater evidentiary basis. It found insufficient evidence to establish that perpetrators acted 
with intent to destroy the targeted group.1640 Boutruche observes that generally, fact-finding 
practitioners found it very difficult to gather information indicating dolus specialis.1641 
4.3 Genocidal policy or pattern of conduct 
Whether a genocidal ‘policy’ is a required element of genocide is controversial. The 
Yugoslavia Commission considered that ethnic cleansing, which it defined as a policy to 
violently remove another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas, could “fall 
within the meaning of the Genocide Convention”.1642 The Rwanda Commission suggested 
that a policy of systematic rape could amount to genocide.1643 The Darfur Commission was 
the first to discuss the legal relevance of genocidal policy in detail, positing that such an 
element demonstrated dolus specialis on the part of governmental authorities.1644 On the facts, 
the Commission found that the Sudanese Government’s “policy of attacking, killing and 
forcibly displacing members of some tribes” did not indicate genocidal intent; rather, attacks 
were conducted in order to “drive the victims from their homes, primarily for purposes of 
counter-insurgency warfare”1645 and “drive a particular group out of an area on persecutory 
and discriminatory grounds for political reasons.”1646 The Commission concluded that the 
Government had not committed genocide in Darfur due to the lack of a genocidal policy.1647 
The Commission cautioned that specific individuals might have had genocidal intent and be 
                                                 
1635 Ibid., para. 65. 
1636 CAR Report, supra note 32, para. 453. 
1637 Ibid., para. 455.  
1638 Ibid., para. 456, citing Rome Statute, supra note 1033, Art. 58(1)(a).  
1639 Ibid., citing Prosecutor v. Omar Al Bashir, ‘Decision on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the ‘Decision 
on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir’,’ ICC-
02/05-01/09OA, PTC I, 3 February 2010, para. 37. 
1640 CAR Report, supra note 32, para. 457.  
1641 Boutruche 2013, supra note 482, at 30.  
1642 Yugoslavia Interim Report, supra note 292, para. 56.  
1643 Rwanda Final Report, supra note 297, para. 145. 
1644 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 518. 
1645 Ibid., para. 518. 
1646 Ibid., para. 519. 
1647 Ibid., para. 522.  
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responsible for genocide on an individual basis,1648 but that “it would be for a competent court 
to make such a determination on a case by case basis”.1649  
This aspect of the Darfur Commission’s report provoked strong reactions in commentary.1650 
Nöelle Quénivet writes that the Commission gave the impression that it did not want to enter 
the fray with respect to whether Sudan was responsible for genocide, while seeming less 
reluctant in suggesting individual criminal responsibility. She surmises:1651 
To some extent, it is less dangerous for the [Darfur] Commission to declare that while 
some individuals may be held responsible for the crime of genocide, the State per se 
cannot be held accountable on the international level. The conclusion of the [Darfur] 
Commission is all the more disappointing as the group of experts had been 
commissioned to ascertain whether inter alia acts of genocide had occurred in Darfur. 
By contrast, Schabas considers the Commission’s affirmation of the centrality of a policy for 
the purposes of state responsibility as “helpful”, as when instructing the Commission to 
investigate whether genocidal acts were committed, “the Security Council wanted to know 
whether genocide was being committed pursuant to a plan or policy of the State.” 1652 
Moreover, state responsibility for genocide must involve a policy: “Individuals have specific 
intent. States have policy. The term specific intent is used to describe the inquiry, but its real 
subject is State policy”.1653  
Other commissions have not discussed whether policy is a required element of state-
sponsored genocide, nor engaged in much depth with the ICC’s requirement that unless 
genocidal conduct could in itself destroy the targeted group, it must occur “in the context of a 
manifest pattern of similar conduct”.1654 The CAR Commission wrote that Rome Statute’s 
definition of genocide reproduced that in the Genocide Convention 1655  and identified the 
‘manifest pattern’ element, but did not discuss whether this was a new element or its relation 
to the idea of genocidal policy.1656 Other commissions which cited Article 6 of the Rome 
Statute did not refer to the requirement for a manifest pattern.1657 These elements remain 
rather unexplored in commissions’ reports. 
                                                 
1648 Ibid., para. 520. 
1649 Ibid., para. 520.  
1650E.g., Ademola Abass, ‘Proving State Responsibility for Genocide: The ICJ in Bosnia v. Serbia and the 
International Commission of Inquiry for Darfur’, (2008) 31(871) Fordham Int'l LJ 871-910 and Andrew 
Loewenstein and Stephen Kostas, ‘Divergent Approaches to Determining Responsibility for Genocide’, 
(2007) 5 JICJ 839-858. 
1651 Noëlle Quénivet, ‘The Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur: The Question of 
Genocide’, (2006) Human Rights Review 39-68, at 52.  
1652 Schabas 2006, supra note 1621, at 1710.  
1653  William Schabas, ‘State Policy as an Element of International Crimes’, (2008) 98(3) J Crim L & 
Criminology 953-982, at 970.  
1654 ICC Elements of Crimes, Art. 6(a), para. 4.  
1655 CAR Report, supra note 32, para. 449. 
1656 Ibid., para. 450. 
1657 E.g., North Korea Report, supra note 32, para. 1156 and They Came to Destroy, supra note 1602, para. 9.  
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4.4 Caution in making findings of genocide 
Commissions generally assessed allegations of genocide with caution. It may be that the 
infamy of genocide as the ‘crime of crimes’ encouraged commissions to tread carefully.1658 
Such reservations are rarely found in inquiry reports, however, where crimes against humanity 
are acknowledged as potentially as serious and stigmatising as acts of genocide.1659  
Some commentators suggest that some commissions’ reticence to report findings of genocide 
in fact reflect policy considerations. The Sri Lanka Panel apparently chose not to report its 
finding that genocide had not occurred as “given the inflammatory nature of the issue, the 
practitioners figured that if the report mentioned genocide, no matter what the report said, the 
report was likely to be misinterpreted.”1660 The desire of the Security Council Inquiry on 
Burundi for a supportive relationship with the concerned state led it to revise its findings; after 
it “found both Tutsis and Hutus guilty of genocide, Burundi’s Tutsi-led government opposed 
the release of the Commission’s final report”.1661 The revised report found that the 1993 
massacre of Tutsis amounted to genocide1662 and that indiscriminate killings of Hutus was not 
stopped, but also not “centrally planned”. 1663  A US official responsible for drafting the 
Commission’s mandate opines that it “made a political decision that the government of 
Burundi had to approve the report” which led it to omit “any mention of Tutsis killing 
Hutus.”1664 It cannot be extrapolated that such considerations influenced all commissions, but 
these examples illustrate the special power that findings of genocide can carry. 
Commissions have been criticized for avoiding issuing findings of genocide. Quénivet writes 
that the Darfur Commission’s report gives the impression that it “did not wish to enter into the 
hot debate as to whether Sudan was, as a State, involved in the genocide”,1665 while also 
dodging the question of individual responsibility by stating that this was a question for a 
judicial body. Makane Mbengue and Brian McGarry are also critical of the Darfur 
Commission’s refusal to make findings of individual responsibility, arguing that the terms of 
its mandate squarely put this question within its competence, and that:1666 
Passing the question of individual criminal responsibility to bodies such as the ICC may 
suggest an inherent structural weakness in quasi-judicial bodies vis-à-vis their 
conventional judicial counterparts. Therefore, despite the Commission’s stated mandate 
‘to identify the perpetrators of such violations,’ one may fairly wonder whether the UN 
Security Council’s establishment of a commission of inquiry or other quasi-judicial 
body is, in fact, an appropriate response to an escalating humanitarian crisis. 
                                                 
1658 Boutruche 2013, supra note 482, at 30. See Schabas 2006, supra note 1621, at 1717. 
1659 CAR Report, supra note 32, para. 78; Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 506; North Korea Report, supra 
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Whether commissions indeed consider genocide as the ‘crime of crimes’ or are concerned that 
audiences will perceive it as such, the upshot is that inquiry reports have taken a more 
cautious tone to assessing genocide than other violations. 
5. Crimes Against Humanity 
The final substantive legal area to be discussed is crimes against humanity. This Section 
discusses how commissions interpreted the contextual elements of this species of international 
crime (5.1) and qualified atrocities as crimes against humanity (5.2). Modes of liability and 
other elements of ICL are addressed in Chapter Six, which examines responsibility regimes.  
5.1 Interpretation of contextual elements  
Commissions agree that certain atrocities may amount to crimes against humanity when 
carried out in the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian 
population.1667 Commissions also considered other contextual elements, namely a nexus with 
armed conflict and that an attack be conducted pursuant to a state or organisational policy. 
Each is discussed in turn.  
The question of whether crimes against humanity must have a nexus with armed conflict was 
raised from the IMT Charter’s definition of crimes against humanity as committed “before or 
during the war”.1668 The Yugoslavia and Rwanda Commissions saw a nexus with armed 
conflict as necessary, writing that such crimes were “committed by persons demonstrably 
linked to a party to the conflict”.1669 The ICTY Statute reflects this view, providing that the 
ICTY may prosecute crimes against humanity “committed in armed conflict”.1670 However 
the ICTY subsequently ruled that a connection to armed conflict was not required, and that its 
statutory definition was narrower than the customary definition. 1671  Subsequently, 
commissions have affirmed that crimes against humanity may also occur in peacetime.1672  
Commissions have taken different views as to whether attacks must be carried out pursuant to 
a state or organisational policy (commonly referred to as the ‘policy requirement’), as stated 
in the Rome Statute.1673 The Syria Commission cited the Rome Statute definition but omitted 
the policy element even though it found a state policy to commit violations on the facts.1674 
By contrast, the HRC’s Burundi Commission discussed the ICC’s interpretation of the policy 
requirement in detail and applied it to the facts.1675 Commissions disagreed as to whether the 
policy requirement was part of the customary definition of crimes against humanity. The 
Eritrea Commission found that the policy requirement was implicitly part of the customary 
                                                 
1667 E.g., Cambodia Report, supra note 324, para. 66(b); Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 178 and Sri Lanka 
Report, supra note 29, para. 249.  
1668 IMT Charter, Art. 6(c) (emphasis added).  
1669 Yugoslavia Interim Report, supra note 292, para. 49; Yugoslavia Final Report, supra note 39, para. 75 and 
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definition, “as it is difficult to conceive of international individual criminal liability for crimes 
that were random rather than organised.”1676 The Darfur Commission and Sri Lanka Panel 
considered that evidence of a policy or plan was relevant but unnecessary.1677 The North 
Korea Commission took a hybrid approach, applying the “lowest common denominator”1678 
so that its findings would satisfy any definition and reasoned that the policy requirement 
ensured that crimes against humanity excluded “isolated or haphazard” atrocities. 1679 
However, it did not conclude whether a policy was generally required, as it found a state 
policy on the facts.1680  
Commissions also considered whether crimes against humanity were committed by members 
of armed groups. This gives rise to a question of the meaning of ‘organisational’ policy in the 
Rome Statute.1681 In a split decision of an ICC Trial Chamber, two possible interpretations 
were identified. The broad approach of the majority included any group with “capability to 
perform acts which infringe on basic human values”, regardless of the level of 
organisation,1682 while Judge Hans-Peter Kaul in the minority would require that a group be 
“state-like”. 1683  To adopt the minority view would narrow the scope of crimes against 
humanity. Commissions have not interpreted the meaning of ‘organisational’ policy, for 
various reasons. Some examined the conduct of states, so this issue was not material. Others 
ostensibly adopted the Rome Statute’s definition but did not mention the policy 
requirement.1684 Heller writes that the Libya Commission’s omission of this requirement was 
“bizarre” as Bassiouni chaired the drafting committee which adopted the policy requirement, 
and that the omission was “anything but harmless… the policy requirement may limit the 
thuwar’s responsibility for crimes against humanity.” 1685  Some commissions stated that 
atrocities were carried out in pursuit of a policy without discussing the meaning of this 
requirement.1686 
5.2 Assessment of crimes against humanity 
When assessing whether atrocities amounted to crimes against humanity, commissions first 
characterised violations as ‘underlying acts’ enumerated in the Rome Statute or the ICTY and 
ICTR Statutes.1687 The Yugoslavia Commission did not identify underlying acts in its interim 
                                                 
1676 Eritrea Second Report, supra note 569, para. 182.  
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report, and in its final report cited acts in the ICTY Statute.1688 Atrocities were characterised 
as crimes against humanity when underlying acts were carried out in a widespread or 
systematic way. 1689  Where contextual elements were not satisfied in situations of armed 
conflict, commissions tended to qualify atrocities as war crimes.1690  
Commissions inferred the existence of a policy from evidence of coordination or patterns of 
attacks. For instance, the North Korea Commission found that “inhumane acts perpetrated in 
the DPRK’s political prison camps occur on a large scale and follow a regular pattern giving 
rise to the inference that they form part of an overarching State policy.” 1691  The Syria 
Commission found in respect of unlawful killings by Government forces, that the 
“coordination and active participation of Government institutions indicated the attacks were 
institutionalized and conducted as a matter of policy.”1692 The Guinea Commission considered 
that facts which supported the “systematic and widespread nature of the attack also support 
the conclusion that the attack should be deemed to have been committed pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a State or organizational policy”.1693 Where attacks were considered systematic, 
the ‘policy requirement’ was not an additional hurdle. Some commissions also recognised 
limits to their characterisations of crimes against humanity by indicating that only judicial 
bodies could enter definitive findings.1694  
6. Cross-Cutting Analysis 
The foregoing discussion demonstrated how commissions’ legal analysis connected to their 
institutional features in relation to different bodies of law and types of violations. This Section 
conducts a cross-cutting analysis of commissions’ interpretations and applications of 
international law. It discusses commissions’ focus on incident-based violations (6.1), the 
certainty of their findings of violations (6.2) and the rigour of their legal analysis (6.3), and 
how these aspects are informed by commissions’ roles and functions. 
6.1 Focus on incident-based violations  
Commissions tended to focus their legal analysis on incident-based violations involving 
specific victims and perpetrators rather than systemic or chronic harms. This tendency is 
reflected in commissions’ focus on violations of civil and political rights, specific types of 
ESCR violations, and violations capable of being characterised as international crimes. 
Allison Corkery writes that fact-finding methods remain “predominantly legalistic and events-
based” so that fact-finders are “poorly equipped to analyze the multidimensional factors and 
multitude of actors that create, perpetuate, or exacerbate chronic and entrenched 
violations.”1695 Eibe Reibel distinguishes micro and macro dimensions of ESCR: the micro-
level concerns minimum core obligations to realize rights, while the macro-level “addresses 
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the need for substantial system changes”. 1696  Commissions tended to focus on micro 
dimensions of ESCR violations due to the practical difficulties in gathering information, 
carrying out systemic analysis and qualifying macro-level deficiencies as violations.  
The functions of promoting accountability and encouraging compliance through naming and 
shaming invite a focus on violations involving identifiable victims and perpetrators. OHCHR 
observes that “[g]enerally, documenting a human rights violation involves gathering 
information to determine ‘who did what to whom’.”1697 Reflecting on human rights fact-
finding strategies, Kenneth Roth writes that to effectively shame a government into changing 
its behaviour:1698 
[C]larity is needed around three issues: violation, violator, and remedy. We must be able 
to show persuasively that a particular state of affairs amounts to a violation of human 
rights standards, that a particular violator is principally or significantly responsible, and 
that a widely accepted remedy for the violation exists. If any of these three elements is 
missing, our capacity to shame is greatly diminished. We tend to take these conditions 
for granted in the realm of civil and political rights because they usually coincide… In 
the realm of ESC rights, the three preconditions for effective shaming operate much 
more independently…  
Such selectivity may unintentionally prioritize certain types of violations. Dustin Sharp 
cautions that if “direct victims and perpetrators occupy the foreground in most INGO 
reporting, broader or structural drivers of conflict and injustice tend to receive comparatively 
little emphasis”,1699 and that a focus on civil and political rights, “whether on the basis of self-
imposed methodological restrictions or not, continues to have the effect of reifying historical 
hierarchies of rights”.1700 The accountability function also encourages a focus on violations 
that may be characterised as international crimes, which more readily translate to the 
international judicial context. Lars Waldorf suggests that ICL’s emphasis on individual 
responsibility rather than structural causes might explain the lack of prosecutions for massive 
ESCR violations.1701  
6.2 Level of certainty of findings of violations 
Where a commission aims to provoke enforcement action, it may be less important for 
findings to have a high degree of certainty, in light of the expectation that further 
investigations will follow. For instance, the Darfur Commission justified its low standard of 
proof on the basis that the Commission “would obviously not make final judgments as to 
criminal guilt; rather, it would make an assessment of possible suspects that would pave the 
way for future investigations, and possible indictments, by a prosecutor.” 1702  Mégret 
                                                 
1696 Riedel, supra note 1411, at 445. 
1697 Manual on Human Rights Monitoring, supra note 1412, at 20.  
1698 Kenneth Roth, ‘Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an International 
Human Rights Organization’, (2004) 26(1) HRQ 63-73, at 67-68. 
1699 Sharp, supra note 103, at 75.  
1700 Ibid., at 73. 
1701 Lars Waldorf, ‘Anticipating the Past: Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic Wrongs’, (2012) 21(2) Social 
and Legal Studies 171-186 at 173. 
1702 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 15 (citations omitted).  
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distinguishes facts needed for action from those needed for adjudication, and the dilemma for 
fact-finding:1703  
Facts needed for action are merely quasi-facts, facts as they can best be ascertained in 
the circumstances; there is a recognition that time is of the essence, that decisions 
cannot afford to wait for certainty. Facts as needed for adjudication are more in the 
manner of incontrovertible, demonstrable, or highly probable truth because of the 
negative consequences they portend for persons or institutions and because one does not 
have, unlike political action, the excuse that time is pressing. Human rights fact-finding, 
and therein lies some of its challenges, now more often than not identifies a dual space: 
providing facts both for the political decision-maker and potentially for the adjudicator.  
Adding further complexity is the fact that commissions’ findings of violations not only serve 
as stepping-stones for corrective action; they have also been cited by adjudicative bodies. For 
instance, the Gaza Flotilla Commission’s finding of disproportionate use of force was cited in 
a dissenting opinion in a decision of the ICC PTC. 1704  The ECHR cited the Syria 
Commission’s findings of serious violations of IHRL and IHL when assessing whether Russia 
would violate the principle of non-refoulement by forcibly returning the applicants to 
Syria.1705 The Human Rights Committee cited the Cote d’Ivoire Commission’s findings that 
the applicant suffered torture and that conditions of detention failed to meet human rights 
standards.1706 Commissions’ cognisance of the potential future use of their findings in judicial 
and adjudicative contexts may motivate them to devote resources towards reaching findings 
with a high degree of certitude. However, this may mean that commissions cannot 
communicate the full range or scope of violations, reducing the rhetoric impact of the report. 
When making a case for corrective action and seeking to give a voice to victims, 
communicating the seriousness of violations may be prized over certainty. This is especially 
so where there is an urgent need for action to prevent violence; investigations are conducted 
under time pressure or with scarce resources; or where states refuse to cooperate. UN atrocity 
inquiries often operate under all three conditions. One strategy adopted by commissions in 
such cases is to find serious violations or patterns of atrocities on a qualified basis. Examples 
include the Goldstone Commission’s findings reached on the basis of ‘available information’ 
and the Syria Commission’s characterisation of complex events as massacres in violation of 
IHL and IHRL while noting the need for further investigations.  
Commissions which made prima facie findings based on available information or drew 
adverse inferences were presented with a conundrum: concerned states could refuse to 
cooperate and then seek to benefit from criticizing the credibility of findings. There is no easy 
solution as to which approach a commission should choose. If broad or qualified findings are 
                                                 
1703 Mégret 2016, supra note 460, at 43.  
1704 Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of 
Cambodia, ‘Decision on Request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor's decision not to 
initiate an investigation: Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Peter Kovacs’, ICC-01/13-34-Anx, PTC I, 16 
July 2015, para. 38.  
1705 ECtHR, L.M. and others v. Russia, No. 40081/14, Judgment, 15 October 2015, paras. 76 and 113, citing 
Syria Eighth Report, supra note 983.  
1706 CCPR, Traoré v. Ivory Coast, UN Doc. CCPR/C/103/D/1759/2008, 31 October 2011, para. 3.4, citing SC 
Côte d’Ivoire Report, supra note 67. 
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subsequently shown to be incorrect, a commission’s credibility may be diminished and its 
catalysing influence neutralised. 1707  However, as noted by the Gaza Commission, “[t]o 
empower noncooperating parties would be to defeat international fact-finding entirely.”1708 In 
assessing violations, therefore, commissions may face a trade-off between prioritising 
certainty at the cost of expressing the extent of harm; or making findings which command 
attention and demand action, whose credibility may be undermined. In practice, most 
commissions adopted the latter course of action, indicating a more advocatory rather than 
adjudicative approach which corresponds to functions of raising alert and provoking the 
mandating authority and other stakeholders to take corrective action.  
6.3 Rigour of legal analysis 
Commissions interpreted and applied international law with varying degrees of rigour. Some 
commissions discussed legal authorities at length before applying them to the facts, such as 
the Darfur Commission’s examination of genocide. Yihdego argues that the Goldstone 
Commission’s extensive legal analysis “raises the issue of whether the exercise was really 
fact-finding as opposed to ‘law-finding’.”1709 Others, such as the HRC-led inquiry into Côte 
d’Ivoire, mentioned the applicable law very briefly and made findings of violations without 
discussing the content of legal norms. 1710  This Section discusses how the rigour of 
commissions’ legal analysis corresponds to different roles and functions.  
Rigorous legal reasoning may render a report less vulnerable to political challenge. Alston 
writes that the Darfur Commission’s robust legal analysis galvanized “public opinion and 
inter-governmental action”1711 and suggests that having to respond to a “carefully documented 
and powerfully argued analytical report”1712 made it more difficult for the Security Council to 
avoid taking action. Van den Herik writes that in politically sensitive situations, commissions 
must “interpret and apply the law quite meticulously” and “such rigor adds to the authority of 
the report”, which may “help to forestall, or at least de-legitimize, unilateral dismissal on legal 
grounds.”1713 Such an approach might also represent a degree of moral accountability where 
legal avenues for redress are unavailable for legal or political reasons.  
Commissions exercised the most caution when interpreting elements of international crimes. 
With respect to genocide, they were hesitant to expand protected groups beyond those 
enumerated in the Genocide Convention and scrutinised the meaning of dolus specialis. More 
flexibility was shown in relation to the elements of crimes against humanity, but commissions 
still based their interpretations on a detailed analysis of legal authorities. Commissions’ views 
were particularly diverse with respect to the policy requirement. As this element may be 
difficult to prove, commissions which omitted this requirement might reach findings of crimes 
against humanity more easily but may not satisfy the Rome Statute’s definition. The North 
Korea Commission’s decision to adopt stricter elements of crimes against humanity accepted 
                                                 
1707 Zeray, supra note 96, at 48. 
1708 PoKempner, supra note 96, at 155. 
1709 Yihdego, supra note 96, at 47. 
1710 E.g., HRC Côte d’Ivoire Report, supra note 810, paras. 9-10 and 69-93.  
1711 Alston 2005, supra note 96, at 604. 
1712 Ibid., at 606. 
1713 Van den Herik, supra note 74, at 29. 
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the possibility of fewer findings of crimes in exchange for conclusions which would satisfy all 
definitions. This cautious approach could reduce the likelihood of inconsistent findings, 
should the DRRK come within the jurisdiction of an international court or tribunal. Such 
concerns may account for commissions’ more conservative interpretations of elements of 
international crimes, in comparison with legal questions less likely to be adjudicated. 
A commission aiming to promote a broad reach of human rights and IHL protections might 
adopt a more advocative approach rather than cleaving to settled legal authority. However, if 
legal analysis is perceived as beyond settled law, the authority of the report may be reduced. 
Hellestveit argues that the temptation to offer a progressive interpretation of international law 
in an inquiry report should be resisted, as it may interfere with the core objective of producing 
an authoritative report of facts upon which the international community can rely.1714  For 
instance, the Libya Commission’s view that IHL targeting rules might be displaced by the 
right to life is described by Kevin Heller as a “radical position”.1715 Marauhn writes that when 
commissions blur the lines between IHL and IHRL, they “not only put compliance with both 
bodies of law at risk by blurring the lines, but they also put their own credibility at risk.”1716 In 
the IHL context, principles of proportionality and precautions were not applied entirely 
consistently, such as by expressing the proportionality test as ex post rather than ex-ante, not 
identifying anticipated military advantage, or judging the effectiveness of warnings by 
whether they prompted evacuation. Concerned states may seek to undermine commissions’ 
competence by pointing to such errors.1717  
The rigour of a commission’s legal analysis raises questions about its potential function of 
developing international law.1718 Many scholars observe that commissions’ legal analysis can 
be influential in practice.1719 International courts and tribunals have been somewhat cognizant 
of inquiry reports as legal authorities. Legal interpretations of the Yugoslavia Commission 
were cited by ad hoc criminal tribunals 1720  and occasionally by regional human rights 
courts1721 and the ICJ.1722 Other inquiry reports were cited occasionally by the ICTR and the 
                                                 
1714 Hellestveit, supra note 20, at 369. 
1715 Heller, supra note 96, at 27. 
1716 Marauhn, supra note 96, at 455.  
1717 E.g., Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Israeli response to the UNHRC Commission of Inquiry’, 22 June 
2015, Point 3, available at http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2015/Pages/Israeli-response-to-the-UNHRC-
Commission-of-Inquiry-22-Jun-2015.aspx (accessed 1 May 2018). 
1718 Boutruche 2013, supra note 482, at 21.  
1719 Akande and Tonkin, supra note 777; Koutroulis, supra note 1730, at 613 and Frulli, supra note 102, at 1239; 
Grace and Coster van Voorhout, supra note 937, at 14; Boutruche 2013, supra note 482, at 21. 
1720 Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgement, 7 May 1997, para. 638; Prosecutor v. Jelisić, IT-95-10, 
Trial Judgement, 14 December 1999, para. 55; Prosecutor v. Martić, IT-95-11-A, Appeals Judgement, 8 
October 2008, para. 306; Prosecutor v. Delalić and others, IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgement, 16 November 1998, 
para. 90; Prosecutor v. Strugar, IT-01-42-T, Decision on Defence Motion Requesting Judgement of Acquittal 
pursuant to Rule 98 bis, 12 June 2004, para. 193 and Prosecutor v. Prlić and others, IT-04-74-T, Trial 
Judgement, 9 May 2013, para. 248; Prosecutor v. Milutinović and others, IT-99-37-PT, ‘Decision on Motion 
Challenging Jurisdiction’, 6 May 2003, para. 33 and Prosecutor v. Brima and others, SCSL-04-16-T, Trial 
Judgement, 20 June 2007, para. 692. 
1721 ECtHR, Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, No. 35343/05, Judgment, Grand Chamber, 20 October 2015, para. 96 and 
IACHR, Martí de Mejía v. Perú, Case 10.970, Report No. 5/96, 1 March 1996, at 157. 
1722 Bosnia Genocide Case, supra note 1289, para. 190, citing Yugoslavia Interim Report, supra note 292. 
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ICC.1723 Reviewing ICTY jurisprudence, David Re finds that UN fact-finding reports were 
“undoubtedly catalysts in developing [ICL], at least in facilitating investigations” but that 
reports “ultimately were probably more politically and historically important than judicially 
influential.”1724 Judicial expressions of commissions’ legal authority are rather lukewarm.1725 
The ICTY Appeals Chamber described the authority of the Darfur Commission’s report as “at 
best persuasive.” 1726  In practice, judicial reliance has clustered around specific reports, 
reflecting the degree of judicial guidance available at the time. Darcy argues that commissions 
largely contributed to ICL when this field was still developing, and that future contributions 
will be “inconspicuous and inadvertent”.1727 
Scholars have engaged with inquiry reports that raise interesting or contentious issues of law 
and findings of violations.1728 Commentary has converged around legal propositions not much 
addressed in judicial settings, such as state responsibility for genocide and human rights 
obligations of armed groups. Certain inquiry reports stimulated significant debate. 1729 
Scholars engaged deeply with the legal analysis of commissions led by legal heavyweights 
such as Cherif Bassiouni, Philippe Kirsch and Antonio Cassese.  
How is commissions’ legal authority to be theorised? Some scholars argue that inquiry reports 
fall within the ambit of Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute which reflects the classic theory of 
sources of international law. Vaios Koutroulis conceives of UN inquiry reports as “informed 
doctrine, due to the expertise of the missions’ members”.1730 Darcy writes that commissions’ 
reports can be considered subsidiary sources or should be analogised as such, as a hybrid of 
doctrine and jurisprudence.1731 A formal account may alternatively rest on delegated state 
authority.1732  
                                                 
1723 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute’, ICC-01/05-01/08, PTC II, 15 June 2009, para. 431, citing Yugoslavia Final Report. 
1724 David Re, ‘Fact-finding in the Former Yugoslavia: What the Courts Did’, in Bergsmo, supra note 94, 279-
323, at 286. 
1725 E.g., Prosecutor v. Omar Al Bashir, ‘Second Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of 
Arrest: Separate and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka’, ICC-02/05-01/09, para. 6.  
1726 Prosecutor v. Popović and others, IT-05-88-A, Appeals Judgement, 30 January 2015, para. 464.  
1727 Darcy, supra note 101, at 256. 
1728 E.g., Schabas 2006, supra note 1621, Abass, supra note 1650, Clapham forthcoming, supra note 513, 
Henckaerts and Wiesener, supra note 1282, Yael Ronen, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Territorial Non-State 
Actors’, (2013) 46(1) Cornell Int'l LJ 21-50 and George Fletcher and Jens Ohlin, ‘Reclaiming Fundamental 
Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case’, (2005) 3 JICJ 539. For a formalist critique of this practice, 
see d’Aspremont, supra note 1387, at 133. 
1729 E.g., Alston 2005, supra note 96; Mbengue and McGarry, supra note 775 and William Schabas, ‘Darfur and 
the “Odious Scourge”: The Commission of Inquiry’s Findings on Genocide’, (2005) 18 LJIL 871-903, at 877, 
discussing the Darfur Report; Marauhn, supra note 96 and Rodenhäuser, supra note 1282 discussing reports 
of the Syria Commission; and Bell, supra note 1535, Falk, supra note 1007, PoKempner, supra note 96, 
Rosen, supra note 1490, Shany, supra note 1513 and Yihdego, supra note 96 discussing the Goldstone 
Report. 
1730 Vaios Koutroulis, ‘The Prohibition of the Use of Force in Arbitrations and Fact-Finding Reports’, in Marc 
Weller (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2015) 605-626, at 
612. 
1731 Darcy, supra note 101, at 234. 
1732 Kirby and Gopalan, supra note 60, at 236 and Ian Johnstone, ‘Law-Making by International Organizations: 
Perspectives from IL/IR Theory’, in Jeffrey Dunoff and Mark Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on 




Conversely, socio-legal scholars conceive of commissions as participants in the argumentative 
practice of international law. 1733  This practice is mediated through an ‘interpretive 
community’1734 where “the use of international law is part of a broader discursive process in 
which norms are invoked to explain, defend, justify and persuade.”1735 To exercise persuasive 
discursive power1736 commissions must adhere to the disciplining rules of the interpretive 
community, including principles of legal interpretation. Ingo Venzke writes that actors 
contribute to the development of international law by exercising ‘semantic authority’, which 
is the “capacity to establish reference points for legal discourse that other actors can hardly 
escape”.1737 Sociological institutionalists similarly posit that ideas spread through the ‘logic of 
arguing’1738 but may also be propagated through “less cerebral processes, involving struggle, 
pressure, and trend-following.”1739 Hun Joon Kim argues that UN atrocity inquiries participate 
in norm diffusion as “[t]he process of comparing actions with standards to determine the 
appropriate response to norm violators feeds back into norm development by elaborating and 
entrenching the norm in question.” 1740  Discursive approaches have also been adopted to 
explain the legal authority of other actors such as special rapporteurs1741 and treaty bodies.1742  
                                                 
1733 E.g., W. Michael Reisman, ‘International Law-making: A Process of Communication’, (1981) 75 Am Soc'y 
Int'l L Proc 101-120; Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It 
(Oxford: OUP, 1995); José Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (Oxford: OUP, 2005) at 
258; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Methodology of International Law’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2011) para. 1; Ian Johnstone, The Power of Deliberation (Oxford: 
OUP, 2011) at 14 and Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) at 226. 
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Legal Studies (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); Harold Koh, ‘How is International Human Rights 
Law Enforced?’, (1999) 74(4) Ind LJ 1397-1417 and Michael Waibel, ‘Interpretive Communities in 
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1737 Ingo Venzke, ‘Semantic Authority, Legal Change and the Dynamics of International Law’, (2015) 12 No 
Foundations 1 at 3 [Venzke 2015], citing Max Weber, Economy and Society (Oakland: University of 
California Press, 1978) at 36. 
1738 Hun Joon Kim and J. C. Sharman, ‘Accounts and Accountability: Corruption, Human Rights, and Individual 
Accountability Norms’, (2014) 68 International Organization 417-448, at 430. See Martha Finnemore and 
Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, (1998) 52(4) International 
Organization 887-917 and Kathryn Sikkink and Hun Joon Kim, ‘The Justice Cascade: The Origins and 
Effectiveness of Prosecutions of Human Rights Violations’, (2013) 9 Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science 269-285. 
1739 Sikkink, supra note 355, at 261.  
1740 Hun Joon Kim, ‘The Role of UN Commissions of Inquiry in Developing Global Human Rights: Prospects 
and Challenges’, (2016) 14(2) Korean Journal of International Studies 241-264, at 252. See Susan Park, 
‘Theorizing Norm Diffusion Within International Organizations’, (2006) 43(3) International Politics 342-
361. 
1741 E.g., Christophe Golay, Claire Mahon and Ioana Cismas, ‘The Impact of the UN Special Procedures on the 
Development and Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, (2011) 15(2) The International 
Journal of Human Rights 299-318 and Tania Baldwin-Pask and Patrizia Scannella, ‘The Unfinished Business 
of a Special Procedures System’, in Bassiouni and Schabas, supra note 97, 419-478 
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(ed.), Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Oxford: OUP, 2013) 621-648; Birgit Schlutter, 
‘Aspects of Human Rights Interpretation by UN Treaty Bodies’, in Helen Keller and Geir Ulfstein (eds), UN 
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Legal Status of Normative Pronouncements of Human Rights Treaty Bodies’, in Holger Hestermeyer et al 
(eds), Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011) 553-575. 
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Where a commission adheres to conventions of legal interpretation, such as by identifying 
relevant legal authorities, applying principles of interpretation and providing detailed 
reasoning, its approach resembles that of courts and tribunals. Some scholars argue that 
commissions enjoy legal authority when they display ‘quasi-judicial’1743 or ‘adjudicative’1744 
characteristics of producing “reasoned decisions in accordance with accepted legal 
principles”.1745 Such an approach is seen in commissions’ detailed and cautious analyses of 
crimes against humanity and genocide, in respect of which coherence was sought with 
existing legal authorities. Commissions’ role as a type of legal authority may also be linked to 
commissioners’ identities as esteemed judges, as was the case for the inquiries into Darfur, 
Libya and North Korea. Authority could be linked both to commissioners’ personal standing 
and the influence of their experience on the bench for their legal analysis and reporting.  
By contrast, ‘progressive’ interpretations which depart from settled legal authority or 
pronounce upon novel legal questions reflect an outlook of advocacy as commissions seek to 
move international law in a particular direction. Examples include ‘humanized’ interpretations 
of IHL, such as the Libya Commission’s view that IHRL may modify targeting rules, and the 
Goldstone Commission’s view that compliance with the principle of precautions should be 
assessed by reference to a due diligence standard. Russell Buchan argues that where a 
commission adopts a progressive interpretation, it should be “substantiated by clear legal 
reasoning and justified in light of previous decisions in alternative adjudicatory forums.”1746 
Darcy argues that “an overly creative approach which seeks to progress the law’s 
development”1747 could undermine the quality of commissions’ legal analysis and reduce their 
credibility. James Devaney argues that the Syria Commission’s ‘progressive’ interpretation of 
human rights obligations of armed groups could be seen as “attempting to extend the law to 
apply it to entities it was not intended to, and most crucially, to be doing so in a way that lacks 
rigor and legal justification”1748 and cautions that it might undermine the report’s legitimacy. 
If a commission’s interpretation departs from settled authority, it may produce a smaller 
‘normative ripple’, 1749  although its findings of violations may still build momentum for 
corrective action. In short, whether and how commissions may contribute to the incremental 
development of international law is shaped by their advocatory or adjudicative approach.  
Conclusions 
Commissions have interpreted and applied a wide array of international legal norms. Some 
legal areas, such as violations of economic, social and political rights and gender-based 
violence, have not been much adjudicated for several reasons, including practical challenges 
in building and bringing a case in respect of such violations, considerations of litigation 
strategy and cultural biases and assumptions. The inquiry context represents a dynamic new 
environment in which such norms can be affirmed, their content elaborated, and their 
                                                 
1743 Darcy, supra note 101, at 234; Buchan 2014, supra note 372, at 481. 
1744 Henderson 2014, supra note 100, at 294. 
1745 Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2007) at 301. See 
Koutroulis, supra note 1730, at 612. 
1746 Buchan 2017, supra note 101, at 282.  
1747 Darcy, supra note 101, at 256.  
1748 Devaney, supra note 1283, at 13.  
1749 Alvarez, supra note 1733, at 122.  
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violation censured. Commissions also assessed commonly adjudicated legal norms, including 
violations of civil and political rights, IHL violations amounting to war crimes and other 
species of international crimes. In respect of such norms, commissions add their voices to the 
existing cacophony, and their legal analysis is more likely to catalyse corrective action than to 
develop international law. 
Through the interpretation and application of legal norms, commissions tilt most directly 
away from politics and towards the realm of law. Classifying atrocities as violations channels 
follow-up action towards legal institutions and processes.1750 Yet there are also pragmatic 
aspects of this turn to international law. At a basic level, the invocation of international law 
has strategic value. Classifying atrocities as violations appeals to the “symbolic power”1751 of 
international law. Van den Herik observes that commissions use the language of international 
law “in a quest to make the facts more objective and to create political effects.”1752 Hellestveit 
sees their primary objective as to “move issues at the international level, influencing political 
processes”, 1753  and Richard Falk writes that the Goldstone Commission’s findings of 
violations were “influential with respect to world public opinion and help to mobilize 
solidarity initiatives in civil society”.1754  
Van den Herik observes that commissions “aim to stir, to evoke action, to opine and to 
condemn.”1755 These different functions call for different approaches to international law. A 
more adjudicative approach which borrows from judicial pedigree may be perceived as highly 
authoritative. Such an approach may boost the authority of findings and ward off critiques of 
unreliability or bias. In exchange, findings of violations may be truncated and not fully 
convey the scale or gravity of suspected atrocities. By contrast, from an advocatory 
perspective, prima facie findings of violations make a case for action but are vulnerable to 
rebuttal and channel attention towards violations which are more obviously justiciable. While 
plainly progressive legal interpretations may be deemed de lege ferenda, commissions may 
yet contribute to a groundswell in legal discourse with repercussions for normative 
development. These choices and tensions arising therefrom reflect the fact that commissions 
are poised between outlooks of advocacy and adjudication, suspended in a normative twilight 
zone between the realms of international law and politics. 
  
                                                 
1750 See Chapter Two, Section 6.1. 
1751 Ingo Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2012) at 59. 
1752 Van den Herik, supra note 74, at 30.  
1753 Hellestveit, supra note 20, at 369.  
1754 Falk, supra note 1007, at 85. 
1755 Van den Herik, supra note 74, at 30.  
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CHAPTER SIX  
 
TRANSLATING VIOLATIONS TO RESPONSIBILITY REGIMES  
IN AN ‘ERA OF ACCOUNTABILITY’ 
 
Introduction 
In 2010, citing developments in international criminal law, the UN Secretary-General 
heralded the birth of a new “age of accountability” and the demise of the “old era of 
impunity”.1756 The concept of accountability frequently appears in commissions’ mandates, 
often in the form of instructions to determine responsibilities, identify perpetrators and make 
recommendations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable. On 
account of the strong emphasis on accountability in contemporary inquiry practice, this 
Chapter zooms in on commissions’ roles and functions with respect to the concept of 
accountability, in light of the institutional and political contexts in which they operate.  
Chapter Six is organised as follows. Section 1 discusses how commissions understood 
different dimensions of the concept of accountability and the interplay with responsibility for 
violations of international law. Section 2 examines how commissions assessed responsibilities 
for violations of international law. Which actors were put in the spotlight, and to what extent 
did commissions engage with responsibility regimes? Section 3 discusses how commissions 
formulated accountability recommendations in light of their institutional features and 
constraints. Section 4 steps back to discuss commissions’ roles and functions with respect to 
different dimensions of accountability. Conclusions are then drawn as to commission’s roles 
and functions with respect to ensuring accountability for violations of international law.  
1. Dimensions of Accountability  
Commissions identified different dimensions of accountability and its relationship with legal 
responsibility. Commissions generally identified a duty to enforce legal responsibilities for 
violations in IHL and IHRL.1757 Some explained that accountability referred to a range of 
measures to enforce responsibility for violations, including but not limited to prosecutions. 
The Libya Commission wrote that accountability “incorporates various methods including 
criminal prosecutions, disciplinary measures, administrative procedures and victim 
compensation measures”1758 and should not be limited to prosecutions. Accountability may be 
sought via judicial and non-judicial means. Commissions also emphasised the need for 
responsibilities to be enforced in practice. For instance, the Sri Lanka Panel wrote that 
                                                 
1756 Secretary-General, ‘The Age of Accountability’, 27 May 2010, available at 
http://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/articles/2010-05-27/age-accountability (accessed 1 May 2018) and 
Secretary-General, ‘In ‘New Age of Accountability’, International Criminal Court, Security Council Can 
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1757 E.g., Gaza Report, supra note 766, para. 602.  
1758 Libya Second Report, supra note 853, para. 763.  
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assigning responsibility is an important but insufficient pre-condition for accountability, 
which attaches “consequences to individuals or institutions deemed responsible”.1759  
Some commissions recognised broader dimensions to accountability beyond enforcing 
responsibilities for specific violations. The Syria Commission wrote that a holistic approach 
to accountability was needed as “judicial measures alone do not suffice to sustainably address 
serious violations”1760 and that measures must be tailored towards “a sustainable culture of 
accountability and rule of law.”1761 In a different formulation, the Sri Lanka Panel wrote that 
accountability is “a broad process that addresses the political, legal and moral responsibility of 
individuals and institutions for past violations of human rights and dignity”.1762 The Panel 
identified non-legal dimensions of responsibility, which were to be addressed through the 
process of accountability. Recommendations in pursuit of aims such as durable peace and a 
culture of the rule of law are more political in nature and reflect key goals of transitional 
justice, defined by the UN as “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a 
society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure 
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.”1763  
Different dimensions of accountability have also been identified by other UN actors and 
scholars. The Secretary-General stated that as the R2P principle “encompasses legal, moral 
and political responsibilities, so too must our approach to accountability.”1764 Lisa Yarwood 
identifies legal, moral and political accountability on the part of states for internationally 
wrongful acts.1765 Ted Piccone proposes a similar typology of accountability in the inquiry 
context.1766 Piccone writes that legal’ accountability centres on prosecutions of international 
crimes; ‘moral’ accountability gives effect to the right to truth and ‘political’ accountability 
includes naming and shaming, lustration, targeted sanctions, memorialisation, compensation 
to victims, and guarantees of non-recurrence.1767 This typology indicates the interrelatedness 
of such dimensions, as several measures categorised by Piccone as ‘moral’ or ‘political’ in 
nature are recognised as legal remedies for violations. However, such typologies usefully 
illustrate the multifaceted nature of accountability. Having made these preliminary 
observations, the discussion turns to commissions’ engagement with responsibility regimes. 
                                                 
1759 Sri Lanka Report, supra note 29, para. 299.  
1760 Syria Fourth Report, supra note 1097, Annex XIV, at 127.  
1761 Ibid., at 128. See Syria First Report, supra note 32, para. 85. 
1762 Sri Lanka Report, supra note 29, para. 8.  
1763 Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice, March 2010, at 
4, available at http://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf (accessed 1 
May 2018) [Transitional Justice Guidance Note]. See Yasmin Sooka, ‘Dealing with the past and transitional 
justice: building peace through accountability’, (2006) 88(862) IRRC 311-325. 
1764 Report of the Secretary-General: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Accountability for Prevention, 
UN Doc. S/2017/556, 10 August 2017, para. 11 [Implementing R2P].  
1765 Lisa Yarwood, State Accountability under International Law: Holding States Accountable for a Breach of 
Jus Cogens Norms (Oxon: Routledge, 2011) at 159.  
1766 Ted Piccone, ‘U.N. human rights commissions of inquiry: The quest for accountability’, The Brookings 
Institution, December 2017, available at http://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/fp_20171208_un_human_rights_commisions_inquiry.pdf (accessed 1 May 2018). 
1767 Ibid., at 3-4.  
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2. Responsibility Under International Law  
Commissions have observed that international responsibilities of different actors may be 
triggered by the same incident.1768 For instance, the Gaza Flotilla Commission observed that 
“individual criminal liability and State responsibility may arise from the same act.” 1769 
Commissions framed responsibility assessments in light of their institutional setting. The non-
binding nature of their reports and low standard of proof of ‘reasonable basis to believe’1770 
meant that their findings were not final determinations but instead placed actors on notice of 
the need for corrective action. Commissions also disavowed a prosecutorial function.1771 For 
instance, the North Korea Commission was “neither a judicial body nor a prosecutor”;1772 
instead its findings of crimes against humanity would merit a criminal investigation. The CAR 
Commission observed that it “is not a judicial body but it views its work as a vital step 
towards encouraging and facilitating criminal investigations and prosecutions”. 1773 
Commissions embraced their mandates to assess responsibilities while distinguishing their 
work from judicial determination. This Section discusses commissions’ engagement with 
responsibilities of different actors, namely states (2.1), international organisations (2.2), 
collective non-state actors (2.3) and individuals (2.4). Some general observations in respect of 
commissions’ approaches to responsibility are then made (2.5).  
2.1 State responsibility  
Commissions generally paid significant attention to the responsibility of states for violating 
international law, reflecting the fact that these actors bear extensive obligations, especially 
towards populations under their jurisdiction. 1774 Not all commissions examined state 
responsibility; exceptions include inquiries focussing on individual criminal responsibility.1775 
This Section discusses how wide commissions cast their nets in scrutinising states’ actions 
(2.1.1) and their engagement with rules of attribution (2.1.2).  
2.1.1 Territorial and third states 
Commissions chiefly focussed on responsibilities of territorial states and states with a direct 
presence in situations of concern. Such presence could arise through occupation, such as the 
several inquiries into Israeli responsibility arising out of the occupation of Palestinian 
territories. States were also scrutinised where they participated in armed conflict. For instance, 
the Syria Commission examined responsibilities arising out of Russian and US military 
operations in the Syrian armed conflict. 1776  Erika de Wet argues that states’ invited 
participation in armed conflict may give rise to complicity liability where the inviting State is 
                                                 
1768 E.g., Libya Second Report, supra note 853, para. 326; Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 593; Sri Lanka 
Report, supra note 29, para. 191. 
1769 Gaza Flotilla Report, supra note 681, para. 47. 
1770 See Chapter Three, Section 4.3.  
1771 E.g., Sri Lanka Report, supra note 29, para. 260; CAR Report, supra note 32, para. 16; Timor-Leste Report, 
supra note 376, at 2. 
1772 North Korea Report, supra note 32, para. 1023.  
1773 CAR Report, supra note 32, para. 24, citing CAR Mandate, supra note 304.  
1774 E.g., Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 628. 
1775 E.g., Yugoslavia Mandate, supra note 290; Rwanda Mandate, supra note 296 and Cambodia Mandate, supra 
note 323. 
1776 E.g., Syria Fourteenth Report, supra note 982, para. 61; Report of the Independent International Commission 
of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. A/HRC/37/72, 1 February 2018, para. 31. 
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implicated in serious violations of IHL and IHRL.1777 Commissions have not yet considered 
this potential type of liability. 
Third states’ responsibilities for contributing to situations of atrocities have been addressed to 
varying extents. For instance, the North Korea Commission examined China’s practice of 
forcibly repatriating North Koreans, finding that China violated the principle of non-
refoulement.1778 Some commissions examined third states’ involvement in conflicts, but did 
not usually enter findings of responsibility. For instance, the Libya Commission observed that 
militias fighting the Gadhafi regime were believed to have received equipment from states 
including Qatar and France,1779 but did not discuss their responsibilities. Heller writes that it is 
surprising that the Commission did not assess whether those actions breached the Security 
Council’s arms embargo.1780 The Syria Commission also examined the role of third states, 
albeit to a limited extent. It found that several states had supplied weapons used to perpetrate 
violations1781 and identified an obligation not to do so when there was a risk of such use,1782 
but stopped short of finding responsibility. Instead, such matters were framed as 
recommendations to cease supplying arms in increasingly strong terms.1783 In 2013, the Syrian 
Government had critiqued the Commission’s lack of attention to states that “finance, arm, 
train and harbour”1784 terror groups. In response, the Commission noted that the Chair had 
criticised the supply of arms to the parties to the conflict;1785 however, those remarks did not 
mention other forms of support or financing.1786 Later, the Commission identified Jabhat Al-
Nusra and ISIS as parties to the conflict, observing that support for the latter was growing in 
terms of recruits and equipment.1787 However, it did not discuss whether states had provided 
such support, and framed other remarks as recommendations to curb the influence of 
extremist factions 1788  and prevent the financing of terrorism. 1789  In short, commissions 
referred to states’ ancillary involvement in situations of atrocities to some extent, but their 
focus usually remained on territorial states and states with some physical presence in 
situations of concern. 
It may be queried whether state responsibility may also arise in connection with obligations 
held erga omnes. The ILC Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
                                                 
1777  Erika de Wet, ‘Complicity in the Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law by Incumbent 
Governments through Direct Military Assistance on Request’, (2018) 67(2) ICLQ 287-313. 
1778 North Korea Report, supra note 32, para. 490.  
1779 Libya Second Report, supra note 853, para. 70. 
1780 Heller, supra note 96, at 46, citing SC Res. 1970 (2011), para. 9. 
1781 E.g., Syria Eighth Report, supra note 983, para. 139.  
1782 E.g., Syria Seventh Report, supra note 805, para. 153. 
1783 ‘Curb’: Syria Fourth Report, supra note 1097, para. 175(b); ‘restrict’: Syria Fifth Report, supra note 1046, 
para. 164(d); ‘stop’: Syria Sixth Report, supra note 1126, para. 203(c); Syria Seventh Report, supra note 805, 
para. 153; ‘refrain’: Syria Fourteenth Report, supra note 982, para. 90(a). 
1784 Syria note verbale 9 January 2013, supra note 1118, at 33. See Syria note verbale 21 December 2011, supra 
note 1109. 
1785 Syria note verbale 15 January 2013, supra note 1119, at 35. 
1786 ‘Statement by Paulo Pinheiro, Chair of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian 
Arab Republic, at the HRC 21st regular session’, 17 September 2012, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/Statement17September2012.pdf (accessed 
1 May 2018). 
1787 Syria Fifth Report, supra note 1046, para. 29.  
1788 Ibid., para. 164(d); Syria Sixth Report, supra note 1126, para. 203(d).  
1789 Syria Seventh Report, supra note 805, para. 153. 
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(Articles on State Responsibility) provide that serious breaches of peremptory norms 1790 
engender positive duties on the part of the international community of states to cooperate to 
lawfully bring them to an end and refuse to recognize situations arising out of such breaches 
as lawful. 1791  Commissions recognised the prohibitions of torture, genocide, and crimes 
against humanity as peremptory norms. 1792  They did not however assess potential 
responsibilities of third states for failing to bring such situations to an end. Instead, such 
matters were framed as ongoing obligations and addressed in recommendations.1793  
2.1.2 Attribution of conduct  
Commissions readily found that states could be responsible for violating international law. 
However, their extent of engagement with rules of state responsibility is another matter. The 
HRC’s Burundi Commission set out state responsibility rules in some detail1794 but most 
commissions only referred to them in passing, if at all. Where violations were carried out by 
de jure state organs such as the armed forces or government officials, commissions did not 
usually spell out the basis for responsibility. The Burundi Commission, Goldstone 
Commission and Gaza Flotilla Commission did expressly attribute the conduct of officials.1795 
Commissions examined questions of attribution more closely where violations were 
ostensibly carried out by non-state actors. For instance, the Darfur Commission considered 
whether violations by Janjaweed militias were attributable to Sudan. Where militias were 
incorporated into Sudan’s armed forces, the Commission found that they were state 
organs.1796 Where not incorporated, the Commission considered whether they were “acting on 
the instructions of, or under the direction or control”1797 of Sudan. In considering the requisite 
degree of control to attribute responsibility, the Darfur Commission cited the Tadić Appeal 
Judgment which requires an armed group to be under the state’s “overall control”, 1798 
entailing “a role in organising, coordinating or planning the [group’s] military actions”1799 
alongside other forms of support. On the facts, the Commission found that most Janjaweed 
attacks occurred with officials’ acquiescence and sometimes their participation;1800 and that 
the coordination of attacks showed “clear links” between them. 1801  The Commission’s 
preference for the ‘overall control’ test is perhaps not surprising given that its Chair endorsed 
this standard judicially at the ICTY1802 and extra-judicially.1803 It diverges from the ICJ’s 
                                                 
1790 VCLT, supra note 1180, Art. 53.  
1791 ILC, Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, GA Res. 56/83, 12 December 2001, 
Art. 41 [ARSIWA].  
1792 E.g., Yugoslavia Final Report, supra note 39, para. 107; Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 376; Goldstone 
Report, supra note 633, para. 1549; North Korea Report, supra note 32, para. 1195.  
1793 ARSIWA, supra note 1791, Art. 41(1) and (2). See, e.g., North Korea Report, supra note 32, footnote 1672 
and Israeli Settlements Report, supra note 572, para. 116.  
1794 HRC Burundi Detailed Report, supra note 405, paras. 66-72.  
1795 Ibid., para. 203; Goldstone Report, supra note 633, para. 814; Gaza Flotilla Report, supra note 681, para. 46.  
1796 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 124; see ARSIWA, supra note 1791, Art. 4. 
1797 ARSIWA, supra note 1791, Art. 8.  
1798 Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 1289, para. 120. The Commission’s reasoning is not entirely clear; it 
wrote that when militias attacked with the Sudanese army they were under its “effective control” but cited 
Tadić: Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 125. 
1799 Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 1289, para. 137. 
1800 Darfur Report, supra note 32, paras. 125 and 302-303. 
1801 Ibid., para. 111. 
1802 Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 1289. 
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more rigorous tests of acting pursuant to a state’s ‘specific instructions’ or under its ‘complete 
dependence’ or ‘effective control’.1804 If the ICJ’s standards were applied, it is unlikely that 
the Janjaweed’s actions would be attributable to Sudan. By contrast, the HRC’s Burundi 
Commission adopted the ICJ’s standards of ‘effective control’ and ‘total dependence’ when 
assessing whether violations by the Imbonerakure (youth wing of the ruling political party) 
could be attributed to Burundi,1805 and found that these standards were met on the facts.1806 
The Commission also found Burundi responsible for violations by Imbonerakure members by 
adopting their conduct as its own.1807 
Some commissions attributed armed groups’ conduct to states without explaining the basis of 
attribution. For instance, the Guinea Commission found evidence of a coordinated attack 
against protestors by security forces, military police and militias,1808  and concluded that 
Guinea was also responsible for violations by militias who “cooperated”1809 with security 
forces. The Syria Commission wrote that although the Shabbiha militia’s structure was 
opaque, its members “acted with the acquiescence of, in concert with or at the behest of 
Government forces”.1810 Neither inquiry cited legal standards for attribution. Coordination and 
cooperation might amount to overall control but would not likely satisfy the effective control 
standard. 
2.2 Responsibility of international organisations 
International organisations may also be responsible for internationally wrongful acts. 1811 
Commissions frequently directed recommendations to international organisations but rarely 
assessed their legal responsibilities. Notably, an inquiry by the Secretary-General into the 
UN’s actions in respect of the Rwandan genocide 1812  recommended that the UN 
“acknowledge its part of the responsibility for not having done more to prevent or stop the 
genocide”1813 but did not identify legal liability, and also used the term ‘responsibility’ in a 
moral sense.1814 
Some commissions examined the actions of multinational forces, particularly when acting as 
parties to the conflict. As discussed in Chapter Four, UN atrocity inquiries identified that 
                                                                                                                                                         
1803 Antonio Cassese, ‘The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in 
Bosnia’, (2007) 18(4) EJIL 649-668. 
1804 Bosnia Genocide Case, supra note 1289, paras. 392 and 400; Nicaragua Case, supra note 1352, paras. 110 
and 115; ILC, Commentary to Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1, at 47-48 [ARSIWA Commentary] and Marko Milanovic, ‘State 
Responsibility for Genocide’, (2006) 17 EJIL 553-604, at 585. 
1805 HRC Burundi Detailed Report, supra note 405, para. 208.  
1806 Ibid., paras. 209-219. 
1807 Ibid., paras. 220-221. 
1808 Guinea Report, supra note 39, paras. 183, 192, 200 and 222.  
1809 Ibid., para. 201.  
1810 Syria Third Report, supra note 564, para. 133.  
1811 Reparation for Injuries Opinion, supra note 198, at 174 and DARIO, supra note 14. See Rosalyn Higgins, 
Philippa Webb, Dapo Akande, Sandesh Sivakumaran and James Sloan (eds), ‘Responsibility of the United 
Nations’, in Oppenheim's International Law: United Nations (Oxford: OUP, 2017) 429-451. 
1812 UN Rwanda Mandate, supra note 375.  
1813 Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in 
Rwanda, UN Doc. S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999, Recommendation 14.  
1814 Ibid., at 37. 
193 
 
these actors must abide by customary IHL when engaged in hostilities. 1815  The CAR 
Commission examined the responsibility of UN forces for violations during peacekeeping 
operations, and specifically discussed IHRL violations by national contingents of Chad and 
the Republic of Congo. Its creative accountability recommendations in respect of these actors 
are discussed in Section 3. Other commissions examined the conduct of multinational forces 
but did not make findings of responsibility, such as the Libya Commission’s investigation of 
NATO’s air campaign in Libya. NATO opposed that line of inquiry, arguing first that the 
Commission’s mandate was limited to IHRL violations1816 and later that the Commission’s 
examination of the parties to the conflict should not include NATO.1817  Nonetheless, the 
Commission did investigate, finding that some NATO attacks caused civilian casualties where 
targets “showed no evidence of military utility”.1818 However, it did not feel able to draw 
conclusions on the basis of information provided by NATO.1819 Nor did it make findings of 
responsibility; its recommendation for compensation was based on NATO guidelines for 
payments provided “without reference to the question of legal liability.”1820 Heller remarks 
that the Commission’s assessment of NATO’s responsibility was “remarkably conservative” 
and ventures that “although it did not prevent the Commission from expanding its mandate, 
NATO’s pressure on the Commission to downplay potential violations of IHL was at least 
partially successful.”1821 
2.3 Responsibility of collective non-state actors 
Although state responsibility dominated discussion in inquiry reports, commissions 
occasionally considered responsibilities of collective non-state actors, namely organised 
armed groups (2.3.1) and corporations (2.3.2).  
2.3.1 Organised armed groups 
The international legal rules deemed by commissions as applicable to organised armed groups 
were traversed in Chapter Four. To recap, commissions recognised that these actors have IHL 
obligations when acting as parties to armed conflict1822 and considered whether they might 
bear human rights obligations. While most commissions did not consider that armed groups 
held treaty-based obligations, some identified customary obligations where groups exercised 
effective control over territory.1823 In determining whether armed groups could be collectively 
responsible, commissions examined their structure and organisation. For instance, the Darfur 
Commission wrote that rebel groups had “a certain threshold of organization, stability and 
effective control of territory, [to] possess international legal personality”1824 so as to be bound 
by IHL. Due to operational difficulties, the HRC’s Burundi Commission could not determine 
                                                 
1815 CAR Report, supra note 32, paras. 568-569; Libya Second Report, supra note 853, para. 613. 
1816 NATO letter 23 January 2012, supra note 1527. NATO reiterated its concerns in NATO letter 15 February 
2012, supra note 997, at 1. 
1817 NATO letter 15 February 2012, supra note 997, at 1. 
1818 Libya Second Report, supra note 853, para. 812.  
1819 Ibid., para. 812.  
1820 Ibid., para. 130(b), citing NATO, Non-Binding Guidelines for Payments in Combat-Related Cases of Civilian 
Casualties or Damage to Civilian Property (2010), Guideline 9 [NATO Guidelines].  
1821 Heller, supra note 96,at 50.  
1822 See Chapter Four, Section 3.2. 
1823 See Chapter Four, Section 2.4. 
1824 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 172. 
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whether the Imbonerakure was sufficiently organised so as to attract collective responsibility 
but signalled the legal relevance of this issue.1825 
Commissions did not identify specific rules of responsibility applicable to armed groups. For 
instance, the Libya Commission observed that thuwar militias had human rights 
obligations1826 but also that “liability for violations generally attaches to state parties rather 
than non-state entities such as the thuwar.” 1827  The Commission seemed to disconnect 
substantive obligations from their enforceability. Indeed, the ICRC writes that because armed 
groups must respect IHL it can be argued that they incur responsibility, yet “the consequences 
of such responsibility are not clear.”1828  The extent to which commissions engaged with 
enforcement action in respect of such actors is discussed in Section 3. 
2.3.2 Corporations 
There is emerging recognition of international rights and duties on the part of corporations.1829 
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Ruggie Principles) recognise 
corporate responsibility to respect certain human rights1830 but note that this responsibility is 
“distinct from issues of legal liability and enforcement, which remain defined largely by 
national law”.1831 The potential liability of such actors is recognised in the UN’s Principles on 
the Right to a Remedy.1832  However, commissions have not identified international legal 
obligations for business enterprises. The Israeli Settlements Commission referred to the 
Ruggie Principles but did not address their legal status.1833 
Commissions occasionally found that transnational corporations and private enterprises 
contributed to situations of violations. For instance, the Eritrea Commission acknowledged 
the importance of private enterprises in supporting that authoritarian regime. 1834  The Sri 
Lanka Panel observed that the Tamil Tigers engaged in “mafia style tactics abroad” to 
generate funds, including using private businesses as front organisations.1835 Having found 
that Israeli settlements in Palestinian territories were illegal, 1836  the Israeli Settlements 
Commission wrote that businesses “enabled, facilitated and profited from the construction and 
growth of the settlements”1837 by providing supplies and services in “full knowledge of the 
                                                 
1825 HRC Burundi Detailed Report, supra note 405, paras. 224-226.  
1826 Libya Second Report, supra note 853, para. 18. 
1827 Ibid., para. 261.  
1828 ICRC Customary IHL Study, supra note 1298, Rule 149.  
1829 E.g., José Alvarez, ‘Are Corporations Subjects of International Law?’, (2011) 9 Santa Clara J Int'l L 1-36 and 
Larissa van den Herik and Jernej Letnar Černič, ‘Regulating Corporations under International Law: From 
Human Rights to International Criminal Law and Back Again’, (2010) 8(3) JICJ 725-743. 
1830 OHCHR, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, UN Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011) [Ruggie 
Principles]. See Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011, 
Principle 12. 
1831 Ruggie Principles, supra note 1830, Commentary to Principle 12.  
1832 Principles on the Right to a Remedy, supra note 540, Principle 15.  
1833 Israeli Settlements Report, supra note 572, para. 117.  
1834 Eritrea Second Report, supra note 569, paras. 154 and 234.  
1835 Sri Lanka Report, supra note 29, para. 419. 
1836 Israeli Settlements Report, supra note 572, para. 104.  
1837 Ibid., para. 96.  
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current situation and the related liability risks”. 1838  While not assigning international 
responsibility to these actors, commissions addressed their conduct through recommendations. 
These proposals are discussed in Section 3. 
2.4 Individual responsibility  
Individuals may bear responsibility for certain conduct prohibited under international law. 
Commissions recognised that individuals may bear international criminal responsibility, with 
some inquiries focussing strongly on individual responsibility for violations.1839 In making 
these assessments, commissions pointed out that they were not exercising a prosecutorial or 
judicial function.1840 Some authors suggest that individuals might also bear international civil 
liability. 1841  This possibility was left open in the ILC’s Commentary on state 
responsibility, 1842  and civil liability for international legal violations is possible in some 
domestic jurisdictions.1843  While non-penal consequences such as reparations may follow 
conviction for international crimes in some jurisdictions, 1844  whether individuals have 
international civil obligations is a different matter.1845 As commissions have not discussed 
civil liability,1846 this Section focuses on criminal responsibility. It discusses commissions’ 
engagement with elements of ICL (2.4.1) and the issue of identification of suspected 
perpetrators (2.4.2). 
2.4.1 Engagement with international criminal law 
Commissions readily accepted that individuals may be responsible for international 
crimes.1847 When assessing such responsibility, commissions engaged with elements of ICL to 
differing extents. At one end of the spectrum, some commissions referred to criminal 
responsibility in a general way, without identifying specific crimes. 1848  For instance, the 
                                                 
1838 Israeli Settlements Report, supra note 572, para. 97. 
1839 E.g., Rwanda Final Report, supra note 297, para. 3. 
1840 E.g., Sri Lanka Report, supra note 29, para. 260; Guinea Report, supra note 39, para. 180; CAR Report, 
supra note 32, para. 16 and North Korea Report, supra note 32, para. 1023. 
1841 E.g., Andrew Clapham, ‘The Role of the Individual in International Law’, (2010) 21(1) EJIL 25-30, at 30 
and Anne Peters, Beyond Human Rights: The Legal Status of the Individual in International Law 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2016) at 152. 
1842 ARSIWA Commentary, supra note 1804, at 142.  
1843 E.g., UNTAET Regulations provide for civil proceedings based on suspected crimes: UNTAET Regulation 
No. 2000/30 on Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedure, UN Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/30, 25 September 
2000, ss. 49(1) and 49(2). The Alien Tort Statute 28 USC § 1350 (US) provides a tortious cause of action for 
violations of international law. 
1844 E.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1033, Art. 75.  
1845 Some authors use the term ‘individual civil responsibility’ to refer to consequences beyond imprisonment for 
international crimes, such as reparations orders: e.g., Friedrich Rosenfeld, ‘Individual Civil Responsibility for 
the Crime of Aggression’, (2012) 10(1) JICJ 249-265. This Study views reparations ordered on the basis of a 
criminal conviction as part of criminal responsibility, as the order stems from a breach of penal law. 
1846 Rosenfeld argues that the Darfur Commission alluded to individual civil liability: Rosenfeld, supra, footnote 
24, citing Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 600. The Commission identified a collective responsibility of 
‘international non-state entities’ to pay compensation and a trend towards recognising victims’ rights to 
compensation “from the individual who caused his or her injury”: para. 175 and footnote 217. The authorities 
cited therein recognised individual liability for reparations arising out of criminal conviction: Letter dated 12 
October 2000 from the President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia addressed to the 
Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2000/1063, 3 November 2000, para. 20. 
1847 E.g., Syria Third Report, supra note 564, Annex II, para. 27 and Rwanda Final Report, supra note 297, 
paras. 169-171. 
1848 E.g., UNCHR Gaza Report, supra note 536, para. 119.  
196 
 
Israeli Settlements Commission stated that the transfer of Israeli citizens into Palestine was 
“prohibited under [IHL] and [ICL]”.1849 Some commissions went slightly further, identifying 
species of crimes without classifying specific incidents. For instance, the Gaza Flotilla 
Commission found that Israeli forces’ violations of IHL, including wilful killing and torture, 
were “within the terms of article 147 of [Geneva Convention IV]”. 1850  The Lebanon 
Commission identified species of war crimes and “violations of a number of core human 
rights”1851 as giving rise to criminal responsibility. That approach did not discuss differences 
between underlying violations and crimes, such as the need for criminal intent. 
Further along the continuum, some commissions identified different elements of international 
crimes.1852 The commissions on Libya and Syria quoted from the ICC’s Elements of Crimes 
when assessing murder as a war crime and a crime against humanity.1853  The Goldstone 
Commission wrote that objective elements were established in respect of all its findings of 
criminal responsibility, and that it could determine whether mens rea was satisfied in almost 
all cases.1854 Most commissions identified knowledge and intent as required mens rea,1855 but 
a few considered advertent recklessness as sufficient in custom.1856 Commissions generally 
gave more attention to subjective elements of crimes requiring dolus specialis.1857 
Some commissions also acknowledged modes of liability but did not always apply them to 
specific incidents. Superior responsibility was frequently identified,1858 reflecting its relevance 
in situations of mass atrocities where crimes were committed through collective entities and 
structures.1859 Some commissions limited their discussion to superior responsibility1860 or only 
briefly alluded to other modes of liability. For instance, the Syria Commission wrote that in 
addition to direct commission, “those who order these crimes to be committed (or plan, 
instigate, incite, aid or abet) are also liable.”1861  It did not analyse modes of liability in 
connection with specific incidents. The Sri Lanka Panel also identified different modes of 
liability 1862  but did simply stated that leaders were responsible “under these forms of 
liability.”1863 The Cambodia Commission took a similar approach, reasoning that its mandate 
was to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to justify bringing Khmer Rouge 
                                                 
1849 Israeli Settlements Report, supra note 572, para. 38. 
1850 Gaza Flotilla Report, supra note 681, para. 182. 
1851 Lebanon Report, supra note 855, para. 347.  
1852 E.g., Guinea Report, supra note 39, paras. 180, 197 and 213-214; HRC Burundi Detailed Report, supra note 
405, para. 672.  
1853 Libya Second Report, supra note 853, paras. 140-142; Syria Third Report, supra note 564, Annex II, para. 
33.  
1854 Goldstone Report, supra note 633, para. 172. 
1855 E.g., Syria Third Report, supra note 564, para. 135; North Korea Report, supra note 32, para. 1042; Libya 
Second Report, supra note 853, footnote 176.  
1856 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 180 and 541; Goldstone Report, supra note 633, para. 172; Sri Lanka 
Report, supra note 29, paras. 197, 198 and 251(a) contra North Korea Report, supra note 32, paras. 1029 and 
118, and footnotes 1544 and 1558. 
1857 E.g., Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 180 (genocide), and Libya Second Report, supra note 853, para. 
385 (persecution as a crime against humanity). 
1858 E.g., Rwanda Interim Report, supra note 298, para. 124; Cambodia Report, supra note 324, para. 81. 
1859 Darryl Robinson, ‘How Command Responsibility Got So Complicated: A Culpability Contradiction, its 
Obfuscation, and a Simple Solution’, (2013) 13 MJIL 1-58. 
1860 E.g., Yugoslavia Final Report, supra note 39, paras. 55-58; Libya Second Report, supra note 853, para. 95.  
1861 Syria Third Report, supra note 564, para. 135.  
1862 Sri Lanka Report, supra note 29, para. 253.  
1863 Ibid., para. 255.  
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leaders to trial rather than reviewing “evidence to make judgements regarding the 
involvement of particular individuals”.1864 By contrast, the Eritrea Commission indicated that 
it examined modes of liability when drawing up a confidential list of suspects.1865  
Commissions’ more abridged engagement with ICL stands in contrast to the approach taken 
by the Darfur Commission, which perhaps reflects the high-water mark in terms of ICL 
analysis by commissions of inquiry. The Commission wrote, “[t]o render any discussion on 
perpetrators intelligible, two legal tools are necessary: the categories of crimes for which they 
may be suspected to be responsible, and the enumeration of the various modes of participation 
in international crimes under which the various persons may be suspected of bearing 
responsibility.”1866 It analysed elements of crimes and modes of liability in detail, specifying 
the number of state officials and members of armed groups it deemed responsible for 
international crimes pursuant to different modes of liability.1867 Frulli writes that the Darfur 
Commission was a “watershed for prosecution oriented fact-finding”.1868 
Defences and mitigating circumstances were generally considered by earlier inquiries, 
particularly those on Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Cambodia. These commissions discussed 
superior orders as a defence or mitigating circumstance,1869 duress, mistake of fact,1870 mental 
defect, and self-defence.1871 The Yugoslavia Commission found that superior orders did not 
appear to be available on the facts but reiterated that individual cases “will have to be judged 
on their respective merits in accordance with the statute of the [ICTY].”1872 The Cambodia 
Commission considered that the defence of mistake of law could not apply to “crimes that are 
so patently atrocious that such ignorance is never an excuse.”1873 More recent commissions 
considered the availability of certain defences, such as the Goldstone Commission’s view that 
targeting errors could give rise to a mistake of fact which would negate the intent required for 
wilful killing.1874 The Libya Commission did not consider defences at length, but noted that 
superior orders was not available for international crimes.1875 The Guinea Commission stated 
that there could be no legal justification for acts of violence by Guinean security forces.1876  
In examining criminal responsibility, commissions had limited engagement with principles of 
criminal law. They acknowledged the high standard of proof of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ 
necessary to secure criminal conviction and contrasted this with their lower standard of proof 
of ‘reasonable grounds to believe’.1877 Some commissions acknowledged the presumption of 
                                                 
1864 Cambodia Report, supra note 324, para. 50. See also para. 80. 
1865 Eritrea Second Report, supra note 569, para. 332.  
1866 Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 530.  
1867 Ibid., paras. 7, 123, 125, 533-557, and 558-564. 
1868 Frulli, supra note 102, at 1330.  
1869 Yugoslavia Final Report, supra note 39, para. 61 (as a defence); Rwanda Final Report, supra note 297, para. 
175 and Cambodia Report, supra note 324, paras. 82-83 (as a mitigating circumstance). 
1870 Rwanda Final Report, supra note 297, para. 176. 
1871 Cambodia Report, supra note 324, para. 82. 
1872 Yugoslavia Final Report, supra note 39, para. 318.  
1873 Cambodia Report, supra note 324, para. 83. 
1874 Goldstone Report, supra note 633, para. 861.  
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innocence1878 and were concerned that their findings should not prejudice the fairness of 
future trials, in recognition of the rights of the accused.1879 These principles are discussed 
further in Section 2.4.2, as they were also taken into account in deciding whether to identify 
suspects. By contrast, few commissions invoked the principle of legality. The Cambodia 
Commission is an exception; it identified legality as fundamental to criminal responsibility, 
writing, “[a]s affirmed at Nuremberg, leaders would be held to have known of the criminality 
of their acts vis-à-vis earlier Cambodian law or international law. These legal factors are 
relevant to our recommendations below regarding the appropriate targets of inquiry for any 
court.”1880 The Eritrea Commission also cited the nullum crimen sine lege principle when 
considering whether the crime against humanity of enforced disappearance existed prior to the 
Rome Statute. 1881  No commission invoked the principle of strict construction; however 
commissions did not generally refer to principles of interpretation, so such an omission is not 
unusual. 1882  Considering the frequency with which commissions made findings of 
international crimes, it is perhaps surprising that principles of criminal law were not referred 
to more often. However, such engagement might invite perceptions that inquiries are de facto 
criminal investigations.  
2.4.2 Identification of suspected perpetrators  
In evaluating responsibility for international crimes, UN atrocity inquiries considered whether 
to publicly identify suspected perpetrators.1883 Many commissions were expressly mandated 
to identify perpetrators in pursuit of accountability. 1884  This function is not limited to 
commissions. In the truth commission context, ‘naming names’ has been seen as a truth-
telling and accountability measure.1885  For instance, the El Salvadorian truth commission 
determined that “the whole truth cannot be told without naming names”.1886 The Principles 
Against Impunity foresee the ‘naming of names’, providing that before truth commissions or 
commissions of inquiry do so, they must corroborate information and afford an opportunity 
for a right of reply.1887 These stipulations reflect the fact that public naming can have serious 
                                                 
1878 Goldstone Report, supra note 633, para. 25 and HRC Burundi Detailed Report, supra note 405, para. 705.  
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1880 Cambodia Report, supra note 324, para. 83.  
1881 Eritrea Second Report, supra note 569, para. 250.  
1882 A few commissions cited principles of interpretation when interpreting the Genocide Convention: Yugoslavia 
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Darfur Report, supra note 32, para. 494. 
1883 Catherine Harwood and Carsten Stahn, ‘What’s the Point of ‘Naming Names’ in International Inquiry? 
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1884 E.g., Guinea Mandate, supra note 311; Libya Mandate, supra note 343; Syria Mandate, supra note 47; HRC 
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Social Inquiry 79-116, at 105. 
1886 From Madness to Hope: the 12-year War in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El 
Salvador, 1993, at 18, available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/ElSalvador-Report.pdf 
(accessed 1 May 2018). 
1887 Principles Against Impunity, supra note 54, Principle 9. See Alison Bisset, ‘Principle 9. Guarantees for 
Persons Implicated’, in Frank Haldemann and Thomas Unger (eds), The United Nations Principles to Combat 
Impunity: A Commentary (Oxford: OUP, 2018) 123-128. 
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negative consequences; “[w]hile public identification is neither a criminal sanction nor a civil 
one, it can have negative effects on the reputation, career, and political prospects of 
individuals.” 1888  Proponents advocate that a truth commission should identify suspected 
perpetrators, particularly where judicial accountability is unlikely, while critics argue that 
such practices threaten due process.1889 Public identification has also occurred in the context 
of UN sanctions. Individuals suspected of being responsible for violations of IHL and IHRL 
have also been publicly identified by some expert groups assisting UN sanctions 
committees.1890 In 2015, a high-level review of UN sanctions recommended that the names of 
individuals suspected of breaching sanctions or proposed for listing by expert groups should 
be conveyed in confidence and should not be included in public reports.1891 
In the inquiry context, Grace observes that commissions have “differently weighed the aims 
of the mandate; the due process rights of the accused and the interests of victims, witnesses 
and the overall affected community.” 1892  Interviews by HPCR indicate that fact-finding 
practitioners are also concerned about concrete consequences for named individuals.1893 These 
considerations led to diverse inquiry practice relating to the identification of individuals.  
At one end of the spectrum, a handful of commissions publicly identified individuals 
suspected of committing international crimes. The commissions on Libya and Côte d’Ivoire 
kept most individuals’ names off the face of their public reports but did identify certain 
leaders by name.1894  The Timor-Leste Commission publicly identified several individuals 
reasonably suspected of committing crimes under domestic law.1895 The Guinea Commission 
identified three leaders, including the President, as suspected perpetrators but clarified that 
their involvement should be judicially examined; 1896  and six others whose involvement 
warranted further investigation.1897 The Commission’s decision to publicly name high-level 
suspects arguably made it easier to scrutinise whether Guinean authorities were investigating 
those ‘most responsible’, which in turn assisted the ICC Prosecutor’s preliminary examination 
into Guinea. The ICC Prosecutor reported that the indictment of several named individuals 
indicated Guinea’s genuine intention to prosecute those most responsible.1898  
At the other end of the spectrum, some commissions did not identify suspected perpetrators 
either publicly or confidentially. For instance, the Sri Lanka Panel wrote that its mandate 
excluded individual liability and that further investigation would be required to identify those 
                                                 
1888 Popkin and Roht-Arriaza, supra note 1885, at 105. 
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responsible and assess mens rea.1899 Some commissions linked their decision not to identify 
individuals with the presumption of innocence and their low standard of proof. 1900  For 
instance, the Gaza Commission wrote that “[a]s the ‘reasonable ground’ threshold is lower 
than the standard required in criminal trials, the commission does not make any conclusions 
with regard to the responsibility of specific individuals”.1901  
In an intermediate approach, several commissions identified suspects confidentially in 
documents handed to the High Commissioner for Human Rights or the Secretary-General, 
depending on the mandating authority, 1902  for use by competent authorities. These 
commissions favoured confidentiality to protect the presumption of innocence, safeguard due 
process and protect witnesses and victims. 1903  The Syria Commission adopted this 
intermediate approach because it deemed its methodology as not meeting “normal 
requirements of due process”.1904 However, after investigating for four years, the Commission 
signalled a potential change, writing that “not to publish names at this juncture… would be to 
reinforce the impunity that the Commission was mandated to combat.”1905 The Commission 
wrote that it should interpret its mandate to give effect to the right to truth and that “putting 
alleged perpetrators on notice will serve to maximize the potential deterrent effect”.1906 At the 
time of writing, the Commission had not published such information, but had shared 
information with states willing to exercise national jurisdiction over crimes committed in 
Syria.1907 The Commission also signalled its readiness to share information with states willing 
to exercise universal jurisdiction over suspected perpetrators. 1908  The Commission shares 
information with the IIIM, which will in turn share information with competent authorities.1909 
Some commissions drew up simple lists of suspects 1910  while others compiled files of 
evidence against individuals.1911 Some commissions also established databases of crime base 
information which could be transferred to competent authorities. For instance, the Yugoslavia 
Commission created a database of war crimes which was transferred to ICTY’s Office of the 
Prosecutor.1912 The CAR Commission likewise compiled a database of all known incidents of 
human rights and IHL violations1913 which was submitted to the Secretary-General along with 
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a list of suspects. 1914  The Syria Commission deposited with the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights “a comprehensive database containing all evidence” 1915  which may be 
disclosed to competent authorities.  
Another approach which may indirectly identify individuals, especially those in leadership 
positions, is to name military units or state institutions implicated in serious violations.1916 For 
instance, the Darfur Commission identified military groups which should be criminally 
investigated. 1917  The North Korea Commission identified state institutions implicated in 
crimes against humanity.1918 The South Sudan Commission identified individuals by military 
rank, though not by name. 1919  Some commissions additionally wrote to heads of state, 
warning of their potential responsibilities for international crimes, including on the basis of 
superior responsibility.1920 Such letters have more than symbolic value. By publicly placing 
individuals in leadership positions on notice, they might evince their knowledge of 
international crimes and their ongoing failure to prevent and punish them, relevant to superior 
responsibility.1921 
2.5 Concluding observations 
Commissions engaged with responsibility regimes to differing extents with respect different 
types of actors. They focussed on the responsibilities of states, organised armed groups, and 
individuals. We also see some selectivity with respect to which states were under scrutiny. 
States with territorial jurisdiction or effective control over situations of concern received the 
lion’s share of attention. Commissions did have some regard to third states’ involvement in 
situations of atrocities but did not always frame them as violations attracting responsibility. 
This was particularly the case for states’ provision of arms and other forms of support to 
armed groups. While such actions might violate the principle of non-intervention, 1922 
commissions did not usually invoke this norm. The focus on concerned states corresponds to 
the mandating authority’s intention to limit scrutiny to the situation of immediate concern. For 
instance, in observing that the Libya Commission focussed on the actions of Libya rather than 
other states, Heller writes:1923 
The [HRC] created the Commission to focus on the crimes of the Qadhafi government, 
and that is exactly what it did – even if not with the single-minded focus that the 
Council intended. That partiality in no way discredits the Commission’s work; its 
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reports provide the most detailed and compelling account of the Libyan conflict to date. 
But it serves as a stark reminder that even the most seemingly independent and impartial 
international commission of inquiry can never escape politics completely. 
Commissions generally gave less attention to responsibilities of international organisations 
and corporate entities. This difference in focus perhaps reflects the more truncated or 
nebulous normative framework governing those entities, and a lack of mechanisms available 
to enforce those obligations. Commissions have however addressed these actors in 
recommendations.  
Almost all commissions examined international crimes to some extent, with a few inquiries 
exclusively focussing on individual responsibility. There was significant variance in 
commissions’ engagement with different aspects of the ICL framework. Some identified 
species of crimes while others went further to identify contextual elements, elements of 
crimes, modes of liability and even defences. Such details distinguish criminal responsibility 
from other responsibility regimes. It may be queried to what extent is it useful for 
commissions to assess these more detailed elements, especially where perpetrators are 
unknown. As recognised by many commissions, their mandate is not to conclusively 
determine criminal liability. To carry out detailed assessments might duplicate or even 
contradict the work of a judicial body. Yet to omit these details might wrongly imply that 
international crimes are conceptually identical to serious violations of IHL or IHRL. It might 
be beneficial for commissions to acknowledge elements of criminal responsibility and 
articulate the extent to which they were assessed when reaching findings of crimes. Such an 
approach is reflected where commissions assessed objective elements and recalled that mens 
rea would also need to be satisfied to attach criminal responsibility and where they identified 
potential modes of liability. Such approaches have synergies with the authorization of 
investigations at the ICC. The Pre-Trial Chamber must be satisfied that there is “a reasonable 
basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being 
committed”.1924 When authorising investigations, Pre-Trial Chambers have decided that in 
light of the stage of the proceedings and because there was no suspect before the Court, they 
could not assess the mental elements, and focused on the physical elements of crimes against 
humanity. 1925  Such an approach might similarly allow commissions to make findings in 
respect of the relevant crime base while articulating the complexity of the ICL framework.  
Commissions took different views as to whether to publicly name suspected perpetrators. 
Potential benefits include upholding a moral dimension to accountability, especially where 
legal avenues for prosecution appear elusive; or alternatively guiding the focus of criminal 
proceedings before the ICC or pursuant to universal jurisdiction. There may even be some 
deterrent value, should public naming become a standard practice of UN atrocity inquires. 
However, commissions frequently positioned their findings of responsibility as part of a 
broader accountability process. Viewed in this light, contemporary commissions’ practice of 
publicly identifying implicated institutions and listing suspects confidentially strikes a balance 
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in respect of different interests, including denunciation, assistance to future accountability 
mechanisms, and concerns around procedural fairness and witness protection.  
3. Accountability Recommendations  
This Section discusses different accountability measures recommended by commissions, 
namely prosecutions of international crimes (3.1), restitution and compensation (3.2), truth-
seeking (3.3), other measures of satisfaction (3.4) and guarantees of non-repetition (3.5). This 
structure loosely reflects the categories of remedies for serious violations of IHRL and IHL 
reflected in the General Assembly’s Principles on the Right to a Remedy. This structure was 
chosen in light of commissions’ frequent invocation of this instrument; the immediate 
relevance of enumerated remedies for the harms at issue; and the fact that the Principles 
depart in key respects from the general reparations regime articulated in the Articles on State 
Responsibility. This Section concludes by offering general observations as to commissions’ 
approaches in respect of recommending accountability measures and mechanisms (3.6). 
3.1 Prosecutions of international crimes 
Commissions identified a duty under customary international law for states to investigate and 
prosecute international crimes. 1926  The North Korea Commission depicted the duty to 
prosecute crimes against humanity as a peremptory norm.1927 Some commissions linked the 
duty to investigate and prosecute with the right to a remedy and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
(R2P) principle, which is elaborated upon in Section 3.4. 1928  Commissions depicted 
prosecutions of international crimes as imperative to foster compliance with international law. 
Some commissions also linked prosecutions with general deterrence of violations.1929 The 
Darfur Commission wrote that determining criminal responsibility “is a critical aspect of the 
enforceability of rights and of protection against their violation.”1930 Most recommendations 
to prosecute were directed at states or UN bodies which could establish criminal justice 
mechanisms, notably the Security Council. A few commissions also identified an obligation to 
investigate and prosecute on the part of non-state actors with government-like functions.1931  
Commissions consistently rejected claims that criminal justice might endanger reconciliation 
or peace-building, arguing that reconciliation “can never be achieved without truth and 
justice”.1932  The South Sudan Commission remarked that some voices calling for peace-
building to take precedence hoped that justice would be prevented, rather than delayed.1933 
Commissions opposed the use of amnesties for international crimes as part of peace 
negotiations or truth-seeking processes.1934 However, they took different views as to whether 
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prosecutions should be comprehensive or selective. The CAR Commission considered that 
impunity would not be avoided by prosecuting a “handful of perpetrators”; rather, as many as 
possible should be prosecuted.1935 By contrast, the Cambodia Commission considered that 
because “a reopening of the events through criminal trials on a massive scale” would impede 
reconciliation,1936 prosecutions should only be pursued against those “most responsible”.1937  
Rather than simply advocating that international crimes be prosecuted, many commissions 
also suggested appropriate venues, taking into account the needs of concerned states, 
community interests, costs, and feasibility. For instance, while recognising benefits of local 
trials, such as access to evidence and responsiveness to the needs of local communities, the 
Rwanda Commission favoured an international tribunal to guarantee independence and 
impartiality in light of the emotionally and politically-charged nature of the crimes and 
because their gravity was of concern to the international community as a whole.1938  The 
Cambodia Commission also opposed local trials due to security concerns and corruption.1939 It 
recommended that an ad hoc tribunal be established by the Security Council or the General 
Assembly.1940  
After the Rome Statute’s entry into force, several commissions recommended the ICC as a 
venue, with jurisdiction to be triggered by the Security Council if necessary.1941 For instance, 
the Darfur Commission preferred the ICC as the most appropriate venue due to the nature of 
the crimes, the authority of suspected perpetrators, the ICC’s authority and impartiality, and 
considerations of delay and cost associated with ad hoc tribunals.1942 The Syria Commission 
similarly discussed the merits of different judicial avenues, comparing the ICC favourably 
with local trials or an ad hoc tribunal.1943 Other commissions adopted a tandem approach, 
suggesting some prosecutions could be pursued at the ICC while others would take place in 
national courts1944 or before hybrid or regional bodies. For instance, the Eritrea Commission 
recommended that in addition to an ICC referral, the AU should establish a mechanism to 
prosecute crimes against humanity.1945  The CAR Commission considered that the CAR’s 
Special Criminal Court should deal with the bulk of criminal cases, while the ICC could deal 
with more controversial or serious crimes. 1946  Recommendations for modalities of 
prosecutions generally tracked the proliferation of international criminal tribunals. The 
implementation of such recommendations is another matter, discussed in Section 4.1.  
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Some commissions proposed follow-up mechanisms to facilitate investigations and 
prosecutions. For instance, the Goldstone Commission recommended that a follow-up 
committee report on parties’ fulfilment of their duties to investigate and prosecute. It directed 
this proposal to the Security Council, recommending that if prosecutions did not materialise, 
the situation should be referred to the ICC. 1947  Ultimately, the HRC established such a 
committee,1948 which found little evidence of accountability action.1949 The HRC requested 
the Secretary-General to continue to report on progress1950 and eventually, its attention shifted 
to other crises. While the follow-up committee did not motivate the parties to act, Daragh 
Murray writes that it usefully “specified a framework for monitoring and assessing criminal 
investigations.”1951 The North Korea Commission’s proposal that OHCHR establish a field-
based structure to help to ensure accountability, including by collecting evidence,1952 led to 
the establishment of an OHCHR field office at Seoul.1953 The HRC also established a group of 
experts to explore ways to secure accountability in the DPRK.1954 The Eritrea Commission 
similarly proposed an OHCHR structure to promote accountability,1955 but the HRC instead 
renewed the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Eritrea to report on implementation of its 
recommendations.1956  
3.2 Restitution and compensation 
Restitution and compensation are well-known remedies in the field of state responsibility.1957 
The right of victims of serious IHL and IHRL violations to reparation is affirmed in several 
instruments,1958 although scholars disagree as to whether such a right is fully recognised as a 
matter of international law.1959 The Principles on the Right to a Remedy provide that full 
reparation for serious violations of IHRL and IHL includes restitution and compensation.1960 
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This Section discusses commissions’ recommendations for restitution and compensation 
directed at states (3.2.1) and other actors, particularly international organisations, armed 
groups and individuals (3.2.2).  
3.2.1 Recommendations to states 
Several commissions linked the duty to provide reparations pursuant to the rules of state 
responsibility with victims’ rights to a remedy1961 and the need for reparations to be victim-
centred.1962 Commissions’ recommendations reflected these different elements. The Guinea 
Commission recommended that Guinea provide healthcare and symbolic reparations as well 
as financial compensation.1963 The Syria Commission recommended that Syria establish a 
reparation fund “for victims of serious human rights violations.”1964 The Palmer Commission 
not style its recommendations as in pursuit of accountability for legal violations, but 
recommended that Israel “offer payment for the benefit of the deceased and injured victims 
and their families, to be administered by [Turkey and Israel] through a joint trust fund”.1965 
Some commissions recommended that the international community assist concerned states 
meet their obligations in light of their precarious financial situations. 1966  The CAR 
Commission proposed that the CAR and Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in 
the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) adopt a policy to restore property rights of those 
forced to flee from violence, and if this was not possible, “a comprehensive program of 
compensation should be put in place, along with appropriate grievance mechanisms.”1967 
Several commissions proposed that UN bodies should establish compensation mechanisms. 
The Darfur Commission made a detailed proposal for an international compensation 
commission1968 which was not adopted by the Security Council.1969 The Lebanon Commission 
recommended that the HRC consider creating “a commission competent to examine 
individual claims”1970 and establish a “follow-up procedure on the measures to be taken, 
notably for the rebuilding of Lebanon and above all reparations for victims”.1971 The HRC 
asked OHCHR to consult with Lebanon on the recommendations;1972  ultimately, no such 
mechanism was established.1973 The Goldstone Commission recommended that the General 
Assembly establish an escrow fund to pay compensation to Palestinian victims, and that Israel 
should pay into that fund.1974 In making this proposal, the Commission cited the inquiries on 
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Darfur and Lebanon as having expressed similar concern that the international community 
must provide compensation where recourse from concerned states was unlikely.1975 While the 
HRC recommended that OHCHR explore modalities for an escrow fund, this was not 
established.1976 None of these recommendations bore fruit.  
3.2.2 Recommendations to other actors 
While the ILC has identified a duty to provide reparation for internationally wrongful acts on 
the part of international organisations,1977 such obligations were not much discussed in inquiry 
reports. Some commissions addressed compensatory recommendations to these actors but did 
not always link them to legal liability. For instance, the Libya Commission recommended that 
NATO apply its non-binding guidelines on payments for civilian losses, where payments are 
provided “without reference to the question of legal liability.” 1978  These guidelines were 
formulated for the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. NATO opposed 
this recommendation, writing that since damages were not owed for harm caused by lawful 
military operations and it was not standard practice to provide compensation programmes in 
such cases, questions of compensation were “of a political character.”1979 It does not appear 
that NATO applied its guidelines on ex gratia payments to its activities in Libya.  
The CAR Commission examined violations by international peacekeeping forces, finding that 
existing inquiry and reporting arrangements “[fail] to satisfy the rights of the family members 
of the victims to an effective remedy.”1980 It recommended that the Security Council establish 
a mechanism to hear complaints of IHRL violations by peacekeeping forces1981 similar to the 
Human Rights Advisory Panel (HRAP), which could hear complaints of violations allegedly 
attributable to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and recommend redress, 
including compensation.1982 As UNMIK did not implement HRAP’s recommendations,1983 its 
utility may be queried. Nonetheless, both the Libya Commission and the CAR Commission 
sought to address concerns regarding accountability of peacekeeping missions by suggesting 
measures which had previously attracted political support.1984  
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Turning to de facto regimes and armed groups, commissions generally invoked obligations to 
provide compensation in respect of actors with state-like characteristics. In contrast to the 
multifaceted reparatory recommendations directed to states, commissions’ recommendations 
to non-state actors were less detailed. While the Goldstone Commission recommended that 
Israel pay compensation, it did not make a reciprocal recommendation to the Palestinian 
side.1985 The Gaza Commission did not specifically identify a duty on the part of Hamas to 
provide compensation, but generally called upon “all parties” to establish accountability 
mechanisms, noting that victims’ right to a remedy “including full reparations, must be 
ensured without further delay.”1986 The Libya Commission considered in its first report that 
the National Transitional Council (NTC) exercised “de facto control over territory akin to that 
of a Governmental authority”1987 and recommended that it grant reparations to victims.1988 In 
its second report, the Commission noted that the NTC was recognised as the interim 
Government, so treated it as the state.1989 
The Darfur Commission took the view that compensation may also be owed by armed groups 
without state-like characteristics, writing that serious violations invoked the international 
responsibility of “the international non-state entity to which those authors belong as officials”, 
so that the “non-state-entity may have to pay compensation to the victims”. 1990  The 
Commission sourced this duty in the Hague Regulations and grave breaches provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I. 1991  Noting that these obligations were 
originally owed between states, the Commission observed that an individual right to a remedy 
had since emerged from human rights doctrines.1992 It concluded that Sudan was obliged to 
pay compensation for crimes perpetrated by its agents or de facto organs, and that a “similar 
obligation is incumbent upon rebels for all crimes they may have committed, whether or not 
the perpetrators are identified and punished.” 1993  The Commission envisaged that rebels’ 
violations should be compensated through a trust fund, to be funded by international voluntary 
contributions.1994 This proposal arguably reflects the principle in the Principles on the Right to 
a Remedy that states must provide reparations where “parties liable for the harm suffered are 
unable or unwilling to meet their obligation”.1995  
Commissions more commonly addressed responsibilities of armed groups indirectly via 
investigation and prosecution of their individual members. As noted by Zegveld, international 
bodies have “largely ignored the accountability of the groups in favour of the accountability 
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of individual members.” 1996  This lack of attention reflects a constellation of difficulties, 
including uncertainty regarding applicable primary rules, underdeveloped rules governing 
responsibility, a lack of forums in which to seek recourse, and practical impediments such as 
the absence of collectively held assets.1997 Luke Moffett argues that responsibility of armed 
groups should not be modelled on state responsibility due to their wide diversity, and 
proposes a “third type of responsibility” that rests collectively on the members of an 
impugned group.1998 Such a possibility was raised in the report of the Darfur Commission.  
Finally, commissions infrequently recognised an obligation to provide compensation on the 
part of convicted individuals. The Darfur Commission observed “a clear trend in international 
law to recognize a right to compensation in the victim to recover from the individual who 
caused his or her injury”,1999  citing the Rome Statute and international declarations. The 
Cambodia Commission considered that the wealth of convicted Khmer Rouge leaders should 
be given as reparations to victims of the regime, observing that this measure was recognised at 
the ICC and ad hoc tribunals.2000 The Commission recommended convicted leaders should 
pay from their own wealth or otherwise through a “special trust fund”, and that states holding 
Khmer Rouge assets should arrange their transfer to meet defendants’ obligations.2001 Most 
commissions did not expressly link the obligation to provide reparations to criminal 
conviction, perhaps because enforcement regimes vary across jurisdictions. 
3.3 Truth-seeking measures 
The right to the truth in respect of serious violations of IHRL and IHL has been recognised by 
the General Assembly,2002 the HRC,2003 certain international judicial bodies,2004 and in some 
academic writings.2005 The Principles on the Right to a Remedy frame truth-seeking measures 
as a means of satisfaction. 2006  Inquiry reports depict truth-seeking as essential for 
accountability and complementary to prosecutions; 2007  however they engaged with the 
modalities of such mechanisms to differing extents. 
Some commissions identified the need for a truth-seeking process but left the modalities of 
such processes open. The CAR Commission considered it important to produce a detailed 
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account of violations and permit victims to tell their stories in light of the reality that many 
crimes would go unpunished.2008 It recommended that the Government invite the Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence to 
recommend the most effective truth-seeking strategy in the circumstances.2009 The Sri Lanka 
Panel recommended that Sri Lanka initiate a process to examine the root causes and conduct 
of the conflict, patterns of violations and institutional responsibilities,2010 and to acknowledge 
its role and responsibility for civilian casualties. 2011  The Syria Commission identified 
“investigation panels, documentation of violations or the securing of archives”2012 as possible 
measures in addition to truth commissions as ways to realise the right to truth. 
A few commissions recommended the establishment of truth commissions.2013 The Darfur 
Commission identified the added value of such a mechanism: “[c]riminal courts, by 
themselves, may not be suited to reveal the broadest spectrum of crimes that took place during 
a period of repression, in part because they may convict only on proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.” 2014  Conversely, other commissions were less confident about the utility of truth 
commissions in situations under investigation. The Cambodia Commission warned that a truth 
commission might not be appropriate in the near future due to enduring divisions in Cambodia 
that could frustrate its work, and also cautioned the simultaneous operation of a truth 
commission and a judicial body, as it could create public confusion and lead to difficulties for 
the fair conduct of trials.2015 The Eritrea Commission stated that a truth commission would not 
be “a viable option in the current circumstances”, 2016  but did not explain why. It 
recommended that the Government provide victims with redress, “including the right to 
truth”,2017 but did not elaborate as to how this right should be realised. The North Korea 
Commission considered that a truth commission which would allow amnesties in exchange 
for truth to be “eminently unsuitable to a situation where crimes against humanity are being 
committed unabated.”2018  It indicated that truth-seeking measures might be possible after 
“profound political and institutional reforms within the DPRK”.2019 
3.4 Other measures of satisfaction 
The Principles on the Right to a Remedy provide that in addition to compensation and 
restitution, measures of satisfaction may be required to remedy serious violations of IHRL and 
IHL. In this respect, the Principles depart from general rules of state responsibility, whereby 
satisfaction is secondary to other forms of reparation.2020 In this context, satisfaction includes 
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cessation of ongoing violations, public apology, judicial and administrative sanctions against 
perpetrators, and commemorations to victims, as well as truth-seeking measures.2021 
Several commissions recognised satisfaction measures as components of reparations.2022 For 
instance, the Beit Hanoun Commission recommended that Israel offer “a memorial to the 
victims that constitutes a response to the needs of survivors”,2023 such as a physiotherapy 
clinic. While the Palmer Commission disconnected recommendations from legal liability, 
some resembled satisfaction, such as the proposal that Israel offer an “appropriate statement 
of regret… in respect of the incident in light of its consequences”. 2024  The Timor-Leste 
Commission recommended a national reparations programme to award measures including 
acknowledgement of wrongdoing, public disclosure of events and rehabilitation.2025 
Lustration and vetting were also recommended to remove individuals who had participated in 
violations from public authority and prevent them from holding public office to “(re-)establish 
civic trust and (re-)legitimize public institutions”.2026 Lustration refers to the policy to remove 
implicated personnel, while vetting is the process by which the policy is implemented.2027 The 
Cambodia Commission recommended that those convicted of international crimes be 
precluded from public office. 2028 The CAR Commission recommended that candidates for 
national political office must attest that they were not implicated in serious violations.2029 
Other commissions advocated that those allegedly responsible for serious violations of IHRL 
or IHL be removed from security, military, and judicial institutions.2030 The UN also conducts 
a screening process for all UN personnel to exclude perpetrators of serious criminal offences 
and those involved in the commission of violations of IHRL or IHL.2031  
Several commissions recommended that sanctions be applied against suspects in leadership 
roles who were implicated in atrocities as a way to end ongoing violations.2032 For instance, 
the HRC’s Burundi Commission recommended that UN member states institute sanctions 
against those suspected of committing serious violations of IHRL and international crimes in 
the absence of improvement in the human rights situation.2033 As noted by Van den Herik, 
originally “UN sanctions were conceived of as political measures addressing a determined 
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threat to the peace rather than legal responses to identified violations of international law.”2034 
She identifies three purposes of sanctions: “(i) to coerce or change behaviour, (ii) to constrain 
access to resources needed to engage in proscribed activities, or (iii) to signal and 
stigmatize.” 2035  Sanctions such as asset freezes and travel bans may be experienced as 
deprivations of rights or benefits. While sanctions have a detrimental impact, their purpose is 
preventive. 2036  In 2012, the Secretary-General reported that a workshop on the Security 
Council’s role in accountability suggested the Council might authorise the use frozen assets 
for reparations payments.2037 Such a proposal has not been made by commissions to date.  
Occasionally, commissions addressed the role of private enterprises in ending violations. 
Some recommendations were made to actors with oversight over businesses.2038 For instance, 
the High-Level Mission on Darfur recommended that the General Assembly compile “a list of 
foreign companies that have an adverse impact on the situation of human rights in Darfur”2039 
and called upon UN bodies to avoid transacting with listed entities. Recommendations were 
occasionally addressed to private companies. Notably, the Israeli Settlements Commission 
recommended that businesses evaluate the human rights impact of their activities and take all 
necessary steps to ensure that they did not adversely impact human rights, including 
terminating their business interests in Israeli settlements.2040 Having found that proceeds from 
mining operations owned jointly by Eritrea and a transnational corporation were an important 
source of state revenue, 2041  the Eritrea Commission recommended that transnational 
corporations operating in Eritrea carry out human rights impact assessments to prevent future 
violations.2042  
Commissions also invited the international community of states to take steps to end situations 
of violations. Some commissions linked these measures to states’ legal obligations to repress 
violations of peremptory norms 2043  and ensure respect for IHL. 2044  Others invoked the 
‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) principle,2045 which provides that states must protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and 
that other states have a responsibility to use peaceful means to help protect populations from 
such atrocities. Where a state manifestly fails to protect its population and peaceful means are 
inadequate, states may take collective action through the Security Council, in accordance with 
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the Charter. 2046  The North Korea Commission considered “the accountability of the 
international community”2047 in light of R2P and found that a “corresponding legal obligation 
is also emerging”2048  under rules of state responsibility. The Commission wrote that the 
international community must ensure that crimes against humanity ceased,2049 including by 
ensuring that prison camps were dismantled.2050 
Some commissions identified wider political action as a means to end situations of violations. 
The Syria Commission repeatedly stated that a politically-negotiated solution was the only 
way to end the Syrian conflict.2051 The North Korea Commission considered ways to promote 
reconciliation between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea2052 and recommended that urgent 
accountability measures “be combined with a reinforced human rights dialogue, the 
promotion of incremental change through more people-to-people contact and an inter-Korean 
agenda for reconciliation”.2053 The Eritrea Commission found that the non-implementation of 
the Algiers Agreement 2000 and the ruling on the demarcation of the Eritrean-Ethiopian 
border were pretexts for Eritrea’s repressive practices 2054  and recommended that the 
international community assist those states “in solving border issues through diplomatic 
means”.2055 Eritrea objected to this as violating the terms of the Agreement, which obliged 
both states to accept the border delimitation decision as final.2056 Dispute resolution was not 
the dominant function of these commissions, but such considerations came within their ambit 
where conflicts and disputes perpetuated situations of ongoing violations. 
Occasionally, stronger enforcement measures were advocated. In respect of violations by 
ISIS, the Syria Commission recommended that the Security Council consider “engaging its 
Chapter VII powers, given the acknowledged threat ISIS imposes to international peace and 
security”.2057 Such recommendations did not always go unchallenged. Eritrea argued that the 
Eritrea Commission’s recommendation that the Security Council decide that the situation in 
the concerned state threatened international peace and security2058 was a “purely political 
determination”2059 outside its mandate. To date, the Security Council has not made such a 
decision.2060 
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3.5 Guarantees of non-repetition 
Guarantees of non-repetition are another type of remedy recognised in the Principles on the 
Right to a Remedy. Such measures include institutional rule of law reforms, education and 
training in IHRL and IHL, and codes of conduct for governmental institutions and economic 
enterprises.2061 As guarantees of non-repetition aim to avert future atrocities, accountability 
has synergies with prevention, 2062  although some commentators raise queries as to 
causality.2063 
Commissions which investigated atrocities in states with weak, unstable, or authoritarian 
systems of governance recommended institutional rule of law reforms.2064 For instance, the 
CAR Commission’s first recommendation was that the Government of the CAR rebuild its 
legal system. 2065  Where violations were deemed endemic to systems of governance, 
commissions recommended fundamental reforms, which were often interpreted by concerned 
states as attempted regime change. The North Korea Commission found that crimes against 
humanity were “ingrained into the institutional framework” 2066  of the DPRK and that 
accountability “requires profound institutional reforms starting at the very top and centre of 
the nation’s institutions”.2067 The DPRK rejected the report, stating that it would “strongly 
respond to the end to any attempt of regime-change and pressure under the pretext of ‘human 
rights protection’.”2068 The Syria Commission stated that accountability was a “fundamental 
component of a transitional period leading to a State founded on the principles of rule of law, 
democracy and human rights”.2069 Syria objected to this statement as a veiled reference to 
regime change.2070 The Syria Commission replied that its statement “does not refer to the 
founding of a new state, and [it] would never imply such an outcome.”2071 Instead, the text 
was said to refer to rule of law reforms that were underway or planned in Syria.2072 
3.6 Concluding observations 
UN atrocity inquiries’ accountability recommendations reflect both retributive and restorative 
conceptions of justice, advocating prosecutions of international crimes as well as remedies 
recognising and compensating harm to victims. Some remedies proposed by commissions 
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(accessed 1 May 2018). 
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aimed to end violations and guarantee their non-recurrence, linking accountability with 
prevention. Others went beyond immediate victims and perpetrators by seeking to correct root 
causes of atrocities through institutional reforms. Such recommendations show that 
commissions did not conceive of accountability as limited to the enforcement of specific legal 
responsibilities, but as a broader concept promoting the rule of law and durable peace.  
Commissions addressed a range of actors beyond their mandating authorities, reflecting a 
conception of accountability in which many sectors of society play a role, including regional 
organisations, peace enforcement missions, and private enterprises. It is notable that many 
HRC-led commissions addressed the Security Council, suggesting that their recommendatory 
function transcends their immediate institutional setting. Such recommendations invite the 
Council’s engagement where its own dynamics prevented action. Some HRC commissions 
informally briefed Council members,2073 and situations of concern were occasionally added to 
its agenda. 2074  At the same time, the Council has been reluctant to act upon HRC-led 
commissions’ recommendations.2075 
Commissions’ formulations of recommendations also indicated their awareness of the limits 
to their mandates, as well as institutional and political factors relevant to implementation. One 
strategy was to formulate discrete recommendations whose implementation would be highly 
visible. Such proposals would also channel advocacy efforts and reduce the need for 
negotiation of operational details and thereby risking political impasse. Such an approach is 
evident in the Darfur Commission’s comprehensive proposal for an international 
compensation commission, although it was ultimately not implemented. Another strategy was 
to escalate recommendations as a situation deteriorated. For instance, the Syria Commission 
first made broad recommendations that Syria be referred to ‘international justice’,2076 but as 
the situation deteriorated, it recommended ICC referral. 2077  After Russia blocked a draft 
referral, 2078  the Commission criticised the Council’s lack of consensus as enabling 
impunity2079 and proposed alternative ways to prosecute through an ad hoc tribunal2080 and 
support of the IIIM.2081  The Syria Commission’s escalating recommendations reflected a 
desire to ensure accountability with or without the support of the Security Council.  
Appreciation of political sensibilities was also reflected in commissions’ invocations of R2P, 
which the the Secretary-General has described as encompassing “legal, moral and political 
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responsibilities”2082 to prevent atrocities. By invoking R2P, commissions appealed to states on 
the basis of international law as well as their political commitment to act. 2083  Finally, 
commissions’ cognizance of political realities was reflected in proposals for immediate 
follow-up measures to monitor and report on recommendation uptake. However, where no 
accountability measures are taken, such mechanisms reflect a “circuit of responses”2084 rather 
than inducing compliance. These tensions and others arising from commissions’ institutional 
and normative positioning are explored further below. 
4. Accountability Roles and Functions 
This Section discusses commissions’ roles and functions in relation to different dimensions of 
accountability for violations of international law. It does not seek to measure the general 
‘impact’ of inquiry reports or establish causality between recommendations and 
implementation, in light of the significant methodological difficulties of such exercises.2085 
Rather, it highlights commissions’ key roles and functions with respect to accountability by 
drawing on examples from practice. As discussed in Section 1, the concept of accountability 
has legal, moral, and political dimensions. As these dimensions are interrelated, there is some 
conceptual overlap. However, this typology allows for different elements of accountability to 
be foregrounded. This Section is structured as follows. Section 4.1 discusses how 
commissions facilitate ‘legal’ accountability, understood as binding enforcement of legal 
responsibilities. Section 4.2 discusses the ‘moral’ accountability function of inquiry, including 
uncovering the truth of violations and the potential expressive role of findings of 
responsibility. Section 4.3 discusses commissions’ ‘political’ accountability function and the 
interplay with the politics of accountability more broadly. 
4.1 Legal accountability  
Inquiry reports can facilitate the enforcement of legal responsibilities in judicial proceedings. 
Scholars refer to such roles as ‘force multipliers2086 or ‘catalysts’2087 of judicial accountability. 
This role is reflected in the Darfur Commission’s view that its assessment of international 
crimes represented “a first step towards accountability”2088 and “will pave the way for future 
investigations, and possible indictments, by a prosecutor, and convictions by a court of 
law.”2089 The CAR Commission similarly saw its task as “to provide the foundations for a 
full-fledged criminal investigation”.2090  
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Some inquiry reports facilitated the establishment of international criminal tribunals or 
triggered international criminal jurisdiction. The Yugoslavia Commission’s recommendation 
for prosecutions before an ad hoc tribunal 2091  was followed by the establishment of the 
ICTY.2092 A similar course of events occurred in relation to the ICTR,2093 though arguably the 
Rwanda Commission was created in service to the Security Council’s desire to establish 
another ad hoc criminal tribunal.2094 The Cambodia Commission’s proposal for an ad hoc 
tribunal was not adopted, but its report informed negotiations between Cambodia and the UN, 
leading to the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.2095  
Inquiry reports have also been utilised by various actors triggering the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
When referring Sudan to the ICC, the Security Council ‘took note’ of the Darfur 
Commission’s report “on violations of [IHL] and [IHRL] in Darfur”.2096 The Union of the 
Comoros invoked the Gaza Flotilla Commission’s report as evidence of crimes against 
humanity and war crimes when referring the situation onboard its flagged vessel to the 
ICC.2097 The ICC Prosecutor has cited inquiry reports as sources of information in preliminary 
examinations.2098 The General Assembly also cited inquiry reports when recommending that 
the Security Council refer the DPRK to the ICC2099 and deciding to establish the IIIM in 
pursuit of criminal accountability.2100  
In addition to acting as force multipliers for international criminal proceedings, some inquiry 
reports guided criminal investigations and were cited as evidence. 2101  For instance, the 
Yugoslavia Commission’s database of evidence helped to “establish the location, character 
and scale of violations” 2102  at the ICTY, and information from the Darfur Commission 
allowed the ICC Prosecutor to plan the criminal investigation. 2103  In ICC proceedings, 
commissions’ factual findings have been cited in decisions to authorize investigations,2104 
arrest warrant decisions,2105 and confirm charges against defendants.2106 While inquiry reports 
have not yet been cited in trial judgments, the Court’s acceptance of NGO reports for 
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corroborative purposes2107 and citations of reports by peacekeeping missions2108 suggests that 
UN inquiry reports may play a similar role. At the same time, the ICC has cautioned that 
human rights reports generally have less probative value, considering the different context and 
purpose for which they were prepared.2109 
An emerging way in which commissions may facilitate legal accountability is in civil 
proceedings against states, individuals, and private enterprises. Throughout the Bosnia 
Genocide judgment, the ICJ cited the Yugoslavia Commission’s factual findings, including 
estimated numbers of casualties.2110 Inquiry reports have also been cited in civil suits against 
private actors in domestic courts. For instance, a case was brought in the US on the basis of 
the Alien Tort Statute against Jean Bosco Barayagwiza for inciting the Rwandan genocide. 
The US District Court referred to the Rwanda Commission’s finding that between 500,000 
and 1 million civilians were murdered in Rwanda.2111 A recent development is a civil claim by 
members of the Eritrean diaspora against mining company Nevsun in Canada, alleging that 
the latter was liable for human rights violations in Eritrea. The Supreme Court of British 
Columbia admitted the Eritrea Commission’s report into evidence in order to provide a 
contextual framework in which to assess first-hand evidence of violations.2112 The Court cited 
the Commission’s findings of lack of due process in the Eritrean judicial system 2113  and 
allowed the case to proceed to trial. 2114  In these cases, inquiry reports provided general 
information rather than evidence of specific violations However, such information might 
assist plaintiffs to establish the context of violations.2115 Use in proceedings against private 
entities remains limited, as it depends on the availability of causes of action, the existence of 
an inquiry report and acceptance of the report into evidence. Should states further recognise 
civil liability for human rights violations, such use may expand in the future. 
While it is theoretically possible for inquiry reports to facilitate enforcement of state 
responsibility, commissions’ contributions in this respect have been less pronounced in 
practice. This may be partly due to issues of availability and access to mechanisms through 
which to determine and enforce state responsibility. However, concrete proposals for 
compensation schemes by the Darfur Commission and the Goldstone Commission2116 were 
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not taken up by the Security Council and General Assembly, respectively. Political 
implications of this selectivity are discussed further at Section 4.3 below.  
While commissions may promote legal accountability, implementation ultimately remains in 
the hands of political actors.2117 There is a track record of uneven uptake of recommendations. 
For instance, the Security Council did not establish a mechanism to prosecute international 
crimes in Burundi,2118 nor acted upon several HRC commissions’ recommendations for ICC 
referrals. 2119  Many states did not fulfil their obligations to investigate and prosecute. 
Commissions are aware of this important limitation and appealed to stakeholders to act. A 
mission established upon the request of the Security Council in respect of the situation of 
Burundi cautioned:2120 
[T]he United Nations can no longer engage in establishing commissions of inquiry and 
disregard their recommendations without seriously undermining the credibility of the 
Organization in promoting justice and the rule of law. 
The Gaza Commission also criticised the lack of implementation of recommendations of 
earlier fact-finding bodies in respect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as “[lying] at the heart 
of the systematic recurrence of violations in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory.”2121 
The Commission recommended that the HRC comprehensively review the implementation of 
recommendations by UN human rights bodies since 2009 and “explore mechanisms to ensure 
their implementation.”2122 In 2017, OHCHR reported that the rate for full implementation of 
recommendations was very low: 0.4 per cent for Israel, 1.3 per cent for Palestinian duty 
bearers, and 17.9 per cent for the international community and the UN.2123 
Some scholars argue that it is counterproductive to establish inquiries when binding 
enforcement action does not follow. Zachary Kaufman questions whether the use of non-
binding investigations represents “strength and creativity or weakness and superficiality in the 
pursuit of accountability”.2124 Frulli argues that it may be unhelpful for the HRC to establish 
accountability-oriented inquiries as it cannot take direct action, and suggests that such bodies 
be established by the Security Council.2125 Frulli cautions that the HRC “runs the risk of 
getting tangled up in fact-finding activities, becoming an end in themselves and not a means 
to achieve accountability.”2126 Devereux writes that if recommendations are not implemented, 
commissions “are at risk of languishing to become ‘historical markers’, referred to in order to 
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illustrate the absence of action”. 2127  From this perspective, a commission whose 
recommendations are not implemented represents tolerance of impunity.  
4.2 Moral accountability  
The term ‘moral accountability’ is used here to refer to dimensions of accountability for 
violations of international law which may be achieved through processes which are not legally 
binding. Moral dimensions include truth-seeking and expressivist functions of findings of 
responsibility. While such functions may also be associated with binding judicial proceedings, 
they are arguably not limited to this context. This Section discusses the extent to which 
commissions’ findings of violations and responsibilities have truth-seeking and expressivist 
functions.  
Commissions’ findings have value as an official record of atrocities and go some way towards 
giving effect to the right to the truth of serious violations. As written by the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to truth, while the fact of violations may already generally be known, 
truth-seeking mechanisms “make an indispensable contribution in officially and publicly 
acknowledging these facts”. 2128  Cassese writes that UN atrocity inquiries “significantly 
contributed to uncovering the truth.”2129 Some commissions articulated that they carried out 
this function. For instance, the Eritrea Commission wrote that its objectives included 
providing a “comprehensive account of violations which could serve as a historical record for 
future accountability”.2130 The Beit Hanoun Commission sought “to draw on the accounts 
given to the mission to bring to the [HRC] as accurate a picture as possible of the shelling and 
its ongoing impact on victims and survivors.”2131  
The Sri Lanka Panel did not articulate its role as finding the truth but rather offering an 
alternative account that challenged the Sri Lankan Government’s denial of perpetrating 
atrocities:2132 
This report makes clear that the Panel’s view of the events leading up to the defeat of 
the LTTE and in the immediate aftermath is fundamentally different from that of the 
Government… By denying that its military operations resulted in tens of thousands of 
civilian deaths, and intimidating and threatening those who challenge that view, the 
Government is effectively closing off the opportunity to open a serious, national 
dialogue on the recent past and the needs of the future. 
Ratner writes that the Panel aimed to “offer an alternative narrative to the Sri Lankan 
government’s position that it had caused no civilian casualties and a new focal point for 
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discussion”. 2133  In this context, official recognition of violations was essential for any 
transitional justice process to be fruitful.  
There are also limits to commissions’ truth-seeking function. Not all commissions sought to 
produce an authoritative narrative, as evidenced by the Palmer Commission’s statement that 
its legal views were “no more authoritative”2134 than those of Israel and Turkey. Secondly, 
commissions cannot comprehensively uncover the truth of violations. Their truth-seeking role 
is more modest than that of truth commissions, as evidenced by frequent recommendations 
that truth commissions should be established following their reports. On a practical level, 
resource shortages and lack of territorial access may significantly limit victims’ participation.  
It may also be queried to what extent findings of legal responsibility resemble ‘truth’. Zegveld 
writes, “law is not about finding the truth. Law is a reasoned application of rules to presented 
and substantiated facts.”2135 Findings of legal responsibility are a particular type of narrative. 
Even comprehensive truth-seeking bodies cannot find ‘the’ truth; judgements must be made in 
respect of relevant facts in view of the purpose of the exercise and the intended audience.2136 
Blank writes that where parties distrust the legitimacy of an inquiry or when multiple entities 
conduct investigations, legal conclusions may reinforce pre-existing perceptions and the law 
may be used as a tool for “further disputes, and the struggle for control of the narrative.”2137  
Inquiry reports might also make expressive contributions by animating frameworks of IHRL, 
IHL and ICL and stigmatising serious violations. The theory of legal expressivism essentially 
provides that law and legal institutions can change or reinforce social meanings and by 
extension, people’s attitudes, and behaviour;2138 and that the “goal of trial and punishment is 
the expression of messages, often about moral or legal wrongdoing.”2139 This theory finds 
linkages with moral philosophy.2140  
Several scholars ascribe an expressive function to international criminal courts and tribunals. 
While some authors focus on the expressive function of punishment,2141 others also identify 
this function in the trial process.2142 For instance, Margaret deGuzman argues that the ICC 
should focus on “expressing global norms”2143 and identifies an expressive function in the 
Prosecutor’s selection of situations and cases. Mirjan Damaška writes that the primary 
function of criminal tribunals should be didactic, bearing in mind their limited deterrent 
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ability, arguing that courts should “aim their denunciatory judgments at strengthening a sense 
of accountability for international crime by exposure and stigmatization of these extreme 
forms of inhumanity”.2144 However, the successful exercise of such a role requires that courts 
“be perceived by their constituencies as a legitimate authority. Lacking coercive power, their 
legitimacy hangs almost entirely on the quality of their decisions and their procedures.”2145  
Commissions might similarly affirm legal values and provide a sense of accountability by 
exposing and denouncing violations. Findings of responsibility express the elementary idea 
that actors are bound by international law and subject to scrutiny. Damaška’s linkage of 
perceptions of legitimacy with legal rationality and fair process holds true for commissions to 
a greater degree in light of their ad hoc establishment by political bodies. However, it may be 
queried whether expressivism necessarily transposes from the trial context to non-binding 
inquiry. Antony Duff distinguishes the investigation of criminal conduct from the trial 
context:2146 
[T]rial is not just an inquiry on an alleged wrongdoer, which aims to determine the truth 
or otherwise of the proposition that she committed a specified wrong; it is a process 
through which she is called to answer—to answer to the charge that she committed this 
crime, and to answer for such wrongful conduct as is proved against her. 
An inquiry cannot call suspected perpetrators to answer to allegations in the same manner as a 
criminal trial. It may be that the legally binding nature of a trial and judgment is essential for 
an expressive role. However, Mark Drumbl writes:2147 
Trials can educate the public through the spectacle of theater—there is, after all, 
pedagogical value to performance and communicative value to dramaturgy. This 
performance is made all the more weighty by the reality that, coincident with the 
closing act, comes the infliction of shame, sanction, and stigma upon the antagonists. 
While inquiry reports do not directly produce legal sanctions, they may well inflict ‘shame, 
sanction, and stigma’, in the sense of reputational costs. In this sense, the expressivist function 
links with the idea of accountability as “having to answer for one’s actions in terms of human 
rights and humanitarian standards, with some measure of sanction if violations are found”.2148  
Much has been written about how shaming can induce actors to comply with obligations.2149 
Michael Kirby and Sandeep Gopalan observe that a “proper appreciation of shaming 
                                                 
2144 Mirjan Damaška, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’, (2008) 83(1) Chi-Kent L Rev 329-
365, at 345.  
2145 Ibid.  
2146 Antony Duff, ‘Can we Punish the Perpetrators of Atrocities?’, in Thomas Brudholm and Thomas Cushman 
(eds), The Religious in Responses to Mass Atrocity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York: CUP, 2009) 
79-104, at 82. 
2147 Mark Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2007) at 175.  
2148 Christine Bell, ‘Post-Conflict Accountability and the Reshaping of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’, in 
Orna Ben-Naftali (ed.), International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: Pas de Deux 
(Oxford: OUP, 2011) 328-370 at 331, citing Nico Krisch, ‘The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law’, 17 
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Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) 43-60 and Emilie Hafner-Burton, ‘Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the 
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illustrates the powerful role that the institution of [inquiry] can play in international law.”2150 
They argue that shaming and negative publicity can induce compliance by the concerned state 
and oblige the international community to acknowledge violations and take corrective 
action.2151 Abbott and others write that institutions that report on compliance with legal norms 
create “implicit sanctions for states that wish to be seen as trustworthy members of an 
international community.”2152  
Commissions’ findings can also counteract denials by concerned states and provoke them into 
‘rhetorical entrapment’, whereby denial gives way to instrumental engagement with norms, 
which are eventually internalized.2153 For instance, following the North Korea Commission’s 
report, several states condemned the concerned state’s human rights record2154 and Botswana 
terminated its diplomatic relations.2155 Although the DPRK dismissed the report as fabricated 
by ‘hostile forces’,2156 Pyongyang dispatched its foreign minister to the General Assembly for 
the first time in fifteen years2157 and issued its own human rights report.2158 The timing of 
these events invites the view that the DPRK was responding to sharpened pressure levelled at 
it as a result of the Commission’s report. Conversely, some scholars observe that the language 
of international law may not always be effective in encouraging compliance, but instead lead 
to a hardening of positions and resistance. Patricia Goedde writes that North Korea perceives 
human rights discourse as ‘lawfare’ and that “rights diffusion may be more successfully 
localized if it resonates within an easily understood cultural context”, using alternative 
discourses and frameworks.2159 Inquiry reports may induce actors to strategically utilise the 
international legal framework but whether they encourage norm internalization is another 
matter.  
Some authors identify limits to the expressive functions of international criminal courts which 
might be shared by commissions of inquiry. These obstacles include barriers to 
communication with different audiences2160 and Western cultural assumptions arguably latent 
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in ICL. 2161  Shiri Krebs issues a more fundamental challenge to the expressivist role of 
commissions which make findings of legal responsibility. She argues that commissions 
engage in the ‘legalization of truth’, defined as “adoption of legal discourse to construct and 
interpret facts outside the courthouse”,2162 in the belief that “legal reports uniformly inform 
the relevant publics with an authoritative account of what happened and motivate domestic 
sanctioning of in-group offenders”.2163 Based on the results of empirical experiments, Krebs 
argues that while ‘legal truth’ provides a framework through which to understand facts, legal 
discourse in inquiry reports is likely to trigger cognitive and emotional biases and belief 
polarization; reduce perceptions of the fairness of the report and be less effective than moral 
framing in influencing attitudes on accountability.2164 She recommends greater recognition of 
the limitations of legal discourse in respect of the interpretation of facts and the nature of its 
influence on attitudes and beliefs. 2165  While the experiments may not have external 
validity,2166 Krebs’ study invites scrutiny of commonly held assumptions regarding ‘legal 
truth’ and juridified fact-finding.  
4.3 Political accountability and accountability politics  
Several commissions identified institutional and political reforms as necessary to 
comprehensively address violations and prevent their recurrence, especially in respect of 
conflict situations and authoritarian regimes. For instance, the North Korea Commission 
wrote, “[o]nce a process to carry out profound political and institutional reforms within the 
DPRK is underway, a parallel Korean-led transitional justice process becomes an urgent 
necessity.” 2167  Commissions’ recommendations for political and institutional reform were 
rather broad and generalized in comparison with their detailed consideration of modalities for 
legal accountability. Ratner writes that a legalistic focus ignores the fact that accountability is 
a “fundamentally political process”2168 which must be achieved gradually with consensus. 
Ratner cautions that politics “does and should affect the interpretation of a commission’s 
mandate, the tone of the report, and the recommendations”, 2169  so fact-finding demands 
political as well as legal expertise. Other commentators are less enthusiastic about overt 
engagement with politics. Saxon writes that while commissions should not ignore the political 
context, they should distinguish documenting the political situation from seeking to achieve 
political objectives to avoid “colouring their results with political influences”.2170 Moreover, 
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commissions should not make recommendations aimed at “resolving or ameliorating the 
situations or events that they investigate.”2171 
It might be thought that by focusing on legal rather than political responses, commissions 
avoid the appearance of politicization. However, some scholars identify latent politics in legal 
processes and in particular the turn towards criminal law in human rights practice. Engle 
observes, “as advocates increasingly turn to [ICL] to respond to issues ranging from economic 
injustice to genocide, they reinforce an individualized and decontextualized understanding of 
the harms they aim to address, even while relying on the state and on forms of criminalization 
of which they have long been critical.”2172 Laurel Fletcher writes that international efforts to 
secure accountability mostly focus on individuals, and observes:2173 
One question that the neglect of international State accountability raises is whether 
international criminal accountability is a mere distraction or decoy drawing attention 
away from addressing the role of States in perpetrating atrocity crimes and in 
maintaining structures that may threaten peace, even after responsible leaders have been 
prosecuted in The Hague. 
This view finds synergies with the critique that an emphasis on individual responsibility can 
distract from or mask responsibilities of collective actors.2174 From this perspective, a legal 
focus does not reduce the influence of politics, but rather reflects a change in their 
manifestation.  
It may be queried whether inquiry reports can transcend power politics.2175 Stanley Cohen 
observes that responses to IHRL violations often do not arise from the violation per se but 
because the response aligns with geopolitical interests.2176 Bassiouni observes that because the 
UN operates as a political process, the activity of upholding accountability and human rights 
is conditioned by political oversight.2177 Bassiouni sees sophisticated realpolitik at work in all 
cases, including ‘successes’ such as the Security Council’s referral of the situation in 
Darfur.2178 Schwöbel-Patel argues that accountability-oriented commissions are utilised as 
part of an “intervention formula”2179 by global powers and “implicated in international law’s 
entwinement in a civilising mission”2180 of liberal internationalism. Other commentators are 
more optimistic, viewing commissions as capable of influencing political actors and 
processes. For instance, Alston writes that the Darfur Commission’s report promoted 
transparency and accountability in the Security Council, and that “[i]t is one thing for the 
Council to be confronted only with diffuse political pressures, some media exposés, and a 
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range of civil society perspectives when determining whether or not to take action in a human 
rights situation. It is quite another to have to respond to a carefully documented and 
powerfully argued analytical report.”2181  Although UN atrocity inquiries operate within a 
political context, they may in turn condition that context. 
Conclusions 
Commissions examined the responsibilities of a range of actors for violating international law, 
with analysis centring on states and, increasingly, individuals. This area of focus is perhaps 
not surprising considering the centrality of individual responsibility in commissions’ 
mandates and the dominance of criminal responsibility in accountability discourse more 
generally. Such a focus is not value-free, but rather reflects choices to construct ‘legal truth’ 
rather than other narratives and to focus on individual accountability. While a legal focus may 
appear to be objective, from a critical perspective, it reflects and may even disguise political 
interests. 
Commissions’ recommendations represent considerations of feasibility and pragmatism as 
well as a commitment to legal principles. Their proposals for modalities of international 
criminal prosecutions, truth-seeking mechanisms and reparations reflect an appreciation of the 
situation ‘on the ground’ and the needs of affected communities. By linking states’ legal 
obligations with political commitments such as R2P, commissions presented a multi-
dimensional approach to accountability bolstered by legal and political doctrines. Their 
‘legacy planning’ proposals for follow-up mechanisms revealed commissions’ awareness of 
the need to continue applying pressure after their mandates had formally concluded.  
Commissions have both instrumental and intrinsic roles to play in ensuring accountability for 
violations of international law. Their reports may encourage enforcement of legal 
responsibilities and also represent a form of moral sanction. These different functions 
arguably call for different levels of engagement with responsibility regimes. In respect of 
legal accountability, commissions’ findings should be sufficiently robust to make the case for 
corrective action while not duplicating or contradicting the work of judicial bodies. Such an 
approach may not warrant in-depth analysis or firm conclusions of responsibility, especially 
ICL. By contrast, if seeking to denounce violators and impose reputational costs, more 
detailed analysis may be in order. Such a role may be more pronounced where legal 
accountability is unlikely for political or practical reasons. 
Commissions also touched upon political and policy-based measures as part of a broad 
approach to accountability that included preventive dimensions. Commentators are divided as 
to the desirability of commissions’ engagement with political aspects of situations. It may 
further be argued that commissions should concentrate on supporting particular accountability 
responses rather than acting as a ‘jack of all trades’. Hellestveit argues that otherwise, a 
commission risks becoming purposeless, “weakening its potential impact, except for its 
symbolic value as an expression of concern by the international community.”2182 However, 
this symbolic or expressive function should not be entirely discounted. Commissions can 
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recognise victims’ experiences, affirm rights and protections, denounce violations, and 
stigmatise perpetrators. From this perspective, they are not only a step along the road to 
accountability but may be accountability mechanisms “in their own right”.2183 Though borne 
out of political forces and ultimately returning to them, UN atrocity inquiries represent a 
moment in which the value of accountability is independently affirmed and are an important 
part of the UN’s contemporary accountability architecture. 
  
                                                 





The recent proliferation of UN atrocity inquiries has given rise to new questions regarding 
their identity in the international legal order. This Conclusion summarises the main findings 
of each Chapter and offers some overarching reflections as to the contemporary and future 
place of UN atrocity inquiries in the international legal order. 
Summary of Findings 
The Introduction set the research agenda and delineated UN atrocity inquiries as the subjects 
of research. While inquiries into situations of atrocities have been established in different 
settings, the UN context is special for two reasons. First, the UN has established the majority 
of international atrocity inquiries, giving rise to a degree of institutional consistency amidst 
the ad hoc-ery generally associated with such bodies. Secondly, the UN represents a forum 
and conduit for collective action on the part of the international community.  
Chapter One situated UN atrocity inquiries within larger institutional and historical contexts. 
It traversed the history of international atrocity inquiries established between states, by 
international and regional organisations, and in the field of IHL. This Chapter then identified 
different periods in UN history and linked the rise of UN atrocity inquiries with geopolitical 
seismic shifts and new conceptual and institutional linkages between the fields of 
development, security, and human rights. 
Chapter Two demonstrated how the institutional characteristics and choices of UN mandating 
authorities shaped the roles and functions of UN atrocity inquiries. It described how the 
Security Council, Secretary-General, General Assembly, and HRC acted as inquiry architects, 
sketching commissions’ broad scope and aesthetics. The varied powers and purposes of these 
mandating authorities produced different degrees of consent and cooperation by concerned 
states. The HRC has emerged as the most prolific mandating authority and also the most 
politically polarizing. Written mandates giving rise to apprehensions of bias or 
predetermination set commissions at a significant disadvantage, as they were perceived as an 
instrument of the mandating authority. The turn towards international law in inquiry can be 
traced to the terms of written mandates which requested commissions to characterise facts on 
the basis of international law. Juridified inquiry was further emphasized through the practice 
of appointing international legal experts as commissioners. Mandating authorities also shaped 
commissions’ roles and functions through operational aspects such as resourcing and time 
limits, but most operational aspects of inquiry were entrusted to commissions. These practices 
give rise to several tensions for the roles and functions of inquiry. Mandating authorities, 
especially those with power to take binding enforcement action, expressed concern about 
accountability while retaining discretion to act. Inquiries built pressure against those violating 
international law while releasing pressure directed at mandating authorities to act. There is 
also some disparity on the part of mandating authorities in bestowing upon commissions a 
function of ensuring accountability when their powers and operational capacities do not allow 
them to carry out corrective follow-up action directly. This invites critiques that the decision 
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to establish an inquiry in the absence of further follow-up action reflects subtle realpolitik at 
work. 
Chapter Three examined how commissions acted as engineers of their mandates by 
interpreting and implementing the mandating authority’s broad plan with an eye to feasibility 
and practicality. It discussed how commissions interpreted their mandates in an effort to 
reinforce their impartiality and ensure that mandates were of appropriate scope. Commissions’ 
design of their working methods reflected a desire to carry out impartial and credible 
investigations in light of constraints posed by time, resources, and security concerns. 
Information gathering and assessment practices were also guided by key principles, such as 
the centrality of victims and accountability. Where states refused to cooperate, commissions 
found innovative ways to gather information so as not to frustrate their mandates. They 
responded to concerns of methodological ad hoc-ery by adopting best practices. The 
emergence of common standards and procedures invites the idea that inquiries occupy a 
unique institutional space. 
Chapter Four discussed how commissions’ roles and functions shaped their identification of 
the applicable legal framework and the substantive applicability of fields of law to the 
situation and actors under examination. Where denunciation and stimulation of enforcement 
action lay at the heart of the mandate, there was a strong emphasis on assessing atrocities on 
the basis of international law. By contrast, where de-escalation of tensions was the underlying 
purpose, legal assessment was depicted as less important and even as unhelpful. Within the 
former approach, commissions interpreted the legal lenses of their mandates broadly to 
include other legal fields deemed as relevant. Commissions drew links between these fields, 
giving the impression of a mutually reinforcing normative framework. Their interpretations of 
the substantive applicability of legal fields reflected their roles and functions as well as wider 
principles such as even-handedness in investigations.  
Chapter Five thematically assessed commissions’ approaches to interpretation and application 
of international law in light of their roles and functions. Commissions promoted an expansive 
reach of human rights and fundamental freedoms but also demonstrated a concern to remain 
within the bounds of accepted law. Commissions’ approaches to making findings of violations 
revealed that different emphases were placed on the value of certainty or rhetorical impact. 
Prima facie findings of patterns of serious violations made a case for action but were 
vulnerable to rebuttal. Conversely, more circumspect findings with a high degree of certainty 
might form an authoritative narrative, but arguably did not fully convey the gravity of 
atrocities. These choices reflect the idea that commissions straddle advocatory and 
adjudicative approaches to legal interpretation and application. Whether commissions’ legal 
pronouncements have the capacity to play a jurisgenerative role, or whether they are simply 
discourse about international law, depends on one’s conception of international law more 
generally.  
Chapter Six took a closer look at commissions’ roles and functions with respect to ensuring 
accountability for violations of international law. It found that while commissions examined 
responsibilities of different actors, there was an emphasis on those of states and individuals. 
Commissions engaged with the ICL framework in a selective and strategic way, to promote 
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and complement criminal proceedings. Commissions recommended a range of corrective 
measures to give effect to the rights to the truth, justice and remedies. They also identified 
intermediate steps to monitor and report upon implementation, so as to maintain pressure after 
their mandates had come to an end. The Chapter also discussed commissions’ roles with 
respect to legal, moral and political dimensions of accountability. Commissions acted as 
precursors or catalysts for international judicial proceedings, and more rarely, as outsourced 
criminal investigations. Where prosecutions did take place, a commission could complement 
the narrow focus of a trial by providing a broader account of the history, causes and 
contributing factors in a situation of atrocities. Where legal accountability was unlikely, a 
commission’s role as an arbiter of moral judgement was brought to the fore. Inquiry reports 
also had an expressive function in affirming the rule of law. A strong legal focus does not 
fully insulate commissions from global politics, since international law is itself shaped by 
political forces and commissions are established by and report to political actors. Nonetheless, 
when commissions affirm the rule of law and raise expectations for corrective action, they 
condition that political context.  
Reflections on Roles and Functions of Contemporary Inquiry 
The turn to international law in most UN atrocity inquiries has fundamentally shaped their 
functional and relational identities in the international legal order. Commissions seeking to 
promote accountability for violations and the rule of law are associated with functions of 
truth-seeking, giving a voice to victims, condemning violations, raising alert, inducing 
compliance and provoking corrective follow-up action. Such commissions perform triage 
accountability assessments, bring situations to the attention of the international community 
and justify the engagement of international criminal justice. Such commissions represent a 
“sequential model” 2184  of international criminal justice, commencing with non-judicial 
evidence collection and followed by criminal trials. In practice, uneven implementation has 
engendered critiques that inquiries often serve as placeholders rather than as precursors for 
accountability.  
More pragmatically, commissions also act as ‘safety valves’, as originally proposed by 
Martens at the 1899 Peace Conference, to slow down and guide stakeholders’ responses in 
situations of concern. Additionally, the example of the Palmer Commission shows that an 
atrocity inquiry may function to deescalate tensions and resolve diplomatic ruptures rather 
than to condemn violations and trigger legal enforcement. The Palmer Commission acted as a 
neutral third party rather than a moral authority and emphasised diplomatic channels and 
policy considerations. The institution of inquiry thus remains flexible and may be established 
in pursuit of lofty legal principles as well as more pragmatic goals.  
Commissions’ interpretations and operationalisations of their mandates also reflect principled 
and pragmatic considerations, as informed by their roles and functions. Where the impartiality 
of an inquiry has been compromised by the mandating authority, commissions adopt a highly 
principled approach to mandate interpretation in an effort to insulate their work from the 
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politicised circumstances of their establishment. Yet in carrying out fact-finding, commissions 
facing non-cooperation by concerned states often find pragmatic workarounds to fact-finding 
challenges to prevent the frustration of their mandates. Commissions seeking to give a voice 
to victims and raise alert often adopt a victim-oriented perspective, enter more expansive 
findings with a lower degree of certainty, and adopt a more flexible legal approach. By 
contrast, commissions aiming to support prosecutions have taken a more cautious and 
technical approach to findings of fact and law. A more conservative approach may also 
neutralise accusations that commissions reproduce bias in their mandating authorities. 
Commissions’ engagement with international law places them firmly on the map of 
international legal discourse and arguably renders them participants in the argumentative 
practice of international law. Yet to analogise inquiry with adjudication would overlook 
central political dimensions to their work. The decision to establish an inquiry reflects a 
commitment to legal principle as well as institutional pragmatism. When using the language 
of international law, commissions make a case for principled action, but also display selective 
engagement with legal frameworks in light of practical realities. In addition, the informality of 
inquiry means that commissions are not restricted by judicial traditions of legal reasoning, nor 
are there binding consequences for implicated actors. Commissions are in this sense well-
placed to propose innovative interpretations of legal norms and to draw attention to violations 
that have not received much attention in judicial settings. In this sense, commissions have 
roles as norm entrepreneurs and as norm amplifiers.  
Back to the Future 
Looking to the future of UN atrocity inquiries, some current trends suggest that their roles and 
functions may circle back to the essential task of finding facts. As new communicative 
technologies gain in popularity, information concerning situations of atrocities is increasingly 
acquired and shared through informal networks and communities. Initiatives such as 
Bellingcat use information from open sources and social media networks to investigate a 
variety of subjects, including situations of atrocities.2185 International criminal proceedings 
have already evolved in response to the availability of digital and technologically derived 
evidence and the challenges of veracity posed by these information sources. 2186  Future 
commissions are also likely to have access to a huge amount of digital information and be 
confronted by issues of the chain of custody, authentication and reliability of open-source 
information, compounded by challenges of technical expertise and resources.2187 The risks 
faced by those collecting information, and the protection of safety and privacy of victims and 
witnesses who may be identified on the basis of that information, are further concerns.  
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The democratization of fact-finding also raises new questions regarding our understanding of 
facts and the truth-seeking function of UN atrocity inquiries. In addition to acting as a tool for 
mobilizing and empowering communities, ‘bottom-up’ fact-finding strategies can disrupt 
traditional hierarchies of knowledge production.2188 The recent attacks against ‘fake news’, 
which refers both to deliberate misinformation and a pretext for undermining genuine 
journalism, gives rise to new challenges for the credibility of public information. In this 
context, commissions’ function of producing authoritative narratives of events may become 
more pronounced. However, the associated phenomenon of ‘post-truth’2189 politics has seen a 
shift in the role of information in shaping public opinion and governmental policies. Impartial 
inquiry could counter such political strategies, but conversely this trend might weaken the 
extent of commissions’ influence, at least in certain political contexts beyond the UN.2190 
We may also see a shift in emphasis away from the role of inquiry in facilitating criminal 
accountability. In recent years the UN has established non-judicial investigative mechanisms 
to facilitate criminal proceedings, such as the IIIM in respect of Syria and the Security 
Council’s investigative team in Iraq.2191 In March 2018, several states called for a mechanism 
similar to the IIIM to be established in respect of Myanmar.2192 Though such entities remain 
rare, commentators identify a trend towards their establishment: the IIIM has been hailed as 
“the crystallization of a new approach to international criminal justice and an enhanced role of 
the General Assembly in the area of accountability”. 2193  As the establishment of such 
mechanisms marks a concrete commitment to criminal accountability and involves significant 
resources, commissions may be established to conduct reconnaissance, with their findings of 
crimes informing the decision to establish a formal investigative mechanism.  
While mandating authorities might prefer to establish a criminal investigative mechanism 
instead of an inquiry in certain situations, it is unlikely that commissions will be entirely 
displaced. Such mechanisms lack the flexibility, breadth and essential publicness of inquiry. 
Their chief aim is not to issue public findings but rather to feed into judicial processes. A 
large part of their work must remain confidential to facilitate investigations and protect the 
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integrity of the trial process. They are ill-equipped to inform policy, provide a contextual 
account of a situation of atrocities, raise alert or express condemnation of violations. As these 
functions remain important in the UN context, inquiry can complement the work of criminal 
investigative mechanisms. 
UN atrocity inquiries are not likely to be rendered obsolete by the emergence of new 
information technologies or investigative mechanisms. However, their roles and functions 
may evolve in response to the changing fact-finding landscape. In this context, the original 
function of finding facts may be revitalized and complement the narrow focus of criminal 
mechanisms. In turn, the equilibrium to be struck between principle and pragmatism may also 
shift. Should commissions focus less on analysing international crimes and more on 
constructing contextual narratives of events and indicating the range and extent of atrocities, 
they might take a more pragmatic approach to information-gathering and assessment without 
undermining their authority. If space is retained for diplomatic and policy-based responses, 
we might also see an expansion in the types of situations under scrutiny, such as interstate 
conflicts or uses of force. However, as findings of atrocities imply the need for corrective 
action whether expressly classified as violations or not, they will continue to draw the 
attention of actors in the international justice space. Ultimately, the flexibility of UN atrocity 
inquiries and their positioning between the realms of law and politics means that they will 
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A/HRC/4/80 
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UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict  HRC HRC Res. S-9/1 
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A/HRC/12/48 
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International Commission of Inquiry Mandated 
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S/2009/693 
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Investigate Violations of International Law 
Resulting from Israeli Attacks on the Flotilla 
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27 Sep 2010 
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UN Independent Commission of Inquiry on the 
2014 Gaza Conflict 
HRC HRC Res. S-21/1 
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The United Nations plays an important role in preventing and responding to situations of mass 
atrocities. The UN system provides for many strategies to address such situations, including 
fact-finding. Fact-finding may take different forms, including international commissions of 
inquiry. These bodies are established on the international legal plane, conduct ad hoc fact-
finding, are impartial and independent, and issue non-binding reports and recommendations. 
The UN has established at least thirty atrocity-related inquiries, which are frequently 
mandated to investigate suspected violations of international law, identify those responsible 
for violations, and make recommendations. Their reports inform their mandating authorities 
and can feed into broader processes of justice and accountability. UN atrocity inquiries 
resemble judicial processes in some respects, while remaining non-legal in others.  
The proliferation of UN atrocity inquiries during the past twenty-five years, in concert with 
their mandates to examine violations of international law, gives rise to new questions as to 
their identity in the international legal order. The thesis explores two elements of identity: 
functional and relational. Functional identity (functions) refers to the ends to be attained by 
UN atrocity inquiries, while relational identity (roles) refers to commissions’ place vis-à-vis 
other institutions. These concepts illuminate the unique institutional space in which 
commissions are situated. In determining the roles and functions, and thus the identity of UN 
atrocity inquiries, the thesis interrogates their turn to international law (juridification) and 
their navigation of considerations of principle (the legal) and pragmatism (the political).  
To set the scene, Chapter One contextualises UN practice through a historical and institutional 
taxonomy of international inquiries into situations of atrocities. The earliest inquiries were 
established pursuant to ad hoc interstate agreements. States established international 
humanitarian law (IHL) inquiry procedures but did not use them much in practice. Regional 
organisations have established a few inquiries. By contrast, the UN has a rich practice of 
establishing atrocity inquiries, particularly from 1992 onwards, where the Yugoslavia 
Commission represented a ‘watershed moment’. This period also marked greater recognition 
of the links between the realms of development, security and human rights, and the 
revitalisation of international criminal law. The features of these different inquiries were 
inexorably shaped by wider institutional and political dynamics.  
The roles and functions of UN atrocity inquiries are informed by the institutional dynamics 
and choices of their mandating authorities, namely the Security Council, Secretary-General, 
General Assembly, and Human Rights Council. Chapter Two explores how UN mandating 
authorities act as ‘architects’ by sketching out the aesthetics and conceptual plan of inquiries 
through their mandates. The varied powers and purposes of mandating authorities produce 
differences in state consent and cooperation. The HRC is currently the most prolific 
mandating authority and also the most politically polarizing. Mandates giving rise to 
apprehensions of bias set commissions at a disadvantage, as they are perceived as politicised 
instruments of their mandating authorities. The juridification of inquiry is linked to mandates 
requesting commissions to establish the facts of atrocities on the basis of international law. 
Juridified inquiry is further emphasized by appointing international legal experts as 
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commissioners. Mandating authorities also shape operational aspects of inquiry such as 
resourcing and time limits. Mandating authorities’ practices give rise to several tensions. They 
express concern about situations while retaining discretion, so that commissions build 
pressure against those violating international law while releasing pressure directed at 
mandating authorities to act. There is also some disparity in bestowing an accountability 
function upon bodies whose powers and operational capacities prevent them from carrying out 
corrective follow-up action.  
If mandating authorities are the architects of inquiries, commissions are the ‘engineers’, 
executing the mandating authority’s plan with an eye to practicality. Chapter Three describes 
how commissions’ roles and functions inform the interpretation and implementation of their 
mandates. Commissions generally interpret their mandates in an effort to reinforce 
impartiality and ensure that mandates are of appropriate scope. Commissions’ design of their 
working methods reflects a desire to carry out impartial and credible investigations in light of 
constraints posed by time, resources, and security concerns. Information gathering and 
assessment practices are also guided by key principles such as the centrality of victims and 
accountability. Where states refuse to cooperate, commissions find innovative ways to gather 
information to avoid frustrating their mandates. Such pragmatic approaches can lead to trade-
offs with respect to the authoritativeness of findings. 
Commissions are often instructed to examine violations of international law, which involves 
norm-to-fact application. A first step in this process is the identification of the applicable 
international legal framework. Chapter Four discusses how commissions’ roles and functions 
shape the identification of the applicable law and the substantive applicability of legal fields 
to the situation and actors under examination. Where accountability is at the heart of the 
mandate, there is a strong emphasis on assessing atrocities on the basis of international law. 
Where the aim is to de-escalate tensions, legal assessment is less crucial. Within the former 
approach, commissions interpret the legal lenses of their mandates broadly to include other 
fields deemed relevant. They draw links between fields, giving the impression of a mutually 
reinforcing normative framework. Commissions’ interpretations of the substantive 
applicability of legal fields reflect their roles and functions and principles such as even-
handedness in investigations. 
Chapter Five discusses how commissions’ engagement with substantive international law is 
shaped by their roles and functions. A thematic comparative analysis is conducted of 
commissions’ interpretations and applications of substantive legal issues, namely economic, 
social and cultural rights, IHL principles and the right to life, sexual and gender-based 
violence, genocide and crimes against humanity. Cross-cutting issues are then discussed. 
Commissions promote an expansive reach of human rights norms while seeking to remain 
within the bounds of accepted law. Their findings of violations reveal differing emphases on 
certainty or rhetorical impact, reflecting the idea that commissions straddle advocatory and 
adjudicative approaches. Whether commissions’ legal pronouncements can play a law-making 
role or are simply discourse about international law depends on one’s conception of 
international law more generally.  
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In light of the recurrent emphasis on ‘accountability’ for violations in inquiry mandates and 
reports, Chapter Six takes a closer look at commissions’ roles and functions with respect to 
this concept. While commissions examine responsibilities of different actors, there is an 
emphasis on states and individuals. They engage with international criminal law in a selective 
and strategic way, and recommend a range of corrective measures to give effect to the rights 
to truth, justice and remedies. Commissions also identify intermediate steps to promote 
implementation of their recommendations. Different roles with respect to legal, moral and 
political dimensions of accountability are visible. Commissions can act as catalysts for 
international judicial proceedings, and more rarely, as outsourced criminal investigations. 
Commissions may also act as arbiters of moral judgement and have an expressive function in 
affirming the rule of law. While a strong legal focus does not fully insulate commissions from 
global politics, they can condition that political context.  
In conclusion, UN atrocity inquiries continuously navigate between realms of law and 
politics, with the equilibrium shifting in different moments and contexts. The turn to 
international law has fundamentally shaped their identity in the international legal order. 
Commissions seeking to promote accountability and the rule of law are associated with 
functions of truth-seeking, giving a voice to victims, condemning violations, raising alert, 
inducing compliance and provoking corrective follow-up. In practice, uneven implementation 
has engendered critiques that inquiries are placeholders for action rather than force-multipliers 
for accountability. Commissions may also act as ‘safety valves’, deescalate tensions and 
resolve diplomatic ruptures. The informality of inquiry means that commissions are not 
restricted by judicial traditions, nor are there binding consequences for implicated actors. 
Commissions are well-placed to propose innovative legal interpretations and draw attention to 
violations that have not received much attention in judicial settings. The decision to establish 
an inquiry reflects a commitment to legal principle as well as institutional pragmatism.  
Looking to the future of UN atrocity inquiries, some current trends suggest that they may 
circle back to the essential task of finding facts. Emerging communicative technologies and 
the increasingly digital nature of information give rise to new issues around the authentication 
and veracity of information and the need for technical expertise. The democratization of fact-
finding and the rise of ‘post-truth’ politics raise further questions regarding our understanding 
of facts and the role of public information. We may also see a shift away from the role of 
inquiry to facilitate criminal accountability in light of the recent establishment of UN 
mechanisms specifically for this purpose. Inquiry can complement the work of such bodies by 
informing policy, providing a contextual account of a situation and condemning violations. In 
short, UN atrocity inquiries are not likely to be rendered obsolete. Their roles and functions 
may instead evolve in response to the changing fact-finding landscape, with the equilibrium 
between principle and pragmatism also shifting. The flexibility of UN atrocity inquiries, and 
their positioning between realms of law and politics, means that they will continue to occupy 




SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 
 
NAVIGEREN TUSSEN PRINCIPE EN PRAGMATISME: DE ROLLEN EN 
FUNCTIES BINNEN DE INTERNATIONALE RECHTSORDE VAN  
VN-ONDERZOEKSCOMMISSIES DIE ONDERZOEK DOEN NAAR 
WREEDHEDEN 
De Verenigde Naties (VN) spelen een belangrijke rol in het voorkomen van, en reageren op, 
situaties van massale wreedheden. Het VN-systeem voorziet in vele strategieën om dergelijke 
situaties aan te pakken, waaronder feitenonderzoek. Feitenonderzoek kan verschillende 
vormen aannemen, waaronder internationale onderzoekscommissies. Deze entiteiten opereren 
op internationaal juridisch vlak, doen op ad hoc basis feitenonderzoek, zijn onpartijdig en 
onafhankelijk, stellen niet-bindende rapporten op en doen niet-bindende aanbevelingen. De 
VN hebben ten minste dertig onderzoekscommissies ingesteld die onderzoek doen naar 
wreedheden en veelal de opdracht krijgen vermoedelijke schendingen van internationaal recht 
te onderzoeken, vast te stellen wie verantwoordelijk is of zijn voor de schendingen, en 
aanbevelingen te doen. Met de rapporten van deze commissies worden de mandaatgevers 
geïnformeerd en kunnen mede hierdoor rechtsbedeling en rekenschap in bredere zin hun 
beslag krijgen. VN-onderzoekscommissies naar wreedheden lijken in sommige opzichten op 
rechtsprocessen, maar blijven op andere punten juist niet-juridisch.  
De grote toename in de afgelopen vijfentwintig jaar van het aantal VN-onderzoekscommissies 
naar wreedheden, in combinatie met het mandaat om schendingen van internationaal recht te 
onderzoeken, roept nieuwe vragen op over de identiteit van dergelijke onderzoekscommissies 
binnen de internationale rechtsorde. In dit proefschrift worden twee identiteitselementen 
onderzocht: functioneel en relationeel. Functionele identiteit (functies) verwijst naar de te 
realiseren doelstellingen van VN-onderzoekscommissies naar wreedheden, terwijl relationele 
identiteit (rollen) ingaat op de positie van commissies ten opzichte van andere instellingen. 
Deze concepten werpen een licht op de unieke institutionele ruimte waarin 
onderzoekscommissies zich bevinden. Teneinde de rollen en functies vast te stellen van VN-
onderzoekscommissies naar wreedheden, en daarmee de identiteit daarvan, wordt in dit 
proefschrift uitgediept hoe deze aanhaken bij het internationale recht (verjuridisering) en 
daarbij wordt genavigeerd tussen principe (het juridische) en pragmatisme (het politieke).  
Ter inleiding wordt in het eerste hoofdstuk de VN-praktijk ingekaderd aan de hand van een 
historische en institutionele taxonomie van internationale onderzoekscommissies naar 
situaties van wreedheden. De allereerste onderzoekscommissies zijn in het leven geroepen 
naar aanleiding van interstatelijke ad hoc overeenkomsten. Staten stelden 
onderzoeksprocedures in op het gebied van internationaal humanitair recht (IHR), waar in de 
praktijk echter maar weinig gebruik van werd gemaakt. Wel hebben regionale organisaties 
enkele onderzoekscommissies opgezet. De VN daarentegen kunnen terugkijken op een rijke 
geschiedenis van onderzoek naar wreedheden, met name sinds de in 1992 opgerichte 
Joegoslavië-commissie, wat een belangrijk keerpunt was. In deze periode kwam er ook meer 
erkenning voor de onderlinge verhoudingen tussen ontwikkeling, veiligheid en 
mensenrechten, en werd het internationaal strafrecht nieuw leven ingeblazen. Dat de 
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kenmerken van deze verschillende onderzoekscommissies werden vormgegeven door de 
bredere institutionele en politieke dynamiek was onvermijdelijk.  
De rollen en functies van VN-onderzoekscommissies naar wreedheden zijn geënt op de 
institutionele dynamiek en de keuzes van de mandaatgevers, namelijk de Veiligheidsraad, de 
secretaris-generaal, de Algemene Vergadering en de Mensenrechtenraad. In het tweede 
hoofdstuk wordt gekeken naar de manier waarop mandaatgevers van de VN het door hen af te 
geven mandaat gebruiken om de esthetische kenmerken en het conceptuele plan van een 
onderzoek te schetsen, en daarmee in feite als ‘architect’ kunnen worden gezien. De diverse 
bevoegdheden en doelstellingen van mandaatgevers zorgen voor verschillen in toestemming 
en medewerking van staten. De actiefste en tevens de meest polariserende mandaatgever op 
dit moment is de Mensenrechtenraad. Door mandaten die aanleiding geven tot vermoedens 
van vooringenomenheid worden commissies op achterstand gezet: zij worden gezien als de 
gepolitiseerde werktuigen van de mandaatgevers. De verjuridisering van het onderzoek houdt 
verband met mandaten waarin een commissie wordt verzocht aan de hand van het 
internationale recht de feiten rond wreedheden in kaart te brengen. Deze verjuridisering wordt 
nog verder versterkt doordat deskundigen op het gebied van internationaal recht worden 
aangesteld als commissaris. Ook de operationele aspecten van het onderzoek, zoals de 
toewijzing van middelen en termijnen, worden door mandaatgevers vormgegeven. De 
handelswijze van mandaatgevers leiden tot verschillende spanningen. Mandaatgevers uiten 
hun bezorgdheid over situaties met de nodige discretie, waarbij commissies de druk opvoeren 
op schenders van internationaal recht en juist druk om actie te ondernemen wegnemen bij 
mandaatgevers. Dat entiteiten die vanwege hun bevoegdheden en operationele capaciteiten 
geen corrigerende vervolgstappen kunnen nemen, maar tegelijk wel worden geacht partijen ter 
verantwoording te roepen, zorgt eveneens voor enige frictie.  
Als mandaatgevers de architecten van het onderzoek zijn, dan zijn commissies de ‘ingenieurs’ 
die bekijken of het plan van de mandaatgever haalbaar is en daar vervolgens uitvoering aan 
geven. In het derde hoofdstuk wordt beschreven op welke wijze de rollen en functies van 
onderzoekscommissies van invloed zijn op de uitleg en uitvoering van hun mandaat. 
Commissies geven over het algemeen zodanig invulling aan hun mandaat om hun 
onpartijdigheid te versterken en een passende omvang van het mandaat te waarborgen. De 
manier waarop commissies te werk gaan, getuigt van een verlangen om onpartijdig en 
geloofwaardig onderzoek te verrichten binnen de opgelegde beperkingen van tijd, middelen 
en veiligheidsoverwegingen. Informatieverzameling en beoordelingspraktijken worden tevens 
beïnvloed door belangrijke uitgangspunten als het centraal stellen van slachtoffers en 
aansprakelijkheid. Wanneer staten hun medewerking weigeren, vinden commissies 
innovatieve oplossingen om informatie te verzamelen en zo het mandaat alsnog zeker te 
stellen. Een dergelijke pragmatische benadering kan leiden tot concessies ten aanzien van het 
gezag van de bevindingen. 
Commissies krijgen vaak de opdracht schendingen van het internationaal recht te 
onderzoeken, waarbij onder meer normen worden toegepast op de feiten. Een eerste stap in dit 
proces is vaststellen welk internationaal rechtskader van toepassing is. In het vierde hoofdstuk 
wordt ingegaan op de wijze waarop met de rollen en functies van onderzoekscommissies 
gestalte wordt gegeven aan de vaststelling van het toepasselijke recht en de inhoudelijke 
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toepasbaarheid van rechtsgebieden op de te onderzoeken situatie en betrokkenen. Wanneer 
aansprakelijkheid de kern van het mandaat vormt, wordt sterk de nadruk gelegd op 
internationaal recht als grondslag voor de beoordeling van wreedheden. Een juridische 
beoordeling is minder cruciaal wanneer de-escalatie van de spanningen het doel is. Bij de 
eerstgenoemde benadering geeft de commissie een brede uitleg aan de juridische lens van het 
mandaat en worden andere relevant geachte rechtsgebieden ook in ogenschouw genomen. Er 
worden daarbij verbanden gelegd tussen rechtsgebieden, waarmee de indruk wordt gewekt 
van een wederzijds versterkend normenkader. De uitleg van commissies van de inhoudelijke 
toepasbaarheid van rechtsgebieden geeft blijk van de rollen en functies en van uitgangspunten 
als onpartijdigheid in het onderzoek. 
In het vijfde hoofdstuk wordt uiteengezet hoe de rollen en functies van onderzoekscommissies 
van invloed zijn op de manier waarop commissies zich wenden tot materieel internationaal 
recht. Er wordt een thematische vergelijkende analyse uitgevoerd van de inhoud en toepassing 
door commissies van zaken van materieel recht, namelijk economische, sociale en culturele 
rechten, IHR-beginselen en het recht op leven, seksueel en gender-gerelateerd geweld, 
genocide en misdaden tegen de menselijkheid. Vervolgens wordt er ingegaan op transversale 
thema’s. Commissies pleiten voor een brede uitwerking van mensenrechtennormen, maar 
proberen daarbij ook binnen de grenzen van aanvaard recht te blijven. In hun bevindingen 
over schendingen wordt in meer of mindere mate de nadruk gelegd op zekerheid dan wel 
retorisch effect, wat het idee onderstreept dat commissies schipperen tussen een benadering 
als pleitbezorger en als rechtspreker. Of de juridische uitspraken van commissies een 
wetgevende rol kunnen spelen of slechts een verhandeling over internationaal recht betreffen, 
hangt af van ieders kijk op internationaal recht in het algemeen.  
In het licht van de steeds terugkerende nadruk in onderzoeksmandaten en -rapporten op 
‘aansprakelijkheid’ voor schendingen wordt in het zesde hoofdstuk dieper ingegaan op de 
rollen en functies van commissies ten aanzien van dit concept. Commissies onderzoeken 
weliswaar de verantwoordelijkheden van verschillende betrokkenen, maar de nadruk ligt op 
staten en personen. Zij wenden zich op selectieve en strategische wijze tot het internationaal 
strafrecht en geven aanbevelingen voor verschillende corrigerende maatregelen om gevolg te 
geven aan het recht op de waarheid, het recht op rechtspraak en het recht op rechtsmiddelen. 
Commissies stellen ook tussenmaatregelen vast om de implementatie van hun aanbevelingen 
te bevorderen. Er zijn verschillende rollen zichtbaar met betrekking tot de juridische, morele 
en politieke kaders van aansprakelijkheid. Commissieonderzoek kan als aanjager dienen van 
internationale gerechtelijke procedures, en in een enkel geval als uitbesteed strafrechtelijk 
onderzoek. Ook kunnen commissies de toon zetten in de morele oordeelsvorming en een 
expressieve functie vervullen in de bekrachtiging van de rechtsstaat. Hoewel commissies zich 
met een sterke juridische focus niet geheel kunnen afschermen van de mondiale politiek, 
kunnen zij die politieke context wel enigszins kneden.  
In VN-onderzoekscommissies naar wreedheden wordt ten slotte continu genavigeerd tussen 
het juridische en het politieke spectrum, waarbij het evenwicht verschuift al naargelang het 
moment en de context. De toevlucht tot het internationaal recht is van wezenlijk belang 
geweest in de vorming van de identiteit van dergelijke onderzoekscommissies binnen de 
internationale rechtsorde. Commissies die rekenschap en de rechtsstaat willen bevorderen, 
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worden geassocieerd met functies van waarheidsvinding: zij geven slachtoffers een stem, 
veroordelen schendingen, slaan alarm, roepen op tot naleving en zetten aan tot corrigerende 
vervolgmaatregelen. In de praktijk heeft een onevenwichtige implementatie echter de 
voedingsbodem gevormd voor de kritiek dat onderzoek in de plaats is gekomen van actief 
optreden en niet wordt gezien als een krachtig middel waarmee partijen ter verantwoording 
worden geroepen. Commissies kunnen ook als ‘veiligheidsklep’ dienen, spanningen de-
escaleren en diplomatieke breuken herstellen. Door de informele aard van het onderzoek zijn 
commissies niet aan gerechtelijke tradities gebonden en zijn er geen bindende gevolgen voor 
verantwoordelijken. Commissies zijn goed gepositioneerd om vernieuwende juridische 
interpretaties voor te stellen en de aandacht te vestigen op schendingen die in de juridische 
wereld niet veel aandacht hebben gekregen. Het besluit om een onderzoek in te stellen getuigt 
van loyaliteit aan zowel de beginselen van het recht als aan institutioneel pragmatisme.  
Als we kijken naar de toekomst van VN-onderzoek naar wreedheden, dan lijken de huidige 
ontwikkelingen erop te wijzen dat wordt teruggekeerd naar de wezenlijke taak van 
feitenonderzoek. Opkomende communicatietechnologieën en de toenemende digitalisering 
van informatie leiden tot nieuwe problemen omtrent de authenticiteit en juistheid van 
informatie en de behoefte aan technische expertise. De democratisering van het vergaren van 
feiten en de opkomst van ‘post-truth politics’ roepen nadere vragen op over ons begrip van de 
feiten en de rol van algemeen beschikbare informatie. Mogelijk wordt ook de onderzoeksrol 
om strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid te faciliteren in enige mate losgelaten, gezien de recente 
invoering van VN-mechanismen voor dit specifieke doel. Onderzoek kan een aanvulling 
vormen op het werk van dergelijke entiteiten, doordat beleidsmakers worden geïnformeerd, 
een beeld wordt gegeven van de context van een situatie en schendingen worden veroordeeld. 
Kortom: VN-onderzoek naar wreedheden zal naar verwachting niet overbodig worden. De 
rollen en functies zullen mogelijk juist meebewegen met de veranderende wereld van 
feitenonderzoek, waarbij ook het evenwicht tussen principe en pragmatisme zal verschuiven. 
Gezien de flexibiliteit van VN-onderzoekscommissies naar wreedheden en de positionering 
daarvan tussen het juridische en het politieke spectrum zal het een grenspositie blijven 
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